Text 3968, 356 rader
Skriven 2006-07-16 10:01:00 av Robert E Starr JR (4441.babylon5)
Ärende: Re: Atheists: America's m
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"Josh Hill" <usereplyto@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:hpjgb2t0q37gmofuis9ffk9vgergdua653@4ax.com...
> On Fri, 14 Jul 2006 20:11:50 -0500, "Carl" <cengman7@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>Not exactly apples to apples; one was a philopsohy, the other was
>>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>>>level of "science" at the time.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Seems to me that both philosophy and science have advanced since
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> time (and that much of what was once considered the province of
>>>>>>> philosophy is now the province of science -- "natural philosophy" --
>>>>>>> instead). And I don't think you'd find support for the concept of
>>>>>>> inherent rights among contemporary thinkers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>I consider philosophy the search for "Why?" rather than "How?" and I'm
>>>>>>not
>>>>>>certain it's advanced.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not sure I understand the distinction here. I want to know "why"
>>>>> the sky is blue and things fall down rather than up. And science does
>>>>> that. I want to know why we exist, and to an extent I would never have
>>>>> believed possible science does that as well, explaining as it does why
>>>>> something can come from nothing, indeed /has/ to come from nothing;
>>>>> which leads me to believe that the distinction between something and
>>>>> nothing, between existence and nonexistence, is a local rather than a
>>>>> global one, important in the minds of men but not of angels or of God.
>>>>
>>>>"Why" a sky is blue is more accurately rephrased "How does the sky
>>>>appear
>>>>blue?"
>>>>
>>>>The "Why?" questions imply meaning, How implies technique, ability,or
>>>>knowledge. "Why are we here?" "Why is it wrong to kill?" "Why is it
>>>>wrong
>>>>to treat <pick your favorite oppressed class> like crap? Why can't I do
>>>>whatever I want to do? Why do I feel guilt for some actions?
>>>
>>> I don't think I would make that distinction. To me, the question "Why
>>> are we here?" is no different than the question "Why is the sky blue?"
>>> It's not that I don't see your point or the distinction you're making,
>>> but rather that I discarded what I regard as the illusion of purpose
>>> many years ago.
>>
>>There's two ideas of purpose. You may or may not hold a concept of
>>a greater purpose above your own, and then there's the ideas that you
>>might decide your life has a goal or purpose.
>>
>>If the latter is illusion, then you're fooling yourself? :)
>
> Seems to me that a goal and a purpose are two different things, in
> that you can have the first without having the second (or, I suppose,
> the second without having the first). Then too, "greater purpose" can
> be local or it can be global. My greater purpose, forex, might be as a
> carrier of DNA, or it might be as a thermodynamically-driven chemical
> reaction that creates order from chaos or chaos from order, depending
> on whether you look at it from the future or the past. Or it may be
> something devised by a deity, albeit such explanations tend to be weak
> on what purpose the deity serves herself -- more a putting off than a
> solving.
>
>>> It seems to me sort of a pathetic fallacy thing -- an
>>> attempt to endow nature with human motivations. Even in the case of
>>> good and evil, I'm inclined to take the Jeremiahesque view (remember
>>> the lecture about fractals?).
>>
>>Actually, I have to admit I missed it. :(
>>
>>> And, you know, some people get upset at the prospect of being without
>>> purpose or meaning, but I haven't found that it makes any difference:
>>> there's still good and bad, there are still things to be done, whether
>>> I view myself as a child of God or a dance of energy-absorbing
>>> molecules.
>>
>>I never said that purpose or meaning has to be external. An athiest
>>(back to the original topic!) might still consider themselves as having
>>a purpose...as defined by themself.
>
> But I think that's substantially different than a purpose that arises
> from the nature of things.
It's easy to argue that whatever you do *is* natural.
>
>>>>Science is the Latin word for knowledge. Knowledge isn't philosphy,
>>>>although unless you're an idealogue it will certainly play a major part.
>>>>Unless you're brainwashed, people have each have an individual
>>>>philosophy.
>>>>Science isn't that subjective.
>>>
>>> I think there's a substantial difference between the term "a
>>> philosophy" and "philosophy." True philosophy seeks -- at least, did
>>> before the post-modernists -- objectivity. It seeks to answer natural
>>> and moral questions in a logically rigorous way. By way of contrast,
>>> an individual philosophy implies the subjectivism of imperfect and
>>> incomplete knowledge.
>>
>>A person may strive to have a completely objective view of their own life
>>and the context in which it is lived. Consider the song by Kansas...
>>"Dust in the wind" may be considered a rather objective perspective
>>towards
>>a particular philosophy. The fact that an individual subscribes to such a
>>philosophy does not negate its objectivity or diminish its validity as
>>philosophy.
>>
>>I see no reason to suggest that "True philosphy" is not subjective through
>>imperfect and incomplete knowledge.
>
> Neither do I, but I think it's nevertheless distinguishable from a
> personal philosophy, because it seeks to uncover truth.
I think anyone honestly asking the "Why" questions can't develop an answer
that is limited to themself; it must also include everyone and so I think
there isn't any real distinction. Even with the "Dust in the Wind" ...which
as I recall is Paul's belief... I doubt that Paul would argue that his
philosphy is that only *he* will be dust and everyone else may have a
different fate after death. I don't see how you can separate the two as
distinctly as you seem to want to.
>
> Personal philosophy: I don't pick fights with strangers.
Nope, that's a statement of fact, not a philosphy since the original
assertion was that Philosphy asks "Why?"
This is more of a statement of fact.
>
> Erroneous objective philosophy: If I pick fights with strangers, I get
> creamed.
>
> Correct objective philosophy: If I pick fights with strangers, it's
> likely that I'll be creamed.
In my mind, none of these questions are actually philosophical questions.
"Why shouldn't I pick fights (whether I win or lose)?" would be a good
philosophical question.
Declaring oneself a conscientious objector to a war is a personal
philosophical statement. If a person objects to a particular war (Iraq) but
accpets the reasons for another (WW II) then it is a personal philosphy, but
in coming to that conclusion, a person should honestly be considering the
larger philosophical concepts ... pacifism as a philosophy of exceptionless
non-violence towards others, for instance. Again, the personal and "larger"
philosphies are not distinct. I think that they are actually unavoidably
linked.
>>Trying to define morals strictly within the bounds of logic is a little
>>like
>>trying to describe sex to a child using pictures in a book.
>
> To be sure, but are subjective impressions part of philosophy, or
> something that's examined by philosophy?
If there is no God, then there is no higher philosophy; all of the "Whys"
become personal and as such they are all subjective because there are no
absolutes to the question of "Why?"
>
>>>>Science can't answer why you should be nice to the person you meet on
>>>>the
>>>>street that you're unlikely to ever see again.
>>>
>>> Two questions: Should you?
>>
>>That's a moral question and relates to the definition of philosphy as "A
>>system of values by which one lives." It's certainly possible to
>>construct
>>a scenerio in which one's actions may be logical but not moral, or
>>illogical
>>and moral.
>
> I don't think I recognize that definition. Philosophy is a lot broader
> than that. Ethics or moral philosophy might be closer.
It's one definition (check Dictionary.com). :)
>
> Agree with the second point.
>
>>> And can't it?
>>
>>You can certainly use science to provide evidence of consequences... but
>>morality judges whether those consequences are good or bad ones.
>
> Why can't science examine what makes those consequences good or bad?
Because I don't think science can't define what's "good" and "bad," which
gets back to my original
comment that science can't answer the philosphical question "Why?"
> It seems to me that both psychology and neuroscience have done that,
> as more recently has evolutionary biology and even mathematics.
Neither biology or mathematics address the question.
If I kill someone...how does mathematics define that act as good or bad?
Eventually you get to a point that somewhere in the "equation" you have some
kind of subjective element in order to determine that the outcome is good or
bad... in which case you might as well chuck the math.
>>> The first seems to me
>>> uncertain from a philosophical perspective: you take it for granted
>>> that you should, and philosophers can provide a fairly elegant
>>> framework for the criteria you would use, but I don't think that
>>> modern philosophers, or most philosophers after Nietzsche, would take
>>> it for granted that you should.
>>
>>>
>>>>From a scientific perspective, the problem would in large measure boil
>>> down to the role of cooperation in evolution.
>>
>>Only on a large scale. Just to clarify, your position is that science is
>>only capable of answering moral questions on an evolutionary level?
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by moral questions. As you point out below,
> science doesn't attempt to assign moral values. It can tell us where
> our moral values come from, examine the process whereby we form them.
Sure, but science can't evaluate (or mathematically express) the morals
themselves.
> It can even recognize that some acts are moral and some amoral within
> a given context and aid in the refinement of moral strictures and
> judgment, by for example refining the primitive incest taboos into
> modern ones based on a knowledge of genetics.
I don't think so. Even the simple act of defining a moral constant in an
equation (moral = 1, amoral = 0; immoral = -1) implies that you can also
define the constant to any act or philosphical question... and that is
completely subjective.
> But by the same token,
> science recognizes that moral systems are at least to some extent
> contingent, personal, and arbitrary. It can suggest changes only
> within the context of externally-supplied parameters.
Exactly! I think you just came around to my way of thinking on this issue!
My original assertion was that science could not answer a certain
question... Why... which is the domain of philosophy. Philosphy deals with
moral questions. Good and bad are defined in the context of philosphy.
>>If a species (including the homo sapiens) dies out...for any reason... is
>>that moral or immoral from a scientific perspective? Nope. It's simply a
>>fact. Science doesn't assign moral values...it simply provides a
>>rationalization for moral values.
>
> Probably true, although I would argue that modern philosophy does the
> same.
>
>>>> Science can't measure
>>>>whether I look at my life as being a good or wasted life.
>>>
>>> Again, can't it? At the very least, it could ask (and I'm sure
>>> psychologists have).
>>
>>What measurement would science possibly use to quantify how I measure my
>>life?
>>Anyone can ask...that doesn't make it science.
>
> But asking questions can be a part of science. Psychologists, for
> example, ask them all the time, and I'm sure they've asked questions
> about the very phenomenon you describe.
Of course asking questions is part of science...but they're different
questions. A scientist doesn't start out to prove something is moral; he or
she proves something that can be proved.
Likewise, a philospher that tries to provide a proof for their philosphy is
equally guilty of fooling themselves... much like St. Anselm and Euler did.
Granted, Anselm did better at fooling others...he was canonized for his
silly piece of sophistry.
>
>>>> It doesn't matter
>>>>how much scientific knowledge is accumulated, it won't be able to
>>>>address
>>>>those questions. If it can't be expressed in numbers, it's not science.
>>>
>>> I would argue that philosophy can be expressed in numbers, that
>>> anything can be expressed in numbers.
>>
>>How much... in numbers...do I love my wife & kids?
>>How much ... in numbers ... do I value the sound of my son laughing?
>>How much...in numbers... does it matter to me that my kids are growing up
>>to
>>be good people that think for themselves?
>>How would you measure the things that I've done that I'm proud of and the
>>things that I've done that I'm not proud of and quantify them?
>>What scale can you apply to this that has any meaning to me?
>
> Again, I think psychologists have devised many scales. They tend to be
> self-centering and normalizing, e.g., "Rate on a scale of 1 to 10 how
> much you love your wife and kids, with 1 being not at all and 10 being
> extremely."
Nope...that doesn't cut it as science. There's no measure. If I said 9, 9
what? Compared to what? What possible relative measure could there be.
If I asked how far away the moon is and someone said "2.3", what would that
mean? If yiou already knew the distance you determine the measure, but
that's cheating.
> And then you could ask the same thing about the other questions using
> the same scale, and compare them to get an idea of the relative
> importance of these things to you. It's crude, but it works.
But the results would only apply to that one person (and so are completely
subjective).
>
>>>As a physicist, forget which
>>> one, once observed, mathematics is formalized thought. It's probably
>>> not an overstatement to say that the universe is made up of numbers.
>>
>>The physical universe can be measured in numbers.
>>The consequences of some events can be measured in numbers.
>>Many things can't be.
>
> I believe that insofar as some things can't be measured at all. But
> that doesn't include how much you love your wife and kids. Some day,
> we will be able to point to the individual neurons and the strength of
> the synaptic connections. Even now, we can detect metabolic activity
> in areas of the brain that are triggered by love, as well as hormone
> levels. And before that, we could ask questions of the sort I
> mentioned above. And ultimately, it all comes down to physics and
> math.
But what you measure isn't reflective of the emotion. For instance, if you
isolated and measured my neural activity when my son had to undergo surgery
and then again when I come home from work and find out that he and his
sister were fighting you might get the impression that I love my son more
when he has surgery when in fact I'm just more acutely aware of my feelings
for him when his welfare is threatened. Likewise, I was not truly aware of
how much I cared about my first girlfriend until she died...but if you asked
me I would have told you that I was completely in love with her. Whatever
you measure...no matter how you try...isn't going to be accurate.
Carl
Given a choice between two theories, take the one which is funnier.
Blore's Razor
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