Text 4014, 597 rader
Skriven 2006-07-16 19:33:00 av Robert E Starr JR (4487.babylon5)
Ärende: Re: Atheists: America's m
=================================
* * * This message was from Josh Hill to rec.arts.sf.tv.babylon5.m * * *
         * * * and has been forwarded to you by Lord Time * * *         
            -----------------------------------------------             

@MSGID: <bgrkb21jtkjpeo67bt5h4fld7eii8u1g33@4ax.com>
@REPLY: <fvhva21hrtqgbmb0u6fir0qno5hjik9a3n@4ax.com>
On Sun, 16 Jul 2006 11:13:02 -0500, "Carl" <cengman7@hotmail.com>
wrote:

>
>"Josh Hill" <usereplyto@gmail.com> wrote in message
>news:ogejb25mnq66gdc38oftc09spvgirncjbr@4ax.com...
>> On Sat, 15 Jul 2006 15:00:30 -0500, "Carl" <cengman7@hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>"Josh Hill" <usereplyto@gmail.com> wrote in message
>>>news:hpjgb2t0q37gmofuis9ffk9vgergdua653@4ax.com...
>>
>>>>>> And, you know, some people get upset at the prospect of being without
>>>>>> purpose or meaning, but I haven't found that it makes any difference:
>>>>>> there's still good and bad, there are still things to be done, whether
>>>>>> I view myself as a child of God or a dance of energy-absorbing
>>>>>> molecules.
>>>>>
>>>>>I never said that purpose or meaning has to be external.  An athiest
>>>>>(back to the original topic!) might still consider themselves as having
>>>>>a purpose...as defined by themself.
>>>>
>>>> But I think that's substantially different than a purpose that arises
>>>> from the nature of things.
>>>
>>>It's easy to argue that whatever you do *is* natural.
>>
>> True, but then everything is natural in that sense. In practice, I
>> don't think anyone would define computers or Silly Putty as "natural"
>
>One could argue that the process of humans making tools is natural.
>Beavers make dams, people make dams.  We just do it ona bigger scale.
>Dolpins "play"...so do people, we invent things like Silly Putty as a tool
>to
>help us play.

Again, in that sense, everything becomes natural, and the word loses
utility.

><snipping just because this is getting long>
>
>>
>>>> Personal philosophy: I don't pick fights with strangers.
>>>
>>>Nope, that's a statement of fact, not a philosphy since the original
>>>assertion was that Philosphy asks "Why?"
>>>This is more of a statement of fact.
>>
>>>> Erroneous objective philosophy: If I pick fights with strangers, I get
>>>> creamed.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Correct objective philosophy: If I pick fights with strangers, it's
>>>> likely that I'll be creamed.
>>>
>>>In my mind, none of these questions are actually philosophical questions.
>>>"Why shouldn't I pick fights (whether I win or lose)?" would be a good
>>>philosophical question.
>>>
>>>Declaring oneself a conscientious objector to a war is a personal
>>>philosophical statement.
>>
>> I think you're sort of hoisted by your own petard here, because that's
>> a statement of fact -- I object morally to war -- rather than a
>> question of why. Indeed, it's very much akin to my "I don't pick
>> fights with strangers," which I intended as a statement of principle.
>
>
>Not quite; it says "I will not serve in the war.  Why? Because it
>goes against my moral code (personal philosphy), and therefore
>my conscience."

No different than my "I don't pick fights with strangers."

>>> If a person objects to a particular war (Iraq) but
>>>accpets the reasons for another (WW II) then it is a personal philosphy,
>>>but
>>>in coming to that conclusion, a person should honestly be considering the
>>>larger philosophical concepts ... pacifism as a philosophy of
>>>exceptionless
>>>non-violence towards others, for instance.  Again, the personal and
>>>"larger"
>>>philosphies are not distinct.  I think that they are actually unavoidably
>>>linked.
>>
>> But linkage isn't identity. If it were, one could argue that the
>> subjective is objective -- I certainly would, since I consider thought
>> a natural phenomenon -- and that there is therefore no distinction
>> between the two.
>
>I never argued that personal = higher philosphy, only that they aren't 
>completely separate and that personal philosphy can be just as earnest
>an attempt to come to the "Truth" as higher philosphy.
>
>> So while I agree that our personal philosophies embody objective
>> elements, or at least claim to, it seems to me that in the practical
>> sense of the word they embody subjective elements as well, in that
>> they represent the state of our own thought and, not infrequently,
>> beliefs and emotional tendencies that are not arrived at through a
>> rational philosophical process, or that subvert that process.
>
>All philosphy has subjective elements.
>
>
>>>>>Trying to define morals strictly within the bounds of logic is a little
>>>>>like
>>>>>trying to describe sex to a child using pictures in a book.
>>>>
>>>> To be sure, but are subjective impressions part of philosophy, or
>>>> something that's examined by philosophy?
>>>
>>>If there is no God, then there is no higher philosophy; all of the "Whys"
>>>become personal and as such they are all subjective because there are no
>>>absolutes to the question of "Why?"
>>
>> I'll have to disagree vociferously on that one! God doesn't answer
>> "why" -- she merely postpones it. Because if the reason we do things
>> and things are the way they are is God, why God?
>
>God answers the Why ("Because God wishes it") an d in doing so provides a 
>moral absolute.

That's not a why, because, as I said, it doesn't explain /why/ God
wishes it. It's no different than saying the King wishes it. Why does
the King wish it? Has he been studying philosophy? Did the Queen nag
him?

>Without that, "Good" and "Evil" must be subjective.  For the 
>sake of this paragraph, let's assume there is a God.  In that case, a 
>personal or group interpretation of what God wishes may be wrong, but there 
>is still an absolute True (or "Good") by which to measure it against. 
>Granted, actually knowing whether yourinterpretation of moral andimmoral is 
>accurate is unknowable until after death, but so what?  As with most things 
>in life, you pay your dues and you give it your best shot.

I don't see why God is necessary to this scenario. It's easy enough to
posit an objective good and evil without recourse to a deity, and many
philosophers and even some religions have done so. Kant's categorical
imperative, for example.

>> I'm reminded of the story of the old lady and the philosopher.
>>
>> "The world is held up by a giant turtle!", the old lady said.
>>
>> The philosopher gave her a patronizing smile. "If the world is held up
>> by a giant turtle, what holds up the giant turtle?"
>>
>> "You can't fool /me,/" said the old lady. "It's turtles all the way
>> down!"
>>
>> That being said, it seems to me that "why" can as easily be "why not"?
>
>"Why not?" Is the same question.  The answer can be stated as a negative 
>too.

But I'm not changing both sides of the equation. I'm suggesting that
from the perspective of the universe, there is no difference between
why and why not. Purposiveness and lack of it are the same, or rather
purposiveness is a local system within lack of purposiveness. For
example, a random quantum fluctuation in empty space might give rise
to a universe like ours, and within that universe, entropy would
increase/decrease and beings would evolve and go about their moral
business. And at the same time, all the other quantum possibilities
would occur, and various things would happen in them, and they'd all
be part of the same thing. Certainly if one looks at physics, one
begins to suspect that everything comes to zip: the uncertainty
principle, the fundamental importance of symmetry, the fact that group
theory seems to encompass all known physical laws.

>> That seems to be the universe's attitude, insofar as it can be said to
>> have one: all possible mathematical outcomes occur simultaneously.
>
>Without a God or underlying intelligence taht one can call God, attributing 
>an attitude is simply anthropomorphism.  Without an underling intelligence, 
>there is no absolute good or moral and everything is personally subjective. 
>The universe doesn't "care" if there's life or not.  IKf it's there, fine. 
>If not, so?

But I don't think anyone can deny that the universe is intelligent.
After all, we're part of it by definition, and we're intelligent,
again by definition.

For that matter, the same logic can be applied to morality: if
morality were not part of the universe, we wouldn't be, since we're
part of it as well.

This isn't the same as saying that morality is subjective, and it
isn't the same as saying that the university has a purpose.

>>>>>You can certainly use science to provide evidence of consequences... but
>>>>>morality judges whether those consequences are good or bad ones.
>>>>
>>>> Why can't science examine what makes those consequences good or bad?
>>>
>>>Because I don't think science can't define what's "good" and "bad," which
>>>gets back to my original
>>>comment that science can't answer the philosphical question "Why?"
>>
>> Are you so sure that it can't define good and bad? Perhaps what you
>> mean to say is that it can't divide things into both because they're
>> to some extent contingent? There's a famous short story, forget its
>> name and will no doubt get some of the details wrong, in which people
>> in an isolated interstellar colony practice cannibalism. And at the
>> end of the story you learn that the cannibalism is /morally right,/
>> that it's considered an honor to be eaten because given the limited
>> resources of the planet, the people in that colony couldn't have
>> survived without it.
>
>For the sake of this paragraph, let's assume there is no God.  You can't 
>determine (other than at a personal level) that cannabilsm in ANY context is 
>morally right or wrong without resorting to majority rules.   There is no 
>absolute good or bad to judge against....so it's all subjective.

Not necessarily. I can simply note that good and bad are phenomena,
and describe them with regard to the local systems that they serve.
That's not subjective any more than any testable theory is: it's a
model that's tested against objective phenomena.

>>>> It seems to me that both psychology and neuroscience have done that,
>>>> as more recently has evolutionary biology and even mathematics.
>>>
>>>Neither biology or mathematics address the question.
>>>
>>>If I kill someone...how does mathematics define that act as good or bad?
>>>Eventually you get to a point that somewhere in the "equation" you have
>>>some
>>>kind of subjective element in order to determine that the outcome is good
>>>or
>>>bad... in which case you might as well chuck the math.
>>
>> Not necessarily. Because we can benefit from a well-developed moral
>> calculus, from understanding why we do things and what we should do to
>> achieve a moral goal.
>
>Understanding why we do things does nothing to establish whether what we do 
>is good or bad or whether the goal is moral; it just helps us to determjine 
>whether the person is well intentioned.  There's a big difference.

I don't think I agree. Components of my morality are based on an
understanding of why we do things. For example, I consider the incest
taboo moral because I understand something of the purpose it serves
and given the current state of our knowledge it seems the best way to
achieve that purpose.

>< And at some point in our understanding, we know
>> enough to take a rigorous, mathematical approach to these questions,
>> to make it hard science.
>
>Unless you can come up with a rigorous, mathematical, scientific definition 
>of moral (which I don't believe that you can), the rest of the equation is 
>simply increasingly precise scalars of the things that youcasn quantify... 
>until you get the variable z=whatever subjective moral value you've 
>rationalized.

I don't follow that last step. It seems to me true only some of the
time. Sometimes it's the other way around -- the things we quantify
influence and change our subjective moral values.

>> We're currently a bit short of that, of course, but not by that much,
>> because we're beginning to model basic evolutionary processes on
>> computers, and I believe that the structures that evolve already
>> develop and exhibit both altruistic and competitive behaviors. At a
>> somewhat less basic level, evolutionary biology now sees these
>> behaviors in terms of the propagation of DNA: individuals are more apt
>> to help close relatives, say, than strangers because in helping the
>> relatives they increase the probability that their DNA will be passed
>> on. And there are circumstances in which amoral behaviors -- stealing
>> some food when the other monkey looks the other way, say -- have the
>> same effect of increasing the probability that one's DNA will be
>> transmitted. So I'd say it's only a matter of time before we have a
>> fairly rigorous, mathematical understanding of the basic principles
>> involved.
>
>You're starting with the arbitrary moral that life and evolution are "good." 
>That's a common and very helpful one to start with, but if there was no life 
>on Earth, would the univere care?  If there were an arbitrary number of 
>beings on the planet that were generally happy and never aged or died, would 
>they care about evolution?
>
>Unless you can prove the answer is yes, it's a common personal philosophy.

"Common personal philosophy" is a bit oxymoronic for my taste. I'd say
instead that it's an observation regarding the "why" of morality. And
when we understand that why, we can in principle find the moral system
that best fulfills that why for a given set of practical
circumstances.

>> I'd say we're
>> talking statistics here at the very least, e.g., with current
>> technology, we can only predict the probability that marrying one's
>> first cousin will produce an idiot. There may be a subjective or
>> arbitrary /element/ in our decision because where we don't have
>> sufficient data to make a perfect one, but there is also an objective
>> element.
>
>The only objective element is the odds of the outcome.  Everything else
>is completely subjective.

That's enough, though. Statistical assumptions are a common component
of law and morality.

>> A hypothetical future society might be able to pick or modify the
>> genes of both parents in such as way as to cull unfortunate
>> recessives. What is in most circumstances an objectively immoral act
>> for us* might then become an objectively moral act for them.
>
>Nope.  The very nature of it being immoral for us and moral for them makes
>it subjective.

I don't think so, any more than the fact that one can fry an egg in a
hot pan and not in a cold one makes burner activation decisions
subjective.

>> *I say most because in some cases it clearly would not be: forex, when
>> a breeding population is very small, as it might be after a massive
>> disaster, inbreeding helps conserve genetic diversity
>
>So?

So there's an objective reason to make a formally amoral behavior,
incest, a moral one.

>>>> But by the same token,
>>>> science recognizes that moral systems are at least to some extent
>>>> contingent, personal, and arbitrary. It can suggest changes only
>>>> within the context of externally-supplied parameters.
>
>And there you have it.  "z"  .. the fudge factor that science can't deal 
>with. Morals are outiside of the bounds of science and strictly in the 
>domain
>of philosphy.

Your second assumption doesn't follow from the first: partial
understanding is not the same as no understanding at all.

>The best science can do with morals is measure commonality of morals between 
>people (x % of people believe killing in this circumstance is immoral)... 
>but that is completely different than saying that science can define what is 
>moral.

I think we're getting very close. Morality is just another phenomenon,
really, like tree climbing or scratching. Freud gave us some
significant insights, and more recent investigations in psychology,
neurology, and evolutionary biology have given us more.

>>>Exactly!  I think you just came around to my way of thinking on this
>>>issue!
>>>My original assertion was that science could not answer a certain
>>>question... Why... which is the domain of philosophy.  Philosphy deals
>>>with
>>>moral questions.  Good and bad are defined in the context of philosphy.
>>
>> Heh, no -- I don't think philosophy can answer "why" any more than
>> science can.
>
>No...but hopefully it provides a set of frameworks through which  a person 
>can choose one they identify with and it will help guide them through the 
>logical consequences of that particular philosphy.  If that philosphy 
>includes God, then there are  requirements and consequences that are part of 
>that philosphy.  If it's existentialism, the higher rules don't exist and 
>you make up your own.   Philsophy itself doesn't mandate that there is a 
>correct answer; it's the people that adhere to a philosphy that attempt to 
>do that.

I disagree with that last. If there are no right and wrong answers,
there's no reason to search for answers: we might as well just sit
back and enjoy the ride.

>
>>Which is to say I don't think it's the right question: as
>> I said earlier, the right question seems to be "why not." And that
>> understanding is coming from science, not philosophy, in the narrow
>> sense in which it's typically construed today.
>
>I think a lot of people would argue with that.
>
>Science may able to map in your brain whether or not you're happy, but 
>knowing it wouldn't make you happy.  When the west started down the road of 
>Socratic thinking and the rest of the world didn't, there was a big shift in 
>technology and science, but that didn't make us happier, better, or more 
>moral.  It made us more technologically advanced.   people of many religions 
>woudl argue that we're crazy for worshipping at thre alter of science rather 
>than trying to focus on "inner" issues.

Scientific thinking made the West stronger, and so spread its memes.
It's an evolutionary process, and while it may seem callous to say
this, it seems to me that it doesn't matter what those people argue,
because they're losing. From that perspective, happiness doesn't
matter, either.

>Understanding science is understanding how the physical universe works. 
>That is not at all the same thing as understanding what is moral... or even 
>meaningful.  They are different questions.

I don't think so. Science is just a more sophisticated and rigorous
way of examining those questions. As it develops, it does a better and
better job.

At the end of the day, of course, it's a tool -- but I can't say
"just" a tool, because I believe that tools change their makers.

>> Which brings us by a
>> commodius vicus of recirculation back to what I said about the fact
>> that science was originally considered part of philosophy, and
>> probably should be today -- not because science needs to be part of
>> philosophy, but because philosophy without science is like a hatchet
>> without a head.
>
>Nope.  Take the most primitive tribe.  As a collective they may not care at 
>all whether there's a neutrino... or whether it's a collection of conditions 
>that cause it to rain of a little purple dwarf named Fred.  They will 
>develop some attempt at answering why they're there.  It may be "The Great 
>Spirit," "Zeus," "Odin," "Charlton Heston" or whatever... but the 
>philosphical questions come first.
>
>Science can (and should) be used to whittle out the obvious flaws (gods 
>playing tenpins create thunder), but science can only go so far.  There is a 
>leap that bridges "What I know" and "What I believe" because there are some 
>things that aren't knowable and some things aren't facts...they're  beliefs 
>that define who were are, both individually and culterally.

I do not believe in -- have never believed in -- that dichotomy
insofar as it affects human affairs. In the realm of quantum
mechanics, yes -- there are some things that can't be known. In a
certain rarified mathematics -- the incompleteness theorem. But those
beliefs, individual and cultural, are just phenomena. One can examine
them, examine where they came from and why they formed, and many have.
The incest taboo is one famous example. Our predecessors may have
ascribed their version of the incest taboo to ancestral spirits, but
we can see now that it is a genetic and memetic phenomenon. To the
extent it's arbitrary, it's the extent that evolution and thought are
-- trying out new genes or memes and new combinations of genes and
memes.

>>>Of course asking questions is part of science...but they're different
>>>questions. A scientist doesn't start out to prove something is moral; he
>>>orshe proves something that can be proved.
>>>
>>>Likewise, a philospher that tries to provide a proof for their philosphy
>>>is
>>>equally guilty of fooling themselves... much like St. Anselm and Euler
>>>did.
>>>Granted, Anselm did better at fooling others...he was canonized for his
>>>silly piece of sophistry.
>>
>> That last is a fairly recent observation in philosophy. That being
>> said, I don't know that there's a theoretical argument against it:
>> philosophy does deal with the objective, it just isn't always
>> rigorous, it isn't always right, and I suspect it can't be complete
>> any more than mathematics can.
>
>And science shouldn't deal with the subjective...because once you define a 
>subjective premise the outcome is also subjective... and that's not what 
>science is for.  Then you start building a house of cards based on 
>subjective premises.  No thank you.

I'm not sure that that's true. In a sense, science always begins with
a subjective premise -- a hypothesis. Then it tests it. It's an
evolutionary process, as is, I believe, morality. All thought, really.

>Philosophy starts with the subjective as a premise and (hopefully) uses 
>logic to build a framework for extending the consequences of the premise to 
>take it as far as it can.  If at some point the premise causes a logical 
>disconnect or undesirable (to the individual) consequences, either the 
>premise is altered or the philosphy is abandoned on the side of the road. 
>Happens all the time.
>
>If a person starts with a philosphy of "I should be able to do anyting I 
>want... Why? Freedom implies this." Consequence? That same freedom is also 
>given to others and then they can do anything they want.  Oh oh... what if 
>they do something I don't like?  Alter the premise...repeat cycle.
>There really isn't a lot of science in this... (although there is (hopefully 
>a lot of logic involved), unless you start to define negative experiences as 
>empiricle data... but that's nitpicking a definition.
>
>In this and most philosphies, "moral" is usually inaccurately defined as 
>desirable.

Desirable from what perspective? Socially desirable might be more
accurate.

>>>> Again, I think psychologists have devised many scales. They tend to be
>>>> self-centering and normalizing, e.g., "Rate on a scale of 1 to 10 how
>>>> much you love your wife and kids, with 1 being not at all and 10 being
>>>> extremely."
>>>
>>>Nope...that doesn't cut it as science.  There's no measure.  If I said 9,
>>>9
>>>what?   Compared to what?  What possible relative measure could there be.
>>>If I asked how far away the moon is and someone said "2.3", what would
>>>that
>>>mean?  If yiou already knew the distance you determine the measure, but
>>>that's cheating.
>>
>> See below.
>>
>>>> And then you could ask the same thing about the other questions using
>>>> the same scale, and compare them to get an idea of the relative
>>>> importance of these things to you. It's crude, but it works.
>>>
>>>But the results would only apply to that one person (and so are completely
>>>subjective).
>>
>> But that's easily solved by asking the question of a statistically
>> valid sample and comparing their responses. This isn't just theory --
>> it's done all the time.
>
>Ask 500 people how much they love their wife.  If they all say "A lot," or 
>"10" does that mean they all love their wifes the same?  Of course not, and 
>because of that, the statistic is meaningless because there is no common 
>frame of reference.

Statistics creates a frame of reference, the degree to which the
average man can love and hate. A wily psychologist who wanted to go
farther could, by comparing it to something else, e.g., a man's
affection for his car. Ultimately one could map all emotional
tendencies. There would be no absolute, because the only thing that
matters is the probability that it will determine behavior. But then,
that's much like physics: there is no natural unit of length, say.
Some choices seem more arbitrary than others, e.g., the length of the
King's thumb seems more arbitrary than the Planck radius, but that's
more a matter of convenience than anything else. 

>>>>>>As a physicist, forget which
>>>>>> one, once observed, mathematics is formalized thought. It's probably
>>>>>> not an overstatement to say that the universe is made up of numbers.
>>>>>
>>>>>The physical universe can be measured in numbers.
>>>>>The consequences of some events can be measured in numbers.
>>>>>Many things can't be.
>>>>
>>>> I believe that insofar as some things can't be measured at all. But
>>>> that doesn't include how much you love your wife and kids. Some day,
>>>> we will be able to point to the individual neurons and the strength of
>>>> the synaptic connections. Even now, we can detect metabolic activity
>>>> in areas of the brain that are triggered by love, as well as hormone
>>>> levels. And before that, we could ask questions of the sort I
>>>> mentioned above. And ultimately, it all comes down to physics and
>>>> math.
>>>
>>>But what you measure isn't reflective of the emotion.  For instance, if
>>>you
>>>isolated and measured my neural activity when my son had to undergo
>>>surgery
>>>and then again when I come home from work and find out that he and his
>>>sister were fighting you might get the impression that I love my son more
>>>when he has surgery when in fact I'm just more acutely aware of my
>>>feelings
>>>for him when his welfare is threatened.   Likewise, I was not truly aware
>>>of
>>>how much I cared about my first girlfriend until she died...but if you
>>>asked
>>>me I would have told you that I was completely in love with her.  Whatever
>>>you measure...no matter how you try...isn't going to be accurate.
>>
>> I think they're a bit more sophisticated at this point, actually: lots
>> of research being done on seemingly similar things that light up
>> different parts of the brain. And we're still in the stone age as far
>> as our understanding goes. The tools keep becoming better, and as they
>> do, we move from Freud, the outside observer with a notebook, a couch,
>> and some theories about neurons of 100 years ago, to someone who can
>> actually watch brain regions and even individual neurons in action,
>> and will eventually be able to "grow" a functioning computer model of
>> a human brain from the genome. And what a sci fi story that would
>> make!
>
>Even if you could isolate and measure "love" by some neural  model. Does 
>that even suggest that the numbers would have any meaning?  Would the data 
>mean the same thing to someone that had never been in love?

Meaning, sure, but subjectively, a description isn't the same as
experience. But that holds true of philosophy as well. Neither
scientific theory nor philosophy directly allow a blind man to see,
inasmuch as they enter the brain through different portals . . .

-- 
Josh

"I love it when I'm around the country club, and I hear people talking about
the debilitating
effects of a welfare society. At the same time, they leave their kids a
lifetime and beyond
of food stamps. Instead of having a welfare officer, they have a trust officer.
And instead
of food stamps, they have stocks and bonds."

- Warren Buffett
      
--- SBBSecho 2.11-Win32
 * Origin: Time Warp of the Future BBS - Home of League 10 (1:14/400)