Text 4035, 749 rader
Skriven 2006-07-17 11:11:00 av Robert E Starr JR (4508.babylon5)
Ärende: Re: Atheists: America's m
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  * * * This message was from Carl to rec.arts.sf.tv.babylon5.m * * *   
         * * * and has been forwarded to you by Lord Time * * *         
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"Josh Hill" <usereplyto@gmail.com> wrote in message 
news:bgrkb21jtkjpeo67bt5h4fld7eii8u1g33@4ax.com...
> On Sun, 16 Jul 2006 11:13:02 -0500, "Carl" <cengman7@hotmail.com>
>>>
>>>>>>> And, you know, some people get upset at the prospect of being 
>>>>>>> without
>>>>>>> purpose or meaning, but I haven't found that it makes any 
>>>>>>> difference:
>>>>>>> there's still good and bad, there are still things to be done, 
>>>>>>> whether
>>>>>>> I view myself as a child of God or a dance of energy-absorbing
>>>>>>> molecules.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>I never said that purpose or meaning has to be external.  An athiest
>>>>>>(back to the original topic!) might still consider themselves as 
>>>>>>having
>>>>>>a purpose...as defined by themself.
>>>>>
>>>>> But I think that's substantially different than a purpose that arises
>>>>> from the nature of things.
>>>>
>>>>It's easy to argue that whatever you do *is* natural.
>>>
>>> True, but then everything is natural in that sense. In practice, I
>>> don't think anyone would define computers or Silly Putty as "natural"
>>
>>One could argue that the process of humans making tools is natural.
>>Beavers make dams, people make dams.  We just do it ona bigger scale.
>>Dolpins "play"...so do people, we invent things like Silly Putty as a tool
>>to
>>help us play.
>
> Again, in that sense, everything becomes natural, and the word loses
> utility.
>
>><snipping just because this is getting long>
>>
>>>
>>>>> Personal philosophy: I don't pick fights with strangers.
>>>>
>>>>Nope, that's a statement of fact, not a philosphy since the original
>>>>assertion was that Philosphy asks "Why?"
>>>>This is more of a statement of fact.
>>>
>>>>> Erroneous objective philosophy: If I pick fights with strangers, I get
>>>>> creamed.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Correct objective philosophy: If I pick fights with strangers, it's
>>>>> likely that I'll be creamed.
>>>>
>>>>In my mind, none of these questions are actually philosophical 
>>>>questions.
>>>>"Why shouldn't I pick fights (whether I win or lose)?" would be a good
>>>>philosophical question.
>>>>
>>>>Declaring oneself a conscientious objector to a war is a personal
>>>>philosophical statement.
>>>
>>> I think you're sort of hoisted by your own petard here, because that's
>>> a statement of fact -- I object morally to war -- rather than a
>>> question of why. Indeed, it's very much akin to my "I don't pick
>>> fights with strangers," which I intended as a statement of principle.
>>
>>
>>Not quite; it says "I will not serve in the war.  Why? Because it
>>goes against my moral code (personal philosphy), and therefore
>>my conscience."
>
> No different than my "I don't pick fights with strangers."

Sure it is, your statement doesn't state or even imply "Why?"
I wouldn't call the reason that you stated in your example "It's likely that 
I'll get creamed" a philosophy either, but YMMV.


>>>> If a person objects to a particular war (Iraq) but
>>>>accpets the reasons for another (WW II) then it is a personal philosphy,
>>>>but
>>>>in coming to that conclusion, a person should honestly be considering 
>>>>the
>>>>larger philosophical concepts ... pacifism as a philosophy of
>>>>exceptionless
>>>>non-violence towards others, for instance.  Again, the personal and
>>>>"larger"
>>>>philosphies are not distinct.  I think that they are actually 
>>>>unavoidably
>>>>linked.
>>>
>>> But linkage isn't identity. If it were, one could argue that the
>>> subjective is objective -- I certainly would, since I consider thought
>>> a natural phenomenon -- and that there is therefore no distinction
>>> between the two.
>>
>>I never argued that personal = higher philosphy, only that they aren't
>>completely separate and that personal philosphy can be just as earnest
>>an attempt to come to the "Truth" as higher philosphy.
>>
>>> So while I agree that our personal philosophies embody objective
>>> elements, or at least claim to, it seems to me that in the practical
>>> sense of the word they embody subjective elements as well, in that
>>> they represent the state of our own thought and, not infrequently,
>>> beliefs and emotional tendencies that are not arrived at through a
>>> rational philosophical process, or that subvert that process.
>>
>>All philosphy has subjective elements.
>>
>>
>>>>>>Trying to define morals strictly within the bounds of logic is a 
>>>>>>little
>>>>>>like
>>>>>>trying to describe sex to a child using pictures in a book.
>>>>>
>>>>> To be sure, but are subjective impressions part of philosophy, or
>>>>> something that's examined by philosophy?
>>>>
>>>>If there is no God, then there is no higher philosophy; all of the 
>>>>"Whys"
>>>>become personal and as such they are all subjective because there are no
>>>>absolutes to the question of "Why?"
>>>
>>> I'll have to disagree vociferously on that one! God doesn't answer
>>> "why" -- she merely postpones it. Because if the reason we do things
>>> and things are the way they are is God, why God?
>>
>>God answers the Why ("Because God wishes it") an d in doing so provides a
>>moral absolute.
>
> That's not a why, because, as I said, it doesn't explain /why/ God
> wishes it. It's no different than saying the King wishes it. Why does
> the King wish it? Has he been studying philosophy? Did the Queen nag
> him?

There is no reason why a person's philosphy must be dependent on the 
rationale of someone (or God's) philosphy.  By saying "Because God wishes 
it." merely says that even though a person of faith may not know why... or 
even think it's possible to know why... the fact that a certain act or 
belief is in line with their understanding of their creator is sufficient to 
accept that act or belief as true, good, and correct... and to answer the 
questions "Why am I here? Why should I behave this way?" etc.

That's not saying the philosphy is right or wrong.

>>Without that, "Good" and "Evil" must be subjective.  For the
>>sake of this paragraph, let's assume there is a God.  In that case, a
>>personal or group interpretation of what God wishes may be wrong, but 
>>there
>>is still an absolute True (or "Good") by which to measure it against.
>>Granted, actually knowing whether yourinterpretation of moral andimmoral 
>>is
>>accurate is unknowable until after death, but so what?  As with most 
>>things
>>in life, you pay your dues and you give it your best shot.
>
> I don't see why God is necessary to this scenario. It's easy enough to
> posit an objective good and evil without recourse to a deity, and many
> philosophers and even some religions have done so. Kant's categorical
> imperative, for example.

"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world or out of it that can be 
called good without qualification except good will."
- Immanuel Kant.

IIRC (andit's been a while) ...Categorical Imperative expresses adherence to 
a moral law by virtue of respect for reason.  He suggests the necessity of 
acting out of duty... even if that duty is simply conforming to the law 
without thought to consequence.

You can suggest this is "Good," but I don't.  If the law is subjective, the 
clearly defining good (even partially) as adherence to the law is also 
somewhat subjective.
Reason is


>
>>> I'm reminded of the story of the old lady and the philosopher.
>>>
>>> "The world is held up by a giant turtle!", the old lady said.
>>>
>>> The philosopher gave her a patronizing smile. "If the world is held up
>>> by a giant turtle, what holds up the giant turtle?"
>>>
>>> "You can't fool /me,/" said the old lady. "It's turtles all the way
>>> down!"
>>>
>>> That being said, it seems to me that "why" can as easily be "why not"?
>>
>>"Why not?" Is the same question.  The answer can be stated as a negative
>>too.
>
> But I'm not changing both sides of the equation. I'm suggesting that
> from the perspective of the universe, there is no difference between
> why and why not. Purposiveness and lack of it are the same, or rather
> purposiveness is a local system within lack of purposiveness. For
> example, a random quantum fluctuation in empty space might give rise
> to a universe like ours, and within that universe, entropy would
> increase/decrease and beings would evolve and go about their moral
> business. And at the same time, all the other quantum possibilities
> would occur, and various things would happen in them, and they'd all
> be part of the same thing. Certainly if one looks at physics, one
> begins to suspect that everything comes to zip: the uncertainty
> principle, the fundamental importance of symmetry, the fact that group
> theory seems to encompass all known physical laws.

I'm probably just too tired to see what you're driving at here.

To ask "Why should I behave <some way>?" is asking for the same answer as 
"Why shouldn't I behave that way."  The same rationale applies to whether 
you do or don't act or believe a certain way.

>>> That seems to be the universe's attitude, insofar as it can be said to
>>> have one: all possible mathematical outcomes occur simultaneously.
>>
>>Without a God or underlying intelligence taht one can call God, 
>>attributing
>>an attitude is simply anthropomorphism.  Without an underling 
>>intelligence,
>>there is no absolute good or moral and everything is personally 
>>subjective.
>>The universe doesn't "care" if there's life or not.  IKf it's there, fine.
>>If not, so?
>
> But I don't think anyone can deny that the universe is intelligent.
> After all, we're part of it by definition, and we're intelligent,
> again by definition.

I'm intelligent (compared to a rock...I make no claim at being more or less 
intelligent than anyone else).  I'm part of the universe.  My shoe is part 
of the universe, therefore my shoe is intelligent?

If the universe is intelligent simply to the degree of the aggregate the 
beings that live within it (which isn't what I was speaking of), then the 
intelligence has no "higher" set of "good" or "evil" that that of the 
existing universal populace....entirely subjective.

> For that matter, the same logic can be applied to morality: if
> morality were not part of the universe, we wouldn't be, since we're
> part of it as well.

That makes no sense to me.  Single cell organisms have no sense of morality, 
they exist...and would most likely exist even  if higher life forms didn't.

>
> This isn't the same as saying that morality is subjective, and it
> isn't the same as saying that the university has a purpose.
>
>>>>>>You can certainly use science to provide evidence of consequences... 
>>>>>>but
>>>>>>morality judges whether those consequences are good or bad ones.
>>>>>
>>>>> Why can't science examine what makes those consequences good or bad?
>>>>
>>>>Because I don't think science can't define what's "good" and "bad," 
>>>>which
>>>>gets back to my original
>>>>comment that science can't answer the philosphical question "Why?"
>>>
>>> Are you so sure that it can't define good and bad? Perhaps what you
>>> mean to say is that it can't divide things into both because they're
>>> to some extent contingent? There's a famous short story, forget its
>>> name and will no doubt get some of the details wrong, in which people
>>> in an isolated interstellar colony practice cannibalism. And at the
>>> end of the story you learn that the cannibalism is /morally right,/
>>> that it's considered an honor to be eaten because given the limited
>>> resources of the planet, the people in that colony couldn't have
>>> survived without it.
>>
>>For the sake of this paragraph, let's assume there is no God.  You can't
>>determine (other than at a personal level) that cannabilsm in ANY context 
>>is
>>morally right or wrong without resorting to majority rules.   There is no
>>absolute good or bad to judge against....so it's all subjective.
>
> Not necessarily. I can simply note that good and bad are phenomena,
> and describe them with regard to the local systems that they serve.

And good and bad in this case are subjective with regard to the local 
systems; there is no absolute definition that applies to all local systems.

> That's not subjective any more than any testable theory is: it's a
> model that's tested against objective phenomena.
>
>>>>> It seems to me that both psychology and neuroscience have done that,
>>>>> as more recently has evolutionary biology and even mathematics.
>>>>
>>>>Neither biology or mathematics address the question.
>>>>
>>>>If I kill someone...how does mathematics define that act as good or bad?
>>>>Eventually you get to a point that somewhere in the "equation" you have
>>>>some
>>>>kind of subjective element in order to determine that the outcome is 
>>>>good
>>>>or
>>>>bad... in which case you might as well chuck the math.
>>>
>>> Not necessarily. Because we can benefit from a well-developed moral
>>> calculus, from understanding why we do things and what we should do to
>>> achieve a moral goal.
>>
>>Understanding why we do things does nothing to establish whether what we 
>>do
>>is good or bad or whether the goal is moral; it just helps us to 
>>determjine
>>whether the person is well intentioned.  There's a big difference.
>
> I don't think I agree.

I'm shocked I say!....Shocked. :)

> Components of my morality are based on an
> understanding of why we do things. For example, I consider the incest
> taboo moral because I understand something of the purpose it serves
> and given the current state of our knowledge it seems the best way to
> achieve that purpose.

What about incest when one party is unable to contribute to procreation?  Is 
that moral?

The purpose is subjective.  You assume that having an increased incident of 
mentally challenged people is a bad thing.  Is it?  Perhaps mankind being 
reduced to that intellectual level would allow other species to thrive and 
become dominant.  Perhaps manking dying out is in the best interest of the 
planet?

>
>>< And at some point in our understanding, we know
>>> enough to take a rigorous, mathematical approach to these questions,
>>> to make it hard science.
>>
>>Unless you can come up with a rigorous, mathematical, scientific 
>>definition
>>of moral (which I don't believe that you can), the rest of the equation is
>>simply increasingly precise scalars of the things that youcasn quantify...
>>until you get the variable z=whatever subjective moral value you've
>>rationalized.
>
> I don't follow that last step. It seems to me true only some of the
> time. Sometimes it's the other way around -- the things we quantify
> influence and change our subjective moral values.

Killing 1 person to save 1000 may or may not be moral.
Killing 1000 to save 1 may or may not be moral
Killing 1 to save 1 = may or may not be moral.

The numbers involved are simply scalars.  You can add any other variables 
that you want to the equations, and they may or may not add to the precision 
of  the consequences...but they do not add to or definition of morality.

>
>>> We're currently a bit short of that, of course, but not by that much,
>>> because we're beginning to model basic evolutionary processes on
>>> computers, and I believe that the structures that evolve already
>>> develop and exhibit both altruistic and competitive behaviors. At a
>>> somewhat less basic level, evolutionary biology now sees these
>>> behaviors in terms of the propagation of DNA: individuals are more apt
>>> to help close relatives, say, than strangers because in helping the
>>> relatives they increase the probability that their DNA will be passed
>>> on. And there are circumstances in which amoral behaviors -- stealing
>>> some food when the other monkey looks the other way, say -- have the
>>> same effect of increasing the probability that one's DNA will be
>>> transmitted. So I'd say it's only a matter of time before we have a
>>> fairly rigorous, mathematical understanding of the basic principles
>>> involved.
>>
>>You're starting with the arbitrary moral that life and evolution are 
>>"good."
>>That's a common and very helpful one to start with, but if there was no 
>>life
>>on Earth, would the univere care?  If there were an arbitrary number of
>>beings on the planet that were generally happy and never aged or died, 
>>would
>>they care about evolution?
>>
>>Unless you can prove the answer is yes, it's a common personal philosophy.
>
> "Common personal philosophy" is a bit oxymoronic for my taste.

Which part?  "Do unto others" fits that definition as well.

> I'd say instead that it's an observation regarding the "why" of morality.

The Why of morality?  Why someone holds to a particular morality?

As opposed to the Why questions answered by a philosphy which
defines a person's morality?

> And
> when we understand that why, we can in principle find the moral system
> that best fulfills that why for a given set of practical
> circumstances.

In other words, we can subjectively pick a "best fit" morality?

>
>>> I'd say we're
>>> talking statistics here at the very least, e.g., with current
>>> technology, we can only predict the probability that marrying one's
>>> first cousin will produce an idiot. There may be a subjective or
>>> arbitrary /element/ in our decision because where we don't have
>>> sufficient data to make a perfect one, but there is also an objective
>>> element.
>>
>>The only objective element is the odds of the outcome.  Everything else
>>is completely subjective.
>
> That's enough, though. Statistical assumptions are a common component
> of law and morality.

So... in answer to the original question...you're saying that science, 
solely in
the form of polls  and statistical assumptions of majority consensus are
 adequate to define morality and why we should behave a certain way?

That's entirely subjective...and fine for practical considerations such as 
law
(although in my mind it often fall's flat on it's face), but I *hope* that 
when
most people consider either a personal or higher philosophy they don't
limit themselves to what is or should be practical law.


>>> A hypothetical future society might be able to pick or modify the
>>> genes of both parents in such as way as to cull unfortunate
>>> recessives. What is in most circumstances an objectively immoral act
>>> for us* might then become an objectively moral act for them.
>>
>>Nope.  The very nature of it being immoral for us and moral for them makes
>>it subjective.
>
> I don't think so, any more than the fact that one can fry an egg in a
> hot pan and not in a cold one makes burner activation decisions
> subjective.

I missed something...if a situation *might* be a moral or immoral act ...how 
is that not subjective?

>
>>> *I say most because in some cases it clearly would not be: forex, when
>>> a breeding population is very small, as it might be after a massive
>>> disaster, inbreeding helps conserve genetic diversity
>>
>>So?
>
> So there's an objective reason to make a formally amoral behavior,
> incest, a moral one.

>
>>>>> But by the same token,
>>>>> science recognizes that moral systems are at least to some extent
>>>>> contingent, personal, and arbitrary. It can suggest changes only
>>>>> within the context of externally-supplied parameters.
>>
>>And there you have it.  "z"  .. the fudge factor that science can't deal
>>with. Morals are outiside of the bounds of science and strictly in the
>>domain
>>of philosphy.
>
> Your second assumption doesn't follow from the first: partial
> understanding is not the same as no understanding at all.

Science can help determine where a set or moral beliefs come from.  It can't 
evaluate the correctness of those morals.

>
>>The best science can do with morals is measure commonality of morals 
>>between
>>people (x % of people believe killing in this circumstance is immoral)...
>>but that is completely different than saying that science can define what 
>>is
>>moral.
>
> I think we're getting very close. Morality is just another phenomenon,
> really, like tree climbing or scratching. Freud gave us some
> significant insights, and more recent investigations in psychology,
> neurology, and evolutionary biology have given us more.

That is one philosphy.  Even evolutionary biology suggests why we would want 
to behave in a certain way, not why we should.  On the other end of the 
spectrum is that there is an absolute good (God's will) and our behavior 
should be aligned with that will to the best of a person's abilities and 
understanding.  And, there are a lot of philosphies in between the two.

>>>>Exactly!  I think you just came around to my way of thinking on this
>>>>issue!
>>>>My original assertion was that science could not answer a certain
>>>>question... Why... which is the domain of philosophy.  Philosphy deals
>>>>with
>>>>moral questions.  Good and bad are defined in the context of philosphy.
>>>
>>> Heh, no -- I don't think philosophy can answer "why" any more than
>>> science can.
>>
>>No...but hopefully it provides a set of frameworks through which  a person
>>can choose one they identify with and it will help guide them through the
>>logical consequences of that particular philosphy.  If that philosphy
>>includes God, then there are  requirements and consequences that are part 
>>of
>>that philosphy.  If it's existentialism, the higher rules don't exist and
>>you make up your own.   Philosophy itself doesn't mandate that there is a
>>correct answer; it's the people that adhere to a philosphy that attempt to
>>do that.
>
> I disagree with that last. If there are no right and wrong answers,
> there's no reason to search for answers: we might as well just sit
> back and enjoy the ride.

My last sentence was referring to the people of one philosphy wanting to 
impose their "correct" philosophy on others, but to follow up on your point, 
many people don't do any soul searching as to what they believe and what the 
consequences of those beliefs are.  One of my points is that if there is no 
God, then that may indeed be the case.  If we all just happen to have 
arrived, live, and turn to dust... are there any answers that mean anything 
to find other than whatever meaning that we give to our own lives?

I'm curious as to Paul's thoughts on this.


>>>Which is to say I don't think it's the right question: as
>>> I said earlier, the right question seems to be "why not." And that
>>> understanding is coming from science, not philosophy, in the narrow
>>> sense in which it's typically construed today.
>>
>>I think a lot of people would argue with that.
>>
>>Science may able to map in your brain whether or not you're happy, but
>>knowing it wouldn't make you happy.  When the west started down the road 
>>of
>>Socratic thinking and the rest of the world didn't, there was a big shift 
>>in
>>technology and science, but that didn't make us happier, better, or more
>>moral.  It made us more technologically advanced.   people of many 
>>religions
>>woudl argue that we're crazy for worshipping at thre alter of science 
>>rather
>>than trying to focus on "inner" issues.
>
> Scientific thinking made the West stronger, and so spread its memes.
> It's an evolutionary process, and while it may seem callous to say
> this, it seems to me that it doesn't matter what those people argue,
> because they're losing. From that perspective, happiness doesn't
> matter, either.

You assume that species continuation is more meaningful than anything else. 
If there is a God, then you're most likely wrong.  If there isn't, again... 
the universe probably doesn't care one way or another.  In the very long 
run...it's unlikely that our species continues anyway.

>>Understanding science is understanding how the physical universe works.
>>That is not at all the same thing as understanding what is moral... or 
>>even
>>meaningful.  They are different questions.
>
> I don't think so. Science is just a more sophisticated and rigorous
> way of examining those questions. As it develops, it does a better and
> better job.

I guess we just disagree.

>
> At the end of the day, of course, it's a tool -- but I can't say
> "just" a tool, because I believe that tools change their makers.
>
>>> Which brings us by a
>>> commodius vicus of recirculation back to what I said about the fact
>>> that science was originally considered part of philosophy, and
>>> probably should be today -- not because science needs to be part of
>>> philosophy, but because philosophy without science is like a hatchet
>>> without a head.
>>
>>Nope.  Take the most primitive tribe.  As a collective they may not care 
>>at
>>all whether there's a neutrino... or whether it's a collection of 
>>conditions
>>that cause it to rain of a little purple dwarf named Fred.  They will
>>develop some attempt at answering why they're there.  It may be "The Great
>>Spirit," "Zeus," "Odin," "Charlton Heston" or whatever... but the
>>philosphical questions come first.
>>
>>Science can (and should) be used to whittle out the obvious flaws (gods
>>playing tenpins create thunder), but science can only go so far.  There is 
>>a
>>leap that bridges "What I know" and "What I believe" because there are 
>>some
>>things that aren't knowable and some things aren't facts...they're 
>>beliefs
>>that define who were are, both individually and culterally.
>
> I do not believe in -- have never believed in -- that dichotomy
> insofar as it affects human affairs. In the realm of quantum
> mechanics, yes -- there are some things that can't be known. In a
> certain rarified mathematics -- the incompleteness theorem. But those
> beliefs, individual and cultural, are just phenomena. One can examine
> them, examine where they came from and why they formed, and many have.
> The incest taboo is one famous example. Our predecessors may have
> ascribed their version of the incest taboo to ancestral spirits, but
> we can see now that it is a genetic and memetic phenomenon. To the
> extent it's arbitrary, it's the extent that evolution and thought are
> -- trying out new genes or memes and new combinations of genes and
> memes.
>
>>>>Of course asking questions is part of science...but they're different
>>>>questions. A scientist doesn't start out to prove something is moral; he
>>>>orshe proves something that can be proved.
>>>>
>>>>Likewise, a philospher that tries to provide a proof for their philosphy
>>>>is
>>>>equally guilty of fooling themselves... much like St. Anselm and Euler
>>>>did.
>>>>Granted, Anselm did better at fooling others...he was canonized for his
>>>>silly piece of sophistry.
>>>
>>> That last is a fairly recent observation in philosophy. That being
>>> said, I don't know that there's a theoretical argument against it:
>>> philosophy does deal with the objective, it just isn't always
>>> rigorous, it isn't always right, and I suspect it can't be complete
>>> any more than mathematics can.
>>
>>And science shouldn't deal with the subjective...because once you define a
>>subjective premise the outcome is also subjective... and that's not what
>>science is for.  Then you start building a house of cards based on
>>subjective premises.  No thank you.
>
> I'm not sure that that's true. In a sense, science always begins with
> a subjective premise -- a hypothesis. Then it tests it. It's an
> evolutionary process, as is, I believe, morality. All thought, really.

The goal of science is to prove or disprove the hypothesis.  The hypothesis 
shouldn't be subjective... it should be a rational extension of the known 
into the previously unknown.

Are you suggesting that one purpose of science is to prove morality?  Even a 
subjective morality?  That's dangerous ground for science.

You're going to prove through science that the Japanese internment camps 
were right or wrong?  How about Hiroshima?

>
>>Philosophy starts with the subjective as a premise and (hopefully) uses
>>logic to build a framework for extending the consequences of the premise 
>>to
>>take it as far as it can.  If at some point the premise causes a logical
>>disconnect or undesirable (to the individual) consequences, either the
>>premise is altered or the philosphy is abandoned on the side of the road.
>>Happens all the time.
>>
>>If a person starts with a philosphy of "I should be able to do anyting I
>>want... Why? Freedom implies this." Consequence? That same freedom is also
>>given to others and then they can do anything they want.  Oh oh... what if
>>they do something I don't like?  Alter the premise...repeat cycle.
>>There really isn't a lot of science in this... (although there is 
>>(hopefully
>>a lot of logic involved), unless you start to define negative experiences 
>>as
>>empiricle data... but that's nitpicking a definition.
>>
>>In this and most philosphies, "moral" is usually inaccurately defined as
>>desirable.
>
> Desirable from what perspective? Socially desirable might be more
> accurate.

Only if your morals include caring about the rest of society.

>
>>>>> Again, I think psychologists have devised many scales. They tend to be
>>>>> self-centering and normalizing, e.g., "Rate on a scale of 1 to 10 how
>>>>> much you love your wife and kids, with 1 being not at all and 10 being
>>>>> extremely."
>>>>
>>>>Nope...that doesn't cut it as science.  There's no measure.  If I said 
>>>>9,
>>>>9
>>>>what?   Compared to what?  What possible relative measure could there 
>>>>be.
>>>>If I asked how far away the moon is and someone said "2.3", what would
>>>>that
>>>>mean?  If yiou already knew the distance you determine the measure, but
>>>>that's cheating.
>>>
>>> See below.
>>>
>>>>> And then you could ask the same thing about the other questions using
>>>>> the same scale, and compare them to get an idea of the relative
>>>>> importance of these things to you. It's crude, but it works.
>>>>
>>>>But the results would only apply to that one person (and so are 
>>>>completely
>>>>subjective).
>>>
>>> But that's easily solved by asking the question of a statistically
>>> valid sample and comparing their responses. This isn't just theory --
>>> it's done all the time.
>>
>>Ask 500 people how much they love their wife.  If they all say "A lot," or
>>"10" does that mean they all love their wifes the same?  Of course not, 
>>and
>>because of that, the statistic is meaningless because there is no common
>>frame of reference.
>
> Statistics creates a frame of reference, the degree to which the
> average man can love and hate.

That's just begging the question.
Please quantify how much (in a meaningful way) what an average man is qand 
how much he can love or hate.

> A wily psychologist who wanted to go
> farther could, by comparing it to something else, e.g., a man's
> affection for his car.

If what a man feels for his wife compares to the affection he feels for a 
car...we're not talking about the same thing.
You can't even compare the love a man feels for a wife to what they feel for 
their kids or parents.

> Ultimately one could map all emotional
> tendencies.

Mapping where it is in the brain is not the same as defining what it means.

>>
>>Even if you could isolate and measure "love" by some neural  model. Does
>>that even suggest that the numbers would have any meaning?  Would the data
>>mean the same thing to someone that had never been in love?
>
> Meaning, sure, but subjectively, a description isn't the same as
> experience.

"Here, this person is feeling love for someone because these neurons are 
triggering."
It doesn't matter that what the person being studies may have an entirely 
different concept of love than the person doing the interpreting of the 
data?

Isn't that a bit like describing the a kind of bluish color to a blind child 
in terms of wavelengths?

Carl
                                                                               
      
--- SBBSecho 2.11-Win32
 * Origin: Time Warp of the Future BBS - Home of League 10 (1:14/400)