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Skriven 2006-07-17 18:35:00 av Robert E Starr JR (4545.babylon5)
Ärende: Re: Atheists: America's m
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* * * This message was from Josh Hill to rec.arts.sf.tv.babylon5.m * * *
         * * * and has been forwarded to you by Lord Time * * *         
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On Sun, 16 Jul 2006 20:41:45 -0500, "Carl" <cengman7@hotmail.com>
wrote:

>
>"Josh Hill" <usereplyto@gmail.com> wrote in message 
>news:bgrkb21jtkjpeo67bt5h4fld7eii8u1g33@4ax.com...

>>>>
>>>>>> Personal philosophy: I don't pick fights with strangers.
>>>>>
>>>>>Nope, that's a statement of fact, not a philosphy since the original
>>>>>assertion was that Philosphy asks "Why?"
>>>>>This is more of a statement of fact.
>>>>
>>>>>> Erroneous objective philosophy: If I pick fights with strangers, I get
>>>>>> creamed.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Correct objective philosophy: If I pick fights with strangers, it's
>>>>>> likely that I'll be creamed.
>>>>>
>>>>>In my mind, none of these questions are actually philosophical 
>>>>>questions.
>>>>>"Why shouldn't I pick fights (whether I win or lose)?" would be a good
>>>>>philosophical question.
>>>>>
>>>>>Declaring oneself a conscientious objector to a war is a personal
>>>>>philosophical statement.
>>>>
>>>> I think you're sort of hoisted by your own petard here, because that's
>>>> a statement of fact -- I object morally to war -- rather than a
>>>> question of why. Indeed, it's very much akin to my "I don't pick
>>>> fights with strangers," which I intended as a statement of principle.
>>>
>>>
>>>Not quite; it says "I will not serve in the war.  Why? Because it
>>>goes against my moral code (personal philosphy), and therefore
>>>my conscience."
>>
>> No different than my "I don't pick fights with strangers."
>
>Sure it is, your statement doesn't state or even imply "Why?"
>I wouldn't call the reason that you stated in your example "It's likely that 
>I'll get creamed" a philosophy either, but YMMV.

I think it's a given that this expression of a personal philosophy is
grounded in reasoning.

I wouldn't call the second a philosophy -- it's an observation.

>>>>>>>Trying to define morals strictly within the bounds of logic is a 
>>>>>>>little
>>>>>>>like
>>>>>>>trying to describe sex to a child using pictures in a book.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To be sure, but are subjective impressions part of philosophy, or
>>>>>> something that's examined by philosophy?
>>>>>
>>>>>If there is no God, then there is no higher philosophy; all of the 
>>>>>"Whys"
>>>>>become personal and as such they are all subjective because there are no
>>>>>absolutes to the question of "Why?"
>>>>
>>>> I'll have to disagree vociferously on that one! God doesn't answer
>>>> "why" -- she merely postpones it. Because if the reason we do things
>>>> and things are the way they are is God, why God?
>>>
>>>God answers the Why ("Because God wishes it") an d in doing so provides a
>>>moral absolute.
>>
>> That's not a why, because, as I said, it doesn't explain /why/ God
>> wishes it. It's no different than saying the King wishes it. Why does
>> the King wish it? Has he been studying philosophy? Did the Queen nag
>> him?
>
>There is no reason why a person's philosphy must be dependent on the 
>rationale of someone (or God's) philosphy.  By saying "Because God wishes 
>it." merely says that even though a person of faith may not know why... or 
>even think it's possible to know why... the fact that a certain act or 
>belief is in line with their understanding of their creator is sufficient to 
>accept that act or belief as true, good, and correct... and to answer the 
>questions "Why am I here? Why should I behave this way?" etc.
>
>That's not saying the philosphy is right or wrong.

But your assertion was that "God answers the Why" -- I merely pointed
out that He doesn't. Which is to say that God isn't an explanation,
He's just an extra step.

>>>Without that, "Good" and "Evil" must be subjective.  For the
>>>sake of this paragraph, let's assume there is a God.  In that case, a
>>>personal or group interpretation of what God wishes may be wrong, but 
>>>there
>>>is still an absolute True (or "Good") by which to measure it against.
>>>Granted, actually knowing whether yourinterpretation of moral andimmoral 
>>>is
>>>accurate is unknowable until after death, but so what?  As with most 
>>>things
>>>in life, you pay your dues and you give it your best shot.
>>
>> I don't see why God is necessary to this scenario. It's easy enough to
>> posit an objective good and evil without recourse to a deity, and many
>> philosophers and even some religions have done so. Kant's categorical
>> imperative, for example.
>
>"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world or out of it that can be 
>called good without qualification except good will."
>- Immanuel Kant.
>
>IIRC (andit's been a while) ...Categorical Imperative expresses adherence to 
>a moral law by virtue of respect for reason.  He suggests the necessity of 
>acting out of duty... even if that duty is simply conforming to the law 
>without thought to consequence.
>
>You can suggest this is "Good," but I don't.  If the law is subjective, the 
>clearly defining good (even partially) as adherence to the law is also 
>somewhat subjective.
>Reason is

Kant's reference to qualification in the quote above isn't a dismissal
of objectivity.

>>>> I'm reminded of the story of the old lady and the philosopher.
>>>>
>>>> "The world is held up by a giant turtle!", the old lady said.
>>>>
>>>> The philosopher gave her a patronizing smile. "If the world is held up
>>>> by a giant turtle, what holds up the giant turtle?"
>>>>
>>>> "You can't fool /me,/" said the old lady. "It's turtles all the way
>>>> down!"
>>>>
>>>> That being said, it seems to me that "why" can as easily be "why not"?
>>>
>>>"Why not?" Is the same question.  The answer can be stated as a negative
>>>too.
>>
>> But I'm not changing both sides of the equation. I'm suggesting that
>> from the perspective of the universe, there is no difference between
>> why and why not. Purposiveness and lack of it are the same, or rather
>> purposiveness is a local system within lack of purposiveness. For
>> example, a random quantum fluctuation in empty space might give rise
>> to a universe like ours, and within that universe, entropy would
>> increase/decrease and beings would evolve and go about their moral
>> business. And at the same time, all the other quantum possibilities
>> would occur, and various things would happen in them, and they'd all
>> be part of the same thing. Certainly if one looks at physics, one
>> begins to suspect that everything comes to zip: the uncertainty
>> principle, the fundamental importance of symmetry, the fact that group
>> theory seems to encompass all known physical laws.
>
>I'm probably just too tired to see what you're driving at here.
>
>To ask "Why should I behave <some way>?" is asking for the same answer as 
>"Why shouldn't I behave that way."  The same rationale applies to whether 
>you do or don't act or believe a certain way.

You're omitting the possibility that from a global perspective, the
two are indistinguishable, and, what's more, that both occur and must
occur simultaneously.

>>>> That seems to be the universe's attitude, insofar as it can be said to
>>>> have one: all possible mathematical outcomes occur simultaneously.
>>>
>>>Without a God or underlying intelligence taht one can call God, 
>>>attributing
>>>an attitude is simply anthropomorphism.  Without an underling 
>>>intelligence,
>>>there is no absolute good or moral and everything is personally 
>>>subjective.
>>>The universe doesn't "care" if there's life or not.  IKf it's there, fine.
>>>If not, so?
>>
>> But I don't think anyone can deny that the universe is intelligent.
>> After all, we're part of it by definition, and we're intelligent,
>> again by definition.
>
>I'm intelligent (compared to a rock...I make no claim at being more or less 
>intelligent than anyone else).  I'm part of the universe.  My shoe is part 
>of the universe, therefore my shoe is intelligent?

Logical fallacy: Your foot is also part of you. It isn't intelligent,
but you are.

>If the universe is intelligent simply to the degree of the aggregate the 
>beings that live within it (which isn't what I was speaking of), then the 
>intelligence has no "higher" set of "good" or "evil" that that of the 
>existing universal populace....entirely subjective.

There's a non-sequitur in those dots, in that the concepts of good and
evil held by the existing universal populace need not be entirely
subjective. And I don't think they are. If you were to travel to
another star system and find a completely unrelated intelligent
species there, you would find a morality that, while not identical to
ours, would contain similar concepts and precepts. For example, if
they had the equivalent of our recessive genes, which is likely, they
would probably have an incest taboo for much the same reason we do.

>> For that matter, the same logic can be applied to morality: if
>> morality were not part of the universe, we wouldn't be, since we're
>> part of it as well.
>
>That makes no sense to me.  Single cell organisms have no sense of morality, 
>they exist...and would most likely exist even  if higher life forms didn't.

Again, the fact that some parts of the universe don't have morality
doesn't mean that the universe doesn't have morality, any more than
the fact that Tom DeLay is under indictment doesn't mean that Congress
is entirely without morality.

>> This isn't the same as saying that morality is subjective, and it
>> isn't the same as saying that the university has a purpose.
>>
>>>>>>>You can certainly use science to provide evidence of consequences... 
>>>>>>>but
>>>>>>>morality judges whether those consequences are good or bad ones.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why can't science examine what makes those consequences good or bad?
>>>>>
>>>>>Because I don't think science can't define what's "good" and "bad," 
>>>>>which
>>>>>gets back to my original
>>>>>comment that science can't answer the philosphical question "Why?"
>>>>
>>>> Are you so sure that it can't define good and bad? Perhaps what you
>>>> mean to say is that it can't divide things into both because they're
>>>> to some extent contingent? There's a famous short story, forget its
>>>> name and will no doubt get some of the details wrong, in which people
>>>> in an isolated interstellar colony practice cannibalism. And at the
>>>> end of the story you learn that the cannibalism is /morally right,/
>>>> that it's considered an honor to be eaten because given the limited
>>>> resources of the planet, the people in that colony couldn't have
>>>> survived without it.
>>>
>>>For the sake of this paragraph, let's assume there is no God.  You can't
>>>determine (other than at a personal level) that cannabilsm in ANY context 
>>>is
>>>morally right or wrong without resorting to majority rules.   There is no
>>>absolute good or bad to judge against....so it's all subjective.
>>
>> Not necessarily. I can simply note that good and bad are phenomena,
>> and describe them with regard to the local systems that they serve.
>
>And good and bad in this case are subjective with regard to the local 
>systems; there is no absolute definition that applies to all local systems.

What do you mean by an "absolute definition"? There's no laundry list,
but that doesn't mean that there's no /theory/ that leads to an
optimal set of moral precepts given known circumstances. That doesn't
make it subjective: it's our own take on it that's subjective, and
probably has to be given our evolution ("There's no one law for the
lion and the lamb." - Blake).

>> That's not subjective any more than any testable theory is: it's a
>> model that's tested against objective phenomena.
>>
>>>>>> It seems to me that both psychology and neuroscience have done that,
>>>>>> as more recently has evolutionary biology and even mathematics.
>>>>>
>>>>>Neither biology or mathematics address the question.
>>>>>
>>>>>If I kill someone...how does mathematics define that act as good or bad?
>>>>>Eventually you get to a point that somewhere in the "equation" you have
>>>>>some
>>>>>kind of subjective element in order to determine that the outcome is 
>>>>>good
>>>>>or
>>>>>bad... in which case you might as well chuck the math.
>>>>
>>>> Not necessarily. Because we can benefit from a well-developed moral
>>>> calculus, from understanding why we do things and what we should do to
>>>> achieve a moral goal.
>>>
>>>Understanding why we do things does nothing to establish whether what we 
>>>do
>>>is good or bad or whether the goal is moral; it just helps us to 
>>>determjine
>>>whether the person is well intentioned.  There's a big difference.
>>
>> I don't think I agree.
>
>I'm shocked I say!....Shocked. :)

No you aren't. :-)

>> Components of my morality are based on an
>> understanding of why we do things. For example, I consider the incest
>> taboo moral because I understand something of the purpose it serves
>> and given the current state of our knowledge it seems the best way to
>> achieve that purpose.
>
>What about incest when one party is unable to contribute to procreation?  Is 
>that moral?

Asked myself the same question. It might be and it might not be. Such
a union would do no harm if /both/ parties were unable to contribute
to procreation (if it were only one, one of the parties might be
discouraged from procreation, which could in some circumstances be
undesirable). So on that level one might sanction incestuous sex.

But -- and it's a bit but -- moral standards have to be simplified to
some extent to make them understandable and transmissible.
Furthermore, our instinctual mechanisms aren't very finely tuned, and
that can make it difficult to make one of a similar set of
circumstances off limit and another on. So in practice, taboos tend to
be rather broad.

They also tend to be narrowed as knowledge increases, and this not
infrequently contributes to social discord. The change in our sexual
mores that followed the introduction of birth control pills is a good
example of that. The most sophisticated segments of society tend to
accept a more nuanced and realistic set of sexual mores than the
moderately sophisticated segments.

>The purpose is subjective.  You assume that having an increased incident of 
>mentally challenged people is a bad thing.  Is it?  Perhaps mankind being 
>reduced to that intellectual level would allow other species to thrive and 
>become dominant.  Perhaps manking dying out is in the best interest of the 
>planet?

I think you're anthropomorphizing the issue. The planet itself doesn't
care. Mankind might not be in the best interest of life, at least from
the perspective of many of its species, but, you know, nature, red in
tooth and claw.

What does seem to matter is the propagation of DNA. The society with
the more effective moral code is the society that is better at
spreading its genes and memes -- and the victor writes the histories.
Which is to say that you won't find very many people today preaching
the virtues of cannibalism, outside of corporate headquarters, anyway.
The cannibals lost.

>>>< And at some point in our understanding, we know
>>>> enough to take a rigorous, mathematical approach to these questions,
>>>> to make it hard science.
>>>
>>>Unless you can come up with a rigorous, mathematical, scientific 
>>>definition
>>>of moral (which I don't believe that you can), the rest of the equation is
>>>simply increasingly precise scalars of the things that youcasn quantify...
>>>until you get the variable z=whatever subjective moral value you've
>>>rationalized.
>>
>> I don't follow that last step. It seems to me true only some of the
>> time. Sometimes it's the other way around -- the things we quantify
>> influence and change our subjective moral values.
>
>Killing 1 person to save 1000 may or may not be moral.
>Killing 1000 to save 1 may or may not be moral
>Killing 1 to save 1 = may or may not be moral.
>
>The numbers involved are simply scalars.  You can add any other variables 
>that you want to the equations, and they may or may not add to the precision 
>of  the consequences...but they do not add to or definition of morality.

I don't see that these are part of a definition of morality, though.
They're merely possible consequences. One has to actually apply the
moral calculus to decide whether any one of those propositions is true
or not, and that moral calculus is quite complex.

>>>> We're currently a bit short of that, of course, but not by that much,
>>>> because we're beginning to model basic evolutionary processes on
>>>> computers, and I believe that the structures that evolve already
>>>> develop and exhibit both altruistic and competitive behaviors. At a
>>>> somewhat less basic level, evolutionary biology now sees these
>>>> behaviors in terms of the propagation of DNA: individuals are more apt
>>>> to help close relatives, say, than strangers because in helping the
>>>> relatives they increase the probability that their DNA will be passed
>>>> on. And there are circumstances in which amoral behaviors -- stealing
>>>> some food when the other monkey looks the other way, say -- have the
>>>> same effect of increasing the probability that one's DNA will be
>>>> transmitted. So I'd say it's only a matter of time before we have a
>>>> fairly rigorous, mathematical understanding of the basic principles
>>>> involved.
>>>
>>>You're starting with the arbitrary moral that life and evolution are 
>>>"good."
>>>That's a common and very helpful one to start with, but if there was no 
>>>life
>>>on Earth, would the univere care?  If there were an arbitrary number of
>>>beings on the planet that were generally happy and never aged or died, 
>>>would
>>>they care about evolution?
>>>
>>>Unless you can prove the answer is yes, it's a common personal philosophy.
>>
>> "Common personal philosophy" is a bit oxymoronic for my taste.
>
>Which part?  "Do unto others" fits that definition as well.

If it's commonly held, how is it personal? Or did you mean "a common
philosophy held by a number of individuals"?

>> I'd say instead that it's an observation regarding the "why" of morality.
>
>The Why of morality?  Why someone holds to a particular morality?
>
>As opposed to the Why questions answered by a philosphy which
>defines a person's morality?

I think the two are related: understand why some creatures have gills
and you will understand something of the possible forms of gills.

>> And
>> when we understand that why, we can in principle find the moral system
>> that best fulfills that why for a given set of practical
>> circumstances.
>
>In other words, we can subjectively pick a "best fit" morality?

I'd say we're experts at it. And the wonderful thing is that most
people don't even know we're doing it . . .

>>>> I'd say we're
>>>> talking statistics here at the very least, e.g., with current
>>>> technology, we can only predict the probability that marrying one's
>>>> first cousin will produce an idiot. There may be a subjective or
>>>> arbitrary /element/ in our decision because where we don't have
>>>> sufficient data to make a perfect one, but there is also an objective
>>>> element.
>>>
>>>The only objective element is the odds of the outcome.  Everything else
>>>is completely subjective.
>>
>> That's enough, though. Statistical assumptions are a common component
>> of law and morality.
>
>So... in answer to the original question...you're saying that science, 
>solely in
>the form of polls  and statistical assumptions of majority consensus are
> adequate to define morality and why we should behave a certain way?

No, rather that statistics in general is sufficient. It's all we have,
ever, with which to observe the world around us.

>That's entirely subjective...and fine for practical considerations such as 
>law
>(although in my mind it often fall's flat on it's face), but I *hope* that 
>when
>most people consider either a personal or higher philosophy they don't
>limit themselves to what is or should be practical law.

It's not entirely subjective, in fact it's anything but. I think you
really have to be careful with that distinction, because if you don't,
you'll end up equating New Age hocus pocus with mathematical physics.
Rather, what I'm doing is applying theory to observed phenomena that
most people don't think about even to the extent of achieving an
understanding that equals the philosophical state-of-the-art of 2500
years ago. And the hypotheses are testable: in many cases the
observations have already been made, e.g., anthropologists have
researched the incest taboo.

>>>> A hypothetical future society might be able to pick or modify the
>>>> genes of both parents in such as way as to cull unfortunate
>>>> recessives. What is in most circumstances an objectively immoral act
>>>> for us* might then become an objectively moral act for them.
>>>
>>>Nope.  The very nature of it being immoral for us and moral for them makes
>>>it subjective.
>>
>> I don't think so, any more than the fact that one can fry an egg in a
>> hot pan and not in a cold one makes burner activation decisions
>> subjective.
>
>I missed something...if a situation *might* be a moral or immoral act ...how 
>is that not subjective?

It's not subjective if it has to be moral in some circumstances and
amoral in others.

For example, killing one's brother to get his money might amoral,
whereas killing one's brother as the only alternative to having him
detonate a nuclear weapon might be moral. That can only be said within
the context of a local system and local circumstances and as a matter
of probability, but it isn't completely subjective.

>>>>>> But by the same token,
>>>>>> science recognizes that moral systems are at least to some extent
>>>>>> contingent, personal, and arbitrary. It can suggest changes only
>>>>>> within the context of externally-supplied parameters.
>>>
>>>And there you have it.  "z"  .. the fudge factor that science can't deal
>>>with. Morals are outiside of the bounds of science and strictly in the
>>>domain
>>>of philosphy.
>>
>> Your second assumption doesn't follow from the first: partial
>> understanding is not the same as no understanding at all.
>
>Science can help determine where a set or moral beliefs come from.  It can't 
>evaluate the correctness of those morals.

Why not?

Here's an actual example: A tribe considers it moral to eat the brains
of the dead. Science learns that that custom spreads kuru, a dreadful
degenerative neurological illness. Science concludes that the tribe's
moral assumption was probably incorrect, the practice is banned, and
the illness goes away.

>>>The best science can do with morals is measure commonality of morals 
>>>between
>>>people (x % of people believe killing in this circumstance is immoral)...
>>>but that is completely different than saying that science can define what 
>>>is
>>>moral.
>>
>> I think we're getting very close. Morality is just another phenomenon,
>> really, like tree climbing or scratching. Freud gave us some
>> significant insights, and more recent investigations in psychology,
>> neurology, and evolutionary biology have given us more.
>
>That is one philosphy.  Even evolutionary biology suggests why we would want 
>to behave in a certain way, not why we should.  On the other end of the 
>spectrum is that there is an absolute good (God's will) and our behavior 
>should be aligned with that will to the best of a person's abilities and 
>understanding.  And, there are a lot of philosphies in between the two.

I'd correct that to evolutionary biology suggests that if we don't
behave a certain way, our group will tend to die out, and our ways
with it.

>>>>>Exactly!  I think you just came around to my way of thinking on this
>>>>>issue!
>>>>>My original assertion was that science could not answer a certain
>>>>>question... Why... which is the domain of philosophy.  Philosphy deals
>>>>>with
>>>>>moral questions.  Good and bad are defined in the context of philosphy.
>>>>
>>>> Heh, no -- I don't think philosophy can answer "why" any more than
>>>> science can.
>>>
>>>No...but hopefully it provides a set of frameworks through which  a person
>>>can choose one they identify with and it will help guide them through the
>>>logical consequences of that particular philosphy.  If that philosphy
>>>includes God, then there are  requirements and consequences that are part 
>>>of
>>>that philosphy.  If it's existentialism, the higher rules don't exist and
>>>you make up your own.   Philosophy itself doesn't mandate that there is a
>>>correct answer; it's the people that adhere to a philosphy that attempt to
>>>do that.
>>
>> I disagree with that last. If there are no right and wrong answers,
>> there's no reason to search for answers: we might as well just sit
>> back and enjoy the ride.
>
>My last sentence was referring to the people of one philosphy wanting to 
>impose their "correct" philosophy on others, but to follow up on your point, 
>many people don't do any soul searching as to what they believe and what the 
>consequences of those beliefs are.  One of my points is that if there is no 
>God, then that may indeed be the case.  If we all just happen to have 
>arrived, live, and turn to dust... are there any answers that mean anything 
>to find other than whatever meaning that we give to our own lives?
>
>I'm curious as to Paul's thoughts on this.

Don't know about Paul, but I haven't found that the transition form
believing in some form of absolute morality to a more nuanced view has
made much of a difference in mine. I do much of what I do because it's
what I was raised and trained to do, and much because of what I was
born to be, and much because society has reached certain conclusions,
and much because I think about the consequences of various
possibilities. Most people don't do the latter, and insofar as they
don't, they might be expected to behave less morally if they didn't
believe in God, but I haven't seen any evidence that that's the case.

>>>>Which is to say I don't think it's the right question: as
>>>> I said earlier, the right question seems to be "why not." And that
>>>> understanding is coming from science, not philosophy, in the narrow
>>>> sense in which it's typically construed today.
>>>
>>>I think a lot of people would argue with that.
>>>
>>>Science may able to map in your brain whether or not you're happy, but
>>>knowing it wouldn't make you happy.  When the west started down the road 
>>>of
>>>Socratic thinking and the rest of the world didn't, there was a big shift 
>>>in
>>>technology and science, but that didn't make us happier, better, or more
>>>moral.  It made us more technologically advanced.   people of many 
>>>religions
>>>woudl argue that we're crazy for worshipping at thre alter of science 
>>>rather
>>>than trying to focus on "inner" issues.
>>
>> Scientific thinking made the West stronger, and so spread its memes.
>> It's an evolutionary process, and while it may seem callous to say
>> this, it seems to me that it doesn't matter what those people argue,
>> because they're losing. From that perspective, happiness doesn't
>> matter, either.
>
>You assume that species continuation is more meaningful than anything else. 
>If there is a God, then you're most likely wrong.  If there isn't, again... 
>the universe probably doesn't care one way or another.  In the very long 
>run...it's unlikely that our species continues anyway.

I'm not referring to species continuation, but to the spread of groups
and ideas. And it's not a matter of whether that's meaningful or not
-- you're still thinking in anthropomorphizing terms. Rther, it's a
matter of what will happen. The consequences of someone stealing my
car radio are meaningful to me in a personal sense, but that's only a
local determinant of morality. In the end, the moral systems we end up
with are the moral systems that survive.

>>>Understanding science is understanding how the physical universe works.
>>>That is not at all the same thing as understanding what is moral... or 
>>>even
>>>meaningful.  They are different questions.
>>
>> I don't think so. Science is just a more sophisticated and rigorous
>> way of examining those questions. As it develops, it does a better and
>> better job.
>
>I guess we just disagree.

I disagree that we disagree. :-)

>>>>>Of course asking questions is part of science...but they're different
>>>>>questions. A scientist doesn't start out to prove something is moral; he
>>>>>orshe proves something that can be proved.
>>>>>
>>>>>Likewise, a philospher that tries to provide a proof for their philosphy
>>>>>is
>>>>>equally guilty of fooling themselves... much like St. Anselm and Euler
>>>>>did.
>>>>>Granted, Anselm did better at fooling others...he was canonized for his
>>>>>silly piece of sophistry.
>>>>
>>>> That last is a fairly recent observation in philosophy. That being
>>>> said, I don't know that there's a theoretical argument against it:
>>>> philosophy does deal with the objective, it just isn't always
>>>> rigorous, it isn't always right, and I suspect it can't be complete
>>>> any more than mathematics can.
>>>
>>>And science shouldn't deal with the subjective...because once you define a
>>>subjective premise the outcome is also subjective... and that's not what
>>>science is for.  Then you start building a house of cards based on
>>>subjective premises.  No thank you.
>>
>> I'm not sure that that's true. In a sense, science always begins with
>> a subjective premise -- a hypothesis. Then it tests it. It's an
>> evolutionary process, as is, I believe, morality. All thought, really.
>
>The goal of science is to prove or disprove the hypothesis.  The hypothesis 
>shouldn't be subjective... it should be a rational extension of the known 
>into the previously unknown.

I'd argue that all hypotheses have an irrational element, insofar as
hypothesis formation involves examining possibilities and discarding
those that aren't consistent with logic or existing knowledge, or that
are logically superfluous. Nietzsche's "aufgeheben."

>Are you suggesting that one purpose of science is to prove morality?  Even a 
>subjective morality?  That's dangerous ground for science.

Why?

>You're going to prove through science that the Japanese internment camps 
>were right or wrong?  How about Hiroshima?

That's more along the lines of moral engineering than moral science.

But, since you mention it, I think the fascists are a good example of
the evolutionary and self-correcting nature of moral systems. Fascism
was an intensely conservative movement: it systematically resurrected
obsolete or obsolescent moral systems, e.g., European colonialism,
slavery, autocracy, wars of conquest. And those moral decisions led to
its failure. Fascism went extinct, or nearly so, and its morality went
with it.

Note that this is in some regards a Nietzschean view, in that good and
evil are no longer seen in Christian or local terms; it posits the
possibility of moral systems that contradict our own. At the same
time, it's a post-Nietzschean view, in that it's grounded in social
evolution.

>>>Philosophy starts with the subjective as a premise and (hopefully) uses
>>>logic to build a framework for extending the consequences of the premise 
>>>to
>>>take it as far as it can.  If at some point the premise causes a logical
>>>disconnect or undesirable (to the individual) consequences, either the
>>>premise is altered or the philosphy is abandoned on the side of the road.
>>>Happens all the time.
>>>
>>>If a person starts with a philosphy of "I should be able to do anyting I
>>>want... Why? Freedom implies this." Consequence? That same freedom is also
>>>given to others and then they can do anything they want.  Oh oh... what if
>>>they do something I don't like?  Alter the premise...repeat cycle.
>>>There really isn't a lot of science in this... (although there is 
>>>(hopefully
>>>a lot of logic involved), unless you start to define negative experiences 
>>>as
>>>empiricle data... but that's nitpicking a definition.
>>>
>>>In this and most philosphies, "moral" is usually inaccurately defined as
>>>desirable.
>>
>> Desirable from what perspective? Socially desirable might be more
>> accurate.
>
>Only if your morals include caring about the rest of society.

I suspect that all moral systems are an attempt to care about society,
whether the participants are aware of it or not. This isn't
necessarily the same as caring about one's fellow man.

>>>>>> Again, I think psychologists have devised many scales. They tend to be
>>>>>> self-centering and normalizing, e.g., "Rate on a scale of 1 to 10 how
>>>>>> much you love your wife and kids, with 1 being not at all and 10 being
>>>>>> extremely."
>>>>>
>>>>>Nope...that doesn't cut it as science.  There's no measure.  If I said 
>>>>>9,
>>>>>9
>>>>>what?   Compared to what?  What possible relative measure could there 
>>>>>be.
>>>>>If I asked how far away the moon is and someone said "2.3", what would
>>>>>that
>>>>>mean?  If yiou already knew the distance you determine the measure, but
>>>>>that's cheating.
>>>>
>>>> See below.
>>>>
>>>>>> And then you could ask the same thing about the other questions using
>>>>>> the same scale, and compare them to get an idea of the relative
>>>>>> importance of these things to you. It's crude, but it works.
>>>>>
>>>>>But the results would only apply to that one person (and so are 
>>>>>completely
>>>>>subjective).
>>>>
>>>> But that's easily solved by asking the question of a statistically
>>>> valid sample and comparing their responses. This isn't just theory --
>>>> it's done all the time.
>>>
>>>Ask 500 people how much they love their wife.  If they all say "A lot," or
>>>"10" does that mean they all love their wifes the same?  Of course not, 
>>>and
>>>because of that, the statistic is meaningless because there is no common
>>>frame of reference.
>>
>> Statistics creates a frame of reference, the degree to which the
>> average man can love and hate.
>
>That's just begging the question.
>Please quantify how much (in a meaningful way) what an average man is qand 
>how much he can love or hate.

Carl, I can't even do that with weight. What does a pound mean?
Nothing, except by comparison to other units. Units are merely a
convenient means of comparing things to one another.

>> A wily psychologist who wanted to go
>> farther could, by comparing it to something else, e.g., a man's
>> affection for his car.
>
>If what a man feels for his wife compares to the affection he feels for a 
>car...we're not talking about the same thing.
>You can't even compare the love a man feels for a wife to what they feel for 
>their kids or parents.

Why not? Psychologist routinely do (the love a man feels for his
mother trumps pretty much everything else, IIRC).

>> Ultimately one could map all emotional
>> tendencies.
>
>Mapping where it is in the brain is not the same as defining what it means.

>>>Even if you could isolate and measure "love" by some neural  model. Does
>>>that even suggest that the numbers would have any meaning?  Would the data
>>>mean the same thing to someone that had never been in love?
>>
>> Meaning, sure, but subjectively, a description isn't the same as
>> experience.
>
>"Here, this person is feeling love for someone because these neurons are 
>triggering."

>It doesn't matter that what the person being studies may have an entirely 
>different concept of love than the person doing the interpreting of the 
>data?

Doubtful. The world isn't that chaotic: if it were, we wouldn't be
able to understand anything.

>Isn't that a bit like describing the a kind of bluish color to a blind child 
>in terms of wavelengths?

But we were talking about measurement of a subjective state. The fact
that we do have measurements -- frequencies -- for the very subjective
experience of seeing something blue suggests that such a thing is
possible.

Caveman discussing color: Ugh! Me say sky "blue"!

Second caveman: Me call it "blue" too, then!

Scientist: Measurements show that the color that people perceive as
blue corresponds roughly to the wavelengths between 4100-4900
Angstroms

Caveman discussing wife: Ugh! Me love wife "a lot!"

Second caveman: Me call love for wife "a lot" too, then!

Scientist: Measurements show that the amount of love that people
perceive as "a lot" corresponds to such and such a degree of arousal
in such-and-such brain regions and the release of such-and-such
combinations of oxytocin and other hormones.

'Professor Helen Fisher, biological anthropologist at Rutgers
University (NY) is convinced that a distinct chemical system is
responsible for our varying love feelings: "We know that libido in men
and women is primarily governed by testosterone, and also by estrogen
in many animals. Close bonding, the third crucial emotion, has to do
with oxytocin and vasopressine. These are substances in the brain that
impart the feeling of deep affection".'

http://www.morgenwelt.de/futureframe/9908-oxytocin.htm

General observation: Historically, it hasn't been a good idea to
underestimate science, to make the assumption that there are areas of
intellectual investigation that are off limits to or exempt from it.



-- 
Josh

"I love it when I'm around the country club, and I hear people talking about
the debilitating
effects of a welfare society. At the same time, they leave their kids a
lifetime and beyond
of food stamps. Instead of having a welfare officer, they have a trust officer.
And instead
of food stamps, they have stocks and bonds."

- Warren Buffett
                                                     
--- SBBSecho 2.11-Win32
 * Origin: Time Warp of the Future BBS - Home of League 10 (1:14/400)