Text 4408, 883 rader
Skriven 2006-07-19 22:25:00 av Robert E Starr JR (4881.babylon5)
Ärende: Re: Atheists: America's m
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* * * This message was from Josh Hill to rec.arts.sf.tv.babylon5.m * * *
         * * * and has been forwarded to you by Lord Time * * *         
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On Mon, 17 Jul 2006 22:23:53 -0500, "Carl" <cengman7@hotmail.com>
wrote:

>
>"Josh Hill" <usereplyto@gmail.com> wrote in message
>news:528nb2por82f6jqc0b76mmgbglsa716o15@4ax.com...
>> On Sun, 16 Jul 2006 20:41:45 -0500, "Carl" <cengman7@hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
><snip>
>
>>>> That's not a why, because, as I said, it doesn't explain /why/ God
>>>> wishes it. It's no different than saying the King wishes it. Why does
>>>> the King wish it? Has he been studying philosophy? Did the Queen nag
>>>> him?
>>>
>>>There is no reason why a person's philosphy must be dependent on the
>>>rationale of someone (or God's) philosphy.  By saying "Because God wishes
>>>it." merely says that even though a person of faith may not know why... or
>>>even think it's possible to know why... the fact that a certain act or
>>>belief is in line with their understanding of their creator is sufficient
>>>to
>>>accept that act or belief as true, good, and correct... and to answer the
>>>questions "Why am I here? Why should I behave this way?" etc.
>>>
>>>That's not saying the philosphy is right or wrong.
>>
>> But your assertion was that "God answers the Why" -- I merely pointed
>> out that He doesn't. Which is to say that God isn't an explanation,
>> He's just an extra step.
>
>Ok, I'll rephrase... A person's belief in a Creator is usually sufficient to
>define absolute concepts of "Right" and "Wrong"  as being in accordance
>with their interpretation of the Creator's design and/or wishes, and as such
>answers sufficently for now (until the afterlife)
>
>"Why am I here?"
>"Why am I supposed to behave in a certain way (and what happens if I
>don't)?"
>"Why will I die (and what happens afterwards)?
>
>The short answer is "Because God says so."
>
>Granted, that by itself is not particularly intellectually gratifying, bit
>no one promised you an answer you'll like.  Those that look for more
>complete answers search the texts of their faith... and hopefully beyond to
>find an internal consistency between what the texts say and what seems
>consistent with their concept of a Creator.
>
>Having said that, "Because God says so" can, by itself be a more emotionally
>gratifying to some than "Well, over a long enough period of time and enough
>solar systems and planets, life was bound to happen eventually.  Have fun
>while you can."

OK, but how does that differ from an atheist's trying to make sense of
his own moral framework? I mean, when asked "Why," you could just as
easily answer "Because Karl Marx said it and his philosophy is the end
of all philosophies."


>It's been quite a while (years) since I suddenly found myself thinking "I
>wonder what ol' Immanuel Kant would say on the subject?"  so I'll have to
>admit I'm unprepared to discuss Kant in any detail.  I was surprised that I
>could actually pull out a quote of Kant that I had stashed without any
>reason to use until now. :)
>
>I'm actually rather surprised that I remembered as much as I did.

Reminds me of a big argument I had with a client: we were screaming at
one another and I blurted out "I don't see how you can know that a
priori!" At which point we both laughed and the argument was over.

But, seriously, perhaps because Kant's thought is as memorably elegant
as his prose is awkward?

>>>> But I don't think anyone can deny that the universe is intelligent.
>>>> After all, we're part of it by definition, and we're intelligent,
>>>> again by definition.
>>
>>>If the universe is intelligent simply to the degree of the aggregate the
>>>beings that live within it (which isn't what I was speaking of), then the
>>>intelligence has no "higher" set of "good" or "evil" that that of the
>>>existing universal populace....entirely subjective.
>>
>> There's a non-sequitur in those dots, in that the concepts of good and
>> evil held by the existing universal populace need not be entirely
>> subjective. And I don't think they are. If you were to travel to
>> another star system and find a completely unrelated intelligent
>> species there, you would find a morality that, while not identical to
>> ours, would contain similar concepts and precepts.
>
>> For example, if
>> they had the equivalent of our recessive genes, which is likely, they
>> would probably have an incest taboo for much the same reason we do.
>
>We have groups here that have no taboo against incest.

I may be wrong, but as I understand it, the incest taboo is universal
(except among Egyptian royalty). Note though that in primitive
societies it can take various forms, such as a taboo against marrying
within one's own clan.

>Of there was a genetic benefit to devouring the genetic material of member
>of the same species, does it follow that they would develop a "Do unto
>others" mentality?  There are a lot of possible scenerios in which an
>entirely different morailty could develop.

Well, yeah, but that doesn't make morality /subjective./ It's more
like a gene: if it's effective, it will propagate, and if it doesn't,
it will die off.

>I think you take it for granted that your morality is right and therefore
>would extend out into the universe.

On the contrary, I'm a moral relativist, which is to say that I
believe morality is an outcome of conditions. But I don't equate that
with the notion that the question of good and evil can't be
objectively determined given the circumstances.

>>>> For that matter, the same logic can be applied to morality: if
>>>> morality were not part of the universe, we wouldn't be, since we're
>>>> part of it as well.
>>>
>>>That makes no sense to me.  Single cell organisms have no sense of
>>>morality,
>>>they exist...and would most likely exist even  if higher life forms
>>>didn't.
>>
>> Again, the fact that some parts of the universe don't have morality
>> doesn't mean that the universe doesn't have morality, any more than
>> the fact that Tom DeLay is under indictment doesn't mean that Congress
>> is entirely without morality.
>
>Your initial argument was stated as a given with nothing to substantiate it.
>Why do you claim that if morality were not part of the universe, we wouldn't
>be?  Do cockroaches have morality?  Can't you image a scenerio in which
>humans don't exist but cockroaches do?

Heh -- an unintentional verbal ambiguity on my part. I didn't mean we
wouldn't exist, but rather that we wouldn't be part of the universe.
Morality is part of the universe. We're part of the universe. So the
universe has both morality and intelligence, or at least what passes
for intelligence among us earthfolk.

>Good and evil (and therefore morality) can't exist without higher
>intelligence, but (assuming the absence of God) the universe could.

I very much disagree with that first. I think good and evil are
consequences of natural law, in that selfish and self-sacrificing
behaviors both arise in an evolutionary situation. And this happened
before humans were around. We tend in our usual anthropocentric way to
arrogate morality to ourselves, but animals demonstrate it, sometimes
in amusing ways, as when a dog gets caught doing something he knows he
shouldn't have and shows every evidence of chagrin and guilt.

><snip>
>>>>>
>>>>>For the sake of this paragraph, let's assume there is no God.  You can't
>>>>>determine (other than at a personal level) that cannabilsm in ANY
>>>>>context
>>>>>is
>>>>>morally right or wrong without resorting to majority rules.   There is
>>>>>no
>>>>>absolute good or bad to judge against....so it's all subjective.
>>>>
>>>> Not necessarily. I can simply note that good and bad are phenomena,
>>>> and describe them with regard to the local systems that they serve.
>>>
>>>And good and bad in this case are subjective with regard to the local
>>>systems; there is no absolute definition that applies to all local
>>>systems.
>>
>> What do you mean by an "absolute definition"? There's no laundry list,
>> but that doesn't mean that there's no /theory/ that leads to an
>> optimal set of moral precepts given known circumstances. That doesn't
>> make it subjective: it's our own take on it that's subjective, and
>> probably has to be given our evolution ("There's no one law for the
>> lion and the lamb." - Blake).
>
>Now you've introduced the term "optimal" into this.  Optimal to whom?
>The existence of our species on this planet is certainly not optimal to
>other species.  Another subjective term.

I've already placed this in the context of social evolution. I meant
optimal from an evolutionary perspective, optimal in that the moral
memes survive and propagate. That may or may not be beneficial to
another species. In the long run, it /must/ be beneficial to at least
some individuals in our own.

><snip>
>
>>>> Components of my morality are based on an
>>>> understanding of why we do things. For example, I consider the incest
>>>> taboo moral because I understand something of the purpose it serves
>>>> and given the current state of our knowledge it seems the best way to
>>>> achieve that purpose.
>>>
>>>What about incest when one party is unable to contribute to procreation?
>>>Is
>>>that moral?
>>
>> Asked myself the same question. It might be and it might not be. Such
>> a union would do no harm if /both/ parties were unable to contribute
>> to procreation (if it were only one, one of the parties might be
>> discouraged from procreation, which could in some circumstances be
>> undesirable). So on that level one might sanction incestuous sex.
>>
>> But -- and it's a bit but -- moral standards have to be simplified to
>> some extent to make them understandable and transmissible.
>
>You have to have stupid morals so people can understand them? :)
>So many comments...so depressing.

Well, another way of looking at it is which would you rather have, our
huge convoluted income tax forms or a single page? We require some
degree of simplification lest we become bogged down in infinite and
impractical detail. That's not just true of morality.

>>>The purpose is subjective.  You assume that having an increased incident
>>>of
>>>mentally challenged people is a bad thing.  Is it?  Perhaps mankind being
>>>reduced to that intellectual level would allow other species to thrive and
>>>become dominant.  Perhaps mankind dying out is in the best interest of the
>>>planet?
>>
>> I think you're anthropomorphizing the issue. The planet itself doesn't
>> care. Mankind might not be in the best interest of life, at least from
>> the perspective of many of its species, but, you know, nature, red in
>> tooth and claw.
>
>Ok.. I should have written in the best interest of the rest of the planet.
>I thought it was implied in other things that I wrote, but if not...

No, I got that -- my point was that morality doesn't have to be about
the best interests of other species. It doesn't even have to be in the
best interests of all the members of our own. Certainly our own
morality isn't in the best interest of axe murderers and pederasts,
nor (and I hope I won't be attacked by the axe lobby for saying this)
do I think it should be.

>> What does seem to matter is the propagation of DNA. The society with
>> the more effective moral code is the society that is better at
>> spreading its genes and memes -- and the victor writes the histories.
>> Which is to say that you won't find very many people today preaching
>> the virtues of cannibalism, outside of corporate headquarters, anyway.
>> The cannibals lost.
>
>Ouch...forgive me one and all, but couldn't that lead back to another
>discussion of gay marriage?  Never mind
>
><Bad Carl...bad Carl...whack!>

Actually, it could -- and really, the question of why we even have
homosexuality given that it would seem to reduce the probability of
reproduction is an interesting one -- but, as you said . . .

>>>>>< And at some point in our understanding, we know
>>>>>> enough to take a rigorous, mathematical approach to these questions,
>>>>>> to make it hard science.
>>>>>
>>>>>Unless you can come up with a rigorous, mathematical, scientific
>>>>>definition
>>>>>of moral (which I don't believe that you can), the rest of the equation
>>>>>is
>>>>>simply increasingly precise scalars of the things that youcasn
>>>>>quantify...
>>>>>until you get the variable z=whatever subjective moral value you've
>>>>>rationalized.
>>>>
>>>> I don't follow that last step. It seems to me true only some of the
>>>> time. Sometimes it's the other way around -- the things we quantify
>>>> influence and change our subjective moral values.
>>>
>>>Killing 1 person to save 1000 may or may not be moral.
>>>Killing 1000 to save 1 may or may not be moral
>>>Killing 1 to save 1 = may or may not be moral.
>>>
>>>The numbers involved are simply scalars.  You can add any other variables
>>>that you want to the equations, and they may or may not add to the
>>>precision
>>>of  the consequences...but they do not add to or definition of morality.
>>
>> I don't see that these are part of a definition of morality, though.
>> They're merely possible consequences. One has to actually apply the
>> moral calculus to decide whether any one of those propositions is true
>> or not, and that moral calculus is quite complex.
>
>And that moral calculus seems (to me) to ultimately require a significant
>subjective element that reduces the rest to scalars.

I just don't agree that that element is completely subjective. A
society that allowed murder, for example, might soon find itself
depopulated, while a society that didn't allow killing in warfare
might find itself overrun. In both cases, the moral memes would be at
a competitive disadvantage vis a vis their counterparts in competing
societies. They would tend to die out.
>
><snip>
>>>>>You're starting with the arbitrary moral that life and evolution are
>>>>>"good." That's a common and very helpful one to start with,
>>>>>but if there was no life on Earth, would the universe care?
>>>>>If there were an arbitrary number of beings on the planet that
>>>>>were generally happy and never aged or died, would
>>>>>they care about evolution?
>>>>>
>>>>>Unless you can prove the answer is yes, it's a common personal
>>>>>philosophy.
>>>>
>>>> "Common personal philosophy" is a bit oxymoronic for my taste.
>>>
>>>Which part?  "Do unto others" fits that definition as well.
>>
>> If it's commonly held, how is it personal? Or did you mean "a common
>> philosophy held by a number of individuals"?
>
>A number of people sharing the same basic philosphy, but a philosphy that
>is not universally shared, which by implication leads to it being
>subjective.

It could be objective but local . . .
>
>>
>>>> I'd say instead that it's an observation regarding the "why" of
>>>> morality.
>>>
>>>The Why of morality?  Why someone holds to a particular morality?
>>>
>>>As opposed to the Why questions answered by a philosphy which
>>>defines a person's morality?
>>
>> I think the two are related: understand why some creatures have gills
>> and you will understand something of the possible forms of gills.
>
>But gills are neither "Right" nor "Wrong," "Good" nor "Evil"
>
>Why a person chose or developed a particular philosphy or morality is
>certainly an interesting question, but at some point the philosphy must
>stand beyond the circumstances of it's creation or else it's completely
>subjective.

Not I think to the extent that the creation of the philosophy is
itself an objectifiable event. Gills aren't good or evil, but they're
work and the fish swims and don't work and the fish croaks, and if
you're designing them, you have to know why they are -- what their
purposes is (to extract air from water), what their limitations are
(have to be biocompatible with the fish, can't be too big, etc.). Same
thing with moral philosophy, I think. If you know why we develop moral
codes, what purpose they serve, you can design moral codes that fit
those purposes. And that's intimately tied in with the question of why
people have and develop morality in the first place, of what purpose
it serves in human affairs.

>>>> And
>>>> when we understand that why, we can in principle find the moral system
>>>> that best fulfills that why for a given set of practical
>>>> circumstances.
>>>
>>>In other words, we can subjectively pick a "best fit" morality?
>>
>> I'd say we're experts at it. And the wonderful thing is that most
>> people don't even know we're doing it . . .
>
>I tend to agree with you.  I just wanted to make sure that you were saying
>what I thought you were.
>
>>>>>> I'd say we're
>>>>>> talking statistics here at the very least, e.g., with current
>>>>>> technology, we can only predict the probability that marrying one's
>>>>>> first cousin will produce an idiot. There may be a subjective or
>>>>>> arbitrary /element/ in our decision because where we don't have
>>>>>> sufficient data to make a perfect one, but there is also an objective
>>>>>> element.
>>>>>
>>>>>The only objective element is the odds of the outcome.  Everything else
>>>>>is completely subjective.
>>>>
>>>> That's enough, though. Statistical assumptions are a common component
>>>> of law and morality.
>>>
>>>So... in answer to the original question...you're saying that science,
>>>solely in
>>>the form of polls  and statistical assumptions of majority consensus are
>>> adequate to define morality and why we should behave a certain way?
>>
>> No, rather that statistics in general is sufficient. It's all we have,
>> ever, with which to observe the world around us.
>>
>>>That's entirely subjective...and fine for practical considerations such as
>>>law
>>>(although in my mind it often fall's flat on it's face), but I *hope* that
>>>when
>>>most people consider either a personal or higher philosophy they don't
>>>limit themselves to what is or should be practical law.
>>
>> It's not entirely subjective, in fact it's anything but. I think you
>> really have to be careful with that distinction, because if you don't,
>> you'll end up equating New Age hocus pocus with mathematical physics.
>> Rather, what I'm doing is applying theory to observed phenomena that
>> most people don't think about even to the extent of achieving an
>> understanding that equals the philosophical state-of-the-art of 2500
>> years ago. And the hypotheses are testable: in many cases the
>> observations have already been made, e.g., anthropologists have
>> researched the incest taboo.
>
>Anthropologists may study what a taboo or a moral is and how... or even why 
>it was adopted
>by a society, but that's not the question Philosphy is interested in.

I think we've established that we take a different view of the limits
of philosophy. From my perspective, science remains "natural
philosophy." And I think contemporary philosophers hurt themselves to
the extent that they distance themselves too far from science. It's
not something Aristotle would have done.

>>>>>> A hypothetical future society might be able to pick or modify the
>>>>>> genes of both parents in such as way as to cull unfortunate
>>>>>> recessives. What is in most circumstances an objectively immoral act
>>>>>> for us* might then become an objectively moral act for them.
>>>>>
>>>>>Nope.  The very nature of it being immoral for us and moral for them
>>>>>makes
>>>>>it subjective.
>>>>
>>>> I don't think so, any more than the fact that one can fry an egg in a
>>>> hot pan and not in a cold one makes burner activation decisions
>>>> subjective.
>>>
>>>I missed something...if a situation *might* be a moral or immoral act
>>>...how
>>>is that not subjective?
>>
>> It's not subjective if it has to be moral in some circumstances and
>> amoral in others.
>>
>> For example, killing one's brother to get his money might amoral,
>> whereas killing one's brother as the only alternative to having him
>> detonate a nuclear weapon might be moral. That can only be said within
>> the context of a local system and local circumstances and as a matter
>> of probability, but it isn't completely subjective.
>>
>
>Unless one's philosphy is absolute pacifism, in which case both actions
>are immoral.... and which philosphy you choose is subjective.

The choice is always subjective, but that doesn't mean that there
isn't an objective morality, specific to local circumstances, that can
assess it. 
>
>>>>>>>> But by the same token,
>>>>>>>> science recognizes that moral systems are at least to some extent
>>>>>>>> contingent, personal, and arbitrary. It can suggest changes only
>>>>>>>> within the context of externally-supplied parameters.
>>>>>
>>>>>And there you have it.  "z"  .. the fudge factor that science can't deal
>>>>>with. Morals are outiside of the bounds of science and strictly in the
>>>>>domain
>>>>>of philosphy.
>>>>
>>>> Your second assumption doesn't follow from the first: partial
>>>> understanding is not the same as no understanding at all.
>>>
>>>Science can help determine where a set or moral beliefs come from.  It
>>>can't
>>>evaluate the correctness of those morals.
>>
>> Why not?
>>
>> Here's an actual example: A tribe considers it moral to eat the brains
>> of the dead. Science learns that that custom spreads kuru, a dreadful
>> degenerative neurological illness. Science concludes that the tribe's
>> moral assumption was probably incorrect, the practice is banned, and
>> the illness goes away.
>
>You're talking apples and oranges again.
>
>It makes a difference why the tribe thinks it's moral to eat the brains
>of the dead.  It is possible for morals are more important than
>physical safety... even the safety of the entire tribe.

Sure, but in this case, that wasn't the case. They were just lacking
knowledge.

>>>>>The best science can do with morals is measure commonality of morals
>>>>>between
>>>>>people (x % of people believe killing in this circumstance is
>>>>>immoral)...
>>>>>but that is completely different than saying that science can define
>>>>>what
>>>>>is
>>>>>moral.
>>>>
>>>> I think we're getting very close. Morality is just another phenomenon,
>>>> really, like tree climbing or scratching. Freud gave us some
>>>> significant insights, and more recent investigations in psychology,
>>>> neurology, and evolutionary biology have given us more.
>>>
>>>That is one philosphy.  Even evolutionary biology suggests why we would
>>>want
>>>to behave in a certain way, not why we should.  On the other end of the
>>>spectrum is that there is an absolute good (God's will) and our behavior
>>>should be aligned with that will to the best of a person's abilities and
>>>understanding.  And, there are a lot of philosphies in between the two.
>>
>> I'd correct that to evolutionary biology suggests that if we don't
>> behave a certain way, our group will tend to die out, and our ways
>> with it.
>
>So what?

Well, quite beyond the question of whether it matters whether we die
out -- and I for one am not anxious to join that experiment -- if a
morality leads to a group's dying out, the morality will probably die
with it. That, in my opinion, is the essential truth of morality: it
is memetic.

><snip>
>
>>>> ... If there are no right and wrong answers,
>>>> there's no reason to search for answers: we might as well just sit
>>>> back and enjoy the ride.
>>>
>>>Many people don't do any soul searching as to what they believe
>>>and what the consequences of those beliefs are.
>>> One of my points is that if there is no
>>>God, then that may indeed be the case.  If we all just happen to have
>>>arrived, live, and turn to dust... are there any answers that mean
>>>anything
>>>to find other than whatever meaning that we give to our own lives?
>>>
>>>I'm curious as to Paul's thoughts on this.
>>
>> Don't know about Paul, but I haven't found that the transition form
>> believing in some form of absolute morality to a more nuanced view has
>> made much of a difference in mine. I do much of what I do because it's
>> what I was raised and trained to do, and much because of what I was
>> born to be, and much because society has reached certain conclusions,
>> and much because I think about the consequences of various
>> possibilities. Most people don't do the latter, and insofar as they
>> don't, they might be expected to behave less morally if they didn't
>> believe in God, but I haven't seen any evidence that that's the case.
>
>I think it's pretty clear that the fear that there is a God impacts
>many people's behavior.

Does it? I mean, I've asked myself this many times: how can people who
say they're Christians go out and commit crimes and otherwise do
things that are likely to get them consigned to Hell given that they
believe they'll spend eternity being raked over hot coals, and that
eternity is a long time?

The answer I think is that while religion isn't without positive
effect, people tend to twist it to justify their own acts. The
good-natured generous person pats himself on the head and says "I'm
good natured and generous, surely St. Pete will welcome me into
heaven." The vile, miserly misanthrope says "I worship God a lot and
I'm faithful to my wife. Surely St. Pete will welcome me into heaven
while all those sin-committing faggots and fetus-killers go to Hell
and roast forever."

I've read that most Christians think they'll end up in heaven. People
can justify almost anything.

>>>>>>Which is to say I don't think it's the right question: as
>>>>>> I said earlier, the right question seems to be "why not." And that
>>>>>> understanding is coming from science, not philosophy, in the narrow
>>>>>> sense in which it's typically construed today.
>>>>>
>>>>>I think a lot of people would argue with that.
>>>>>
>>>>>Science may able to map in your brain whether or not you're happy, but
>>>>>knowing it wouldn't make you happy.  When the west started down the road
>>>>>of
>>>>>Socratic thinking and the rest of the world didn't, there was a big
>>>>>shift
>>>>>in
>>>>>technology and science, but that didn't make us happier, better, or more
>>>>>moral.  It made us more technologically advanced.   people of many
>>>>>religions
>>>>>woudl argue that we're crazy for worshipping at thre alter of science
>>>>>rather
>>>>>than trying to focus on "inner" issues.
>>>>
>>>> Scientific thinking made the West stronger, and so spread its memes.
>>>> It's an evolutionary process, and while it may seem callous to say
>>>> this, it seems to me that it doesn't matter what those people argue,
>>>> because they're losing. From that perspective, happiness doesn't
>>>> matter, either.
>>>
>>>You assume that species continuation is more meaningful than anything
>>>else.
>>>If there is a God, then you're most likely wrong.  If there isn't,
>>>again...
>>>the universe probably doesn't care one way or another.  In the very long
>>>run...it's unlikely that our species continues anyway.
>>
>> I'm not referring to species continuation, but to the spread of groups
>> and ideas.
>
>But the spread of groups is not moral or immoral.  Even the spread of ideas
>is not particularly moral by itself.  Spreading ideas such as racism, for 
>instance
>isn't a particularly moral act (by my morals).

My point is that as the groups spread, they carry their memes, their
social constructs with them -- and that these include their specific
morality.

As things now stand, the groups that are spreading aren't the ones
that believe in cannibalism, but are the ones that believe in, say,
democracy. And some time in the future, it will be another set of
moral beliefs, a hatred of sex with robots, maybe, or the belief that
all men should be cloned. And that will become our new morality, both
insofar as they increase in numbers and their moral memes spread to
other groups.

>>>>>And science shouldn't deal with the subjective...because once you define
>>>>>a
>>>>>subjective premise the outcome is also subjective... and that's not what
>>>>>science is for.  Then you start building a house of cards based on
>>>>>subjective premises.  No thank you.
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure that that's true. In a sense, science always begins with
>>>> a subjective premise -- a hypothesis. Then it tests it. It's an
>>>> evolutionary process, as is, I believe, morality. All thought, really.
>>>
>>>The goal of science is to prove or disprove the hypothesis.  The
>>>hypothesis
>>>shouldn't be subjective... it should be a rational extension of the known
>>>into the previously unknown.
>>
>> I'd argue that all hypotheses have an irrational element, insofar as
>> hypothesis formation involves examining possibilities and discarding
>> those that aren't consistent with logic or existing knowledge, or that
>> are logically superfluous. Nietzsche's "aufgeheben."
>
>Hopefully, by developing the hypothesis you've shed yourself of the
>irrational and work from a rational possibility.
>
>Now, you may have a subjective preference for one hypothesis over
>another, but the hypothesis either results in objective results or it's
>dubious science.

To be sure.
>
>>>Are you suggesting that one purpose of science is to prove morality?  Even
>>>a subjective morality?  That's dangerous ground for science.
>>
>> Why?
>>
>
>One can rationally argue that wars have positive results. Extend that to try 
>to
>prove (because of quantifiable results) that war is moral.

But that's been done, e.g., the doctrine of just war.

>"In Italy for thirty years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror, 
>murder,
>bloodshed - they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci and the 
>Renaissance.
>In Switzerland they had brotherly love, five hundred years of democracy and
>peace and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock."
>
>-- Spoken by Orson Welles' character Harry Lime

And warfare probably contributed to other European and human
developments as well. It's not without its function, albeit one would
think that we'd be smart enough by now to find something better. (One
could argue that capitalism is an early attempt at a substitute).

>>>>>>>> Again, I think psychologists have devised many scales. They tend to
>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>> self-centering and normalizing, e.g., "Rate on a scale of 1 to 10
>>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>> much you love your wife and kids, with 1 being not at all and 10
>>>>>>>> being
>>>>>>>> extremely."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Nope...that doesn't cut it as science.  There's no measure.  If I said
>>>>>>>9,
>>>>>>>9
>>>>>>>what?   Compared to what?  What possible relative measure could there
>>>>>>>be.
>>>>>>>If I asked how far away the moon is and someone said "2.3", what would
>>>>>>>that
>>>>>>>mean?  If yiou already knew the distance you determine the measure,
>>>>>>>but
>>>>>>>that's cheating.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> See below.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And then you could ask the same thing about the other questions
>>>>>>>> using
>>>>>>>> the same scale, and compare them to get an idea of the relative
>>>>>>>> importance of these things to you. It's crude, but it works.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>But the results would only apply to that one person (and so are
>>>>>>>completely
>>>>>>>subjective).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But that's easily solved by asking the question of a statistically
>>>>>> valid sample and comparing their responses. This isn't just theory --
>>>>>> it's done all the time.
>>>>>
>>>>>Ask 500 people how much they love their wife.  If they all say "A lot,"
>>>>>or
>>>>>"10" does that mean they all love their wifes the same?  Of course not,
>>>>>and
>>>>>because of that, the statistic is meaningless because there is no common
>>>>>frame of reference.
>>>>
>>>> Statistics creates a frame of reference, the degree to which the
>>>> average man can love and hate.
>>>
>>>That's just begging the question.
>>>Please quantify how much (in a meaningful way) what an average man is qand
>>>how much he can love or hate.
>>
>> Carl, I can't even do that with weight. What does a pound mean?
>> Nothing, except by comparison to other units. Units are merely a
>> convenient means of comparing things to one another.
>
>No... there  is an absolute standard as to what a pound is (and for the US 
>it's locked away in the USB of Standards and Measures).  Because of this, 
>you can provide an absolute, unambiguous translation to other units as well. 
>Without units, the numbers are meaningless.
>
>If I say that I'm 6' 3"... there is an absolute standard for what a foot and 
>an inch are.  They allow us to determine in a scientifically unambiguous way 
>that I am taller than my 5' 2" wife.  Without the numbers, I could say I'm 
>"tall," but that's about it.... and that's meaningless when comparing me to 
>someone 6'2 " or 6' 5" if we're not in the same room.

But it's entirely arbitrary. The unit could be a pound or it could be
an ounce. It's simply an arbitrary measure of weight. Which means it's
no different than a measure of happiness. About the best that can be
said is that we can at present measure it more accurately in
individual cases than we can love or happiness, because we have to
rely on an individual's subjective impression of his happiness. That
will change one day, but for now we're limited by the primitive state
of our knowledge.

>>>> A wily psychologist who wanted to go
>>>> farther could, by comparing it to something else, e.g., a man's
>>>> affection for his car.
>>>
>>>If what a man feels for his wife compares to the affection he feels for a
>>>car...we're not talking about the same thing.
>>>You can't even compare the love a man feels for a wife to what they feel
>>>for
>>>their kids or parents.
>>
>> Why not? Psychologist routinely do (the love a man feels for his
>> mother trumps pretty much everything else, IIRC).
>
>Hmmm.  Then I fall outside the norm.  I do that a lot.

So, in some regards, does everybody. :-)

>>>> Ultimately one could map all emotional
>>>> tendencies.
>>>
>>>Mapping where it is in the brain is not the same as defining what it
>>>means.
>>
>>>>>Even if you could isolate and measure "love" by some neural  model. Does
>>>>>that even suggest that the numbers would have any meaning?  Would the
>>>>>data
>>>>>mean the same thing to someone that had never been in love?
>>>>
>>>> Meaning, sure, but subjectively, a description isn't the same as
>>>> experience.
>>>
>>>"Here, this person is feeling love for someone because these neurons are
>>>triggering."
>>
>>>It doesn't matter that what the person being studied may have an entirely
>>>different concept of love than the person doing the interpreting of the
>>>data?
>>
>> Doubtful. The world isn't that chaotic: if it were, we wouldn't be
>> able to understand anything.
>
>No...experience for tangible things gives us a common frame of reference.
>For most things, desirable or undesirable don't have to be quantified.
>In this case, though, you're claiming that you can go beyond that and
>actually quantify them in a meaningfule way.
>
>I still don't see how.

I guess I don't see how not. I mean, as a matter of practicality,
psychologists and social scientists do it all the time. And having
filled out some surveys, I know that it isn't always easy to answer
those questions, but coarse as the results are, I don't think it can
be said that they aren't quantifiable, particularly in the aggregate,
since individual variations tend to cancel.

>>>Isn't that a bit like describing the a kind of bluish color to a blind
>>>child
>>>in terms of wavelengths?
>>
>> But we were talking about measurement of a subjective state. The fact
>> that we do have measurements -- frequencies -- for the very subjective
>> experience of seeing something blue suggests that such a thing is
>> possible.
>>
>> Caveman discussing color: Ugh! Me say sky "blue"!
>>
>> Second caveman: Me call it "blue" too, then!
>>
>> Scientist: Measurements show that the color that people perceive as
>> blue corresponds roughly to the wavelengths between 4100-4900
>> Angstroms
>
>OK... now take away the measure and describe blue in terms
>of a number of tomatoes.... or just the number 6 with no units.
>
>The units are important... and they have to be meaningful.

Language is a two-way street: if we described blue that way, and did
so systematically, the meaning of the words would change and they
would become units, just as did the meaning of "Angstrom," which
previously referred to some poor dead guy and now refers to a meaning
of length.

>> Caveman discussing wife: Ugh! Me love wife "a lot!"
>>
>> Second caveman: Me call love for wife "a lot" too, then!
>>
>> Scientist: Measurements show that the amount of love that people
>> perceive as "a lot" corresponds to such and such a degree of arousal
>> in such-and-such brain regions and the release of such-and-such
>> combinations of oxytocin and other hormones.
>>
>> 'Professor Helen Fisher, biological anthropologist at Rutgers
>> University (NY) is convinced that a distinct chemical system is
>> responsible for our varying love feelings: "We know that libido in men
>> and women is primarily governed by testosterone, and also by estrogen
>> in many animals. Close bonding, the third crucial emotion, has to do
>> with oxytocin and vasopressine. These are substances in the brain that
>> impart the feeling of deep affection".'
>>
>> http://www.morgenwelt.de/futureframe/9908-oxytocin.htm
>>
>> General observation: Historically, it hasn't been a good idea to
>> underestimate science, to make the assumption that there are areas of
>> intellectual investigation that are off limits to or exempt from it.
>>
>
> Perhaps.  I'm unconvinced.  I also don't think we'll ever get a FTL drive,
>and so I think our race is stuck on this planet and therefore has a limited
>span.
>
>I may be wrong.  It happens far too often for my comfort. :)

Dangerous to say we won't get an FTL drive! After all, how likely
would you have thought it 2000 years ago that we'd one day have the
technology to fly at 500 mph? The best that can be said is that right
now we don't have a clue how to do it -- or, perhaps more accurately,
that we have some glimmers of how it might be done, but that we have
no idea how to implement them.

-- 
Josh

"I love it when I'm around the country club, and I hear people talking about
the debilitating
effects of a welfare society. At the same time, they leave their kids a
lifetime and beyond
of food stamps. Instead of having a welfare officer, they have a trust officer.
And instead
of food stamps, they have stocks and bonds."

- Warren Buffett
                                      
--- SBBSecho 2.11-Win32
 * Origin: Time Warp of the Future BBS - Home of League 10 (1:14/400)