Text 4434, 738 rader
Skriven 2006-07-20 08:32:00 av Robert E Starr JR (4907.babylon5)
Ärende: Re: Atheists: America's m
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  * * * This message was from Carl to rec.arts.sf.tv.babylon5.m * * *   
         * * * and has been forwarded to you by Lord Time * * *         
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"Josh Hill" <usereplyto@gmail.com> wrote in message 
news:7jssb2hrsmclb5mjpnf6lm315b9rq5khvi@4ax.com...
> On Mon, 17 Jul 2006 22:23:53 -0500, "Carl" <cengman7@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
<snip>

>>"Why am I here?"
>>"Why am I supposed to behave in a certain way (and what happens if I
>>don't)?"
>>"Why will I die (and what happens afterwards)?
>>
>>The short answer is "Because God says so."
>>
>>Granted, that by itself is not particularly intellectually gratifying, bit
>>no one promised you an answer you'll like.  Those that look for more
>>complete answers search the texts of their faith... and hopefully beyond 
>>to
>>find an internal consistency between what the texts say and what seems
>>consistent with their concept of a Creator.
>>
>>Having said that, "Because God says so" can, by itself be a more 
>>emotionally
>>gratifying to some than "Well, over a long enough period of time and 
>>enough
>>solar systems and planets, life was bound to happen eventually.  Have fun
>>while you can."
>
> OK, but how does that differ from an atheist's trying to make sense of
> his own moral framework? I mean, when asked "Why," you could just as
> easily answer "Because Karl Marx said it and his philosophy is the end
> of all philosophies."

Josh... you worship Karl Marx... Now everything makes perfect sense! :-)

There's two different elements in your statement.  The philosphy itself may 
be more than sufficent for the atheist, but I don't think that Karl Marx has 
the authority to validate the philosophy at a higher than personal level 
(which isn't a problem for the atheist).  However, if you believe that Karl 
Marx was a prophet for a higher authority (or the incarnation of one), then 
it is the same thing (but atheist would be "right out").

<snip>

>>If there was a genetic benefit to devouring the genetic material of member
>>of the same species, does it follow that they would develop a "Do unto
>>others" mentality?  There are a lot of possible scenerios in which an
>>entirely different morailty could develop.
>
> Well, yeah, but that doesn't make morality /subjective./ It's more
> like a gene: if it's effective, it will propagate, and if it doesn't,
> it will die off.

But that particular genetic benefit might work counter to
"Do unto others" and not be adopted by that society,
so the morality is subjective in the absence of a higher
moral compass than simply propagation.

I still see no direct correlation to species propagation
and morality.  I see propagation as a rationalization for a morality.

Within my moral framework there are things that I would die for...and would 
have died for before I got married and had my kids (thereby failing to 
propagate).   Does this idea violate your personal or meta moralities?

>
>>I think you take it for granted that your morality is right and therefore
>>would extend out into the universe.
>
> On the contrary, I'm a moral relativist, which is to say that I
> believe morality is an outcome of conditions. But I don't equate that
> with the notion that the question of good and evil can't be
> objectively determined given the circumstances.

But could you plug all of the elements into a single applicable equation and 
*always* have it evaluate to everyone's agreement on what is right or wrong? 
Not likely.

>>>>> For that matter, the same logic can be applied to morality: if
>>>>> morality were not part of the universe, we wouldn't be, since we're
>>>>> part of it as well.
>>>>
>>>>That makes no sense to me.  Single cell organisms have no sense of
>>>>morality,
>>>>they exist...and would most likely exist even  if higher life forms
>>>>didn't.
>>>
>>> Again, the fact that some parts of the universe don't have morality
>>> doesn't mean that the universe doesn't have morality, any more than
>>> the fact that Tom DeLay is under indictment doesn't mean that Congress
>>> is entirely without morality.
>>
>>Your initial argument was stated as a given with nothing to substantiate 
>>it.
>>Why do you claim that if morality were not part of the universe, we 
>>wouldn't
>>be?  Do cockroaches have morality?  Can't you image a scenerio in which
>>humans don't exist but cockroaches do?
>
> Heh -- an unintentional verbal ambiguity on my part. I didn't mean we
> wouldn't exist, but rather that we wouldn't be part of the universe.
> Morality is part of the universe. We're part of the universe. So the
> universe has both morality and intelligence, or at least what passes
> for intelligence among us earthfolk.

The universe *contains* elements of intelligence and (varying degrees of) 
morality.
That's different than the universe being intelligent or moral.  It doesn't 
even siggest that the universe must continue to contain intelligence or 
morality.  It could be comletely coincidental.  My home may or may not have 
people (and the world's greatest black lab) in it.  If so, it contains 
elements of intelligence and morality.  If not, the house doesn't cease to 
exist or change the underlying properties of the house.

>
>>Good and evil (and therefore morality) can't exist without higher
>>intelligence, but (assuming the absence of God) the universe could.
>
> I very much disagree with that first. I think good and evil are
> consequences of natural law, in that selfish and self-sacrificing
> behaviors both arise in an evolutionary situation. And this happened
> before humans were around. We tend in our usual anthropocentric way to
> arrogate morality to ourselves, but animals demonstrate it, sometimes
> in amusing ways, as when a dog gets caught doing something he knows he
> shouldn't have and shows every evidence of chagrin and guilt.


Honestly, the first sentence was not what I intended to write,
but for the life of me I don't know the point I wanted to make.

Probably just restating "A *higher* good and evil could not exist without
a higher intelligence..."

>
>><snip>

>>>>>>
>>>>>>For the sake of this paragraph, let's assume there is no God.  You 
>>>>>>can't
>>>>>>determine (other than at a personal level) that cannabilsm in ANY
>>>>>>context
>>>>>>is
>>>>>>morally right or wrong without resorting to majority rules.   There is
>>>>>>no
>>>>>>absolute good or bad to judge against....so it's all subjective.
>>>>>
>>>>> Not necessarily. I can simply note that good and bad are phenomena,
>>>>> and describe them with regard to the local systems that they serve.
>>>>
>>>>And good and bad in this case are subjective with regard to the local
>>>>systems; there is no absolute definition that applies to all local
>>>>systems.
>>>
>>> What do you mean by an "absolute definition"? There's no laundry list,
>>> but that doesn't mean that there's no /theory/ that leads to an
>>> optimal set of moral precepts given known circumstances. That doesn't
>>> make it subjective: it's our own take on it that's subjective, and
>>> probably has to be given our evolution ("There's no one law for the
>>> lion and the lamb." - Blake).
>>
>>Now you've introduced the term "optimal" into this.  Optimal to whom?
>>The existence of our species on this planet is certainly not optimal to
>>other species.  Another subjective term.
>
> I've already placed this in the context of social evolution. I meant
> optimal from an evolutionary perspective, optimal in that the moral
> memes survive and propagate. That may or may not be beneficial to
> another species. In the long run, it /must/ be beneficial to at least
> some individuals in our own.

An "optimal" set of moral concepts does not mean it is
universally objective.


>
>><snip>
>>
>>>>> Components of my morality are based on an
>>>>> understanding of why we do things. For example, I consider the incest
>>>>> taboo moral because I understand something of the purpose it serves
>>>>> and given the current state of our knowledge it seems the best way to
>>>>> achieve that purpose.
>>>>
>>>>What about incest when one party is unable to contribute to procreation?
>>>>Is
>>>>that moral?
>>>
>>> Asked myself the same question. It might be and it might not be. Such
>>> a union would do no harm if /both/ parties were unable to contribute
>>> to procreation (if it were only one, one of the parties might be
>>> discouraged from procreation, which could in some circumstances be
>>> undesirable). So on that level one might sanction incestuous sex.
>>>
>>> But -- and it's a bit but -- moral standards have to be simplified to
>>> some extent to make them understandable and transmissible.
>>
>>You have to have stupid morals so people can understand them? :)
>>So many comments...so depressing.
>
> Well, another way of looking at it is which would you rather have, our
> huge convoluted income tax forms or a single page? We require some
> degree of simplification lest we become bogged down in infinite and
> impractical detail. That's not just true of morality.

GE had to file a 24,000 page tax return.  If that's the simplified form, we 
need
to rethinl (or redefine) "simplified."


>
>>>>The purpose is subjective.  You assume that having an increased incident
>>>>of
>>>>mentally challenged people is a bad thing.  Is it?  Perhaps mankind 
>>>>being
>>>>reduced to that intellectual level would allow other species to thrive 
>>>>and
>>>>become dominant.  Perhaps mankind dying out is in the best interest of 
>>>>the
>>>>planet?
>>>
>>> I think you're anthropomorphizing the issue. The planet itself doesn't
>>> care. Mankind might not be in the best interest of life, at least from
>>> the perspective of many of its species, but, you know, nature, red in
>>> tooth and claw.
>>
>>Ok.. I should have written in the best interest of the rest of the planet.
>>I thought it was implied in other things that I wrote, but if not...
>
> No, I got that -- my point was that morality doesn't have to be about
> the best interests of other species. It doesn't even have to be in the
> best interests of all the members of our own. Certainly our own
> morality isn't in the best interest of axe murderers and pederasts,
> nor (and I hope I won't be attacked by the axe lobby for saying this)
> do I think it should be.

I think I made the same point elsewhere.
Agreement? :)


>
>>> What does seem to matter is the propagation of DNA. The society with
>>> the more effective moral code is the society that is better at
>>> spreading its genes and memes -- and the victor writes the histories.
>>> Which is to say that you won't find very many people today preaching
>>> the virtues of cannibalism, outside of corporate headquarters, anyway.
>>> The cannibals lost.
>>
>>Ouch...forgive me one and all, but couldn't that lead back to another
>>discussion of gay marriage?  Never mind
>>
>><Bad Carl...bad Carl...whack!>
>
> Actually, it could -- and really, the question of why we even have
> homosexuality given that it would seem to reduce the probability of
> reproduction is an interesting one -- but, as you said . . .
>
>>>>>>< And at some point in our understanding, we know
>>>>>>> enough to take a rigorous, mathematical approach to these questions,
>>>>>>> to make it hard science.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Unless you can come up with a rigorous, mathematical, scientific
>>>>>>definition
>>>>>>of moral (which I don't believe that you can), the rest of the 
>>>>>>equation
>>>>>>is
>>>>>>simply increasingly precise scalars of the things that youcasn
>>>>>>quantify...
>>>>>>until you get the variable z=whatever subjective moral value you've
>>>>>>rationalized.
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't follow that last step. It seems to me true only some of the
>>>>> time. Sometimes it's the other way around -- the things we quantify
>>>>> influence and change our subjective moral values.
>>>>
>>>>Killing 1 person to save 1000 may or may not be moral.
>>>>Killing 1000 to save 1 may or may not be moral
>>>>Killing 1 to save 1 = may or may not be moral.
>>>>
>>>>The numbers involved are simply scalars.  You can add any other 
>>>>variables
>>>>that you want to the equations, and they may or may not add to the
>>>>precision
>>>>of  the consequences...but they do not add to or definition of morality.
>>>
>>> I don't see that these are part of a definition of morality, though.
>>> They're merely possible consequences. One has to actually apply the
>>> moral calculus to decide whether any one of those propositions is true
>>> or not, and that moral calculus is quite complex.
>>
>>And that moral calculus seems (to me) to ultimately require a significant
>>subjective element that reduces the rest to scalars.
>
> I just don't agree that that element is completely subjective. A
> society that allowed murder, for example, might soon find itself
> depopulated, while a society that didn't allow killing in warfare
> might find itself overrun. In both cases, the moral memes would be at
> a competitive disadvantage vis a vis their counterparts in competing
> societies. They would tend to die out.

Let's go back to this.  In each of the following possibilities, the result 
may or may not be moral:

1 person kills 1
1 person kills 1000
1000 people kill 1
1000 people kill 1000

The interpretation of any of the events might lead one person to consider 
them as moral qand another (particularly if you're the 1 or one of the 1000 
that gets the short end of the stick).

Does intent play a part?  If so, how do you possibly include that element 
without requiring an inherently subjective element? If not, does the moral 
judgment rely on the consequences (which may also be ambiguous and 
subjective).  Often in moral questions both intent and outcome may be 
considered to determine the morality of an action.

Consider the common practical definition of morality: "Justice."    You're 
arguing that eventually we'll be able to develop an equation that will in 
all cases satisfy (even the majority) of people's definition of the word 
"Justice?"

>>
>><snip>
>>>>>>You're starting with the arbitrary moral that life and evolution are
>>>>>>"good." That's a common and very helpful one to start with,
>>>>>>but if there was no life on Earth, would the universe care?
>>>>>>If there were an arbitrary number of beings on the planet that
>>>>>>were generally happy and never aged or died, would
>>>>>>they care about evolution?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Unless you can prove the answer is yes, it's a common personal
>>>>>>philosophy.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Common personal philosophy" is a bit oxymoronic for my taste.
>>>>
>>>>Which part?  "Do unto others" fits that definition as well.
>>>
>>> If it's commonly held, how is it personal? Or did you mean "a common
>>> philosophy held by a number of individuals"?
>>
>>A number of people sharing the same basic philosphy, but a philosphy that
>>is not universally shared, which by implication leads to it being
>>subjective.
>
> It could be objective but local . . .

It would be perfectly objective only to the people that agree/believe the 
underlying elements of any given moral question conform to a common 
understanding and evaluation.

Getting back to the "Justice" example, 12 people may come up with the same 
verdict for different reasons...weighing each element differently.  The 
resulting judgement might suggest a common morality, but certainly doesn't 
require it.


>>>
>>> It's not entirely subjective, in fact it's anything but. I think you
>>> really have to be careful with that distinction, because if you don't,
>>> you'll end up equating New Age hocus pocus with mathematical physics.
>>> Rather, what I'm doing is applying theory to observed phenomena that
>>> most people don't think about even to the extent of achieving an
>>> understanding that equals the philosophical state-of-the-art of 2500
>>> years ago. And the hypotheses are testable: in many cases the
>>> observations have already been made, e.g., anthropologists have
>>> researched the incest taboo.
>>
>>Anthropologists may study what a taboo or a moral is and how... or even 
>>why
>>it was adopted
>>by a society, but that's not the question Philosphy is interested in.
>
> I think we've established that we take a different view of the limits
> of philosophy. From my perspective, science remains "natural
> philosophy." And I think contemporary philosophers hurt themselves to
> the extent that they distance themselves too far from science. It's
> not something Aristotle would have done.

If you want to define science that way, that's fine, but the "Why" questions
often try to address spiritual philosophy (which may or may not be
different from religious philosophy).

>>> For example, killing one's brother to get his money might amoral,
>>> whereas killing one's brother as the only alternative to having him
>>> detonate a nuclear weapon might be moral. That can only be said within
>>> the context of a local system and local circumstances and as a matter
>>> of probability, but it isn't completely subjective.
>>>
>>
>>Unless one's philosphy is absolute pacifism, in which case both actions
>>are immoral.... and which philosphy you choose is subjective.
>
> The choice is always subjective, but that doesn't mean that there
> isn't an objective morality, specific to local circumstances, that can
> assess it.

I think we've gone around this merry-go-round often enough.
Agree to disagree?

<snip>

>>> I'd correct that to evolutionary biology suggests that if we don't
>>> behave a certain way, our group will tend to die out, and our ways
>>> with it.
>>
>>So what?
>
> Well, quite beyond the question of whether it matters whether we die
> out -- and I for one am not anxious to join that experiment -- if a
> morality leads to a group's dying out, the morality will probably die
> with it. That, in my opinion, is the essential truth of morality: it
> is memetic.

The test of a morality is the degree to which those people that
believe in it, try to adhere to it.

This may result in the morality (and those that believe in it) die out, but
that doesn't make the morality less "Right" or "Good."

>
<snip>
>>
>>>>> ... If there are no right and wrong answers,
>>>>> there's no reason to search for answers: we might as well just sit
>>>>> back and enjoy the ride.
>>>>
>>>>Many people don't do any soul searching as to what they believe
>>>>and what the consequences of those beliefs are.
>>>> One of my points is that if there is no
>>>>God, then that may indeed be the case.  If we all just happen to have
>>>>arrived, live, and turn to dust... are there any answers that mean
>>>>anything
>>>>to find other than whatever meaning that we give to our own lives?
>>>>
>>>>I'm curious as to Paul's thoughts on this.
>>>
>>> Don't know about Paul, but I haven't found that the transition form
>>> believing in some form of absolute morality to a more nuanced view has
>>> made much of a difference in mine. I do much of what I do because it's
>>> what I was raised and trained to do, and much because of what I was
>>> born to be, and much because society has reached certain conclusions,
>>> and much because I think about the consequences of various
>>> possibilities. Most people don't do the latter, and insofar as they
>>> don't, they might be expected to behave less morally if they didn't
>>> believe in God, but I haven't seen any evidence that that's the case.
>>
>>I think it's pretty clear that the fear that there is a God impacts
>>many people's behavior.
>
> Does it? I mean, I've asked myself this many times: how can people who
> say they're Christians go out and commit crimes and otherwise do
> things that are likely to get them consigned to Hell given that they
> believe they'll spend eternity being raked over hot coals, and that
> eternity is a long time?

If it weren't true, in the past the Catholic church would not have been
able to sell forgiveness.

I know people that don't do certain things because it's considered a sin.

Ever read Jonathon Edwards "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God?"


>
> The answer I think is that while religion isn't without positive
> effect, people tend to twist it to justify their own acts.

People twist the law and everything they possibly can to justify
their own acts.

> The
> good-natured generous person pats himself on the head and says "I'm
> good natured and generous, surely St. Pete will welcome me into
> heaven." The vile, miserly misanthrope says "I worship God a lot and
> I'm faithful to my wife. Surely St. Pete will welcome me into heaven
> while all those sin-committing faggots and fetus-killers go to Hell
> and roast forever."

Please...let's not go there.  I really don't want politics brought into 
this.

>>>
>>> I'm not referring to species continuation, but to the spread of groups
>>> and ideas.
>>
>>But the spread of groups is not moral or immoral.  Even the spread of 
>>ideas
>>is not particularly moral by itself.  Spreading ideas such as racism, for
>>instance
>>isn't a particularly moral act (by my morals).
>
> My point is that as the groups spread, they carry their memes, their
> social constructs with them -- and that these include their specific
> morality.

Which only affects the popularity of a morality.

>>
>>>>Are you suggesting that one purpose of science is to prove morality? 
>>>>Even
>>>>a subjective morality?  That's dangerous ground for science.
>>>
>>> Why?
>>>
>>
>>One can rationally argue that wars have positive results. Extend that to 
>>try
>>to
>>prove (because of quantifiable results) that war is moral.
>
> But that's been done, e.g., the doctrine of just war.
>
>>"In Italy for thirty years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror,
>>murder,
>>bloodshed - they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci and the
>>Renaissance.
>>In Switzerland they had brotherly love, five hundred years of democracy 
>>and
>>peace and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock."
>>
>>-- Spoken by Orson Welles' character Harry Lime
>
> And warfare probably contributed to other European and human
> developments as well. It's not without its function, albeit one would
> think that we'd be smart enough by now to find something better. (One
> could argue that capitalism is an early attempt at a substitute).

Or that it strengthened the species by making them self-relant rather than
dependent.

>>>>> Statistics creates a frame of reference, the degree to which the
>>>>> average man can love and hate.
>>>>
>>>>That's just begging the question.
>>>>Please quantify how much (in a meaningful way) what an average man is 
>>>>qand
>>>>how much he can love or hate.
>>>
>>> Carl, I can't even do that with weight. What does a pound mean?
>>> Nothing, except by comparison to other units. Units are merely a
>>> convenient means of comparing things to one another.
>>
>>No... there  is an absolute standard as to what a pound is (and for the US
>>it's locked away in the USB of Standards and Measures).  Because of this,
>>you can provide an absolute, unambiguous translation to other units as 
>>well.
>>Without units, the numbers are meaningless.
>>
>>If I say that I'm 6' 3"... there is an absolute standard for what a foot 
>>and
>>an inch are.  They allow us to determine in a scientifically unambiguous 
>>way
>>that I am taller than my 5' 2" wife.  Without the numbers, I could say I'm
>>"tall," but that's about it.... and that's meaningless when comparing me 
>>to
>>someone 6'2 " or 6' 5" if we're not in the same room.
>
> But it's entirely arbitrary. The unit could be a pound or it could be
> an ounce. It's simply an arbitrary measure of weight.

It's still not arbitrary because all units of weight can be converted back 
and forth. If I say I'm 6'3, there is a specific, non-arbitrary meaning that 
is converyed to anyone.  If they choose to convert that to (~190 cm), it 
doesn't matter because a single, consistent meaning is conveyed.

If I said that if you wanted to recognize me on the street, you could look 
for someone that was 7822373, it would be meaningless.  There is no usefull 
information conveyed.

> Which means it's no different than a measure of happiness.

Sure it is... no units *means* it's arbitrary.

> About the best that can be
> said is that we can at present measure it more accurately in
> individual cases than we can love or happiness, because we have to
> rely on an individual's subjective impression of his happiness. That
> will change one day, but for now we're limited by the primitive state
> of our knowledge.

I don't think we'll get there, but who knows?






>
>>>>> A wily psychologist who wanted to go
>>>>> farther could, by comparing it to something else, e.g., a man's
>>>>> affection for his car.
>>>>
>>>>If what a man feels for his wife compares to the affection he feels for 
>>>>a
>>>>car...we're not talking about the same thing.
>>>>You can't even compare the love a man feels for a wife to what they feel
>>>>for
>>>>their kids or parents.
>>>
>>> Why not? Psychologist routinely do (the love a man feels for his
>>> mother trumps pretty much everything else, IIRC).
>>
>>Hmmm.  Then I fall outside the norm.  I do that a lot.
>
> So, in some regards, does everybody. :-)
>
>>>>> Ultimately one could map all emotional
>>>>> tendencies.
>>>>
>>>>Mapping where it is in the brain is not the same as defining what it
>>>>means.
>>>
>>>>>>Even if you could isolate and measure "love" by some neural  model. 
>>>>>>Does
>>>>>>that even suggest that the numbers would have any meaning?  Would the
>>>>>>data
>>>>>>mean the same thing to someone that had never been in love?
>>>>>
>>>>> Meaning, sure, but subjectively, a description isn't the same as
>>>>> experience.
>>>>
>>>>"Here, this person is feeling love for someone because these neurons are
>>>>triggering."
>>>
>>>>It doesn't matter that what the person being studied may have an 
>>>>entirely
>>>>different concept of love than the person doing the interpreting of the
>>>>data?
>>>
>>> Doubtful. The world isn't that chaotic: if it were, we wouldn't be
>>> able to understand anything.
>>
>>No...experience for tangible things gives us a common frame of reference.
>>For most things, desirable or undesirable don't have to be quantified.
>>In this case, though, you're claiming that you can go beyond that and
>>actually quantify them in a meaningfule way.
>>
>>I still don't see how.
>
> I guess I don't see how not. I mean, as a matter of practicality,
> psychologists and social scientists do it all the time. And having
> filled out some surveys, I know that it isn't always easy to answer
> those questions, but coarse as the results are, I don't think it can
> be said that they aren't quantifiable, particularly in the aggregate,
> since individual variations tend to cancel.
>
>>>>Isn't that a bit like describing the a kind of bluish color to a blind
>>>>child
>>>>in terms of wavelengths?
>>>
>>> But we were talking about measurement of a subjective state. The fact
>>> that we do have measurements -- frequencies -- for the very subjective
>>> experience of seeing something blue suggests that such a thing is
>>> possible.
>>>
>>> Caveman discussing color: Ugh! Me say sky "blue"!
>>>
>>> Second caveman: Me call it "blue" too, then!
>>>
>>> Scientist: Measurements show that the color that people perceive as
>>> blue corresponds roughly to the wavelengths between 4100-4900
>>> Angstroms
>>
>>OK... now take away the measure and describe blue in terms
>>of a number of tomatoes.... or just the number 6 with no units.
>>
>>The units are important... and they have to be meaningful.
>
> Language is a two-way street: if we described blue that way, and did
> so systematically, the meaning of the words would change and they
> would become units, just as did the meaning of "Angstrom," which
> previously referred to some poor dead guy and now refers to a meaning
> of length.
>
>>> Caveman discussing wife: Ugh! Me love wife "a lot!"
>>>
>>> Second caveman: Me call love for wife "a lot" too, then!
>>>
>>> Scientist: Measurements show that the amount of love that people
>>> perceive as "a lot" corresponds to such and such a degree of arousal
>>> in such-and-such brain regions and the release of such-and-such
>>> combinations of oxytocin and other hormones.
>>>
>>> 'Professor Helen Fisher, biological anthropologist at Rutgers
>>> University (NY) is convinced that a distinct chemical system is
>>> responsible for our varying love feelings: "We know that libido in men
>>> and women is primarily governed by testosterone, and also by estrogen
>>> in many animals. Close bonding, the third crucial emotion, has to do
>>> with oxytocin and vasopressine. These are substances in the brain that
>>> impart the feeling of deep affection".'
>>>
>>> http://www.morgenwelt.de/futureframe/9908-oxytocin.htm
>>>
>>> General observation: Historically, it hasn't been a good idea to
>>> underestimate science, to make the assumption that there are areas of
>>> intellectual investigation that are off limits to or exempt from it.
>>>
>>
>> Perhaps.  I'm unconvinced.  I also don't think we'll ever get a FTL 
>> drive,
>>and so I think our race is stuck on this planet and therefore has a 
>>limited
>>span.
>>
>>I may be wrong.  It happens far too often for my comfort. :)
>
> Dangerous to say we won't get an FTL drive! After all, how likely
> would you have thought it 2000 years ago that we'd one day have the
> technology to fly at 500 mph? The best that can be said is that right
> now we don't have a clue how to do it -- or, perhaps more accurately,
> that we have some glimmers of how it might be done, but that we have
> no idea how to implement them.
>
> -- 
> Josh
>
> "I love it when I'm around the country club, and I hear people talking 
> about the debilitating
> effects of a welfare society. At the same time, they leave their kids a 
> lifetime and beyond
> of food stamps. Instead of having a welfare officer, they have a trust 
> officer. And instead
> of food stamps, they have stocks and bonds."
>
> - Warren Buffett
>
>
                                                  
--- SBBSecho 2.11-Win32
 * Origin: Time Warp of the Future BBS - Home of League 10 (1:14/400)