Text 8755, 221 rader
Skriven 2006-09-21 18:26:00 av Robert E Starr JR (9252.babylon5)
Ärende: Re: Atheists: America's m
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* * * This message was from Josh Hill to rec.arts.sf.tv.babylon5.m * * *
* * * and has been forwarded to you by Lord Time * * *
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On Wed, 20 Sep 2006 15:44:24 -0700, "Vorlonagent"
<nojtspam@otfresno.com> wrote:
>>>A toaster does not "want" to toast bread. It is not aware or self-aware,
>>>therefore not capable of desiring anything. (hence the techno-shaman
>>>comment) Unless it has stood time in the castle of "Beauty and the Beast"
>>>(Disney version) it can't very well converse with you either. It is a
>>>collection of mostly-metal parts that when put together execute a function
>>>or small series of functions.
>>
>> Question: how does this differ from us, except insasmuch as the
>> toaster has more metal?
>
>You can ask that question. When you come across a self-reflexive toaster,
>let me know.
A toaster that has a microprocessor, as I'm sure some now do, and has
a model of its own state and makes decisions on that basis would be
self-reflexive.
Hell, one could argue that even the simple bimetallic toaster is
self-reflexive, in that it contemplates how hot it is and acts to
eject toast when it reaches a certain temperature.
>>>If a toaster has a heating element go out or a spring break or even a
>>>piece
>>>of bread caught in it, does it experience sadness or distress? No. It's
>>>a
>>>broken or clogged toaster.
>>
>> Sadness and distress, like other emotions, are merely states that, in
>> an evolutionary context, promote certain behaviors. Certainly the
>> toaster "wants" to heat and then eject its bread. It doesn't have the
>> alternative strategies that would give it more sophisticated emotions
>> -- at least, the simple spring types don't (have no idea what they've
>> put in microprocessor yuppie models). If you break a spring, the
>> toaster as a whole will no longer want to eject the toast, but then
>> again, if you remove a chunk of our brains, we may no longer feel
>> sadness or distress.
>
>Certainly the toaster does NOT want to heat bread. It doesn't feel. It
>doesn't know what bread is because it doesn't know anything in any
>conventional sense. Would you ask the toaster its preference between, say,
>bread and pop-tarts? It has none. It is a mechanism.
A. On what basis do you claim that the toaster doesn't feel?
B. I have no preferences between things that I don't understand or
with which I'm not familiar -- the passages of the Koran, say. Does
this mean that I don't know anything in a conventional sense?
C. We are mechanisms too.
>It does not have "alternate strategies" because it has nothing by which it
>could enact them. A million years from now, when bilogical organisms have
>changed according to their environment and evolution, the toaster will not.
>It does not evolve. It is only re-designed.
Alternate strategies can be designed in, and, I imagine, are in some
microprocessor yuppie toasters.
Toasters do evolve, and are subject to natural selection; the
difference being that, at present, the evolution occurs in the human
brain rather than in the toaster itself. But I don't see what that has
to do with thought or feeling: there's nothing that says something
can't think or feel without evolving.
>Break a spring, the toaster will no longer be *able* to eject toast. Big
>difference. There is no desire. There is only an energy storage system
>(the spring) that doesn't work anymore.
>
>Break a human's leg and the human will still desire to walk.
The toaster will still desire to eject toast -- the thermostat will do
its thing. It just won't be able to eject it.
How, except in degree of sophistication, is this different from a
human who's been in an accident, sends nerve impulses to move his leg,
and discovers that it can't move? The only qualitative difference I
can see is that a simple toaster doesn't have the self-awareness and
intelligence to use alternative strategies, e.g., pulling oneself
along by ones hands, making a splint, calling for help. But it's
possible to build a toaster with such capabilities, and for all I know
some microprocessor-equipped models already have them.
>>>Next you'll be telling me your newsreader "wants" to read and post to
>>>newsgroups. Is it panting after that hot new binaries NG? Does it feel
>>>sad
>>>if you don't write enough posts through it on any given day?
>>
>> I am finding it hard to respond to this without sarcasm of my own. Out
>> of respect for the moderators, and a hefty check, I will not.
>
>Then don't anthopomorphize the damn machinery.
>
>Perhaps I used sarcasm to make it, but the point made is valid.
There is no anthropomorphization going on here. I am merely pointing
out that people are machines. There is no "magic" to us, to
self-awareness or emotion or intelligence. We operate according to
physical law. And if the mechanisms that give rise to self-awareness
or emotion have their analogs in mechanical devices, there is no
reason to suppose that the mechanical devices do not experience
self-awareness or emotion.
>>>> To suppose that there is such a special quality is to violate Occam's
>>>> Razor by introducing an unnecessary element.
>>>
>>>Actually, you're incorrect. The process of nerve synapsing involves
>>>random,
>>>quantum phenomina.
>>
>> All processes involve random quantum phenomena. Do you worry about
>> whether your desk will reappear on the other side of the room? It is
>> entirely possible that it might.
>
>Naturally not. We're not talking about comparable phenomena so your
>question is meanignless.
In what way are they not comparable? They're the same phenomenon --
the uncertainty principle.
>>> Synapsing on a nerve has the effect randomizing the
>>>state of part of one of the molecules involved. whicever way that state
>>>goes affects how the nerve processes the synapse. I get this from "Taking
>>>the Quantum Leap" by Fred Allen Wolf. The bit I'm referring to starts
>>>with
>>>page 230 of my (paperback) edition. Unless Wolf's molecular biology has
>>>since been disproven (or I read him wrong), the human brain operates in
>>>ways
>>>radically different than that of an electronic computer, which are based
>>>on
>>>Turing's model of a machine that deterministically takes in the same input
>>>and gives back the same output every time. It's been a while since I read
>>>Wolf's book and I skimmed it now just to be sure I had the right source.
>>>I
>>>can go over Wolf in detail if this thumbnail explanation isn't enough.
>>
>> I've never read the books on QM and the brain because I thought them
>> almost certainly 99% nonsense. This merely confirms my suspicion.
>>
>> There is no reason to suppose that quantum fluctuations implies a
>> mystery meat element into the functioning of the human brain. Minor
>> errors, perhaps, but such errors are no more fundamental to
>> intelligence or the trivial matter of self-awareness than gamma ray
>> errors are fundamental to the operation of computers.
>
>Nothing more to add here.
>
>Evidence to dispute a hypothesis is rejected out of hand.
Huh?
>>>You keep maintaining that Science "represents" some part of ourselves. It
>>>doesn't.
>>
>> If science isn't part of us, what is about to type "E=MC^2"?
>>
>>>You appear to be anthopomorphosizing both science and toasters.
>>
>> I find that a bit, well, odd, coming from someone who has argued for
>> religion, which is essentially an attempt to anthropomorphize the
>> universe.
>
>Sez you.
>
>You speak as if your knowledge is the alpha and omega on the issue.
I'm reasonably confident in my conclusions, yes, since the evidence
for what I say is overwhelming, e.g., most religions try to
anthropomorphize the universe by positing the existence of various
deities, generally of human form, sometimes a combination of human and
animal form but with human intellect. The best one can say in argument
against that is that some religions and beliefs, e.g., Buddhism, are
more philosophical -- that is true -- and that one of the
deity-worshipping religions may be right, in which case all the others
are wrong and therefore still attempts to anthropomorphize the
universe.
>> Do what I did, and drop the old-fashioned conceits with which you (and
>> most people today living) have been raised, e.g., that humans are
>> somehow set apart from things. Pretend that you're an alien from a
>> different universe. When you study an emotion, you are merely noting
>> what it is, what it does, what it accomplishes. When you see a human
>> being, you see a sack of chemicals.
>>
>> What you will find if you do this is that there is no evidence
>> whatsoever that there is an ingredient x that sets people apart from
>> the rest of the physical universe. You are analyzing a machine.
>
>You're welcome to believe that.
>
>I don't.
>I'm done here, save for the special case of discovering a self-reflexive
>toaster. You may have the last word.
Then here's my word: the fact that you don't believe that is
absolutely meaningless, given that you've presented no real argument
and don't appear to have one. I submit that you haven't troubled
yourself to analyze the actual issue: you're merely relying on habit
and perhaps subscribing to an emotionally-satisfying anthropocentrism.
--
Josh
[Truly] I say to you, [...] angel [...] power will be able to see that [...]
these to whom [...] holy generations [...]. After Jesus said this, he departed.
- The Gospel of Judas
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