Text 338, 185 rader
Skriven 2005-05-06 23:56:43 av Steve Asher (3:800/432.0)
Ärende: Secret Downing St Memo
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Original article at The Sunday Times
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html

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05/01/05 "Sunday Times" 

The secret Downing Street memo

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY 

DAVID MANNING 
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir
Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan
Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss
Iraq. 

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made.
It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its
contents. 

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment.
Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to
overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was
worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was
not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime
expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that
regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public
was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible
shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush
wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the
conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were
being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN
route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's
record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath
after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August,
Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August. 

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72
hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead
time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to
Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000),
continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead
time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A
hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego
Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf
states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for
UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with
a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two
Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of
activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken,
but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action
to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the
US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell
this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take
military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case
was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD
capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should
work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN
weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification
for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a
legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases:
self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The
first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR
1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of
course change.


The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference
politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN
inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was
the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies
for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right,
people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether
the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to
give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan
was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions. 

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day
one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You
said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added
the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a
military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On
this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy,
there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should
explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-
ball with the UN. 

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in
only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK
military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned
that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum
route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the
political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in
any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning
before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US
military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds
could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed
military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the
week.


(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background
on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam. 

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of
countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member
states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence
update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would
consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)


MATTHEW RYCROFT 

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

Copyright 2005 Times Newspapers Ltd.

(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is
distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior
interest in receiving the included information for research and
educational purposes. Information Clearing House has no affiliation
whatsoever with the originator of this article nor is Information
Clearing House endorsed or sponsored by the originator.)

                           -=<*>=-

Source: Information Clearing House ...
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article8709.htm


Cheers, Steve..

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