Text 11071, 107 rader
Skriven 2005-04-05 11:56:20 av Alan Hess
Ärende: bad ambassador choice?
==============================
This guy sounds like a bad choice for the job of U.S. amabassador to the U.N. 
Your opinion?
*********

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/bal-op.bolton05apr05,1,3347117.story?
coll=bal-pe-opinion
Wrong man for the job


By Robert O. Boorstin and Andrew J. Grotto

April 5, 2005

WASHINGTON - The decision by President Bush to nominate John R. Bolton as U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations has generated a great deal of controversy.

Mr. Bolton's supporters say he is exactly what the United Nations needs: a
hard-talking, no-nonsense, experienced diplomat who will shake up an
institution that needs to be reformed. Sixty-six of them signed a letter sent
to Sen. Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, as well
as other committee members and congressional leaders.

His detractors - including 59 former ambassadors who wrote to senators - have
expressed astonishment at the president's choice, noting Mr. Bolton's public
rants about the United Nations and asking whether he's the right man for the
job.

But there is a much better reason for senators to reject the president's
choice: Mr. Bolton's dismal record in his current job as undersecretary of
state for arms control and international security. Simply put, his performance
does not merit promotion. Mr. Bolton's failures have been devastating and
directly concern what are the gravest threats to U.S. national security:
nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists and the nuclear ambitions of North
Korea and Iran.

Experts are unanimous that once terrorists acquire enough fissile materials,
there is little chance of preventing them from carrying out an act of nuclear
terrorism. But a cutoff of the supply of fissile materials virtually guarantees
that terrorists cannot attack America with nuclear weapons.

Yet fewer fissile materials were secured in the two years after 9/11 than in
the two years before. The reasons for the dismal progress are fundamentally
political and concern disputes with the Russians over legal liability, access
to sensitive sites and bureaucratic red tape. As the lead U.S. diplomat on
nonproliferation, it was Mr. Bolton's job to clear these obstacles.

On his watch, North Korea likely has produced enough weapons-usable plutonium
to quadruple the suspected size of its nuclear arsenal. When asked about this
disturbing development, Mr. Bolton responded that concerns about the size of
North Korea's nuclear arsenal are "quibbling."

What seems to have escaped Mr. Bolton is that the difference between North
Korea having one or two nuclear weapons - which the CIA has suspected for a
decade - and many more weapons is that North Korea could be tempted to sell the
extra weapons for cash to terrorists or anyone else willing to pay.

This lack of urgency is apparent in Mr. Bolton's dealings with North Korea. In
the summer of 2003, he seemed to prefer calling the North Koreans names rather
than keeping his eye on the ball: that North Korea is bent on acquiring a
sizable nuclear arsenal.

These rhetorical games gave North Korea the political pretext to draw out these
already difficult negotiations and led North Korea to refuse to deal with Mr.
Bolton, the senior U.S. diplomat on nuclear proliferation. Getting kicked out
of diplomatic negotiations for calling the other side names hardly inspires
confidence in Mr. Bolton's ability to handle sensitive issues and solve tough
problems.

Mr. Bolton mishandled Iran. Three times during his tenure as undersecretary,
Tehran made secret overtures to the United States to resolve outstanding issues
between the two countries, including Iran's weapons programs. The
administration declined to respond to them.

Instead, the only concrete proposal for peacefully resolving the impasse with
Iran over its nuclear programs has been to haul it before the U.N. Security
Council.

The proposal is puzzling, because China or Russia never would support tough
measures against Iran because of their considerable economic interests there.
Mr. Bolton must be aware of this, so he knows that the Security Council won't
act and is merely setting it up for failure.

Some small successes can be attributed to Mr. Bolton. He played a key role in
concluding the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty with Russia, which sets
modest limits on the number of nuclear weapons each side can deploy.
Unfortunately, the treaty has no verification provisions, so we can't tell
whether the Russians are cheating. Implementation has been very slow.

Mr. Bolton also has worked hard to organize training exercises and other joint
efforts to improve cooperation among countries to investigate and intercept
suspected weapons shipments. Such cooperation is a valuable but small part of a
comprehensive, layered nonproliferation strategy. But it merely strengthens
years-long cooperation. Moreover, there is no binding legal framework defining
the rights and duties of participants, no budget and no secretariat for
coordinating cooperation.

We need a diplomat at the United Nations with a record of solving the toughest
problems.

Robert O. Boorstin is senior vice president for national security at the Center
for American Progress. Andrew J. Grotto is associate scholar in national
security there.

Copyright + 2005, The Baltimore Sun

--- Msged/2 6.0.1
 * Origin: The Nerve Center BBS - telnet via tncbbs.no-ip.com (1:261/1000)