Text 22777, 185 rader
Skriven 2006-09-26 19:41:14 av Bob Sakowski (1:275/311)
Ärende: NIE
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Declassified Key Judgments of the National
Intelligence Estimate ?Trends in Global Terrorism:
Implications for the United States? dated April 2006

Key Judgments

United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged
the leadership of al-Qa?ida and disrupted its operations;
however, we judge that al-Qa?ida will continue to pose the
greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a
single terrorist organization. We also assess that the global
jihadist movement?which includes al- Qa?ida, affiliated and
independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells?is
spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.

? Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with
precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that
activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small
percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and
geographic dispersion.

? If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and
abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks
worldwide.

? Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in
Muslim majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances
jihadists exploit. Over time, such progress, together with
sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the vulnerabilities of
the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa?ida, could
erode support for the jihadists.

We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized,
lacks a coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse.
New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are
increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose
and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine
jihadist groups.

? We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized
cells will grow in importance to US counterterrorism efforts,
particularly abroad but also in the Homeland.

? The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking
Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim
diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban
attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London
bombings.

We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of
terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success
there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle
elsewhere.

? The Iraq conflict has become the ?cause celebre? for jihadists,
breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world
and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.
Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be
perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be
inspired to carry on the fight.

We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the
movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for
the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.

? Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist
movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption,
injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger,
humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq
?jihad;? (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic,
social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations;
and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims?all of
which jihadists exploit.

Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged
that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin to slow the
spread of the movement. They include dependence on the
continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of
the jihadists? radical ideology, the emergence of respected
voices of moderation, and criticism of the violent tactics
employed against mostly Muslim citizens.

? The jihadists? greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate
political solution?an ultra-conservative interpretation of
shari?a-based governance spanning the Muslim world?is unpopular
with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the religious and
political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists?
propaganda would help to divide them from the audiences they seek
to persuade.

? Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious
interpretations by a few notable Muslim clerics signal a trend
that could facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to
jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This also could
lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader
Muslim communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of
radicals to capitalize on passive community support. In this way,
the Muslim mainstream emerges as the most powerful weapon in the
war on terror.

? Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require
coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations
to capture or kill terrorist leaders.

If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress
over the next five years, political participation probably would
drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing
to use the political process to achieve their local objectives.
Nonetheless, attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing
transitions will create new opportunities for jihadists to
exploit.

Al-Qa?ida, now merged with Abu Mus?ab al-Zarqawi?s network, is
exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and
donors and to maintain its leadership role.

? The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would
cause the group to fracture into smaller groups. Although
like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the mission,
the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and
disagreements. We assess that the resulting splinter groups
would, at least for a time, pose a less serious threat to US
interests than does al-Qa?ida.

? Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back
attacks against Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular
appeal and present a global threat.

? The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of
al-Qa?ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus
their efforts on external operations.

Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah
Islamiya, Ansar al- Sunnah, and several North African groups,
unless countered, are likely to expand their reach and become
more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside
their traditional areas of operation.

? We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland
than does al-Qa?ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to
our allies and to US interests abroad. The focus of their attacks
is likely to ebb and flow between local regime targets and
regional or global ones.

We judge that most jihadist groups?both well-known and newly
formed?will use improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks
focused primarily on soft targets to implement their asymmetric
warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct sustained
terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience
in Iraq are a potential source of leadership for jihadists
pursuing these tactics.

? CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist groups.

While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active
state sponsors of terrorism, many other states will be unable to
prevent territory or resources from being exploited by
terrorists.

Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and
fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist,
nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to
attack US interests. The radicalization process is occurring more
quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age,
raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups
whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.

? We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the
Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain
logistical and financial support.
[end]

Heck of a job, George and breaking the army as well!

Dynamite job, George.

-- 

"To announce that there must be no criticism of the president, or
that we are to stand by the president right or wrong, is not only
unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the
American public." -- Theodore Roosevelt
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