Text 5298, 104 rader
Skriven 2007-10-22 13:51:58 av Alan Hess
Ärende: more than the resolution
================================
Judging by this column, there's much more affecting Turkish-U.S. relations than
the ill-timed House bill re Armenian genocide.  Is the columnist accurate?

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www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-op.turkey22oct22,0,1959468.story
baltimoresun.com
Fraying ties with Turkey

By Graham E. Fuller

October 22, 2007

Turkish-American relations are in crisis. But the House resolution declaring
the World War I-era killings of Armenians a genocide is only one cause - and
that's just a sideshow. Turkish-American relations have been deteriorating for
years, and the root explanation is simple and harsh: Washington's policies are
broadly and fundamentally incompatible with Turkish foreign policy interests in
multiple arenas. No amount of diplomat-speak can conceal or change that
reality. Count the ways:

? Kurds. U.S. policies toward Iraq over the last 16 years have been a disaster
for Turkey. Since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, the Iraqi Kurds have gained
ever-greater autonomy and are now on the brink of de facto independence. Such a
Kurdish entity in Iraq stimulates Kurdish separatism inside Turkey.
Furthermore, Washington supports Kurdish terrorists against Iran.

? Terrorism. Turkey has fought domestic political violence and terrorism for
more than 30 years - Marxist, socialist, right-wing nationalist, Kurdish,
Islamist. U.S. policies in the Middle East have greatly stimulated violence and
radicalism across the region and brought al-Qaida to Turkey's doorstep.

? Iran. It is Turkey's most powerful neighbor and a vital source of oil and gas
- second only to Russia - in meeting Turkey's energy needs. Washington
heavy-handedly pressures Turkey to end its extensive and deepening relations
with Iran in order to press a U.S. sanctions regime there. Though there is
little affection between Turkey and Iran, there has been virtually no serious
armed conflict between the two nations for centuries. Ankara sees U.S. policies
as radicalizing and isolating Tehran further, which is undesirable for Turkey.

? Syria. Ankara's relations with Syria have done a 180-degree turn in the last
decade, and are flourishing. Syrians - as well as many other Arabs - are
impressed with Turkey's ability to simultaneously be a member of NATO, seek
entry into the European Union, say no to Washington on using Turkish soil to
invade Iraq, restore respect for its Islamic heritage, develop new relations
with the Arab world and adopt a genuinely balanced position on the Palestinian
conflict. Ankara resists Washington's pressures to marginalize and stifle
Damascus.

? Armenia. Ankara and Yerevan, Armenia's capital, are in productive unofficial
contact with one another, such as via "gray" trade and air links, and both
would like to effect a reconciliation. It is the Armenian diaspora, with its
intense nationalist rhetoric, that is one of the key factors in inflaming the
atmosphere against potential rapprochement.

? Russia. There has been a revolution in Ankara's relations with Moscow after
500 years of hostility. Moscow is the second-largest importer of Turkish goods
after Germany, and Turkey has invested up to $12 billion in Russia in the
construction field. Russia is Turkey's primary source of energy, and Ankara
increasingly looks to Eurasia as a key part of its economic future.

Turkish generals, angry with Washington, even mutter about a Russian strategic
"alternative" if it is stiff-armed by the West. Although there is some rivalry
over the routing of Central Asian energy pipelines to the West - whether via
Russia or Iran and Turkey - Ankara values its ties with Moscow and opposes U.S.
efforts to bait the Russian bear in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe on NATO
expansion and missile issues.

? Palestine. Turks care a lot about Palestine - which they had jurisdiction
over in Ottoman times. They sympathize with Palestinian suffering under 40
years of Israeli occupation. Ankara views Hamas as a legitimate element on the
Palestinian political spectrum and seeks to mediate with it. Washington says
no. Ankara has good working ties with Israel but does not shrink from sharp
public criticism of what it perceives as Israeli excesses.

Overall, a "new Turkey" actively seeks good-neighbor relations with all
regional states and players. It seeks to be a major player and mediator in the
Middle East - to bring radicals into the mainstream via patient diplomacy
against what it perceives as complicating U.S. belligerence.

Turkey has deep interests in Central Asia. If the Chinese- and
Russian-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organization bids to be the dominant
geopolitical grouping in Eurasia, then Turkey, like Afghanistan, Iran and
India, would like an association with it. Washington opposes that.

One may quarrel with the specifics of Turkish policies, but there is broad
belief across the Turkish political spectrum that these policies serve the
country's core needs. While the State Department may soothingly speak of "vital
shared interests" in democracy, stability and counterterrorism, all of that is
empty talk when compared with conflicting concrete policies in so many key
spheres.

We had better get used to the fact that Turkey, strengthened by its popular
democracy, is going to pursue its national interests, regardless of
Washington's pressure. Few Turks want it any other way.

Graham E. Fuller is a former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council
at the CIA. His latest book, "The New Turkish Republic," will be published in
December. This article originally appeared in the Los Angeles Times.

Copyright + 2007, The Baltimore Sun

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