Text 1608, 640 rader
Skriven 2005-10-21 23:35:18 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (051021) for Fri, 2005 Oct 21
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Press Briefing by Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor Fran
Townsend
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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
October 21, 2005

Press Briefing by Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor Fran
Townsend
James S. Brady Briefing Room



11:10 A.M. EDT

MS. TOWNSEND: Good morning, everybody. On September 15th, when the
President spoke to the nation from Jackson Square, Louisiana, he pledged
that -- quote -- "this government will learn the lessons of Katrina." He
said we would review every action and make necessary changes so that we're
better prepared for any challenge of nature, or act of evil men, that could
threaten our people.

The President also ordered every Cabinet Secretary to participate in this
comprehensive review of the government response to Katrina. At the
President's direction, on September 16th, Secretary Card sent a memo to
each Cabinet agency asking them to designate a senior point of contact. And
the President tasked myself, working with the Homeland Security Council, to
lead this review effort.

The review effort has been up and running. On September 19th, the President
had a Homeland Security Council meeting where he talked again about the
importance of a comprehensive review, and all of the agencies cooperating
with it. And I must say that the cooperation and commitment of the Cabinet
Secretaries has been extraordinary.

On September -- we had our first -- I had hosted my first meeting of the
Cabinet Secretaries, the Homeland Security Council principals on September
23rd, and then, pursuant to Secretary Card's memo, I hosted, on September
30th, a meeting of the senior points of contact from the various federal
departments and agencies. I then sent out a request for additional
assistance and information on October 3rd. The task force here at the White
House -- obviously, to undertake a responsibility of this size, I needed
additional staff. I did not want in any way to overburden the Homeland
Security Council regular staff, given the breadth of their
responsibilities, and so I asked for additional staff from the departments
and agencies.

There are 12 people working on the task force. The person leading it is an
individual who works for me here at the White House on the Homeland
Security staff, and then there are 11 detailees to the effort from across
the federal government. They meet on a daily basis. I meet with them and
get updates several times a week, and direct their experience -- their
effort. They are all experienced professionals.

I am planning to travel to Louisiana and Alabama* next week to have a
discussion with state and local officials and get their feedback on what
the lessons learned should be. Next month -- early next month, I'll travel
to Texas,* Mississippi and Florida. That's tentative and we're working on
dates that accommodate state and local officials.

In the October 3rd memo that I mentioned, there were a number of areas I
suggested that the internal reviews of the departments and agencies focus
on: as you know, the appropriate role of the United States military in a
catastrophic event, the communications both within agencies and between
agencies, as well as with state and locals.

It's clear we want to quickly identify and fix problems and not play a
blame game. We have already begun to take things that we understood were
problems in the Katrina response and begin to recalibrate to try and fix
them in subsequent disasters like Rita, and as we prepare and work with
state and local officials in Wilma. Lessons are what the President wants,
not finger-pointing. He is less interested in last time. The President has
made perfectly clear that he was not satisfied with our response last time;
his concern is with the next time, and ensuring that we strengthen our
response capability to make sure we are both more efficient and effective.
We will make incremental policy changes to improve our nation's emergency
response and capability, and not wait until the end of the review.

Despite the problems, I feel I really want to take this opportunity to say
to you there were some things that went right. There were thousands of
federal workers and state and local officials and first responders who were
true heroes and saved thousands of lives in Katrina. The Coast Guard is but
one example. You heard Secretary Chertoff's testimony. They saved -- they
were involved in 33,500 lifesaving missions, which is more than six times
their calendar average.

With that, I'm happy to take your questions.

Q What do you make of the -- in terms of mistakes that were made and
lessons learned and trying in the future to alleviate some of those
problems, what do you make of the testimony that was given by FEMA's point
person in New Orleans on the Hill yesterday? It seemed like people at the
very top of FEMA weren't listening.

MS. TOWNSEND: Look, it's very concerning. And part of what we're doing now
is trying to do the fact-gathering. We're trying to understand what were
the significant and critical events, and how could there be such a gap in
communications, and what do we need to do to make sure we've fixed it.

We've sent more people downrange in the catastrophe now to make sure we're
getting these sort of facts off the ground, to have accurate situational
awareness, because, after all, good facts make for better decision-making.
We need to look at that carefully. I have not gone through the complete
testimony yet, but that certainly will be part of review.

Q I guess the one thing that really stuck out was his email on Wednesday to
Brown's assistant, and the assistant said, Mike Brown is having dinner, we
can't bother him now. And the guy said, well, I just ate an MRE and used
the toilet in the halls of the Superdome, so I can understand your concerns
with busy restaurants. But, I mean, it sounds like you may have had a big
problem here with Katrina, and the problem was the guy who was in charge,
and the people around him.

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, Secretary Chertoff replaced Mr. Brown with Admiral Thad
Allen --

Q Things have gone pretty well since then, right?

MS. TOWNSEND: -- and we need to understand -- I'm not going to prejudge it.
I had the same concerns that you're expressing when I saw that part of his
testimony, and we need to really dig down and understand what exactly
happened there so we can fix it.

Q Fran, in the other part of his testimony, he said that there was a
systemic failure at all levels of government. In what you've looked at so
far, what you've heard from people so far, do you think that reaches to the
White House and to the President?

MS. TOWNSEND: The answer is a bad information flow at all levels will
result in less than good, solid decision-making. And I think it's too early
for me to say, because I don't have a comprehensive chronology yet. We're
building that and it's getting stronger every day. I want to see that. But
the President has made perfectly clear, if there are mistakes, wherever
they are and wherever the problems are, we're to identify them, regardless
of where that leads us. And we will go wherever the facts lead us.

Q Just one follow-up, if you don't mind. You talked about not wanting to
finger-point. But you have to point fingers at someone and some things and
some -- in order to fix things. So why the disconnect?

MS. TOWNSEND: I don't think there is a disconnect. Here's how I -- I'm not
suggesting -- you will find -- I'm reading lessons learned in other context
to understand how people did it, and I've talked to the United States
military, which is the agency of government that's got the most experience
right now with lessons learned. The answer is, we will -- you do need a
narrative of facts to emphasize particular points and particular
weaknesses. And to that extent -- I didn't mean to suggest -- there will be
facts we need to use and to point to, to explain what the problem is, and
how a particular recommendation solves that problem. So I'm not -- I'm
gathering facts because I need them to make -- it really underscores your
point -- but what I'm saying to you is, I'm not going to -- I refuse to be
dragged down into a blame game and a finger-pointing exercise. That's not
my role. And frankly, what I need to be able to do is to identify the
systemic and process and procedural problems that resulted in the failures.

Q Fran, you talked about lessons learned. You've got another hurricane
right now hovering down around Yucatan, which will probably end up making a
beeline for Florida. What are some of the lessons learned thus far that
might have to be applied and might be very applicable to the hurricane when
it hits Florida? How is FEMA going to handle that?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, for the specific details of this, I would refer you to
DHS. But let me talk a little bit about some examples of things we
understand. We are deploying more communications gear, both through FEMA
and DOD, down into the affected areas. We have NORTHCOM planners now
stationed at FEMA Headquarters here in Washington, D.C. that we didn't have
the last time, to make sure that the connection between the military and
civilian authority, federal authority in this country is closer.

We have -- we've got people downrange in Florida working with state and
local officials who I would emphasize are in the lead. We are there in
support. The Governor has made clear what assistance he needs or does not
need, and so, based on Governor Bush's requirements, we are positioned to
meet them more effectively and efficiently, based on what we did the last
time.

Q Given what you have heard so far, what would you say were some of the
most egregious failures that occurred, and that perhaps need to be remedied
right away?

MS. TOWNSEND: You know, you're going to find me to be pretty cautious. I
think it's a mistake to try and jump to conclusions early on, before you've
got all the facts. And so I'm reluctant to get into -- to start
cherry-picking things off one at a time, before I have all the facts. I
will say to you, the one that I think everybody understands and is apparent
from the way it unfolded is the failure of communications. At the beginning
of this we talked about one that is internal to DHS, but I expect that we
will find -- whether it's across federal agencies, or with the state and
locals, I think the thing we have to absolutely find ways to fix, and
that's why I mentioned it, as we prepare for Wilma, having people in
Florida, working with state and locals, having an enhanced presence there.
That's the single most important thing, because I think it really affects
the decision-making process.

Q Is that the only lesson that you can say that you've learned so far?

MS. TOWNSEND: No, and it's not fair. What I said was I wasn't going to draw
-- I was not going to get pulled into drawing early conclusions before I
had all the facts. I used that as an example of one of them, but I'm not
going to go through a litany a little bit at a time --

Q I guess what I'm asking is, could you give us, say, the top -- you have
been at this a couple weeks now. Could you give us the top three lessons
that you think you've taken away from this exercise so far?

MS. TOWNSEND: Let me caveat it this way. I'm reluctant to say it's the top
three, because when I come back in here in a month to give you an update
because you want more information, you're going to say, those aren't the
three you gave me last month.

Q I'll take any three. (Laughter.)

MS. TOWNSEND: Okay. Information flow is one. And we're working every day to
fix that now. Communications, both public and internal to the federal
government, and with state and locals and first responders, is another --
sort of a persistent issue that we need to make stronger and better. Are
the current authorities of the government adequate to deal -- legal
authorities adequate? We're looking at the Stafford Act and the
Insurrection Act. Do we need additional or different authorities as relates
to the appropriate use of the United States military. These are all the
sort of -- these are baskets, if you will, of issues. And there's a lot in
each of those, but I think that those are consistent themes that we hear
across the government and from state and locals that we need to look at.

Q What about competent leadership at the top?

MS. TOWNSEND: I think you've got -- I have to tell you, first you've got to
decide the top of what. Are you talking about the top of FEMA, the top of
DHS, the top of the federal government? I mean, I think you've got to look
at all of that. I mean, I don't think any of that is off the board, but I
can't -- I'm not going to be drawn in to making preliminary judgments
before I have all the facts.

Q Fran, the administration announced that they were going to be funding the
levees to pre-Katrina status, I guess, within a year or so, and to waive
the costs for states. What is the administration's intention in improving
the levee system? Is there a plan for that?

MS. TOWNSEND: This has all got to be part of the long-term reconstruction
and planning. What does the population look like; how are they -- where do
we rebuild and what -- and a lot of that is a state and local question that
remains. And part of those facts will form the basis of a decision.

I will tell you I'm focused on the lessons learned so I can strengthen the
response system. And while there are many people focused, rightly, on the
reconstruction effort, that really goes to the heart of the reconstruction.
I'd prefer that I stay on the lessons learned.

Q There was an anecdote as this was unfolding that somebody had to actually
take a DVD to the President to show him examples of news reports. Are you
going to be willing and comfortable asking perhaps awkward questions of the
President, himself, about whether he's too insulated, or whether he was out
of touch with what was going on?

MS. TOWNSEND: The President's feeling on this and his views on this are not
a secret. I think he's spoken publicly about his own frustration and his
sense that the -- that we were inadequate in the way we handled it. I have
spoken both -- I have had the opportunity to speak privately with him. I'm
not going to go into those discussions, but he has been very open to having
an ongoing dialogue with me and getting -- frankly, he's very personally
interested in getting updated as we uncover additional facts and learn
lessons. And so he and I have regular conversations about this.

Q But was there a discussion about maybe in the first few days that he
wasn't paying close enough attention to the news, or was out of touch for
some reason?

MS. TOWNSEND: I am unfamiliar with the particular report you're talking
about. If that's true, I'm unaware of it. And I will tell you I'm having
ongoing discussions with the President about what information he received
and how he received it and whether or not it served his decision-making.

Q When you talk about processes, not wanting to play the blame game and so
forth, are you saying that you're not going to focus on human error in
looking at this, and that you won't -- that, for example, nobody else will
be losing their job over what happened in New Orleans?

MS. TOWNSEND: I can't predict for you what the end result is going to be
this early in the process. I can't tell you if I think somebody is going to
lose their job, or not. It's not -- the purpose of my review -- and I make
the distinction -- look, Congress has got two investigations going on that
quite clearly will result in assigning responsibility and blame. And that's
for them to do. That's not what I've been asked to do. What I've been asked
to do, and it's the focus of my effort, is to look at the system and ensure
that we are doing everything in our power to the best of our ability to
secure and keep safe the American people.

Q Okay, but the White House would take, if they found somebody extremely
culpable on Capitol Hill, the White House would take appropriate action in
response to that, wouldn't they?

MS. TOWNSEND: If it resulted in a system -- a part of the system's failure,
you can expect we will point to that, as a consequence of that failure, the
system failed. So I'm not going to avoid it. All I'm telling you is it's
not the focus of my effort. And I think it's important that you understand
what my focus is and what I think the mission is of my review.

Q One more if I could. Is there any consideration being given to taking
FEMA out of the Department of Homeland Security?

MS. TOWNSEND: The Secretary was asked this yesterday. There are very good
reasons to have the response capability in the Department of Homeland
Security, and that was a very carefully considered decision at the creation
of the department. If there's something about the underlying facts here
that causes us to question that, we'll question it. But I've not seen that
so far.

Q You mentioned that one of the lessons learned and one of the things
you're doing is you have all these point people down in the area, in
Florida, to interface with local officials. But that was also done before
Katrina. There were FEMA people at all the state operations headquarters,
so how is this different?

MS. TOWNSEND: Again, for the specifics in terms of numbers and things, I'd
refer to you DHS. But I would tell you my understanding is that it is an
enhanced complement of people to work with the federal coordinating
officer, as well as the defense coordinating officer.

Q And one other thing. Also, right in the aftermath, there were a lot of
problems getting things where they needed to be -- water, supplies, food.
How is it going to be different this time? Is there something you learned
from that lesson that you're now applying to this hurricane?

MS. TOWNSEND: One of them we related to pre-positioning more and better
communications equipment, and we're doing that. And my understanding from
the department is that they're pre-positioning more supplies, substantially
more supplies than they had before.

Q Yes, a couple of questions. First, when do you expect to make a final
report?

MS. TOWNSEND: There is not -- the President didn't assign a deadline. As
you can imagine, it's more important that we get it right, as opposed to be
making a specific deadline. My goal is to try and hit somewhere between
January and December -- December and January.

Q January and December next year?

MS. TOWNSEND: No, no, no, sorry. (Laughter.) Oh, I should be so lucky.
(Laughter.) December this year, January next year. Look, you understand the
reason for that is you need enough time that if you need legislative
change, you want to get into the spring legislative session. You want to --
I think we have a commitment to the American people to make sure that any
changes that we need to make are not only in place, but comfortably in
place and exercised in advance of the next hurricane season. So it's sort
of -- it's a practical -- the imperative in getting this done is a
practical common-sense one.

Q Can I get one more? We're two or three days out from this hitting
Florida. What would you say is really different this time, two or three
days out, than it was before Katrina? What -- you mentioned an increase in
the complement of people and maybe some supplies, but what overall picture
has changed from the two days out?

MS. TOWNSEND: I'm not -- I've tried to answer that now twice. I obviously
haven't satisfied you. The person responsible -- the agency responsible for
coordinating with the state and locals is DHS. The Secretary has spoken to
the Governor; the Governor has had contact here with the White House. We
have really tried to ensure that we are supporting most effectively the
needs of the Governor, who is in charge of the response. And he's got it
very well in hand. Florida is an extremely experienced state. We have
enormous confidence in the Governor and his emergency management staff.

And so if this is -- I think it's important -- what I'm trying to make the
point is, it's not a one size fits all. And we've got to be sensitive to
that. The President, being a former governor, is acutely aware of that. And
so I think it's -- you've got to be careful when you're measuring our
response to one state versus another, and what's required of us, because in
many ways, that's determined by the state and locals.

Let me try and get to some people who haven't had --

Q Aside from that long-range question of taking FEMA out of Homeland
Security, are you looking at all at the emphasis that FEMA has put on
terrorism above natural disasters, which has also been a factor in all of
this? And do you think that right now there's more of an emphasis on
natural disasters for the agency that there was before Katrina?

MS. TOWNSEND: I'm not sure I accept the premise that FEMA has paid more
attention to terrorism than natural disasters. Let me talk about capability
because I think that's what is important, and I think that's what not only
the American people care most about, but our state and local partners care
most about.

What we need to understand is what our capability is -- whether it's to a
chem-bio attack, a nuclear attack, a hurricane, a cat five. We need to
understand what are all the tools we have in responding to any major
catastrophic event. When you do that, you can then apply those tools
against the particular catastrophic event, regardless of the cause. Some
tools apply uniquely to a natural disaster, but many don't. And so the
benefit you have in having the Secretary of Homeland Security have all
those tools is he's able -- it's a menu, and he can select from that,
depending on both the catastrophic event, the state and local response, and
what we've been asked to provide. And so that's the importance, that's,
frankly, the benefit of having FEMA's capability, as well as others in a
single department.

Q And how are you enacting these incremental changes? What's the
governmental vehicle, if you will, for doing this? Do you communicate with
Chertoff and say, look, I found this out, you should do this? Or is the
President doing -- how is this happening?

MS. TOWNSEND: There is -- it depends on -- frankly, it depends on what the
issue is. For policy issues, there's a standing policy process here in the
Homeland Security Council, much like there is in the National Security
Council, where we serve policy options up to the deputies committee, the
principals committee, and take it to the President. Look, it's been made
perfectly clear, and everyone understands, this will not be a process of
consensus. Where there are differing opinions, we will serve it up to the
President, just as I did in the Silberman-Robb Commission. If there were
differences in opinion, we served them up, and a decision was made and we
moved forward towards implementation. But we will use the regular policy
process to do that. On those things which there is unanimous agreement just
need to be changed, we will just move forward and begin to make those
changes. Q On the revision of the Stafford Act and the Insurrection Act,
and so on, what's your sense of the need to revise the guidelines for the
military's action in these disasters? And what's your reaction to the plan
by the Northern Command to have sort of a 911 rescue force based here using
active duty troops?

MS. TOWNSEND: Okay, let me -- you've asked me like three questions, so I'm
-- let me do my best. I know you'll remind me if I forget one. I don't
think I'm -- I'd rather not get into whether or not -- I haven't presumed
that there needs to be a revision of Stafford or the Insurrection Act.
Frankly, I think it's very important that there be a common understanding
about what those authorities are and are not. And so I think you need to
look at them.

In terms of the appropriate use of the United States military, I was
fascinated by the reaction to this. The President, having been a former
governor, is well aware, well understands that the governor is the
commander-in-chief within his state and of his National Guard, respects
that, and has seen that work the way it's supposed to work, and should
work. This was really -- what the President was raising was the possibility
that there will be a narrow band of cases that are so catastrophic we ought
to expect that it outstrips state and local capability, and we ought to
have both the authority and the capability to respond effectively and
efficiently, and move out with alacrity. And so the question is, do we need
some other narrow set of authority that permits that option to be
available. That doesn't mean that -- I hear a lot about the federalization
of response. The federal government is never going to be the nation's first
responder. We shouldn't be, we don't have the capability to be, and we
won't be.

And so to the extent people are worried about sort of overturning years of
tradition and cultural sensitivity and sort of our experience, that's not
what we're talking about. What we need to be able to -- the question we
need to frame and consider is, is there a narrow band of cases where we are
expected to come in fast, and what is the capability, then, that we need,
and how do you best build it? It's too soon for me to tell you what that
looks like, but we are very focused on it, and we owe the President some
options.

Q Has the Northern Command come to you with this idea on paper so that you
can review it in context of your broader review?

MS. TOWNSEND: I personally have not reviewed the paper that you're
referring to, but I'd welcome it. I'm happy to look at it. This is a place
where all good ideas and all smart thinking needs to be put on the table,
and then we need to have an honest conversation, including with the
governors, about how best to frame it.

Q Can you talk a little bit more about the process that you're going
through in terms of evaluating what sort of military role might be needed
in these ultra-catastrophes, what -- how you're going to be evaluating that
question?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, we've asked both DHS, DOD, as well as other agencies if
they have thoughts on this area about how best to frame the problem and
then options for solution, to share them with us. We're going to pull that
together and try to pull the best of that together for a policy discussion.
This is an issue that will absolutely have to go through a deputies and
principals process to better frame options for the President.

Q Then how do the governors fit into that?

MS. TOWNSEND: I will raise it in the context of my conversations with the
governors, as I go -- as I'm doing the lessons learned. I mentioned I'm
going the end of next week to see -- to two states, and then again to
others in November. I'll raise it and solicit their ideas, and welcome
conversations with other governors who were not in affected states, if they
wish to engage with me on the issue.

Q At this point, do you have a sense of whether the National Response Plan
worked -- works for catastrophic events, and in this case, was it executed?

MS. TOWNSEND: Yes -- your last question is exactly how you analyze this.
First was, the National Response Plan -- my question that I'm looking at in
the review -- was it executed as it was written, and second, if not, why
not? Lastly, if it was, was it adequate to the task? You sort of have to
think of this in a very disciplined way, and I'm going to walk through it
in that way. It's too soon for me to tell.

Q And this is a follow-up. Mike Brown has now been reported saying that he
called the White House and superiors in Washington Monday, saying he
couldn't get a unified command established. He's been reported being told
that the levees were broken and that he called the White House immediately
after that. Did Mike Brown tell the White House the levees were broken?
What did he tell the White House?

MS. TOWNSEND: I have to tell you I am unaware of those specific
communications. But obviously, as we gather information, we're gathering it
from across the government, including the White House, and if there is some
significant fact in there that we need to understand to make sure that we
fix the information flow, we're going to do that. But it's all part of
understanding the facts to identify the problems and the solutions.

Q One last thing on the working group. Is it right that there were four DOD
staffers and three DHS staffers? And if so, does that reflect the primacy
or the priority that the administration puts on the Defense Department's
role either in the problem, or in the Homeland Security solution, and the
role of Homeland Security?

MS. TOWNSEND: I'm glad to say it's good staffing. I was told you were going
to ask me this, so I've got the breakdown for you, okay? Here we go. We
have four active duty from DOD,* three from DHS -- two civilians and one
U.S. Coast Guard officer. I have one person from HHS, from the Public
Health Service, one from the Department of Justice, one from FBI, and one
from the Department of Transportation. That doesn't include the individual
who works for me who leads the effort.

This was not a question of the primacy of one over the other. I'd like to
say I have primacy over the process, and those people who are there are not
working right now, in terms of taking tasking, for their home agency.
They're working for me. And this does not reflect the primacy of one agency
over the other. I have actually been quite impressed with the
cooperativeness, the collegiality of the review. It's a single effort, and
the thing that makes it that way is every one of the Cabinet Secretaries is
absolutely committed to making the system better. The State Department,
Secretary Rice has offered two people who will work with me part-time, as
we get to issues that are relevant to them, as well as other agencies have
made offers just like that. So the fact that you don't see an agency on
here doesn't mean they haven't offered or aren't working. This -- all I've
given you is the full-time staff.

Q Why more from DOD than Homeland?

MS. TOWNSEND: I know you're looking for some great answer to this. It was
not designed -- it wasn't like I said, I want four from DOD and three from
DHS. It's -- what I was looking for was the appropriate expertise to bring
to the issue, and that's how it shook out. There was no greater reason to
it.*

Q In terms of the National Response Plan, who implemented it? Was that
Chertoff? Did he make the move to trigger that plan? And what role did your
office have the day before Katrina, the day of Katrina, going forward?
Exactly what went on in here, in the White House?

MS. TOWNSEND: The National Response Plan is triggered by the declaration of
an incident of national significance. That's triggered by Secretary
Chertoff. You should know, well before that, before Katrina hit, the state
emergency declarations had already occurred. Secretary Chertoff had already
-- he was standing up the incident management group out of DHS. And so
there was a lot of activity already occurring. Precise time lines to that
are being sort of gathered as we speak.

But I said earlier, the Department of Homeland Security, as well as the
other federal departments and agencies, have operational responsibility. As
you know, the policy councils here at the White House are coordinating
bodies. The Homeland Security Council, like other staffs here at the White
House, was very busy and very involved before Katrina hit. And I have
responsibilities both for counterterrorism and for homeland security. My
homeland security responsibilities include counterterrorism, response to
natural disasters, and we were fully engaged at the time.

I will tell you that -- have no doubt about it, if there are ways that my
staff, in their coordination of the federal agencies, failed, I will call
it as I see it. And that includes me. If there is something I should have
done that I didn't do, you will hear that from me.

Q Has Mike Brown, himself, been cooperative in this review?

MS. TOWNSEND: I have not had an opportunity to speak to Mr. Brown; I have
not asked for the opportunity to speak to Mr. Brown yet. I'm really in the
process now of pulling the documents back in and trying to establish the
facts, before I go out and have conversations.

Q Do you plan to ask at some point? It seems logical that you would want to
speak with someone who was so involved.

MS. TOWNSEND: It's too soon for me to say. I'm trying to gather the facts
first, and then I will begin to talk to people across the federal
government, both current employees and former employees.

Q There's a fundamental question I've had since August 29th. We've heard
the President say this was not a normal hurricane; there were plenty of
other people saying we weren't expecting this, we weren't up to the task.
But the worst-case scenario has been gamed out in New Orleans for decades,
including the Hurricane Pam simulation a year ago. It was well-known the
track this hurricane was on; it was well-known the strength; there were
video conferences with the Hurricane Center and the administration two days
prior to landfall. The fundamental question that's been nagging at me is,
why was this such a surprise?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, it's interesting that you should say that. There were
video conferences, and the sense of everyone who had been involved at that
point was that we were appropriately positioned and we had the right
mechanisms in place. It turned out we were all wrong. We had not adequately
anticipated. That said, as you know from looking at the tracks of the
hurricanes, oftentimes, they reduce in strength before they hit based on
sort of the fundamental science of it. There had been hurricanes and
tropical storms in the region. The thing that changed this was not Katrina,
itself. The thing that was the catastrophic event was the failure of the
levee.

Q Right.

MS. TOWNSEND: And so --

Q Pam's simulation predicted that almost down to the neighborhoods that
would get flooded.

MS. TOWNSEND: Right, and we have to --

Q And that was a category three hurricane.

MS. TOWNSEND: And we have to understand if there were lessons that should
have been taken from that, why weren't they? This is all part of -- there
were prior GAO reports about emergency preparedness and response. There
have been a number of studies, and we have to look at what recommendations
were made, what were taken, what weren't, and what, perhaps, should have
been acted on or taken more seriously. Okay, thanks, everybody.

END 11:42 A.M. EDT

* Will travel to Louisiana and Texas next week, and Alabama, Mississippi
and Florida next month.

* Correction: From DOD, three active duty military and one civilian from
the Pentagon.

* At this time, DOD has the most lessons learned expertise and experience
in the federal government.
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