Text 1697, 667 rader
Skriven 2005-11-10 23:32:42 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (0511107) for Thu, 2005 Nov 10
====================================================
===========================================================================
Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steve Hadley
===========================================================================

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 10, 2005

Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steve Hadley
James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

Press Briefing
"); //--> view


3:21 P.M. EST

MR. HADLEY: Good afternoon.

On Monday, November 14th, the President and Mrs. Bush will depart for Asia.
They'll be traveling to Japan, South Korea, China and Mongolia. The
President is traveling to Asia to advance the interests of American
workers, businesses and entrepreneurs by seeking expanded trade and
economic opportunity, energy security and international property rights
protection. And he will be discussing all these topics on the trip.

He's also seeking to advance cooperation on international security
challenges, including the war on terror, health preparedness and regional
security issues. And finally, he is traveling to advance his agenda -- the
freedom agenda, including human rights and democracy.

The President's trip to Asia comes at a time when our relations with
nations of the region have rarely been stronger. During the trip, President
Bush will reaffirm the importance of, and his commitment to those
relationships. He will thank his counterparts for their efforts to defeat
terror, and he will look to make progress on regional economic issues that
are in the interests of the American people.

The APEC nations are strong proponents of expanding trade. And the
President will discuss the upcoming Doha Round of global trade negotiations
at the APEC ministerial, but he will also be addressing bilateral trade
issues as he visits with the individual leaders in the region.

Let me go through the schedule as it now stands. On Monday, the President
and Mrs. Bush will depart Andrews Air Force Base en route to Kyoto, Japan.
On the way to Japan the President will deliver remarks on the war on terror
at Elmendorf Air Base, in Anchorage, Alaska, where he and Mrs. Bush will
also visit with families of fallen soldiers.

From Alaska, he will continue to Japan, crossing the International Date
Line, and arriving at Osaka International Airport on Tuesday, November
15th. He and Mrs. Bush will then proceed to Kyoto.

On Wednesday, November 16, the President and Mrs. Bush will participate in
a cultural event at the Temple of the Golden Pavilion in Kyoto. The
President will then meet his friend, Prime Minister Koizumi. He will, I'm
sure, congratulate Prime Minister Koizumi on his strong reelection showing,
and will thank him for his support in the war on terror. Japan is the
second largest donor after the United States to reconstruction and
rebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq. And the President will express his
appreciation for that commitment.

The President will urge Prime Minister Koizumi to use his strong electoral
mandate to continue his efforts to promote economic reform so that Japan
can be an engine of growth for the world economy. Japan is also taking
steps to reopen its market to American beef, and trade between our two
nations will continue to create jobs in both countries.

The President will deliver a speech in the ancient Japanese capital of
Kyoto. That speech will offer a positive vision of American engagement in
Asia, Asia's own progress in this new century, and the importance of the
President's freedom agenda for Asia's continued success.

After Japan, the President will visit President Roh of South Korea, and
will participate in the APEC leaders meetings.

On Thursday, the 17th -- that's what he will be doing in South Korea,
generally. The specific schedule is that on Thursday, November 17th, he
will visit the ancient Korean capital of Gyeongju, where he and President
Roh will reaffirm the alliance between South Korea and the United States.
As you know, South Korea is a strong ally and key partner in Iraq. The
President will discuss our common approach in the six-party talks, which,
as you know, is aimed at the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Late afternoon on Thursday, November 17th, the President and Mrs. Bush will
participate in an event at the Bulguksa Temple. And following that event,
the President and Mrs. Bush will return to Busan, Korea, and there the
President will have a bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister of
Malaysia.

On Friday, November 18th, the President will meet with the ASEAN leaders to
demonstrate our commitment to the region and the U.S. desire to enhance
cooperation with ASEAN. That afternoon the President will begin
participation in the first session of the APEC leaders. That will be
followed by a meeting between the APEC leaders and the members of the
Business Advisory Council to APEC. And in the evening, the President and
Mrs. Bush will attend a gala dinner with APEC leaders.

As you know, APEC is the most robust multinational institution in the
region. And the agenda will be focused on working to promote trade, to
cooperate in the upcoming WTO ministerial in Hong Kong in December,
cooperating to respond to the risk of avian influenza, and continuing
APEC's work to protect the region from security threats such as terrorism,
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The President and his counterparts will discuss the new initiative launched
in September to respond to the threat posed by avian influenza. As you
know, the avian flu respects no borders, and we can best protect the
American people through close cooperation around the world to try and
ensure that as cases are identified, data is shared quickly and nations
take immediate steps to address any outbreak.

On Saturday, November 19th, the President will meet with the President of
Indonesia. And following that meeting, the President will participate in
the second session of APEC leaders. The leaders will meet, have lunch, have
an official photograph, and the President will participate in an event to
present the APEC leaders' declaration to the public.

Following the APEC events, the President will deliver remarks to troops at
Osan Air Base. And following his remarks, the President and Mrs. Bush will
depart Korea en route to Beijing, China.

In China, the President will meet with both President Hu and Premier Wen.
The two Presidents will talk about our mutual economic ties. President Bush
will press the Chinese to carry out their commitments and the commitment
President Hu made specifically in New York in September, to "work with the
United States to take effective measures to increase China's imports from
the United States," and, "to protect the legitimate rights and interests of
all international intellectual property rights owners, including those in
the United States."

Progress on intellectual property rights, currency reform and market
opening are good for our companies, but they are equally good and important
for China's own future prosperity, and that is the message that the
President will take. As the recent textile agreement between the United
States and China shows, we, the two countries, can work together in mutual
interest to benefit their people.

The President will, and has, welcomed China's decision in July to abandon
its pegged exchange rate, but he will urge China to take further steps to
implement China's stated objective of moving toward a market-based
currency.

President Bush will also share his view that as President Hu pursues his
vision of peaceful development, he will find that greater individual
freedom to worship, to speak and to pursue prosperity will strengthen his
country. It is an ambitious vision for China that the President hopes the
Chinese will embrace.

President Hu has said he wants to improve the lives of all Chinese people,
and it is in the interest of the American people that he succeed.

On Sunday, November 20, the President and Mrs. Bush will attend a social
lunch with Premier Wen, and a social dinner with President Hu and Madam Liu
in addition to their conversations.

The morning of Monday, November 21, the President and Mrs. Bush will
participate in an embassy event in Beijing. Following that event, they will
depart China en route to Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.

The President's visit there will be the first trip of a sitting U.S.
President to Mongolia. Mongolia has deployed troops to Iraq and
Afghanistan, and President Bush will thank Mongolian leaders for their
contribution to the war on terror.

Mongolia is the 14th largest contributor of troops to Iraq, and the third
largest contributor, if you compute it on a per capita basis. And it simply
shows that every nation in every corner of the globe has something at stake
and something to contribute in the war on terror. President Bush will
commend Mongolia on the progress it has made in becoming a more mature and
stable democracy, which observes human rights and civil liberties, and a
private-sector led free market economy.

In Mongolia, the President and Mrs. Bush will be greeted with an arrival
ceremony at Government House, and then the President will meet with the
President of Mongolia, and following that, with the Prime Minister. That
afternoon, the President will deliver remarks at Mongolian Government
House. And following those remarks, the President and Mrs. Bush will visit
Ikh Tenger and then participate in an embassy event at the airport. They
will then depart en route Andrews Air Force Base.

Before I take questions, I want to address something that many of you have
been asking about, and that is the notion that somehow the administration
manipulated prewar intelligence about Iraq. Our statements about the threat
posed by Saddam Hussein were based on the aggregation of intelligence from
a number of sources, and represented the collective view of the
intelligence community. Those judgments were shared by Republicans and
Democrats alike.

Seventy-seven senators, representing both sides of the aisle, the previous
administration, and foreign governments around the world all believed,
based on the same intelligence, that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass
destruction and imposed an enormous threat to his neighbors and to the
world at large.

The President created the bipartisan Silberman-Robb commission to examine
our intelligence system. Their report in March of last year states: "The
commission found no evidence of political pressure to influence the
intelligence community's prewar assessments of Iraq's weapons programs."

To ensure our policymakers received the best intelligence, the President
worked with the Congress to implement broad recommendations for
intelligence reform. I point out that some of the critics today believed,
themselves, in 2002 that Saddam Hussein had weapon of mass destruction,
they stated that belief, and they voted to authorize the use of force in
Iraq because they believed Saddam Hussein posed a dangerous threat to the
American people. For those critics to ignore their own past statements,
exposes the hollowness of their current attacks.

I'll be glad to take some questions.

Q Steve, on China, when you say that the President will urge them to take
further steps toward a market-based currency, what further steps are you
talking about here? And will the President seek a specific commitment from
the Chinese while he's there, or just talk about this issue?

MR. HADLEY: He'll talk about it. As you know, what they announced in July
is a framework by which adjustments could be made over time to allow the
two currencies to reflect market factors. There was some -- an initial
adjustment and an initial evaluation, and very little since. And I think
what the President will urge is that the Chinese begin to take steps
towards their own stated objective that market factors be taken into
account in the valuation of their currency.

Q Are there going to be -- is there going to be, first of all, a bilat with
President Putin of Russia? Maybe I missed it. And secondly, could you
outline some of the specific takeaways that you expect from this trip?

MR. HADLEY: Sure. We have offered a time when the President could meet with
President Putin. We have not yet closed with them. We don't know whether it
works in terms of President Putin's schedule, so that's still an item
that's being worked.

In terms of the trip as a whole, of course, one, to show the U.S.
commitment to Asia as an area of our interest; two, to indicate clearly
that the President knows the United States has an important role to play in
both the economic and security challenges in Asia, and that he wants to
play that role; three, there is enormous opportunity. This is a region that
has made good economic growth, understands and has capitalized on free
trade in order to enhance economic growth, and the President will, of
course, want to talk with them about what we can do bilaterally,
regionally, and internationally in order to move a free-trade agenda
forward.

He's not looking for any specific deliverables or specific outcomes. This
is an ongoing discussion in an audience of countries who are committed to
greater free trade. And there will be an opportunity for him to exchange
views with them in order to find a way to capitalize on the opportunities
before us.

Similarly, they will talk about regional issues. But this is not a meeting
for initiatives or new departures in terms of the six-party talks. That, of
course -- those talks are going on. They've had two days of talks. We
expect they will adjourn soon. They will resume in December.

Again, the six-party talks -- we have a common position about how to move
forward to de-nuclearize the peninsula. And while it will be a topic of
discussion, you shouldn't expect any major new initiatives out of that. So
those are, I think, a list of the range of issues they'll talk about.

They'll continue to work and talk about how we can move forward together on
security challenges, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, and, of
course, the new topic which has been put on the agenda, the need to
cooperate to deal with the potential of a pandemic based on avian flu. So,
again, I think you should not be looking for particular deliverables. It's
an opportunity for the leaders to get together and talk about how they can
work together to advance what is a very broad and rich agenda.

Q And that applies to China, too? I mean, the China meeting?

MR. HADLEY: Yes, and I've said very clearly the kind of things that we
expect to be on the agenda, in terms of China, which is intellectual
property rights and market access, and also a couple of the -- particularly
the currency issue.

But, again, these are issues that we've talked about. The President and
President Hu talked about it in New York. We had some good statements from
the Chinese side. And the issue is just how can they be now translated into
concrete action. But, again, it will be discussions with two friends. And
whatever decisions the Chinese decide to make in the wake of those
discussions will be decisions that they will make as a sovereign country.

Sir.

Q Yesterday, President welcomed His Holiness, Dali Lama, the Tibet leader.
What message do you think the President is getting from His Holiness, Dali
Lama, to the Chinese, as far as prosecution of his people in Tibet for the
last 50-plus years? And he's demanding freedom for his people, and human
rights are violation of their rights in every way.

MR. HADLEY: This is obviously a longstanding issue. There is an issue about
encouraging the dialogue between the Dali Lama and his representatives in
China. We think that is an important thing. It's something that the
President has encouraged in the past and will encourage again, that some
arrangement be worked out that reflects the unique religious and cultural
character of the Tibetan people. That's a message we've sent before and
will certainly be sending again.

Yes, ma'am.

Q There have been reports that there were threats against luxury hotels in
China next week when the President is there. These were knocked down, it
seems, by the Chinese government this morning. Can you tell us what
information you have about the security issues while the President travels?

MR. HADLEY: Well, obviously, before the President travels, there's a
security assessment that is made, and all the things you would expect. As I
stand here, I'm not aware of specific threat reporting associated with
that. There are other places in the government where that is reviewed, and
we can -- where some of those are, and you can check on that. But in terms
of what has been brought to my attention, I'm not aware of any serious
threats.

Q The statement you volunteered about prewar intelligence assessments
speaks fine to those Democrats who supported the war. But what do you say
to the Democrats who opposed the war, who said if we had not rushed into
it, we would have had the benefit of better intelligence and perhaps a
broader international coalition, a more substantial international coalition
than the one we have now?

MR. HADLEY: That's a different issue. The issue I was addressing was an
issue of the notion that somehow this administration manipulated the
intelligence. And those people who have looked at that issue, some
committees on the Hill in Congress, and also the Silberman-Robb Commission
have concluded it did not happen. So what we are left with is a body of
intelligence that was developed over a long period of time, was looked at
by the prior administration. They reached the conclusions that they
reached.

Congress, in 1998, authorized, in fact, the use of force based on that
intelligence. And as you know, the Clinton administration took some action.
It was the basis by which, as I said, over 70 senators from both parties
voted in 2002, noting specifically in their resolution the presence of
programs for chemical weapons, biological weapons, and an effort to
reconstitute a nuclear program.

So the point I was trying to make is, we all looked at the same
intelligence, and most people, on the intelligence, reached the same
conclusion. And it was the basis for actions by our Congress, action by two
administrations, and was concluded by intelligence services and leaders
around the globe.

The issues you raised are a different issue, and we can go back to the
history. I guess the point I would make is, if you recall the arrangements
under which the inspectors were operating, they were very much constrained
by Saddam Hussein, and they were not getting a whole lot of intelligence.

And finally, on the issue of diplomacy, this is something that was a charge
raised at Tony Blair, and he answered I think very clearly, and he
basically said, the diplomacy was active in Iraq over a period of over 12
years; 17 U.N. Security Council resolutions, and we were going for yet
another when it became clear -- based on statements from another -- leaders
who had seats on the U.N. Security Council that there would be no
consequences for non-compliance with these resolutions. And the President
at that point, as he said, very clearly, words of the United Nations have
to have consequence.

And I would also remind people that when we talked about the rationale for
going to war, it was more than just weapons of mass destruction. If you
look at those 17 Security Council resolutions which reflected the judgments
of the international community, they talked about weapons of mass
destruction, they talked about support for terror, they talked about
threats to his neighbors, they talked about his oppression of his own
people, and the nature of the regime he ran, and finally, the issue of
defiance of the international community over a period of 17 resolutions in
12 years. So it's a broad case, a broad case.

Q It was, however, the weapons of mass destruction that was used to justify
the urgency, and that, of course, is what my question dealt with.

MR. HADLEY: The intelligence was clear in terms of the weapons of mass
destruction, and after 9/11, what we learned was that the coincidence
between a rogue regime that was -- supported terror and pursued weapons of
mass destruction was a serious risk that the United States needed to deal
with. Having tried for 12 years and 17 resolutions to address it through
diplomacy, and continuing to try to address it through diplomacy, trying to
maintain the international consensus, once it was clear that that
international consensus had broken down, the President had no alternative.

Peter.

Q Do you believe now even if the intelligence was not manipulated that
perhaps in the White House it was assessed with pre-conceived ideas or not
enough skepticism? In hindsight looking back at that, what lessons do you
draw from that? What mistakes were made?

MR. HADLEY: Well, there have been a lot of lessons from that. And you can
look at the Silberman-Robb Commission. You can look at what the DNI is
doing -- you can look at what the DNI is doing. And some of the things that
the DNI is doing is reflecting that.

One of the reasons you have a DNI is so that when he comes into the White
House, he is bringing intelligence not just from the CIA, but from other
elements of the intelligence community. And the President now gets that.
And he will have pieces that come from CIA, come from FBI, come from DIA,
come from INR over at State. That is a good thing, and it shows a broader
range.

Obviously, what comes into the Oval Office, again, is an effort to provide
a consensus judgment. But I think one of the things we've all learned from
that is that it is important, also, to be clear about dissenting opinions
and make sure that dissenting opinions also are given visibility; that we
need more competitive analysis and to have products that come to the
President. This is one view; this is another view.

And we're starting to see those products as part of what we've learned from
this -- these events, as part of what we've learned under the
Silberman-Robb Commission, 9/11 Commission, and others. And you're
beginning to see that happen in terms of how intelligence is coming to the
President.

Q But Silberman-Robb didn't address how the White House used the
intelligence, specifically tried to address what the intelligence community
did in providing it. Do you think now, as you -- as a participant at the
time, do you think now that you, for instance, looked at this, and other
people looked at this, and say -- brought in your own preconceived notions?

MR. HADLEY: Preconceived notions -- you try and test intelligence. But in
the end of the day, the President looks to his senior intelligence
officials for their judgments on the intelligence. That's how it should be.
You test it, and you probe it. The President tests it, and the President
probes it.

But as you know, the case that was brought to him, in terms of the NIE, and
parts of which have been made public, was a very strong case.

Sir.

Q Steve, A, is the President going to talk about this tomorrow, the whole
question of the criticism he's been taking in recent weeks on Iraq? And, B,
you said -- you used the word "hollow" before. Are you suggesting politics
is at play here?

MR. HADLEY: I think people have to look at the record, look at how we got
the intelligence, and look the judgments of the -- the statements that
people made at the time on that intelligence. And that's to -- needs to
inform the judgment we make about some of the things we're hearing said
now.

Q Is the President going to talk about it tomorrow?

MR. HADLEY: He may talk about it. The thrust of the speech tomorrow is to
continue to talk to the American people about the war on terror, the nature
of the enemy, what is at stake, the importance that we see it through to
success, and the contribution that Iraq and Afghanistan, and what we're
doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, can make to winning the war on terror and
advancing the cause of democracy and freedom, which, as you know, the
President believes is the long-term direction we have to head to deal with
this problem.

David.

Q Steve, while you're on the subject of trying to assess intelligence,
since we are headed to South Korea -- as you said, you'll be dealing with
North Korean issues -- can you give us a sense now of what you believe the
state of play is of the North Korean nuclear program?

Two years ago when you first raised the issue of the uranium program, the
intelligence that you were discussing suggested that by the middle part of
this decade, around now, they would be producing fuel for uranium weapons.
Is that still the case to your mind? While the negotiations are underway,
is it your understanding that North Korea is continuing to producing fuel
for weapons? And does that suggest to you that Vice President Cheney's line
in China, during his trip, that time is not on our side, still applies? We
didn't hear any of that from you in the quotes of the briefing.

MR. HADLEY: As I say, the six-party talks are not the focus of this trip.
We have a forum in which we have a strategy in place. We have gotten a
document out of the last session of the six-party talks. That is a way
forward and starts from the proposition that North Korea has agreed to give
up all nuclear weapons and its nuclear program. So that's the starting
point, and we will be talking in the six-party talks about how to move --
how to turn that into action, in terms of disclosures, dismantlement, under
verified conditions. That's obviously the agenda of the six-party talks,
and there's no dispute about that.

In terms of intelligence, you know, one of the problems, in dealing with a
closed society such as North Korea, is you don't know what you don't know,
and what you do know tends to be fairly limited. And as you know, we don't
know as much about their enrichment program as we would like. And that's
one of the reasons why, as part of the six-party talks, it will be very
interesting to have -- and very important to have a declaration, to have
dismantlement procedures and verification measures so we can be sure that
in a otherwise fairly non -- extremely non-transparent society, these
commitments to give up nuclear weapons and nuclear programs are carried
out.

But David, we -- there's a lot we don't know on both sides of that.

Yes, ma'am.

Q Do you stand by the old estimate that they would be producing enough fuel
to make weapons by the middle part of this decade?

MR. HADLEY: You say, "the old estimate." I mean, I've seen a lot of
estimates. I don't know which one you're referring to. What I would --

Q That was at the time that you first revealed the existence of the
program.

MR. HADLEY: I would say the same thing. I don't know what specific
estimates you refer to, what assumptions were the basis of that estimate.
What I would say is what the President has said, is that it's time for the
six-party talks to start producing results. And we think we took a step
forward towards that in the last round where we got a statement, which is a
way forward, and that is a good thing. And it is -- I think justifies the
President's confidence that the way to approach this was on a regional
basis in the format of the six-party talks.

Now the challenge is to turn that into a step-by-step plan to reveal,
dismantle under verifiable conditions their nuclear program, and also to go
forward with the other steps that are talked about in that declaration.

Q Steve?

MR. HADLEY: Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell us what the government knows at this stage about the attacks
in Jordan and the possible connection to Zarqawi and what else is known at
this point?

MR. HADLEY: I can tell you where it stood as of this morning. This is one
of those things that is very much ongoing. There will be forensic teams
that will go on the ground, that will analyze what you see. So I think we
don't -- we will learn more as the investigation goes forward. Obviously,
Zarqawi, in Iraq, has claimed responsibility, in terms of a website. I
think our judgment is that is a credible claim, but I think we are going to
learn a lot more as the investigation goes forward.

Q What more does it tell this government about training that may be going
on in Iraq, and that is exported?

MR. HADLEY: Well, it tells us a lot about the enemy that we are worried
about, and the nature of the enemy that we're against. I mean it is a
shocking attack. In one of the hotels -- the President talked to the King
of Jordan this morning -- one of the hotels, there was a wedding going on.
And a large number of the casualties are small children. The bride and the
groom each lost large portions of their family. I mean, this -- it shows
the brutality of this enemy.

It also shows that there is sort of no safety. This is an attack in Jordan.
It killed mostly Jordanians, and overwhelmingly Muslims. It also took its
toll on some of the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. So it shows
that in some sense, we are all targets, that it is an extremely vicious
enemy that has really no principles.

And it also, in some sense, has a sort of haunting ring to the Zawahiri
letter, which we talked about. This is the letter from the al Qaeda Number
Two, Zawahiri, to Zarqawi in Iraq, and talked about their approach, which
was to attack the Americans, to get them to leave, to consolidate control
in Iraq, and then to begin to attack Iraq's neighbors. That's very clearly
the strategy. And what we're seeing is the kind of thing we can expect from
Zarqawi if we do not defeat terrorism in Iraq. And that's what makes it so
important.

Q Can I just do one follow on the intelligence? You said the prewar
intelligence was clear. It was also wrong.

MR. HADLEY: Which clear?

Q You said the prewar intelligence was clear.

MR. HADLEY: Right.

Q It was also wrong, wasn't it?

MR. HADLEY: I said it was, I believe, a strong case -- a strong case was
what I said in answer to the earlier question. And a lot of it --

Q You said the intelligence was clear.

MR. HADLEY: -- and a lot of it turned out to be wrong.

Q A lot of it turned out to be wrong.

MR. HADLEY: We know that.

Q Why -- I'm sorry, I didn't --

MR. HADLEY: Is there a follow-up? Can this be the last follow-up?

Q This will be the last follow-up.

MR. HADLEY: Good.

Q If that's the case and you're talking about lessons learned, then why is
it that Ahmed Chalabi, who was thought by this government to be one of the
main pedlars of intelligence that turned out to be flat wrong, why is he
now welcomed at the highest levels of this administration?

MR. HADLEY: He, as you know, saw many senior officials. He did not meet
with the President. He was received here because of what he is. He is the
-- one of the deputy prime ministers of Iraq. He came here representing the
Iraqi government. And we are representing -- we are receiving a number of
officials from the Iraqi government -- I'll give you an example. In terms
of the recent months, we have seen Ali Alawi, Massoud Barzani, Hashim
Hasani, Prime Minister Jaafari, Mowaffak Rubai, Barham Salih, Jalal
Talabani, the President -- we're seeing a lot of Iraqi government
officials.

He is one. And we're seeing a lot of them because this is a critical time
in Iraq going into the elections, and it is very important that these
elections produce an outcome, that it reflects the will of the Iraqi
people, that results in a government -- that is broadly based, drawing from
all elements of the Iraqi society, that gets stood up quickly and is a
strong government that can take the kinds of difficult, economic and
security decisions that the new government is going to have.

I will say on the specific intelligence, this, as you know, is something
that was looked at very hard in a number of the studies I've talked about.
And their judgment is that intelligence that came from the INC had a
minimal impact on any judgments of the intelligence community in preparing
the intelligence that went forward to the President and to others.

Q You said the President is going to give a speech in Japan on his vision
for the U.S. role in Asia. Critics of this administration have said that
the U.S. policy in Asia has been somewhat adrift for the last five years,
focused too much on the war on terror. How do you answer those kinds of
concerns, and what is it different or new that he's going to bring to the
table in this speech?

MR. HADLEY: Well, I have to say I dispute the premise. I think most people
you talk to would say our relations with Japan, Korea and China have rarely
been better. For example, the President has established in the six-party
talks a regional approach for dealing with one of the most serious security
challenges. And that format is beginning to produce results, as I talked
about earlier, in terms of the last round of the six-party talks.

If you look at what we have done just with Japan, we have resolved a very
difficult issue about the repositioning of U.S. forces in Japan. We have
dealt with some of the issues of Okinawa in reducing our force presence in
Okinawa. Japan continues to be part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, continues
to be part of -- with us on the ground in Iraq. We have been able -- we're
on, I think, in the direction of resolving the issue of U.S. beef going
into Japanese markets. We have an issue that has been resolved about a
nuclear carrier going into Japan.

These are very difficult issues. Some of them have been outstanding for
years, and we've been able to resolve them because of the strength of the
relationship both between the President and Prime Minister Koizumi, but
also to the relationship between the two governments.

I would say the same thing in South Korea. We've been able to reposition
our forces in South Korea and get a common approach that reduces the U.S.
footprint, but also enhances our capability overall so that, in fact,
security on the peninsula will be increased, rather than decreased.

And, finally, in terms of China, I think we have got a very solid
relationship that allows us to work candidly with one another and work
together on a lot of common problems -- on proliferation, on
counterterrorism, on trade issues, on six-party talks.

So I just think that, in some sense, we're beyond the point that the
President has to come with deliverables, because the dialogue with each of
these countries is so broad and rich, that it's an issue of two -- of the
President sitting down with his counterparts and having a strategic
discussion about events in their region and how we can move it along
towards a set of increasingly shared objectives.

I'm sorry, I've got to go. Thanks very much.

END 3:59 P.M. EST
===========================================================================
Return to this article at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051110-7.html

 * Origin: (1:3634/12)