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Ärende: Press Release (0511151) for Tue, 2005 Nov 15
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Setting the Record Straight: The New York Times Editorial on Pre-War
Intelligence
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For Immediate Release
November 15, 2005

Setting the Record Straight: The New York Times Editorial on Pre-War
Intelligence



The New York Times Editorial Says Foreign Intelligence Services Did Not
Support American Intelligence. "Foreign intelligence services did not have
full access to American intelligence. But some had dissenting opinions that
were ignored or not shown to top American officials." (Editorial, "Decoding
Mr. Bush's Denials," The New York Times, 11/15/05)

But Even Foreign Governments That Opposed The Removal Of Saddam Hussein
Judged That Iraq Had Weapons Of Mass Destruction (WMD).
  þ French Foreign Minister Dominique De Villepin: "Right Now, Our
    Attention Has To Be Focused As A Priority On The Biological And
    Chemical Domains. It Is There That Our Presumptions About Iraq Are The
    Most Significant. Regarding The Chemical Domain, We Have Evidence Of
    Its Capacity To Produce VX And Yperite. In The Biological Domain, The
    Evidence Suggests The Possible Possession Of Significant Stocks Of
    Anthrax And Botulism Toxin, And Possibly A Production Capability."
    (United Nations Security Council, 4701st Meeting, New York, 2/5/03)

  þ German Ambassador To The United States Wolfgang Ischinger: "I Think All
    Of Our Governments Believe That Iraq Has Produced Weapons Of Mass
    Destruction And That We Have To Assume That They Still Have That They
    Continue To Have Weapons Of Mass Destruction. We Have Not Yet Seen
    Evidence Produced By The Inspectors." (NBC's "Today," 2/26/03)

The New York Times Editorial Implies That Congress Was Presented With
Incomplete And Manipulated Intelligence. "Congress had nothing close to the
president's access to intelligence. The National Intelligence Estimate
presented to Congress a few days before the vote on war was sanitized to
remove dissent and make conjecture seem like fact." (Editorial, "Decoding
Mr. Bush's Denials," The New York Times, 11/15/05)

But The Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) Was Judged Not To Have Different
Intelligence Than The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Provided To
Congress, Which Represented The Collective Opinion Of The Intelligence
Community.
  þ Then-CIA Director George Tenet Said The NIE Summarized The Intelligence
    Community's Assessment Of Iraq's WMD Programs. TENET: "Let's turn to
    Iraq. Much of the current controversy centers on our prewar
    intelligence, summarized in the national intelligence estimate of
    October of 2002. National estimates are publications where the
    intelligence community as a whole seeks to sum up what we know about a
    subject, what we don't know, what we suspect may be happening and where
    we differ on key issues. This estimate asked if Iraq had chemical,
    biological and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. We
    concluded that in some of these categories Iraq had weapons, and that
    in others where it did not have them, it was trying to develop them.
    Let me be clear: Analysts differed on several important aspects of
    these programs and those debates were spelled out in the estimate. They
    never said there was an imminent threat. Rather, they painted an
    objective assessment for our policy-makers of a brutal dictator who was
    continuing his efforts to deceive and build programs that might
    constantly surprise us and threaten our interests. No one told us what
    to say or how to say it." (CIA Director George Tenet, Remarks On
    Intelligence-Gathering And Iraq's WMD Programs, Washington, D.C.,
    2/5/04)

  þ The Robb-Silberman Commission Reported That The Intelligence In The PDB
    Was Not "Markedly Different" Than The Intelligence Given To Congress In
    The NIE. "It was not that the intelligence was markedly different.
    Rather, it was that the PDBs and SEIBs, with their attention-grabbing
    headlines and drumbeat of repetition, left an impression of many
    corroborating reports where in fact there were very few sources. And in
    other instances, intelligence suggesting the existence of weapons
    programs was conveyed to senior policymakers, but later information
    casting doubt upon the validity of that intelligence was not." (Charles
    S. Robb And Laurence H. Silberman, The Commission On The Intelligence
    Capabilities Of The United States Regarding Weapons Of Mass
    Destruction, 3/31/05, p. 14)

  þ The Robb-Silberman Commission Found The PDB To Contain Similar
    Intelligence In "More Alarmist" And "Less Nuanced" Language. "As
    problematic as the October 2002 NIE was, it was not the Community's
    biggest analytic failure on Iraq. Even more misleading was the river of
    intelligence that flowed from the CIA to top policymakers over long
    periods of time in the President's Daily Brief (PDB) and in its more
    widely distributed companion, the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief
    (SEIB). These daily reports were, if anything, more alarmist and less
    nuanced than the NIE." (Charles S. Robb And Laurence H. Silberman, The
    Commission On The Intelligence Capabilities Of The United States
    Regarding Weapons Of Mass Destruction, 3/31/05, p. 14)

The New York Times Editorial Implies That UN Sanctions Were Preventing
Saddam Hussein From Pursuing WMD. "It's hard to imagine what Mr. Bush means
when he says everyone reached the same conclusion. There was indeed a
widespread belief that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons. But Mr.
Clinton looked at the data and concluded that inspections and pressure were
working a view we now know was accurate." (Editorial, "Decoding Mr. Bush's
Denials," The New York Times, 11/15/05)

But Former President Bill Clinton Warned After 9/11 That The United States
Could Not Allow Saddam Hussein To Continue Defying Weapons Inspectors.
  þ In June 2004, Bill Clinton Said President Bush Had The Responsibility
    To Make Sure Iraq's Chemical And Biological Weapons Did Not Get In The
    Hands Of Terrorists. "After 9/11, let's be fair here, if you had been
    President, you'd think, Well, this fellow bin Laden just turned these
    three airplanes full of fuel into weapons of mass destruction, right?
    Arguably they were super-powerful chemical weapons. Think about it that
    way. So, you're sitting there as President, you're reeling in the
    aftermath of this, so, yeah, you want to go get bin Laden and do
    Afghanistan and all that. But you also have to say, Well, my first
    responsibility now is to try everything possible to make sure that this
    terrorist network and other terrorist networks cannot reach chemical
    and biological weapons or small amounts of fissile material. I've got
    to do that. That's why I supported the Iraq thing. There was a lot of
    stuff unaccounted for. So I thought the President had an absolute
    responsibility to go to the U.N. and say, 'Look, guys, after 9/11, you
    have got to demand that Saddam Hussein lets us finish the inspection
    process.' When you're the President, and your country has just been
    through what we had, you want everything to be accounted for." (Bill
    Clinton, "His Side of The Story," Time, 6/28/04)

  þ The Duelfer Report Concluded That Saddam Hussein Sought To
    "Reconstitute His Weapons Of Mass Destruction (WMD) When Sanctions Were
    Lifted." "Saddam [Hussein] so dominated the Iraqi regime that its
    strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while
    preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted." (Comprehensive Report Of
    The Special Advisor To The DCI On Iraq's WMD, Key Findings Regime
    Strategic Intent, 9/30/04, p. 1)

The New York Times Editorial Says There Was Little Evidence Suggesting Iraq
Was Pursuing A Nuclear Weapon. "The administration had little company in
saying that Iraq was actively trying to build a nuclear weapon. The
evidence for this claim was a dubious report about an attempt in 1999 to
buy uranium from Niger, later shown to be false, and the infamous aluminum
tubes story. That was dismissed at the time by analysts with real
expertise." (Editorial, "Decoding Mr. Bush's Denials," The New York Times,
11/15/05)

But The Weapons Inspectors Concluded That Saddam Hussein Sought A Nuclear
Capability.
  þ The Duelfer Report: "Saddam Aspired To Develop A Nuclear Capability."
    "Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq's WMD capability which was essentially
    destroyed in 1991 after sanctions were removed and Iraq's economy
    stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that
    which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear
    capability in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international
    pressure and the resulting economic risks but he intended to focus on
    ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities."
    (Comprehensive Report Of The Special Advisor To The DCI On Iraq's WMD,
    Key Findings Regime Strategic Intent, 9/30/04, p. 1)

The New York Times Editorial Says The Claim That Iraq And Al Qaeda Were In
League Was "Absurd" And Implies That The President Connected Saddam Hussein
To The 9/11 Attacks. "The Bush administration was also alone in making the
absurd claim that Iraq was in league with Al Qaeda and somehow connected to
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. That was based on two false tales. One was the
supposed trip to Prague by Mohamed Atta, a report that was disputed before
the war and came from an unreliable drunk. The other was that Iraq trained
Qaeda members in the use of chemical and biological weapons. Before the
war, the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that this was a deliberate
fabrication by an informer." (Editorial, "Decoding Mr. Bush's Denials," The
New York Times, 11/15/05)

But The President Never Connected Iraq To The 9/11 Attacks While Other
Politicians And Independent Commissions Judged That There Were Contacts
Between Iraq, Al-Qaeda And Other Terrorist Groups.
  þ President Bush Said There Is "No Evidence That Saddam Hussein Was
    Involved With" 9/11. PRESIDENT BUSH: "We've had no evidence that Saddam
    Hussein was involved with the September 11th." (President Bush, Remarks
    After Meeting With Members Of The Congressional Conference Committee On
    Energy Legislation, Washington, D.C., 9/17/03)

  þ Condoleezza Rice Said That Saddam Hussein Never "Had Either Direction
    Or Control Of 9/11." RICE: "And we have never claimed that Saddam
    Hussein had either, that Saddam Hussein had either direction or control
    of 9/11. What we have said is that this was someone who supported
    terrorists, helped train them. But most importantly, that this is
    someone who, with his animus towards the United States, with his
    penchant for and capability to gain weapons of mass destruction, and
    his obvious willingness to use them, was a threat in this region that
    we were not prepared to tolerate." (ABC's "Nightline," 9/16/03)

  þ Sen. Clinton (D-NY): "[Saddam] Has Also Given Aid, Comfort, And
    Sanctuary To Terrorists, Including Al-Qaida Members, Though There Is
    Apparently No Evidence Of His Involvement In The Terrible Events Of
    September 11, 2001. This Much Is Undisputed." (Sen. Hillary Clinton,
    Congressional Record, 10/10/02, p. S10288)

  þ In 1999, The Clinton Administration Issued A Report That Said Iraq Was
    Supporting Terrorists. "[T]he Patterns of Global Terrorism report
    listed Iran, Libya, Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan and Syria and exiled
    Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden as terrorist sponsors. The seven
    countries were on the same list last year. Secretary of State Dr
    Madeleine Albright said: 'Governments on the list that would like to
    see their names removed know exactly what they must do: stop planning,
    financing and supporting terrorist acts and stop sheltering or
    interfering with the apprehension and prosecution of those who commit
    them.'" ("No Reprieve For Nations Of Terror," The [Perth, Australia]
    Sunday Times, 5/2/99)

  þ The 9/11 Commission: "There Is Evidence That Around This Time [1997]
    Bin Ladin Sent Out A Number Of Feelers To The Iraqi Regime, Offering
    Some Cooperation." ("Final Report Of The National Commission On
    Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States," The 9/11 Commission Report,
    7/22/04)

  þ The 9/11 Commission: "In March 1998, After Bin Ladin's Public Fatwa
    Against The United States, Two Al Qaeda Members Reportedly Went To Iraq
    To Meet With Iraqi Intelligence." ("Final Report Of The National
    Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States," The 9/11
    Commission Report, 7/22/04)

The New York Times Editorial Implies That There Was Political Pressure To
Change Intelligence. "Richard Kerr, a former deputy director of central
intelligence, said in 2003 that there was 'significant pressure on the
intelligence community to find evidence that supported a connection'
between Iraq and Al Qaeda. The C.I.A. ombudsman told the Senate
Intelligence Committee that the administration's 'hammering' on Iraq
intelligence was harder than he had seen in his 32 years at the agency."
(Editorial, "Decoding Mr. Bush's Denials," The New York Times, 11/15/05)

But Congressional And Independent Committees Have Repeatedly Found No
Political Pressure To Change Intelligence.
  þ The Bipartisan Senate Select Committee On Intelligence Report "Did Not
    Find Any Evidence" Of Attempts To Influence Analysts To Change
    Intelligence. "Conclusion 83. The Committee did not find any evidence
    that Administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or
    pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons
    of mass destruction capabilities. Conclusion 84. The Committee found no
    evidence that the Vice President's visits to the Central Intelligence
    Agency were attempts to pressure analysts, were perceived as intended
    to pressure analysts by those who participated in the briefings on
    Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, or did pressure analysts
    to change their assessments." ("Report On The U.S. Intelligence
    Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq," U.S. Senate
    Select Committee On Intelligence, 7/7/04, p. 284-285)

  þ The Robb-Silberman Commission Found "No Evidence Of Political
    Pressure." "These are errors serious errors. But these errors stem from
    poor tradecraft and poor management. The Commission found no evidence
    of political pressure to influence the Intelligence Community's pre-war
    assessments of Iraq's weapons programs. As we discuss in detail in the
    body of our report, analysts universally asserted that in no instance
    did political pressure cause them to skew or alter any of their
    analytical judgments. We conclude that it was the paucity of
    intelligence and poor analytical tradecraft, rather than political
    pressure, that produced the inaccurate pre-war intelligence
    assessments." (Charles S. Robb And Laurence H. Silberman, The
    Commission On The Intelligence Capabilities Of The United States
    Regarding Weapons Of Mass Destruction, 3/31/05, p. 50-51)

  þ The British Butler Report Found "No Evidence" Of Intelligence
    Distortion. "In general, we found that the original intelligence
    material was correctly reported in [Joint Intelligence Committee]
    assessments. An exception was the '45 minute' report. But this sort of
    example was rare in the several hundred JIC assessments we read on
    Iraq. In general, we also found that the reliability of the original
    intelligence reports was fairly represented by the use of accompanying
    quali cations. We should record in particular that we have found no
    evidence of deliberate distortion or of culpable negligence. We
    examined JIC assessments to see whether there was evidence that the
    judgements inside them were systematically distorted by
    non-intelligence factors, in particular the in uence of the policy
    positions of departments. We found no evidence of JIC assessments and
    the judgements inside them being pulled in any particular direction to
    meet the policy concerns of senior of cials on the JIC." ("Review Of
    Intelligence On Weapons Of Mass Destruction," Report Of A Committee Of
    Privy Counsellors, 7/14/04, p. 110)

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