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Skriven 2005-11-30 23:33:20 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (051130) for Wed, 2005 Nov 30
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Fact Sheet: Training Iraqi Security Forces
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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 30, 2005
Fact Sheet: Training Iraqi Security Forces
ÿÿÿÿÿ
Today's Presidential Action:
Today, President Bush Addressed The Midshipmen Of The Naval Academy On The
Strategy For Victory In Iraq, The Central Front Of The War On Terror.
President Bush discussed the steps being taken to train the Iraqi military
and police and the progress being made as Iraqis stand up to protect their
strengthening democracy.
The Administration Released The "National Strategy For Victory In Iraq."
The United States is pursuing a comprehensive strategy in Iraq, and
Americans should have a clear understanding of this strategy. Posted on the
White House website, whitehouse.gov, this strategy document is available
for all Americans to read.
þ The Strategy In Iraq Has Three Elements - A Political Component, A
Security Component, And An Economic Component. Politically, America is
helping Iraqis build inclusive democratic institutions to protect all
Iraqis, engage those who can be persuaded to join the new Iraq and
marginalize those who never will. To strengthen security, the Coalition
and Iraqi security forces are on the offensive - clearing out areas
controlled by the enemy, holding that territory using Iraqi forces, and
following up with targeted reconstruction to help Iraqis rebuild their
lives. The Coalition is also working with Iraqis to help them build
capable and effective Iraqi security forces. Economically, America is
helping the Iraqis restore infrastructure, reform the economy, and
build the economic framework that will give all Iraqis a stake in a
free and peaceful Iraq. In achieving this, Coalition countries, the UN,
international organizations, and supportive regional states are all
helping Iraqis build their future.
The Enemy In Iraq
A Clear Strategy Begins With An Understanding Of The Enemy In Iraq. The
enemy is a combination of rejectionists, Saddamists, and terrorists.
þ Rejectionists. By far the largest group, these are ordinary Iraqis -
mostly Sunni Arabs - who miss the privileged status they had under
Saddam Hussein's regime. They reject an Iraq in which they are no
longer the dominant group. While not all Sunnis fall into the
rejectionist camp, most of those who do are not actively fighting, but
are giving aid to the enemy. Many Sunnis boycotted the January
elections but now recognize that opting out of the democratic process
has hurt their interests. Today, those who advocate violent opposition
are being increasingly isolated by Sunnis who choose to participate in
the democratic process. Sunnis voted in the recent constitutional
referendum in large numbers, and Sunni coalitions are forming to
compete in coming elections. Over time, most rejectionists will be
persuaded to support a democratic Iraq led by a federal government that
is strong enough to protect minority rights.
þ Saddamists Or Former Regime Loyalists. This smaller, but more
determined, group includes former regime loyalists who held positions
of power under Saddam Hussein and seek to return to power. These
hard-core Saddamists are trying to foment anti-democratic sentiment
among the larger Sunni community. But they cannot stop democratic
progress. Over time, they can be marginalized and defeated by the Iraqi
people and Iraqi security forces.
þ Terrorists Affiliated With Or Inspired By Al-Qaida. This is the
smallest, but most lethal, group. Many are foreign fighters believed to
be responsible for most of the suicide bombings, beheadings, and other
atrocities seen on television. Led by Zarqawi, al-Qaida's chief of
operations in Iraq who has pledged his allegiance to Osama bin Laden,
their objective is to drive U.S. and Coalition forces out; use the
vacuum that would be created by an American retreat to gain control;
and use Iraq as a base from which to launch attacks against America,
overthrow moderate governments in the Middle East, and establish a
totalitarian Islamic empire that reaches from Indonesia to Spain. This
enemy shares the same ideology as the terrorists who struck the United
States on 9/11 and many other cities across the world. If the United
States was not fighting and destroying this enemy in Iraq, these
terrorists would not be idle, but plotting and killing in the name of
their ideology. In Iraq, America's military is defeating a direct
threat to the American people. America will never back down, give in,
or accept anything less than complete victory.
Progress In Training Iraq Security Forces
To Defeat The Enemy, Iraqis Need Strong Military And Police Forces.
Bringing skills and knowledge to the fight that Coalition forces cannot,
Iraqi troops know their people, language, and culture. They know who the
terrorists are and are earning the trust of their countrymen. As Iraqi
forces grow in size and capability, they are helping to keep a better hold
on cities and are increasingly taking the lead. The goal is to train enough
Iraqi forces to carry the fight against the terrorists.
þ In The Past Year, Iraqi Security Forces Have Made Real Progress. This
time last year, there were only a handful of combat-ready Iraqi
battalions. Now, there are over 120 Iraqi Army and Police combat
battalions in the fight - typically comprised of between 350 to 800
Iraqi forces. Of these, about 80 battalions are fighting alongside
Coalition forces. About 40 other battalions are taking the lead, and
most are controlling their own battle space and conducting their own
operations with some Coalition support.
þ Iraqi Forces Are Taking The Lead. This progress is especially clear
when comparing last year's assault in Fallujah and recent
anti-terrorist operations in Tal Afar. In Fallujah, the assault was led
by nine Coalition battalions - with six Iraqi battalions supporting.
The Iraqis fought and sustained casualties but were primarily limited
to protecting the flanks of Coalition forces and securing ground
already cleared. This year in Tal Afar, the assault was primarily led
by 11 Iraqi battalions, backed by five Coalition battalions. Many Iraqi
units conducted their own anti-terrorist operations and controlled
their own battle space. Many Iraqi forces have stayed behind to ensure
the city's safety and move ahead with reconstruction projects. In
October, the citizens of Tal Afar were able to vote on the
constitutional referendum.
þ Iraqi Forces Are Taking Control Of More Territory. Today, over 30 Iraqi
Army battalions have assumed primary control of their own areas of
responsibility. In Baghdad, Iraqi battalions have taken over major
sectors - including some of the city's toughest neighborhoods. Iraqi
troops are securing the area around Baghdad's Haifa street, and roughly
ninety square miles of Baghdad province. Across the country, Iraqi
battalions are making similar strides, taking responsibility of areas
in South-Central, Southeast, Western, and North-Central Iraq. As Iraqi
forces take control of more territory, Coalition forces can concentrate
on training Iraqis and hunting down high-value terrorist targets.
þ Coalition Bases Are Being Transferred To Iraqi Control. As Iraqi forces
take over more territory, the Coalition is transferring forward
operating bases to Iraqi control. Over a dozen bases have been handed
over to the Iraqi government - including Saddam Hussein's former palace
in Tikrit. From many of these bases, the Iraqi Security Forces are
planning and executing their own operations against the terrorists.
þ By Any Reasonable Standard, The Iraqi Security Forces Are Making
Progress. Some critics point to the fact that only one Iraqi battalion
has achieved complete independence from the Coalition. To achieve
complete independence, an Iraqi battalion must not only fight the enemy
on its own but also provide its own support elements, including
logistics, airlift, intelligence, and command and control through their
ministries. There are some battalions from NATO militaries would not be
able to meet this standard. But not every Iraqi unit has to meet this
level of capability for the Iraqi Security Forces to take the lead in
the fight against the terrorists.
Progress Has Resulted Because Of Changes Made In Helping Train Iraqi
Troops. Learning from earlier experiences, the Coalition has changed its
approach to training. Now, Iraqi Army recruits receive about the same
length of basic training as new U.S. Army recruits. With Coalition help,
Iraqis have established schools for the Iraqi military services, an Iraqi
military academy, a non-commissioned officer (NCO) academy, a military
police school, and a bomb disposal school. NATO has established an Iraqi
Joint Staff College as well. There is also an increased focus on leadership
training, including professional development for Iraqi squad leaders,
platoon sergeants, warrant officers, and sergeants-major. A new generation
of Iraqi officers is being trained to lead their forces with skill, defeat
the terrorists, and secure their freedom.
þ Changes Have Been Made To Iraqi Police Training. At first, Iraqi police
recruits spent too much time in classroom lectures and received limited
small-arms training. Now, recruits spend more of their time outside the
classroom with intensive hands-on training in anti-terrorism operations
and learning real-world survival skills. Iraq has six basic police
academies, and one in Jordan, that together produce over 3,500 new
police officers every 10 weeks. The Baghdad police academy has
simulation models to prepare Iraqi police for real-life situations.
Because Iraqi police are not facing common criminals, they are getting
live-fire training with the AK-47s they need to fight the terrorists.
þ Recruits Are Being Instructed By Iraqi Officers. When the training
effort began, nearly all the trainers came from Coalition countries.
Today, the vast majority of Iraqi police and army recruits are taught
by Iraqi instructors. By training the trainers, an institutional
capability is being created to allow the Iraqi Forces to continue to
develop and grow long after Coalition forces have left Iraq.
þ The Quality Of Recruits Is Improving. Even though Iraqi police and army
recruits are being targeted by the terrorists, there is no shortage of
Iraqis willing to risk their lives to secure a free Iraq. As Iraqi
Security Forces become larger and more capable, more Sunnis are being
encouraged to join the Iraqi army and police. These efforts were given
a significant boost when more than 60 influential Sunni clerics issued
a fatwa calling on young Sunnis to join the Iraqi Security Forces.
These religious leaders are helping to make Iraqi Security Forces a
truly national institution able to serve, protect, and defend all
Iraqis.
The Coalition Is Helping Iraqis Build The Institutions They Need To Support
Their Forces. North of Baghdad, a national depot has been established to
supply the logistical needs of the 10 Iraqi Army divisions. Regional and
base support units across the country are supplying Iraqi troops. Iraq's
Air Force and Navy are conducting operations to support Iraqi troops and
protect vital ports. The Iraqi Military Intelligence School is producing
skilled Iraqi intelligence analysts and collectors. By taking these steps,
the Coalition is helping Iraqi Security Forces become self-supporting, take
the fight to the enemy, and sustain themselves in that fight.
As Iraqi Forces Become More Capable, The Mission Will Continue To Change.
Coalition forces will continue to shift from providing security and
conducting nationwide operations, to conducting more specialized operations
targeting the most dangerous terrorists. Coalition troops will increasingly
move out of Iraqi cities, reduce the number of bases, and conduct fewer
patrols and convoys. As Iraqi forces gain experience, and the political
process advances, the United States will be able to decrease its troop
levels in Iraq without losing the capability to defeat the terrorists.
These decisions will be driven by ground conditions and the commanders'
judgments - not by artificial timetables set by politicians in Washington.
Pulling Out The Troops Before They Have Achieved Their Purpose Is Not A
Plan For Victory. An artificial deadline would send a message around the
world that America is a weak and unreliable ally. It would send a signal to
the enemy that if they wait long enough, America will cut and run. It would
vindicate the tactics of beheadings, suicide bombings, and mass murder -
and invite new attacks on America. The President pledges that America will
not run in the face of car bombers and assassins so long as he is Commander
in Chief.
Victory In Iraq
We Are Helping The Iraqi Security Forces To Secure Democracy And A Free
Future. In just over two-and-a-half years, Iraqis have made incredible
political progress from living under a brutal tyrant to liberation, free
elections, and a democratic constitution. On December 15, they will go to
the polls to elect a fully constitutional government that will lead the
country for the next four years. With each ballot cast, the Iraqi people
are sending a message that they will not be intimidated and will determine
their own destiny.
The President Will Settle For Nothing Less Than Complete Victory In Iraq.
Victory will come when the terrorists and Saddamists can no longer threaten
Iraq's democracy, Iraqi Security Forces can provide for the safety of their
own citizens, and Iraq is not at risk of becoming a safe haven for
terrorists to plot attacks against America. As progress is made toward
victory, Iraqis will take more responsibility for their security and fewer
U.S. forces will be needed. Iraq will not be left to the terrorists. Iraq
will be a free nation and a strong ally in the Middle East - and this will
add to the security of the American people.
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