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Skriven 2006-02-09 23:40:14 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (0602094) for Thu, 2006 Feb 9
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Press Briefing on the West Coast Terrorist Plot by Frances Fragos Townsend,
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
February 9, 2006

Press Briefing on the West Coast Terrorist Plot by Frances Fragos Townsend,
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
Via Teleconference



12:24 P.M. EST

MS. TOWNSEND: Good afternoon, everybody. I thought I'd start with a general
statement and then go to the West Coast plot.

The President's speech this morning was intended to stress the point that
terrorism is a global problem requiring a global response, that uses all
the tools of national and international power. We are facing a global
terrorist network and that requires a global alliance to combat it. The
United States cannot fight this alone. All the nations have a stake in the
war and all have a part to play in the war on terror. As the President
mentioned, we have a coalition of over 90 countries. Protecting American
citizens requires the unprecedented cooperation of many nations. The
President used the two examples of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and their
ongoing contributions and successes in the war on terror.

The speech makes the point explicitly that this cooperation is happening on
a daily basis. With our partners abroad we have disrupted terrorist
networks around the world and serious al Qaeda plots, including plots to
attack inside the United States. We have done this using all instruments of
national power, including extensive collaboration with our international
partners.

The President today highlighted one example of a disrupted plot, in which
al Qaeda intended to use a hijacked airliner to attack the West Coast of
the United States. I should say, he used the phrase "Liberty Tower," that
should have been "Library Tower." This plot is an instructive and chilling
reminder of al Qaeda's global connections and their intention to attack our
homeland. More importantly, it makes clear to the American public that
there's an ongoing and effective international cooperation that is working
to undermine al Qaeda's attempts to attack us. It also reminds us that we
must continue to gather as much information as possible and from all
sources, especially detainee debriefings and intelligence operations, to
reveal the evolving terrorist networks and plots.

In telling the American public about this foiled plot, we have to be
sensitive to the need to protect sources and methods since we are dealing
with the ongoing threat from al Qaeda -- and you'll appreciate that's why
the President doesn't name the countries, the particular allies or the
particulars of the sources and methods to glean the operational leads that
led to the disruption of the plot.

As you'll all recall, the September 11th attack was conceived as a broader
plot than what was actually executed. It was meant to include -- it was
intended, in its initial, formative stages, to include by the East Coast
and the West Coast plots. It was bin Laden who decided that it should just
focus on the East Coast, and that the West Coast should be held in abeyance
until there was a -- as a follow-on attack. It's our understanding now that
it was too difficult to get enough operatives for both the East and West
Coast plots at the same time.

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad was the individual who led this effort. He initiated
the planning for the West Coast plot after September 11th, in October of
2001. KSM, working with Hambali in Asia, recruited the members of the cell.
There was a total of four members of the cell. When they -- KSM, himself,
trained the leader of the cell in late 2001 or early 2002 in the shoe bomb
technique. You all will recall that there was the arrest of the shoe
bomber, Richard Reid, in December of 2001, and he was instructing the cell
leader on the use of the same technique.

After the cell -- the additional members of the cell, in addition to the
leader, were recruited, they all went -- the cell leader and the three
other operatives went to Afghanistan where they met with bin Laden and
swore biat -- that is an oath of loyalty to him -- before returning to
Asia, where they continued to work under Hambali.

The cell leader was arrested in February of 2002, and as we begin -- at
that point, the other members of the cell believed that the West Coast plot
has been canceled, was not going forward. You'll recall that KSM was then
arrested in April of 2003 -- or was it March -- I'm sorry, March of 2003.

The ongoing cooperation between -- and information exchange between all of
the international partners of the various countries involved in this
operation permitted us to continue to get more leads, even after Hambali's
arrest. And it permitted us -- even after KSM's arrest, I'm sorry. And that
allowed us to follow the path of Hambali, who was ultimately arrested in
August of 2003.

The case, I think more than anything, underscores the importance of
real-time information sharing. And the fact is, if we don't -- by sharing
the information, by working with others and sharing information real-time,
while it can be a slow process -- you can see we unraveled this over a
period of years, this information allows us to get the dots, as the 9/11
Commission put it. And it's only by collecting those dots and sharing them
with each other, something that in isolation may not seem significant, we
put together the picture that permits us to disrupt it. It is of critical
importance that we build these relationships, that we foster these
relationships of cooperation and trust with our allies. And, frankly,
they've done nothing but get stronger since 9/11.

I also think that it's a reminder of the importance of detainee
debriefings. It's only by getting this information and combining that with
other sources and methods in the intelligence community that we can truly
understand the intentions of our enemies and their tactics. And so we have
to be careful to protect them, but that is one of the most important
techniques that we have. I would also say while we have heard many
criticisms of our intelligence community, this is an absolute success story
of the intelligence community in general, and CIA, in particular.

Okay, with that, I'm ready to take questions.

Q Hello, are you there?

MS. TOWNSEND: Yes, I am.

Q Hello, how are you doing?

MS. TOWNSEND: Good, how are you?

Q Not too bad. Anyway, to start with, you said that the cell leader of the
West Coast plot had been arrested. What about the other cell members? Can
you give us any further details, number one? And, number two, you talked
about the need and great successes of international cooperation. Can you
comment in any way on recent events in Yemen, when perhaps the
international cooperation fell down a little bit?

MS. TOWNSEND: Sure. I should have said it, and Mark, thank you for
reminding me. All of the cell leaders were ultimately arrested and taken
into custody. So there are none of the remaining -- none of the four are at
large.

As regards Yemen, look, I will tell you I find the developments in Yemen
not only deeply disappointing, but of enormous concern to us, especially
given the capabilities and the expertise of the people who were there. We
are disappointed that they were all housed together. We are disappointed
that their restrictions in prison weren't more stringent. We have spoken
with our colleagues in Yemen through our ambassador and expressed this to
them and asked them for the strongest and most transparent cooperation so
that we can help them.

We are also working with our allies in Saudi Arabia -- after all, Saudi
Arabia had turned over a number of people to Yemen, back to Yemen, who were
detained and now have escaped. And so our allies in Saudi Arabia face as
great, if not a greater, threat by virtue of this escape than we do.

And so we're -- again, it's a good example of how we're going to approach
this escape and work together with our allies.

Q I understand that the House Intelligence Committee was briefed yesterday
on the NSA wire tapping program, and I understand that at least some of the
members present asked either General Hayden or Mr. Gonzales why they
couldn't tell more success stories. So it's interesting to me that news of
this is coming out today. So my follow question is, did the NSA wire taps,
did they play any role in any of these arrests that you talked about, and
in disrupting this particular plot?

MS. TOWNSEND: As I said to you, we use all available sources and methods in
the intelligence community, but we have to protect them. So I'm not going
to talk about what ones we did or didn't use in this particular case. And I
wasn't at the briefing yesterday, so I can't speak directly to that.

Q So you can't say that this is a direct result, a successful result of
that initiative?

MS. TOWNSEND: I wouldn't say one way or the other. I wouldn't comment on
it.

Q Hi. I had essentially the same question related to the NSA. Is there
nothing at all that you can tell us in any regard as to whether the NSA
surveillance was at all instrumental?

MS. TOWNSEND: No, I'm sorry, I can't. It continues to be a very sensitive
program. It's resulted in successes, but I can't relate it in any way one
way or another to this particular plot.

Q As a follow up, because certainly in the light of the hearings going on
this week, and the criticism for this surveillance, it would seem that the
President talking about a success story such as this sort of skirts the
question of the NSA. Is it wrong for us to put two and two together?

MS. TOWNSEND: The point -- as I said in my opening statement, the point of
the President's speech was to talk about the international cooperation.
This was not meant to be a speech about the NSA surveillance program.

Q Okay. Thank you very much.

MS. TOWNSEND: Sure.

Q Hi Fran. Well, I was going to ask the same question you just got twice
before, in general.

MS. TOWNSEND: Okay.

Q But talk about the timing of this bigger picture. I mean, we've known
about this plot, in general, before. Why have the President talk about
these new details -- declassified these new details, particularly at a time
when you've got Porter Goss and other people saying that having
intelligence information out there is harmful to gathering it? Why do that
at this time?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, I have to -- I'm smiling, if you could see me, because
usually we get the question, why can't you declassify more? Now you want to
know why we're declassifying it now.

What I would say to you is, the President is always looking for
opportunities to share with the American people the details and the texture
of the ongoing war on terror. He speaks about it frequently. The problem is
you can't share these details when you have operational leads. And so we've
got to be sure that we've used up all the operational leads from a
particular case before we can -- and that's why I said it takes time, this
unraveled over years, and there are still things you can see we're not
talking about -- we're not talking about the countries, we've not named
them, because, frankly, they don't want to be named. They are partners and
we respect that, so we're not naming them.

And so it takes time. We try to do it as we get that information available,
without compromising any operational interest we have.

Q Fran, just one other follow up. What we don't know is the time. Can you
give us some more details on the timeline on this -- meaning, you know,
when, exactly, was this plot scheduled for? Do we know that?

MS. TOWNSEND: We don't know exactly when the plot was scheduled for. The
intelligence tells us that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad began to initiate it in
October of 2001. We know that between then and when the lead operative was
arrested in February of '02, between those two periods of time, they
traveled through Afghanistan, they met with bin Laden, they swore biat,
they came back, and the lead guy is arrested, which disrupts it in February
of '02. So you see what I'm saying? It's during that short window of time,
between October of 2001 and February of 2002, but we don't know when they
planned -- we don't know when it was planned to actually be executed.

Q Just a question on the timing. You said that the operatives and the
leader met with bin Laden in early 2002 in Afghanistan; is that right?

MS. TOWNSEND: It's between October 2001 and February of 2002, when the
leader is arrested.

Q But when did they meet with bin Laden in Afghanistan?

MS. TOWNSEND: Hold on, let me see. They're telling me the intelligence
community believes it was in October.

Q Of 2001?

MS. TOWNSEND: Yes.

Q Before the U.S. invasion?

MS. TOWNSEND: Okay, hold on. I can't be that specific, because we don't
know.

Q Okay. So you don't know whether or not they met with bin Laden in
Afghanistan while U.S. forces were in the country?

MS. TOWNSEND: I don't know.

Q Okay.

Q Who was the cell leader that got arrested? Actually, I wouldn't mind
having all the four names. And where were they caught?

MS. TOWNSEND: I can't speak to where they were caught. Let me see if I'm
allowed to release any of the names. No, I'm sorry, the names all remain
classified.

Q They haven't been made public at all, even though we've got lots of names
out there -- Ramzi Binalshibh, all those people?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, the problem with that is, the fact that names may be
out in the public doesn't make them declassified. And so we're not
releasing the names of the cell leader or the other cell members.

Q Is there any connection between Richard Reid and this plot, or did they
get the idea from Richard Reid? What came first?

MS. TOWNSEND: It's not clear what came first. It was clearly the same
technique that they were intending to use, the shoe bomb. More than that,
we don't have the intelligence to tell us whether the cells -- that is,
Richard Reid and this cell -- knew each other or had contact with one
another. We just don't know that.

Q And was it just one country that helped thwart this?

MS. TOWNSEND: No.

Q One South Asian country?

MS. TOWNSEND: No.

Q How many were there?

MS. TOWNSEND: Hold on, let me count. A total of four.

Q All in South Asia?

MS. TOWNSEND: Yes -- no -- hold on. Two in South Asia, two in Southeast
Asia.

Q Thank you.

MS. TOWNSEND: Sure.

Q Hi, Fran.

MS. TOWNSEND: Hi, Elisabeth.

Q How are you doing?

MS. TOWNSEND: Good.

Q You know, I have the same question, but I thought I would try another
way. You said here, the case, I think, more than anything underscores the
importance of real-time information sharing. That sure sounds like NSA to
me. I mean, there's nothing you can -- what does that mean? Can you just
talk about real-time information-sharing right there? You said that --

MS. TOWNSEND: Right, I did say that. But it doesn't -- it means close in
time to when our liaison partners get it that they share it with us. That's
what I mean when I say real-time information sharing. That is, you don't
wait months, it's not a formal process. There is a period in time when we
treated these as law enforcement matters; you had to file a formal written
request through the Justice Department. Real-time information sharing means
you've got a relationship, a trusting confidence where it moves
intelligence service to intelligence service in close proximity to the time
that's it's collected by either us or by our partners.

Q Okay, okay. And then, again, is there any other details -- you can't say
where they were arrested, who they are? Can you tell us where they are?

MS. TOWNSEND: They're all in custody, but I --

Q I know --

MS. TOWNSEND: I know, but I can't tell you their names, because that would
give it away, and I can't tell you the names of the countries because --
not because I care, but because our partners want to have it kept a secret.

Q Are they in the United States? Are they in Gitmo? I mean, can you give us
any sense of --

MS. TOWNSEND: I can't.

Q Okay.

MS. TOWNSEND: Thanks.

Q What level of operational detail did this plot reach before it was
foiled? I mean, was it -- were they planning to fly a plane out of LAX? Did
it reach that level of detail?

MS. TOWNSEND: We didn't know what plane or what flight. We knew that they
were going to fly a commercial airliner into the tallest building in
California, or the West Coast. And there was an analytic judgment by the
intelligence community that that meant the Library Tower. But, I mean, we
didn't have a day or a week; we didn't know that.

Q Okay. And, also, you know, it seems like the plot, you know, was plotted
out in South Asia or Southeast Asia, you know, the Cole bombing, apparently
meetings took place there on that. What does that say about, you know, that
area being used as, you know, sort of a meeting place to plot these things
out?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, I agree with you that it suggests that we have a real
interest, an operational interest in disrupting things and looking there.
The good news is we have strengthened our relationship throughout that
region in South Asia and Southeast Asia with our partners since 9/11, and
so we're able to work with liaison services to do these sorts of
disruptions and have this sort of intelligence exchange. And that's much
stronger than it was pre-9/11.

Q You had said before that the original 9/11 plot was meant to be both East
Coast and West Coast, and I just wanted to sort of clarify: are you saying
this is the West Coast part of the 9/11 plot that was moved to later?

MS. TOWNSEND: Yes, ma'am. Absolutely.

Q And following up on what Toby asked before, at the time last October when
the President first revealed this plot there were a number of stories
quoting anonymous counterterrorism sources as claiming that we shouldn't be
claiming this as a disrupted plot because it never got far enough to be
disrupted, and suggesting that the administration was claiming credit for
more than had been accomplished. Can you respond to that?

MS. TOWNSEND: I think that -- I obviously don't know who the anonymous
counterterrorism sources are. What I would say to you is -- suggest to you
there are people who don't appreciate and truly understand what the
timeline was. This was not only blessed, if you will, from bin Laden on
down through Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, who was the operational chief at the
time, but it showed the linkage through the terrorist network with Jemaah
Islamiya -- JI -- it showed the relationship between the group. It required
us to work with our international partners in the information exchange. It
required information gleaned from detainee debriefings to be
operationalized and turned around.

And you can see from the timeline the arrests, one by one, it's the cell
leader, it's KSM, it's the members of the cell, it's ultimately Hambali. I
mean, the chronology of it makes very clear that these people continued to
plot against us not only past 9/11, but Hambali continued through JI and
his operatives to plot other attacks. And so it was critical that they all
be gotten and put in custody in order to disrupt potential attacks against
the United States. So, I mean, there is no question in my mind that this is
a disruption. And this is -- it's not about credit, it's about protecting
the American people. And the American people are absolutely safer as a
result of these arrests.

MS. PERINO: That will have to be our last question. Thanks, everybody, for
participating.

MS. TOWNSEND: Thank you, everyone.

END 12:50 P.M. EST

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