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Skriven 2006-03-08 23:33:06 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (0603083) for Wed, 2006 Mar 8
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India Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Responding to Critics
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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
March 8, 2006

India Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Responding to Critics



CRITICS: The U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation deal will accelerate the
nuclear arms race in South Asia.

COUNTERPOINT: This is an historic agreement that brings India into the
nonproliferation mainstream and addresses its growing energy needs through
increased use of nuclear energy in cooperation with the international
community. The United States has no intention of aiding India's nuclear
weapons program. India's plan to separate its civilian and military nuclear
facilities and programs will allow other nations to cooperate with India's
civilian facilities to expand energy production. Those facilities will be
under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to prevent
diversion of technology and materials to India's military program. Greater
use of nuclear reactors to produce energy for the Indian people will not
undermine regional security or stability.

CRITICS: Doesn't this initiative effectively recognize India as a nuclear
weapons state?

COUNTERPOINT: No, the United States has not recognized India as a nuclear
weapons state. The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) defines a
nuclear weapons state as "one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967." (The
United States, UK, France, Russia, and China exploded nuclear devices prior
to that date.) India does not meet this definition, and we do not seek to
amend the Treaty.

CRITICS: Only 14 of India's 22 nuclear power reactors will be safeguarded
under its separation plan, and India's two developmental fast breeder
reactors will remain unsafeguarded. With these facilities, India can
produce enough nuclear weapons to significantly expand its current arsenal.

COUNTERPOINT: The understanding we have reached with India will
significantly increase the number of Indian nuclear reactors under IAEA
safeguards, as well as bring associated facilities under safeguards. At
present, only four of India's nuclear power reactors are under safeguards.
Under its civil-military separation plan, India has agreed to place the
majority of its existing nuclear power reactors and those under
construction under safeguards and to place the other associated upstream
and downstream facilities that support those reactors under safeguards.
Furthermore, India has committed to place all future civilian power and
fast breeder reactors under safeguards.

This agreement is good for American security because it will bring India's
civilian nuclear program into the international nonproliferation
mainstream. The agreement also is good for the American economy because it
will help meet India's surging energy needs - and that will lessen India's
growing demand for other energy supplies and help restrain energy prices
for American consumers.

CRITICS: Doesn't this initiative create a double standard and won't it
encourage rogue nations like North Korea and Iran to continue to pursue
nuclear weapons programs?

COUNTERPOINT: It is not credible to compare the rogue regimes of North
Korea and Iran to India. Unlike Iran or North Korea, India has been a
peaceful and vibrant democracy with a strong nuclear nonproliferation
record.

Under this initiative, India - which has never been a party to the NPT -
has agreed to take a series of steps that will bring it into the
international nonproliferation mainstream.

Iran and North Korea are very different cases. They signed and ratified the
NPT and gave lip service to adhering to their international obligations.
Through their covert actions, however, they broke the very nonproliferation
commitments they claimed to follow. Additionally, both regimes have
isolated themselves from the international community and are state sponsors
of terrorism.

India, on the other hand, has agreed to take steps that will bring it into
the nonproliferation mainstream, including:
  þ Placing its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and
    monitoring;
  þ Signing and implementing the Additional Protocol, which allows more
    extensive inspections by the IAEA;
  þ Ensuring that its nuclear materials and technologies are secured and
    prevented from diversion, including its recent passage of a law to
    create a robust national export control system;
  þ Refraining from transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technologies
    to states that do not already possess them and supporting efforts to
    limit their spread;
  þ Working to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty;
  þ Continuing its moratorium on nuclear testing; and
  þ Adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the
    Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.

CRITICS: This initiative will weaken or unravel the global nonproliferation
regime. Creating an exception for India will lead Pakistan and Israel, who
are also outside the NPT regime, to insist on a similar deal or cause other
nations to withdraw from the Treaty.

COUNTERPOINT: India has stood outside the global nonproliferation regime
for the last 30 years. Through this initiative, India will enter the
international nonproliferation mainstream, thereby strengthening the regime
that continues to play a vital role in enhancing international security and
stability.

All nations that are party to the NPT are permitted full access to nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes but are prohibited from pursuing or
possessing nuclear weapons (except for the five recognized nuclear weapons
states). We do not expect nations to withdraw from the NPT. Any move to
withdraw from the NPT would clearly signal a nation's intent to pursue
nuclear weapons and would result in the loss of access to nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes.

Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and
different histories. Our relationship with Pakistan, which has Major
Non-NATO Ally status, follows a separate path that reflects our countries'
strong commitment to maintaining close ties and cooperation, including in
the War on Terror. However, Pakistan does not have the same
nonproliferation record as India, nor the same energy needs. We do not
intend to pursue a similar civil nuclear cooperation initiative with
Pakistan.

The status of Israel is not comparable to that of India. Israel has not
declared itself to be a nuclear power, nor articulated such extraordinary
energy needs. As for other Middle Eastern countries, we expect all NPT
parties to live up to their treaty obligations.

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