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Skriven 2006-09-27 23:31:34 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (0609272) for Wed, 2006 Sep 27
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Press Briefing by Tony Snow
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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
September 27, 2006

Press Briefing by Tony Snow
White House Conference Center Briefing Room

Press Briefing view


11:46 A.M. EDT

MR. SNOW: Good morning. Welcome. A couple of opening notes. The President,
today, or this evening, will be making brief remarks on the way to dinner.
I know a lot of you are interested in what's going to be happening. But on
the way to dinner with Presidents Musharraf and Karzai, he'll make some
comments on the way. We'll also give you a readout afterward. I'll try to
figure out who is going to do that. But just for your planning purposes, I
think the initial statement is about 7:20 p.m. or so.

As far as the National Intelligence Estimate, just a couple of --

Q What time?

MR. SNOW: What does it say on the schedule?

Q 7:50 p.m. on the schedule.

MR. SNOW: Thank you. Okay, 7:50 p.m. Thank you.

Q And the readout will be after this dinner?

MR. SNOW: We thought we'd read out the dinner afterward, yes.

Q Wow.

Q Can't you do it in advance? (Laughter.)

MR. SNOW: Lewis Lapham is not doing the readout. (Laughter.)

Q Do you know how you're going to do the readout, the format? Conference
call?

MR. SNOW: What?

Q How are you going to do the readout?

MR. SNOW: We'll get to you on that. We'll try to figure it out. But we'll
get it done.

On the National Intelligence Estimate, I know there will be a lot of
questions; just a couple of opening thoughts. What it does is it raises a
very important and simple question, which is, do we intend to go on the
offense in the war on terror? The NIE mirrors statements that the President
has made about the nature of the threat that we face. It also, I think,
vindicates many of the steps that have been taken and that were outlined on
the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which we made available to
you about a month ago.

Also, there's controversy about releasing the entire National Intelligence
Estimate. Let me tell you why we're not gong to do that. First, the full
text includes detailed information, collected by human agents, technical
means, and also in cooperation with foreign governments. And to reveal that
information would place at risk the lives of our agents, and also humint
agents -- as well as compromising our ability to work with foreign
governments, or for that matter, to employ the means that we use. We don't
want them to understand our sources and methods.

It also would compromise the independence of people doing intelligence
analysis. What you want are intelligence analysts who are going to be able
to give you free and full -- their free and full views of what the
situation is. If they think that their work is constantly going to be
released to the public, they're going to pull their punches. And that's the
last thing you want to have happen.

As for what was released, Jane Harmon said that it accurately reflected
what was in the National Intelligence Estimate. And as you know, Jane has
been a critic in other areas. But at least, I think that ought to serve to
note that we did not cherry-pick -- or actually, the Director of National
Intelligence did not cherry-pick conclusions. But, instead, you've got an
accurate reflection of what is within the text of the NIE itself.

In short, we're not going to release the documents because we don't want to
place people's lives at risk. We don't want to place sources and methods at
risk. We don't want to compromise our ability to work with foreign
governments who have been essential in helping prosecute and continue to
prosecute the war on terror. And we want to make sure that the President
receives the best and most honest analysis he can from intelligence
sources.

So with that as my prelude, let's go to questions. Brett.

Q Tony, can you address the comments of the House Minority Leader and
Representative Harmon, saying that there is a second Iraq estimate out
there that is in draft form that is being held until after the November
elections?

MR. SNOW: They're just flat wrong. What happened is, about a month ago
Director Negroponte informed the committees that he was, in fact, going to
do an exhaustive review on Iraq. That's a month ago. These reviews take
about a year to do, so the idea that it is in "draft" form -- they're just
beginning to do their work on it. And Intelligence Committee members if
they don't know it, should. But there is not a waiting Iraq document that
reflects a national intelligence estimate that's sitting around gathering
dust, waiting until after the election.

Q And the fact that they're talking about it being extremely grim, how do
you characterize it? Has the President been briefed on this yet?

MR. SNOW: You don't brief somebody on a document that's just in the very
early stages of composition. That's what it is.

Jennifer.

Q Thanks. I want to revisit a little bit of what we went over yesterday.
Now that we have actually seen the key judgments, maybe we can ask some
more profound questions.

MR. SNOW: Please.

Q Why does the President continue to say that we're winning the war on
terror and we are more safe, when the overall picture painted by these key
judgments is actually quite bleak and points to several areas where that is
not a conclusion you could reach by reading it?

MR. SNOW: I'm not sure I agree. I'm not sure I agree. For instance, I know
it's been characterized as being bleak. What it is, is it's a snapshot, as
of February 28th, of what was going on in the region.

Let me explain why the President thinks we're winning the war on terror,
and also give a little bit of context to some of the statements that are
made -- I've got the NIE text here, because I think I know the areas that
-- well, good -- and I think I know the areas that you might want some
responses to.

The first thing is, let's start with the obvious. Since September 11, 2001,
we have not been attacked. And, furthermore, the United States, since
September 11, 2001, has taken a much more aggressive approach toward terror
than it had taken previously. Before September 11, 2001, the United States
-- many people in the United States did not realize the nature of the enemy
we were facing. In the previous administration, we had an attack on the
World Trade Center, on Khobar Towers, we had attacks on both embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, and an attack on the USS Cole.

Also, Osama bin Laden, in February of 1998, made it clear that he not only
intended to wage war on the United States, but he wanted to use Iraq as a
central battleground. From his fatwa, on February 23, 1998, he complained
that "for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands
of Islam and the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its
riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its
neighbors, and turning bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through
which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples."

The reason I read that is that it reflects part of the strategy of building
jihadism, which is to foment hatred and to try to get people worked up in
such a way that they may feel inclined to "join the jihad."

There were other statements about America's continuing aggression. He said,
"If the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the
aim is also to serve the Jew's petty state and divert attention from its
occupation of Jerusalem and the murder of Muslims there." He continues,
"All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear
declaration of war on God, His messenger, and Muslims."

So he issued a fatwa. And here is part of what the fatwa said: "The ruling
to kill the Americans and their allies, civilians and military, is an
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it
is possible to do it." He later said, "We, with God's help, call on every
Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's
order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever
they find it."

In short, there was a gathering threat. In those years, bin Laden noticed
that the United States had, in fact, been cutting back dramatically on
intelligence assets and on military assets. As a matter of fact, even with
the buildup since September 11th, we are only now beginning to achieve the
same sort of levels that we had, in terms of intelligence assets that we
had at the beginning of the Clinton administration.

Bin Laden also had drawn some comfort from the retreat of Americans from
Somalia, which he cited as "proof of the weakness of the American heart,"
and therefore as a reason to inspire some of his colleagues to continue to
wage jihad and to try to kill Americans. The fact is, it was a dangerous
world.

So what we have done since? And this is why the President says we're safer.
Al Qaeda has been significantly degraded. It is one of the key conclusions
-- or at least the key judgments; you don't have conclusions in a National
Intelligence Estimate -- that, in fact, the operational structure had been
weakened.

Furthermore, what the United States has done is not only go after al Qaeda,
not only fight on the battlefield, but also to come up with an approach
that tries to deny terrorists safe havens anywhere, including on the
Internet where they try to share information, financially -- going after
their finances, the SWIFT program, listening in on their conversations,
where you have the terrorist surveillance program.

There have been cooperative and collaborative efforts with other
governments. The United States, in and of itself, we're not fighting this
battle alone, but we're fighting it in conjunction with allies -- so you
have the Pakistanis and the Brits helping us when it came to interrupting a
terror plot that was foreseen to happen this year with planes flying from
Heathrow to New York.

In short, what has happened in the war on terror is that you at one point
had Osama bin Laden with the ability to control a country. Before September
11th, what did you have? You had terrorists who had moved into Afghanistan,
taken the country for their own. They had operational bases where they were
able to train. They had the ability not only to have their people all
together, but they had logistics, they could communicate with impunity
around the globe, and they knew that nobody was going to be able to -- they
didn't think anybody was going to intercept what they were doing. They had
an operational capability then that they do not have now.

When you have a dispersed terror threat -- and this is also in the NIE
--they tend to be less threatening, although, let's make no mistake about
it, they would like to become more threatening. But when you have
organizations that are led by strong and charismatic leaders, when you have
attacks on those, or when you take care of a leader like Abu Musab al
Zarqawi, what you do is you throw them into disarray. So the terrorists
today cannot sleep safe because they know we're listening to them, they
know we're watching them, they know we're tracking their finances; and they
know that we are not only trying to use whatever means in our power to go
after them, but also in places like Iraq and elsewhere, the locals are
beginning to turn them in. So it's a different -- you've got a different
set of circumstances than you did on September 11th.

Think of it this way, if we had done nothing after September 11th, would
the threat have vanished? Based on what we know about bin Laden -- who
moved from Somalia to Afghanistan, had the advantage of a failed state from
which to mount operations, when the United States wasn't looking, he
trained tens of thousands of people, dispatched them around the globe and
set up the operational capability of pulling off a September 11th -- he no
longer has that. And that is one of the ways in which it makes the world
safer.

Now, does it mean that we put on rose-colored glasses and say there's no
threat? Of course not. But it's a different kind of threat now. It is more
numerous because you have more people who are responding to jihadi
propaganda, but on the other hand, you do not have the concentrated
capability to hit. And we are determined to continue to develop methods to
strike them wherever they are so that they are not going to be able to
regain those sorts of capabilities.

Q A couple things. You said, first of all, that al Qaeda has been degraded.
Actually, the report said al Qaeda's leadership has been degraded, but that
its ranks have increased. You also just --

MR. SNOW: But operational -- okay.

Q Let me just finish and go through here. You also said that -- you're
talking about things the administration has done and, yet, the intelligence
estimate is taking this into account and coming up with this conclusion
that the factors fueling this growth of the movement, they report, outweigh
the vulnerability of the movement and will do so for some time. That's not
"we're safer."

MR. SNOW: No. It talks about jihadism.

Q It's also not "we're winning."

MR. SNOW: Well, it doesn't draw judgments like that. You've read the
National Intelligence Estimate.

Q I'm practically quoting verbatim from the report. I could read it.

MR. SNOW: I know, but -- look for "we're not winning." Please show me --

Q The President has said, we're not winning -- we're winning.

MR. SNOW: The President says we're winning -- but she said it says --

Q But the President --

MR. SNOW: I understand that. I'm explaining -- and I've explained why --

Q So let's just read that sentence again. I mean, how can you translate
that into "we're winning"? I just want to hear you make that argument.

MR. SNOW: Okay, let's go back to what you said. For instance, one of the
things that you mentioned is that it's degraded the leadership. Here's what
it says: "The loss of key leaders, particularly bin Laden, Zawahiri, and
Zarqawi, in rapid succession probably would cause the group to fracture."
We know that at least one if not two of those are still alive. But it says,
"The loss of these leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements. We
assess that the resulting splinter groups, at least for a time, pose a less
serious threat to U.S. interests than does al Qaeda."

When it comes to degradation -- when you talk about degrading the
leadership of al Qaeda, you have degraded the operational capability. Once
again, you don't have training camps. You do not have the ability to train
and to carry off operations like you do before. You don't have the freedom
of communication they had before. You do not have the freedom of motion
they had before. So the degradation is a degradation of capability.

It says that al Qaeda remains the most dangerous or the most threatening, I
think, of the terror groups. Absolutely. But what you're talking about here
-- and this is an important distinction to make -- between jihadis and
those who are capable, operationally capable of devastating strikes on the
United States and other governments, you simply do not have the kind of
concentrated operational capability that you had before. And that does come
through here.

Now, what is going on? They're looking for excuses. As a matter of fact,
Ayman al Zawahiri today is going to issue yet another tape that is -- at
least we are told -- that is going to try to get people whomped up, in this
case, I think about the Pope, about Darfur -- because, apparently, we're
trying to save people in Darfur -- and the Danish cartoons.

So the fact is, there are a number of ways of recruiting and incitement.
And incitement is something that typically would happen. Every time there's
an American victory, they will go and say, ah-ha, they have killed Zarqawi,
join the movement. Just because somebody says they joined the movement does
not necessarily mean that they are prepared to strap on a vest and blow
somebody up. So that's the distinction to make.

Q Well, again, the report says, "factors fueling the movement outweigh the
vulnerabilities." It says they're not --

MR. SNOW: Yes, but --

Q -- that the movement has grown, and that it's harder to find and harder
to prevent attacks.

MR. SNOW: I believe what it says. You've gotten it about right.

Q And they're training new leaders who are being battle-tested in Iraq.

MR. SNOW: No, it says -- let's run through it, because these are all good
questions. First, it says -- let's see -- what you're talking about -- I'm
sorry. Where are we here? Rephrase the one that you're going after here.

Q Let's see --

Q The vulnerabilities question.

Q Right. Well, we can go back over -- I can read you verbatim --

MR. SNOW: All right, here we go. Yes, the -- okay, that's -- thank you.

Q -- but we're also talking about harder -- you know, the "confluence of
shared purpose and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and
undermine jihadist groups."

MR. SNOW: Right. Which is precisely why the President has said -- if you
look back at what the President has been saying, he says it's numerous and
more dispersed. We're not disagreeing with that. I'm not trying to pick a
fight with it.

What I'm trying to tell you is, there's a difference between an al Qaeda
that has training camps, that has the operational ability. What this is
talking about is the ability to get people to say, I'm a jihadist, and be
angry, to identify themselves as part of a movement. It's not the same --

Q Tony, he says we're winning the war on terrorism. That's what he says.

MR. SNOW: I know.

Q And there are more of them. They're more dispersed. They're harder to
find. And, yet, the President is saying, we're winning the war on
terrorism.

MR. SNOW: That's right. But we're also fighting the war on terrorism. See,
I think what -- it is typical in a time like this for people to try to go
ahead and gain adherence. The question is, are they going to win? And the
more important factor is -- and this is the key -- that the Iraq conflict
has become the center of it all for these guys. If we --

Q But if they're doing --

MR. SNOW: You can follow up; I'm going to finish the answer and then you
can hit back. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves and be
perceived to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry
on the fight. The fact is, they see Iraq, it's described here, as a cause
célŠbre.

And so what is going on right now is that there is a propaganda effort to
get people whomped up. And if there is a perception that we're losing in
Iraq, that's going to get more people to identify themselves as jihadists.
The question, again, the operational question -- and it's not answered in
here because I'm not sure it's answerable -- is, are there more cells that
are operationally capable of killing us? Or do you have more people who
say, we hate the United States?

Q Look at Iraq.

MR. SNOW: Yes, we are looking at Iraq, and that's --

Q They're fully capable of killing in great numbers there.

MR. SNOW: That's right.

Q I mean, you've got --

MR. SNOW: And who are they killing?

Q That's a prime example. They're killing Iraqis, they're killing
Americans, they're killing civilians, they're killing military.

MR. SNOW: Yes, but you're mixing apples and oranges here, so let me go
through it. When you're talking about Iraq --

Q But you're the ones who say that's the central front on terrorism.

MR. SNOW: Yes, and that's why, in fact, we're trying to fight it, and we
are fighting it, and we're going to win it.

Q Zarqawi didn't make it go away -- when Zarqawi was killed, which is the
example you used, as well.

MR. SNOW: No, I don't think you just fell off the turnip truck. You
understand that, as a matter of fact, what happens is that there are a
number of jihadists, united by an ideology that they do want to kill us. I
mean, that's not a surprise.

As a matter of fact, it is typical for an embattled organization to do
this. Look, let me ask you a simple question: Do you think bin Laden is
better off today than he was six years ago?

Q No -- but I don't know that; I have no idea.

MR. SNOW: Okay. All right. Do you think Zawahiri is better off than he was
six years ago?

Q Let's ask you the question. Let me go to something else, the strategy
overall. You talk about aggressive stances, you talk about going after
these guys. What's happened with doing that is they've dispersed and
they're harder to find. So what, if any, is a new approach to that? How do
you adapt to that kind of approach?

MR. SNOW: Did you read this?

Q Yes, I did read that approach.

MR. SNOW: Okay, well, then we'll walk through it.

Q But what have we done, and have we done enough to go to the root of the
problem? The President talks about that all the time and, yet, they're
dispersing, spreading, growing.

MR. SNOW: Well, again, dispersing, spreading and growing, you still have to
ask yourself, do you have the operational capability, or are these people
-- who, in fact, are going to be -- there are a couple of other conclusions
in here -- I know I'm jumping around, let me back up -- conclusions in here
that also bear upon your question. For instance, let's look at the
underlying grievances -- "entrenched grievances such as corruption and
justice and fear of Western domination, slow pace of real sustained
economic, social, and political reforms, and also pervasive anti-U.S.
sentiment among Muslims."

What it also concludes is that the possibility of democracy is going to
have a significant discouraging effect. That is one thing. Secondly, when
you take a look at what we've been doing in terms of discouraging, you not
only have battlefield operations, you have military operations, you have
intelligence operations. But, also, there are a number of ongoing efforts
to try to create conditions where you do address underlying causes, where
you do address the kind of discontent that has been simmering in the region
for a very long time.

Let me remind you, it did not begin with the Iraq war. It, in fact, had
grown in enormous strength before the Iraq war. It would not have gone away
with or without the Iraq war. The fact is, we have a problem that we are
trying to deal with on many fronts. And we could walk through all the
steps. You know, I can go back through the conclusions here.

Q Can I do one, lessons learned, maybe, from Iraq? You're fighting an
insurgency in Iraq, correct? I mean, what is your strategy for fighting an
insurgency, and what lessons did you learn from that? Maybe every time you
strike one insurgent, you get 10 more. Whatever those lessons are that
you've learned there, how are you applying those to -- if you call it a
global insurgency --

MR. SNOW: Well, again -- again, if you take a look at the insurgency,
challenges -- this is from the counterterrorism document -- "Terrorist
networks are more dispersed, they're more centralized, more reliant on
smaller cells inspired by common ideology." What have we done? We
interrupted their communications, we interrupted their finances, we
interrupted their operational capabilities, and you continue to do things
like that. You make it more difficult for them to operate morning, noon and
night.

At the same time, you understand that there is a violent ideology which you
not only have to fight with arms and intelligence and cooperation with
others, but you also have to work on ways to make what they do less
attractive to people around them. And that has also worked, as you know,
Martha.

A number of the strikes that have been going on in Iraq for the last couple
of years are the result of people who in the past may have been afraid of
standing up to terrorists, providing actionable intelligence. And that has
gone from a small trickle to thousands of intelligence leads each and every
month. It, in fact, led to significant operations within there. There is no
question that these people are trying to fight in Iraq. There is no
question that they're going to try to use the images of gore as a way of
planting fear in people's hearts.

But there's also no question -- and this gets back to the fundamental issue
-- are you going to go on the offensive against them or not? What this is,
is a snapshot of the people the President has been describing for the last
month. They're committed, they're violent, they're dispersed, and we can
beat them.

Now if the question is, we can't beat them and we shouldn't fight, that's a
debate we can have in the United States; that's a debate that we can have
in Congress. The answer the President has is, you don't back off, you put
them on the run, you win in Iraq, you establish democracy, and then they
are going to know that there's just no way they can win.

Q Tony, let me refocus for a second here, because when this story broke, it
seemed to me that the question here was whether or not the NIE, at least
according to the part that was leaked, suggested that the war in Iraq, as a
part of the general war on terror, was creating more terrorists, not fewer.
And it seemed as though the administration's first response had to do with
how the information came out, or that it was a small part. Is there -- do
you have an issue with that statement?

MR. SNOW: Yes, as a matter of fact, I called you and took issue with it
because there's a difference between causation and something that's simply
-- two phenomena that happen to go side-by-side.

Q So it's a misreading of the report?

MR. SNOW: The report does not say that Iraq is -- it says that Iraq jihad
is a contributing factor to trying to recruit people to jihad. It doesn't
say that Iraq has made terrorism worse. And that is the shorthand that was
employed in a number of cases.

Q I'm sorry -- spell out the difference for me?

MR. SNOW: Real simple, number one --

Q -- read it.

MR. SNOW: Yes, here it is. No, I'd be happy to read the sentence, I'll do
it for everybody, because there are two parts to it -- and only the first
half was leaked.

"The Iraq conflict has become a cause célŠbre for jihadists breeding a deep
resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating
supporters for the global jihadist movement," correct? "Supporters." That's
right. People say they -- this is what we're talking about, we're talking
about supporters of a global jihadist movement. What it doesn't say is we
now have tens of thousands more people armed and ready to hit the United
States. It doesn't say that. It says that they're "creating an atmosphere
where people are identifying themselves as jihadists."

Now, here's the second part: "Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive
themselves and be perceived to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be
inspired to carry on the fight."

The critical judgment here is Iraq has become for them the battleground. If
they lose, they lose their bragging rights. They lose their ability to
recruit, and that is why at this point -- the President has made the point
over and over. He has not tried to say there are fewer. He has not tried to
say that they haven't been winning propaganda victories. What he has said
is we've got a different kind of enemy, and we have kept America safe, and
we will continue to do it.

Q But it seems to me that what is being suggested here --and maybe we're --
the question is, how do we define "jihad," and is it the same thing? Is
their "jihad" our "war in Iraq"? And maybe we're just having a problem with
terms. But it seems to me that what is being suggested here is that what is
going on in Iraq, that conflict is creating more jihadists, terrorists --
I'm not sure what term you want to use here.

MR. SNOW: You know what's being used? It's -- what it's doing is, it's
trying -- and let me go see if I can find the bin Laden quote here. What
bin Laden tries to do is to use events as a way of stirring up hatred so
that he can get people who will identify -- who will support him. That does
not mean -- and I want to make -- because I don't know -- you try to make
the distinction. People who say, yes, I support bin Laden is a lot
different than people who say, I'm strapping on the vest and going to kill
Americans. That's a difference.

And so you've got a jihadist movement where there has been propaganda --

Q But it does say that --

Q That's exactly what this is suggesting --

Q Jihadists aren't on the sidelines. They're not just --

MR. SNOW: No, it's -- no, I --

Q They're not spectators.

MR. SNOW: They're also not people -- they are not people -- well, a lot of
them are. But the other --

Q By definition, they're not spectators.

MR. SNOW: No, there's no definition in here.

Q The word, "jihadist."

MR. SNOW: A jihadist is somebody who says --

Q That implies action.

MR. SNOW: Well, but what's interesting is --

Q Finish that sentence, "jihadist is somebody who says," what?

MR. SNOW: A jihadist is somebody who says that they believe -- that they
believe that these kind of actions, that terror, in fact, will provide a
road to glory. So they believe it. They buy the ideology.

Q So you're suggesting we've created more people who dislike us, but not
more people who want to harm us.

MR. SNOW: Well, they may even want to harm us. The question is
operationally, do they have the capability, and are they going to move
forward to do so?

Q But Tony, let me follow here, because I guess my question is, is there
anything in the NIE that is causing the President to rethink strategy about
how to fight the war on terror, or the war in Iraq? And if this was done,
stop -- the intelligence was gathered no later than February, it was
written in April, we don't know about it until now -- is there anything in
the last half a year where he's looked at this information that he had in
February and said, you know what, we should do business a little
differently?

MR. SNOW: This was written, in part, with the recommendations -- or the
conclusions of the NIE in mind. And we've talked about the ways in which
you've got to be nimble in responding to these things. A lot of the stuff
that's in here -- what's interesting is, a lot of the stuff that's in here,
you could have read a month ago. And it does, in fact, talk about a more
dispersed terror network, it does talk about people are communicating over
the Internet, it does talk about the necessity of approaching this from a
number of different angles.

So the answer is, yes, there has been a much more nuanced approach to doing
this. And this is what happens as the war against terror continues. As they
adjust, we adjust. That's not a steady state.

Q This a political Rorschach test. If you're looking at the NIE and you're
predisposed to be critical of the war in Iraq, you see -- you read it that
more terrorists are being created.

MR. SNOW: No, if you're predisposed to be critical of the war in Iraq, you
just ask yourself the question, where do you proceed? What is your strategy
for victory? That's a question. If you're predisposed to be against the
war, do you want to fight it? Do you want to win it? That's a separate
political judgment.

The fact is, the President has been saying over and over, you have
committed terrorists that hate us and want to kill us. We're not going to
let them. It's pretty simple trying to lay these things out. And we will
use every means at our disposal to fight them.

These are people who, again, before September 11th -- let's take fuller
look at the picture here. Again, when we did nothing, what did they do?
They gained strength, they gained boldness, they drew the conclusion --
here's bin Laden: "We experienced the Americans through our brothers who
went to combat against them in Somalia." They understood our previous
responses as weakness.

One of the things that they suddenly realized afterward was that the
American response was one that they had not anticipated. But Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, in a communication with bin Laden, said he hadn't anticipated it
and, therefore, they had to waive off attacks.

Q But do you think there are a bunch of people out there -- the critics of
the administration -- who aren't committed to winning the war on terror?
Can you draw a distinction between wanting to re-tool your strategy to win
the war on terror, look at something like the NIE and think maybe we need
to change the way we do business in Iraq?

MR. SNOW: No, look, I'm perfectly happy to hear -- and I think the
President is -- anybody who has got ideas about it. Again, I really would
encourage you -- I know I keep waving this around. But this does, in fact
-- go back and look at it again, because it really does talk about a lot of
the key things that appear in the NIE, and the ways in which we have go
about trying to be nimble and fighting a terror network that is dispersed,
continues to be dispersed, and it's dispersed in part because we have
succeeded in smashing the old centralized organizations.

And the more you use the --

Q So the NIE is a success story, the NIE.

MR. SNOW: No, the NIE -- the NIE is not designed to draw judgments about
success or failure. It's an intelligence document.

Q But as you read it, it's a success story?

MR. SNOW: No, I think it's a snapshot. Look, a success story is when you
have democracy successful in Iraq. A success story is when we complete the
job. That's the success story. That's the end state that we all ought to
reach. And I think we're perfectly open to hearing what others may have to
say. But also part of the -- but let me say a few things that have
occurred, which is, as a result of American engagement in the war on terror
we do have more allies in this war than we used to have, operationally
within the region.

You've got the Pakistanis. Obviously, you've got Afghanistan and Iraq, the
Saudis cooperating in ways -- the UAE, which had been one of the two
nations to recognize the Taliban. The engagement in the war on terror I
think has made it clear as other people look at these terrorists that they
mean business. And, therefore, others are standing up and saying, okay,
yes, this is real; this going to affect us, as well. And they're fighting.

Helen.

Q Change of subject, but not venue. The Washington Post is carrying a
series of polls saying that the Iraqi people most affected by our so-called
war want us out, want us out of Iraq. What is the President's reaction?

MR. SNOW: Not really surprised. I mean, nobody wants to have an occupying
army. It's understanding that when you have an army on your soil, that you
want them out. But on the other hand, the Iraqi government has made it
clear, and you've heard statements by Prime Minister Maliki, and now
President Talabani, as recently as last week, saying, don't leave until the
job is done.

We understand the sentiments of the Iraqi people and we'd love to be out of
there as soon as possible, but you have to have the end state --

Q Well, do they count?

MR. SNOW: Of course, they count -- and one of the reasons why their elected
officials want us to stay is that they don't want them subjected to
tyranny. They want the ability to win the battle of terror on Iraqi soil.
So the President does understand it. It's also interesting, Helen --

Q -- on Iraqi soil. We want it on Iraqi soil.

MR. SNOW: Let me just finish the -- I'm sorry, what?

Q I said, the question of winning, we declared Iraq a central front and so
forth -- we want it there, instead -- and they want out.

MR. SNOW: Well, no, we didn't declare Iraq the central front, bin Laden
did.

Q Yes, we did.

MR. SNOW: Bin Laden declared it the central front in the war on terror. But
we're quibbling here. They want us out. Yes, of course. The Europeans
wanted us out after World War II. We ended --

Q Why do we stay there?

MR. SNOW: The reason we're staying is that we have made a commitment to
providing a government -- a democracy --

Q A commitment to whom?

MR. SNOW: To the people of Iraq and to their government, a government than
can sustain itself, defend itself, and govern itself. And we are continuing
--

Q We invaded that country.

MR. SNOW: Please, please, we're getting into the heckle zone here. The
point is that the government has asked us and you have now had a Shia prime
minister and a Kurdish President saying, stay, finish the job.

The other interesting thing is if you look in the region, there are only
two countries that want us to leave immediately. And you know what they
are? They're Syria and Iran. They're the key supporters of terror. They
understand that our departure is good for them, and success for us in the
region is bad for them. And we're simply not going to back off our
commitment.

Q Tony, let's turn to tonight's dinner. Afghanistan is in danger, analysts
say, of reverting to its pre-9/11 state. Does the President believe that
General Musharraf is doing everything in his power to prevent that from
happening? And to what extent will this be the topic of tonight's dinner?
What is the President trying to achieve by the dinner?

MR. SNOW: Well, a couple of things -- first you said, Afghanistan is in
danger --

Q Yes, I mean --

MR. SNOW: The President, and also President Karzai, have a different take
on it. What has been happening in Afghanistan is that the government of
Afghanistan has slowly and continuously -- and I've said this before --
been expanding its sphere of influence. For a long time, it basically had
control of the area directly around Kabul. And what has happened now -- for
instance, they're in the southern provinces and in areas within those
provinces, over which they've never had effective control before. And what
has happened is that the Taliban is fighting back and suffering devastating
defeats at the hand of NATO forces.

Two related things have been taking place: the expansion of effective
control; and the transfer, in some areas, from U.S. to NATO control. The
Taliban has been testing it; it has been losing. President Karzai has made
it clear that he and his people are still committed -- "still" -- are
committed to victory. And, furthermore, we are continuing to work on
training Afghan troops and provide them with the equipment they need so
that they can go ahead and continue to wage the war successfully.

The ultimate aim, in both places, is not that we win the wars, but that we
allow the countries to have the capability to go ahead and build peace and
stability on their own. President Musharraf also made it clear, for
instance, in a much discussed agreement with tribal leaders in Waziristan
and some of the other areas. That was interpreted at first as being a pact
with the Taliban. It is anything but. It was a pact against the Taliban, to
go after the Taliban. And it was working with tribal leaders to get their
help and assurance in trying to make sure, A, that the Taliban was not
going to be able to recruit; that, B -- in fact, to de-Talibanize the
areas.

Furthermore, there was also an agreement that they would prevent
cross-border incursions, which has been a sore spot with the Afghans. And I
think you're going to have conversations between the two heads of state and
the President, all acknowledging one thing, which is, both states need to
be able to be secure. And President Musharraf has certainly given his
assent to that and, obviously, President Karzai is interested in making
sure, especially in those border areas, that they get secured.

Q But even those --

Q So, wait, so does the President believe that General Musharraf is doing
everything in his power to make certain that Afghanistan is secure?

MR. SNOW: I don't know how you define "everything in his power." How would
I define it?

Q Is he doing everything he possibly can?

MR. SNOW: He is making serious efforts. The President is satisfied with the
efforts he's made, and supports them.

Q But even though Musharraf and Karzai met earlier this month in Kabul and
pledged unity, they have continued throwing barbs at each other for weeks
now. What can the President -- what can President Bush do to bridge these
differences in a very brief dinner gathering?

MR. SNOW: Well, I think one of the things that the President has done --
keep in mind, we've also had unilateral meetings with both now in the last
week or week and a half. And the President has made it clear that they've
got a shared interest, and the shared interest is combating terrorism --
Taliban, al Qaeda and other forms of terror -- and also making sure that
the two states are successful. And he will remind them of the fact, and I
think both men understand that.

So certainly we understand that there are tensions between the countries,
and we're going to do whatever we can -- that they want us to do -- to help
resolve them. But the two leaders also understand that they've got a shared
interest in making sure that the other guy succeeds.

Q Whose idea was the dinner?

MR. SNOW: I don't know. I don't know, I'll find out. Rather than faking it,
I'll just find out.

Q Is the President ready to talk tough to these two and say, cut it out,
get your act together?

MR. SNOW: The President is always candid when he speaks to other heads of
state.

Q And find out, Tony, who else will be at the dinner, please.

MR. SNOW: Fred, do we know who is --

MR. JONES: The Vice President, the Secretary of State. Each head of state
will have a representative with them, as well.

MR. SNOW: Okay, so we'll have the President, the Vice President, the
Secretary of State. Will the National Security Advisor be --

MR. JONES: I don't know.

MR. SNOW: Okay, and security advisors for both. We'll get you a full list.

Q Follow-up on Musharraf?

MR. SNOW: Is this on Musharraf?

Q Yes, it's on Musharraf, too. You said the agreement that Musharraf signed
concerning the Taliban was anything but, allowing the Taliban safety, a
haven there. Did the administration believe that from the beginning?

MR. SNOW: Let me -- I don't --

Q Or has he clarified? I mean, because one of the things the President said
the other day is, he looked me in the eye and told me that it wasn't.

MR. SNOW: And furthermore -- actually, thank you, because he expanded upon
it. It is not merely -- it's not merely a military operation, but also, and
maybe even more importantly, an economic development operation, as well. So
what they're trying to do is to build infrastructure and prosperity in the
region, as well. This is not simply strictly saying to tribal leaders,
okay, you guys go after the Taliban. It's, look, we've got to work
together, we know that you've got problems, we're going to try to work on
building prosperity, and at the same time, you've got to work with us to
build security.

There has been a lot of confusion about it, and the President wanted to
find out exactly what President Musharraf had offered. And he laid it out.
I'll have to go back to my notes, but it was a three-part plan. And it --

Q And he's absolutely convinced Musharraf is telling the truth on this --
but wasn't from the beginning?

MR. SNOW: I don't know that that's the case. I really don't. I mean, I just
--

Q He's convinced now, absolutely convinced?

MR. SNOW: I don't know, "absolutely." The President -- what President
Musharraf said is, this is a construct that we think is going to work. And
we are going to try to use that to have success in the war on terror and
also helping out with problems of poverty within the region. And if it
works, it becomes a great template, and if it doesn't, then you've got to
go back and figure out how to make it work.

So I think what the President is convinced is that President Musharraf is
making a creative and very good-faith effort to try to address the problem
of terrorism and the spread of terrorism in a way that, like our own
strategy, addresses it on a number of fronts and not simply on a single
front.

Q President Musharraf, since he's been in the United States -- particularly
at the United Nations, and then subsequently here at the White House -- has
made some statements that seem strange to many individuals, in the case of
talking about his publisher and book and Comedy Central. He had some
remarks to the NATO troops in Afghanistan, saying that their criticisms of
Pakistan not doing enough should be equated by the fact that more
Pakistanis have died than their soldiers and they should get over it, that
kind of thing.

The point I'm trying to get at here is, you're an expert in the area of
public relations and statements and things of that kind, do you sometimes
wince at the way Musharraf deals in public, in terms of making these kind
of statements, given that he is probably now one of the strongest potential
allies of the United States war on terrorism?

MR. SNOW: I hope in addition to being a now acknowledged expert on public
relations that I'll develop a reputation for diplomacy. And in that case,
I'm not going to comment on President Musharraf's statements.

Here are the participants, Cheryl, for tonight: the President, the Vice
President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor. On the
Afghan side, there will be President Karzai and Said Tayab Jawad, who is
the Ambassador to the United States, President Musharraf will also be
accompanied by his Ambassador, Mahmud Ali Durrani. Those will be the
participants in tonight's dinner.

Q And you'll, of course, tell us what room it's going to be in and what was
served?

MR. SNOW: We'll put together a to-do list. We'll even try to find out the
flowers.

Q That's --

Q On the schedule, Old Family Dining Room.

MR. SNOW: That's what I thought. Thank you. Thank God for Knoller.

Q Tony, do you think the enemy, from their point of view, was encouraged or
discouraged by what they saw in the NIE? And do you think the release of
the NIE damaged the U.S. war effort in any way?

MR. SNOW: No, the President would not have released the NIE if the findings
damaged the war effort. There is the concern that when you are taking on
national intelligence estimates and taking key judgments and making them
public, the key concern is that you're going to cause analysts to pull
their punches. And you worry about whether foreign governments are going to
look at you and say, can we trust you? That is why there was special care
given to making sure that no sources or methods or foreign cooperation was
compromised. The President would not have authorized the release of the
document if he thought it would compromise the efforts.

Q And what do you think the enemy thinks of what they saw in that?

MR. SNOW: You know, I think the enemy is going to make more of what they
see in terms of successes in impeding their activities than anything else.
Far be it for me to climb into the head of a jihadian and draw a
conclusion.

What they -- you know what they may be seeing? They maybe see democracy in
action and people disagreeing without slitting each other's throats.

Q Can I just go back to your argument? Just so I'm clear. There is another
way to say it, that the Americans should take comfort because while there
may be more seeds of terrorist ideology across the globe, they're not in
full bloom, full operational bloom --

MR. SNOW: That's probably -- but the other thing is, I don't want -- that's
a good way of putting it. Now, you know, the PR crown now passes to you.
But let me --

Q But why should that be a comforting thought, it's --

MR. SNOW: But let me -- I was about to answer that part. You don't sit back
and take comfort. What you do is you say, we've got an enemy, we've got to
beat them. And that gets back to what I said. You've got to decide whether
you're going to go on the offense or not. Now would the world be a better
place if Saddam Hussein were still in power? Would the world be a safer
place if Saddam were still in power? Those are the kinds of questions you
need to ask.

And, furthermore, in the present world, which has been laid out now, once
again, and you can take a look at the President's speeches, going back to
the 31st of August, you can take a look at the counterterrorism document,
you can take a look at this. And what you now have is a picture of a
dispersed yet determined global terror network that means business. But on
the other hand, it also gives you a picture -- not a full picture, because
we don't want them to know everything we're doing -- but the many and
various ways we're going after them, and that you have an administration
where all hands are on deck.

Now, again, in the interest of democracy, if somebody has got a better way
to do this, if they've got suggestions, that's great, let's hear them. But
this is the debate that is worth having and get into tough questions about
whether we're safe or not. And we're going to continue discussing these, I
have absolutely no doubt. And you know what? We should, because Americans
need, to the best of their ability, to get a sense of whether they ought to
be scared or not. And the other thing they ought to know is whether they
ought to have confidence that a government is going on the offensive at
being as aggressive and as resourceful as possible in going after it.

Keep in mind, again, before September 11th, we went through a long period
where we put our feet up and said, wow, the Cold War is over. And we didn't
realize what was looming. And the threat grew and become far more capable,
and now it has taken us more than five years -- roughly five years to
rebuild a lot of our intelligence. It has taken us -- we are continuing to
try to develop our own means and methods of dealing not only with a new
kind of threat, but a constantly changing threat, and to make sure that
we've got our eyes open.

And one more point to make -- and I want to reiterate again -- which is
that what you have here is also a challenge to the internatio