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Skriven 2006-10-10 23:31:08 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (0610105) for Tue, 2006 Oct 10
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Press Briefing by Tony Snow
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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
October 10, 2006

Press Briefing by Tony Snow
White House Conference Center Briefing Room

Press Briefing view


11:50 A.M. EDT

MR. SNOW: Good afternoon. Let's go straight -- I guess it's still morning.
Let's go straight to questions.

Q Where are you in the state of determining whether or not North Korea
tested a nuclear device?

MR. SNOW: That's really up to the scientists. They're really trying to take
a look, Terry, at all the seismic and other evidence to figure out whether
it was a nuclear device. They do know that there was a seismic event,
presumably an explosion. But at this point, the analysts are being
extremely careful. They want to make sure they don't outrun the facts, and
they continue to assess it.

I wish I could tell you, because, like you, I'm curious to find out what
rendering they have. And there's a possibility that they will never be able
to say to a complete certainly exactly what did occur. Nevertheless, as
they continue to study it and as they feel comfortable in making
statements, we'll pass them on. I don't know whether DNI's office is going
to be the proper venue, or we will, but in any event, I'll make sure that
the Press Office gets out to anybody any statements that are made to try to
assess precisely what happened.

Q Tony, does the administration believe that North Korea has the capability
to put a nuclear weapon on a ballistic missile?

MR. SNOW: Don't know.

Q Can you address this threat from North Korea today that they would fire
one at the U.S.?

MR. SNOW: Again, that is not unusual and not new for the North Koreans to
be provocative. That's what the real take-away has been from the last few
days. And furthermore, they've been provocative in the face of direct
attempts to influence their behavior on the part of the Chinese and the
South Koreans and others, so this does fit a pattern. And we have seen the
pattern of making statements that are designed to be provocative,
presumably in order to get concessions. And in the past, that sort of
behavior has worked. But it appears now that the parties in the six-party
talks other than North Korea are unwilling to go that way.

The Chinese today have called for taking actions against the North Koreans.
You have had the South Koreans out with a tough statement, the Japanese out
with a tough statement. The point is that this is a pattern of behavior
that has worked in the past for the North Koreans, but it appears that it
may work no more.

Q Tony, in 2003, the President said very clearly that we will not tolerate
North Korea with nuclear weapons.

MR. SNOW: Right.

Q And here we are in 2006 operating on the assumption, as the government
is, that, in fact, they tested a nuclear devise. So what went wrong?

MR. SNOW: I'm not sure anything went wrong. The failed diplomacy is on the
part of the North Koreans because what they have done so far is turn down a
series of diplomatic initiatives that would have given them everything they
have said they wanted, which was the ability to have adequate power for
their country, to have economic growth, to have diplomatic ties with other
countries, and to have security guarantees. All of that was included in the
September 19th agreement of last year. And yet they've walked away from all
of it. So if there's a failure in diplomacy, it's on their part.

But what also has happened, David, is that over that period of time you
have seen the six-party talks continue to evolve, and the United States and
the allies working together, trying to figure out what is the proper way
and the effective way, diplomatically, to put leverage on the government of
North Korea that in the past has been able -- as I was just saying to Brett
-- has been able to use bluff and bravado as a way of exacting concessions.
And that appears to be something of declining utility at this point.

So rather than having something going wrong, what you really have is the
emergence of a process now in which the people who have the most leverage
over the North Koreans -- and let's face it, the Chinese, the South
Koreans, the Japanese, they all have more direct leverage over the North
Koreans than we do -- the people who have the greatest ability to influence
behavior are now fully invested as equal partners in a process to deal with
the government of North Korea. So what really has changed now is not only
the method by which you approach it, which is now a multilateral method,
but also, I think, the determination and the unity of the parties that are
involved.

Q In 2002, though, and since then, this President likes to focus on
results. So here's the result: In 2002, the President said that he didn't
want the so-called "axis of evil", the worst regimes in the world, to get
the most dangerous weapons, WMDs. And here we are in 2006; this President
has invaded a country that had no nuclear weapons, and there is a country
that in that process has been able to acquire more nuclear weapons.

MR. SNOW: Well, it's an open question about what the status -- as you know,
there was speculation even back in the Clinton years, did they have six,
did they have eight nukes, and the intelligence on that, I think, has
always been a little varied. The fact is that the North Koreans --

Q You dispute the idea that they have more today than they had when you
came into office?

MR. SNOW: I don't know, I honestly don't know. And I think intelligence
analysts will tell you that they're teasing through the question, as well.
You'll have to ask a technical question of whether they've had the
capability to build additional weapons since they unlocked Yongbyon a
couple years ago. Don't know. But I think the most significant -- so let's
set a couple of benchmarks. Number one, going back to the 1990s, it was
clear that the North Koreans were attempting to try to put together a
nuclear program. That was why you had the agreed framework back in 1994
under the Clinton administration. The idea was, you provide the carrots,
maybe they'll back off. It was -- it made a lot of sense, but it didn't
work because the North Koreans cheated on it and were trying on the sly to
enrich uranium.

So it is not -- so what has happened in recent days, at least in terms of
an announced or desire by the North Koreans to develop a nuclear weapon,
that's not new. They've been trying to do this for years. What is new is
that you do have, I think, a much more effective mechanism, or at least a
more promising mechanism for dealing with them, because the people who have
direct leverage, the people who can turn the spigots economically and
politically, are now fully engaged and invested in this. That was not the
case in the 1990s; it was not the case earlier in this decade; it is the
case now.

Q But, Tony, results -- I'm trying to get you to focus on results. You
invaded a country that had no nuclear weapons and all the while a country
further developed their nuclear capacity.

MR. SNOW: You may have better intelligence than I do. You're --

Q It's not a question of me. I think the intelligence is not as unclear as
you're projecting it as.

MR. SNOW: No, I think it is. People have been trying to assess. But you
know what, I'll take the worst case scenario as you've placed it, okay?
Number one, we invaded a country that was directly involved in a war on
terror, that was paying off terrorists, that was making direct threats.
That was one thing. And we went ahead and we dealt with a terrorist threat,
and, frankly, the world is safer off without Saddam Hussein.

At the same time that all this was going on, the United States was also
working on the Korea problem. Having learned from the mistakes, or having
learned from the inability of prior administration efforts to try to deal
with the North Koreans, we thought, you know what, if we go it alone, we
don't have the leverage. We need to come up with a much more practical way
of trying to deal with a regime that sometimes does not seem to respond to
rational incentives. And we have to find a way from every possible angle to
look for a diplomatic solution to this problem.

The North Koreans have made it clear for a very long time -- you can go
back and look at what members of the Clinton administration said, or what
we have said -- they've made no bones about it. So you look for the most
effective diplomatic method of doing this. The North Koreans have
proceeded. Absolutely right; given. But now what has happened is that the
people, again, who are most directly capable of influencing their decisions
have stepped up and said, you know what, the old policy of appeasing these
guys apparently isn't going to work anymore. So you have to look
prospectively now, and say, okay, what is going to be happening in the
future that we think is going to enable us to modify the behavior of the
North Koreans?

Q Just one more, I just want to be clear. You're suggesting the Clinton
approach was appeasement?

MR. SNOW: No, what I'm saying is that in the past what has happened is the
attempt to say to the North Koreans -- because I think the Clinton
administration, again, tried something and it was worth trying, which is to
say, okay, we're going to give you a bunch of carrots: You guys renounce;
we're going to try to give you a light-water breeder reactor, we'll give
you incentives. And the North Koreans took it and ran away with it. What
has also happened is that in response to bad behavior in the past, people
have said, you know, what we'll do is we'll increase aid, we'll increase
trade.

So rather than using the term "appeasement," what I will say is that you
had primarily a carrots-oriented approach. Now you've got carrots and
sticks. The sticks would be economic pressure on the government of North
Korea, but the carrots are even more important, because you've got millions
of people there who are starving, who are in agony, who have been living
under an oppressive regime, who deserve better. And what the United States
and the allies have been offering are ways in which those people can enjoy
a better quality of life, North Korea can enjoy more security, and the
region generally will be able to enjoy security.

Q And your belief is that the march to war against Iraq in no way limited
this administration's ability to dissuade North Korea from developing
nuclear weapons?

MR. SNOW: Absolutely right, absolutely right, absolutely right. The two
are, in fact, separate issues that are worked on by separate people. And as
I pointed out, the administration was working on the six-party approach
completely independent of what's going on. The fact is that it has been a
difficult process, and will continue to be, for people in the region to
figure out how you deal with these guys. It is not something that has a
simple answer. So what you try to do is to use new approaches and look for
something that's going to be effective. And right now it seems a lot more
likely to be effective if you've got the Chinese and the South Koreans and
others who have the most direct influence stepping up and trying to assert
it.

Q Tony, if the intelligence eventually suggests that this was not a nuclear
detonation, does that change anything in terms of the urgency that the
diplomatic process --

MR. SNOW: No, no, because you still have a deliberate act of provocation
that has the aim of, in some senses, either trying to frighten or
destabilize the region, and it also makes it clear that the region will be
a lot better off if nobody has to worry about whether North Korea has
nuclear weapons, knowing that it does not have nuclear weapons, and
furthermore, that there are closer ties politically, diplomatically and
economically, and in terms of security, that give the North Koreans an
incentive to be a force for peace in the region rather than a force for
instability.

Q Can you give us a sense of how this diplomatic effort may unfold over the
next 24, 48 hours?

MR. SNOW: I honestly don't know. I mean, you can read as well as I can
what's going on on the wires, which is that there are ongoing conversations
with the U.N. Security Council --

Q Yes, but you have more intelligence than that.

MR. SNOW: Yes, but not a whole lot more, because what's going on here is
that there are conversations within the U.N. Security Council -- it does
seem now that the major parties are agreed that there needs to be some
appropriate punishment for the North Koreans for doing this. Nuclear or
not, they made a statement that they have developed a weapon; they made a
statement, and a celebratory statement, that they had fired one. And that,
in and of itself, is one of those markers that I think has persuaded the
other members in the five-party talks, all the members in the five-party
talks, to say we need to work together. So now they're having conversations
and trying to coordinate which steps to take next.

Q The President didn't say anything this morning in the photo op, and he's
been quiet since his statement yesterday. So what's he thinking?

MR. SNOW: What he's thinking is let's see how the talks proceed. Again, we
have received signals from the allies, and most of these have now been made
public, that they are determined to take a different approach when it comes
to North Korea -- so trying to figure out the proper way to set up the
inducements, the sticks, so that the North Koreans will sit down at the
talks again, the six-party talks again, and circumstances in which they
renounce, and verifiably so, nuclear ambitions both in the civil nuclear
power business and also the weaponry business, and avail themselves of a
series of benefits that would be good for the country, good for the
government and good for the people.

Q I don't think that the other five parties would object to face-to-face
talks between the U.S. and North Korea.

MR. SNOW: Actually, they do. And the point they've made, Helen, is that --
yes, they've made the point that, in fact, there is strength in numbers and
it's more important to work with a united front. If you have a negotiation
like this and somebody says, well, wait a minute, you guys stand aside and
I'll talk instead, that gives the North Koreans an inducement to try to
figure out ways to chip away at the partners, to break up the coalition.
It's much smarter from a negotiating standpoint not to give them the option
of trying to cherry-pick or to try to find ways of dividing, and instead if
you have a united front that says, this is our position, it forces the
North Koreans to stop trying to probe for weakness and to start dealing now
with the determined effort and a united effort by the coalition.

So I understand the argument, but we did try that. And what they did is
they tried to isolate us. The point is not to isolate an individual partner
in terms of the five parties working with the North Koreans; it's to
isolate the North Koreans in such a way that they'll feel it's in their
self-interest to come back to the talks.

Q Is North Korea a greater threat to our national security than Iraq was?

MR. SNOW: I don't know. I don't know. I mean, I'm not in a position to do
that. I'll let you do the analysis -- scale one to ten.

Q Even though we believe they have 8 to 11 nuclear weapons and that they
most likely conducted a nuclear test yesterday?

MR. SNOW: As I've said, you've posed an interesting question, but it's not
one that's simply and easily quantifiable, so I'm not going to try to make
a run at it.

Q Okay, a couple of things you've just said -- you've said that you've got
to approach this diplomatically, you've got millions of people who are
starving to death there under a repressive regime, which is pretty much
what you had in Iraq and we invaded. What's the difference here?

MR. SNOW: Well, one of the differences is that you have neighbors that have
extensive ties in a way that you did not, with trade and other activity.
Also the North Koreans are far more heavily reliant for basic resources,
whether they be food or energy, than the Iraqis were under Saddam Hussein
-- Saddam not being wholly dependent. Also you have the additional bit of
geographic proximity; whereas Baghdad was hundreds of miles from the
nearest border, Pyongyang is very close, as you know, to Seoul and the
borders are close. So there are differences in the two situations.

Q You also had inspectors on the ground at the time. We had, as far as we
thought then, better intelligence. And yet, you're even saying this morning
our intelligence is unclear. The President has long said they do not want
to wait for a mushroom cloud, and yet you seem willing here.

MR. SNOW: No, you seem to think we ought to go to war. We don't.

Q I don't think anything, I'm asking you.

MR. SNOW: No, no, you do. The declared insinuation --

Q I'm asking you to explain the difference between why we went to war with
Iraq and why --

MR. SNOW: Because in the case of Iraq we had exhausted all diplomatic
possibilities. We're just exploring them now in the case of North Korea.
We're going to approach --

Q But you had inspectors on the ground. What was completely exhausted? And
you had the U.N. saying, wait, wait, wait.

MR. SNOW: No, some members of the U.N. were saying, wait, wait, wait, and
other members in the U.N. Security Council believed Resolution 1441 was
pretty clear in terms of the obligations.

Q Didn't say, go to war.

MR. SNOW: Furthermore, what you ended up having, as you know, was a
constant attempt to try to make life difficult for the inspectors. You can
go back and re-litigate that. I think it makes a lot more sense to try to
talk about diplomatically what's going on. You have a concerted diplomatic
effort that involves, fully now as equal partners, the Russians, the
Chinese, the Japanese, the South Koreans. That offers the best hope. And if
you want to argue for war, you're going to have to argue it someplace else.

Q I'm not arguing for anything, Tony. I know you like to do that, but I'm
not arguing for anything.

MR. SNOW: I'm arguing for diplomacy.

Q Tell me -- you say you can't tell which is more dangerous, a
nuclear-armed North Korea or what state we had with Iraq. Tell me how
dangerous you think North Korea is, what kind of threat does it pose.

MR. SNOW: Well, once again, what you're asking me to do is to engage in an
intelligence assessment even if I were fully armed with the facts would be
classified and I can't do. It is clear that a North Korea that has nuclear
weapon is going to pose a potential threat to its neighbors. And I think
it's a question that you might want to pose equally -- I know, I'm
indulging in gamesmanship here, but it's with a point -- with the South
Koreans, the Japanese, the Chinese or the Russians. The fact is that this
is at least potentially a threat. And you've got to take it seriously, and
that is one of the most important things that you deal with.

The second matter is that we will find out in the fullness of time exactly
what they're capabilities are. If it turns out that they didn't have the
capability and somebody were to take an action there, I daresay it would be
the cause of much speculation after the fact. It is important to try to
proceed as best you can on a diplomatic track until that is no longer
effective or available.

Q When you said this morning that the explosion might have been old and off
the shelf, what were you talking about?

MR. SNOW: The fact is there was a lot of -- that was a mere hypothetical.
It was the case where there was a lot of speculation. And Martha just
referred to it a bit. They think they have six, they think they have eight,
they think they have 11. There was some speculation that they had nuclear
weapons even before the six-party talks got underway. I think at this
point, again, the real point of emphasis for us is let's figure out
diplomatically how to make sure that the end number of nukes they have is
zero, and that the nuclear capability gets zeroed out, as well.

Q You seem to be trying to cast doubt on the strength of this program.

MR. SNOW: No, I honestly -- no, no. Because, as with anything else in North
Korea, it's opaque. We don't know. That is one of the reasons why it has
been very difficult for anybody at this juncture, and this would include
all of our allies, to assess precisely what took place the other day.

Q Tony, you're just saying that's what different now is that some of North
Korea's neighbors have leverage there, like China and South Korea, that
provide them with energy and food and other goods -- they're now engaged,
they're now invested. Does the United States believe they are engaged and
invested enough to, for the first time, support the U.S. in these strong
sanctions that we are proposing? And if not, what leverage do we have to
persuade them that that's necessary?

MR. SNOW: Look, I think the biggest leverage they have is their own
self-interest. This is important for them. If North Korea were to have a
nuke, it certainly would have a lot more impact in the capitals -- in Seoul
and Beijing and Tokyo and even Moscow than it would here in Washington.
Here's what the Chinese said just a little bit ago: said, North Korea must
face "some punitive actions for testing a nuclear device." This from the
U.N. Ambassador.

The point is that there is agreement that there needs to be punitive
action, and I'm sure that there's going to continue to be debate. It is
natural to ask yourself what is the least punitive action we can take.
That's always going to be the natural tendency. And so people are going to
look for what is the very least you need to do to be effective. And I'm
sure there's going to be a debate about that. And there will eventually
come, I assume, some set of punitive actions. One hopes they work. If not,
then you go back and you revisit it. That's kind of the nature of
diplomacy, and that's how it would work.

The important point now is that the Chinese and the South Koreans both are
talking about punitive actions, and that is an important step because what
it indicates is that they've gotten tired of trying to sort of reason with
the North Koreans in the sense of when there's a threat they try to provide
more in the way of aid and support. Now it's clear that they want to send a
message to Kim Jong-il and others that they need to take seriously the
international community's call for them to renounce nuclear weapons,
nuclear weapons ambitions, and nuclear power domestically.

Q Are we confident they will support sanctions?

MR. SNOW: I think rather than being confident, let's just find out what
they do. I can't read the minds of the people who are talking right now at
the Security Council.

Q And if they don't, what are our options?

MR. SNOW: Well, again, let's -- rather than running through the decision
tree, let's address the facts as they become available, and then we'll
respond accordingly.

Q Tony, what is the President doing? Is he working the phones to try to
keep China and South Korea in the corral, so to speak?

MR. SNOW: No. They didn't have to be placed in the corral. The
conversations yesterday were conversations in which the Chinese and the
South Koreans were fully supportive of the idea of going to the Security
Council and working something out. So this is not an arm-twisting exercise
on the part of the President. He did his leader calls yesterday. Meanwhile
you have ongoing diplomatic efforts that involve the Secretary of State.
Chris Hill also has been on the phone today. I think Sean McCormack has
briefed about that already. So there's a lot of diplomatic activity taking
place.

Q For now he's -- today he's just settling back and letting Condi and
others --

MR. SNOW: I don't think "settling back" -- it's not like you kick back,
grab your pretzels and ask what's going on. Instead, what the President is
doing is he talking on a regular basis with his national security team
trying to get updated. But you do have diplomats dealing with diplomats
directly, and so we're continuing to work on that.

Okay, let me first -- is this on this topic?

Q No, it's not --

MR. SNOW: Okay, let's exhaust all on this topic, and then we'll go back.
We'll get there. Jim.

Q I guess the Japanese, I guess within the last few minutes, have kind of
floated the idea of military action. The Chinese seem to have reacted
strongly against that idea.

MR. SNOW: I've seen it -- at this point, we are pursuing the diplomatic
path. That is our strategy.

Q This administration has long said Kim Jong-il is a leader who doesn't
seem to care about the welfare of his people. Is that correct?

MR. SNOW: That is correct.

Q So how is a policy based on sanctions, carrots, incentives that might
affect the welfare of his people supposed to work?

MR. SNOW: Well, his people, sooner or later, are going to understand who
cares about them. But the sanctions package, if there is one, is likely to
be targeted, as have past actions, not at the people, but at the
military-industrial complex that, in fact, has been stealing resources from
those people, and it would be targeted specifically toward what people in
that establishment are doing. You're right, you try to pinpoint it so
you're not cutting food shipments, you're not doing those sorts of things.

Q Is there any way to punish that segment of that country without punishing
everybody, or resulting in the punishment --

MR. SNOW: I don't know, I honestly don't know. But that is something,
obviously, that all the parties are thinking about.

Q Tony, this administration says that there are many options -- a menu of
options as it relates to the situation. But let's go back to the issue of
military might. Some have said, critics from past administrations to
include the Reagan administration, have said that --

MR. SNOW: The dreaded "some have said." Go ahead.

Q I'll give you the names -- that the military might is extremely thin; we
don't have the might to go that route once diplomacy shows that it's not
working.

MR. SNOW: Well, I thank them for their characterizations. At this point,
I'm not even going to get up here and speculate about military force
because we are committed to trying to solve this diplomatically. And,
frankly, any comments about military would not advance our diplomatic aims,
and so I'm not going to engage in it.

Q And also, on money laundering, where does that fall? You're talking about
missiles and nukes; where does money laundering fall? Because that was one
of the reasons that first stopped the six-party talks because --

MR. SNOW: One of the reasons the North Koreans stopped coming is because we
were using U.S. law, as we have done with others, to punish those who
engage -- who use money laundering for proliferation activities, and that
is a standard part of the law and it's been applied elsewhere. We certainly
-- April, for anybody to back off that, you talk about appeasement, that
would be directly responding to a complaint by the North Koreans, rather
than to good behavior. This now has to be a situation in which,
diplomatically, our response is to reward not complaints, but good behavior
on the part of that government.

Q So money laundering is still on the table?

MR. SNOW: Not on the table, it's something that we're not going to accept.

Q Tony, would the United States be supportive of any sentiment in Japan to
become a part of the nuclear club for self-preservation?

MR. SNOW: I think at this point, we have talked about we would like a
non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. We have learned about the possibility of an
arms race in the region; we don't want it to happen.

Q Thank you, Tony. Today on North Korea, also in China said that North
Korea might have another nuclear test right before the November elections.
The timing seems to -- somehow trying to affect the outcome of the
elections. What is your comment?

MR. SNOW: There's no comment on that. We'll react to developments as they
happen.

Q To try to put a little finer point on the question that people have been
dancing around, there seems to be a school of thought developing among some
people -- Sam Nunn said it in the front page of The New York Times today --
that of the three countries of the axis of evil, the President picked the
wrong one to invade first, the one that didn't have nuclear weapons. Now
one apparently does and the other is certainly on the way. So, generally,
how do you respond to that?

MR. SNOW: Well, it's backseat generalship. What you have is, in fact, that
the United States has been engaged actively on all three problems. And you
use what are the appropriate means at the appropriate times and the
appropriate situations. We are continuing to work aggressively on diplomacy
with the Iranians and with the North Koreans. Diplomacy had run its course
when it came to Iraq. We are still hopeful that diplomacy is, in fact,
going to yield the desired results when it does come to North Korea and
Iran. And I think Senator Nunn would probably support that. But the idea
that somehow we were not already engaged would be wrong. We have been
engaged from the beginning on all of these problems.

Q To the question that while you were doing diplomacy with Iran and North
Korea they have been rather busy on their own side --- North Korea proving
that a couple days ago, apparently, and Iran certainly on the way -- what
about that?

MR. SNOW: They've been trying to do that for a long time. The idea that
somehow, if there were no engagement in Iraq they wouldn't be doing this --
I don't think so. Keep in mind, the agreed framework -- as early as 1992,
North Korea was being brought to the table to talk about nuclear weapons
proliferation. The Iranians have been chief exporters of arms and terror
for a number of years. These are things that, for whatever reason, they
perceived in the interest of the governments of those countries and they've
been doing it independently of any events. They were doing it when nobody
was talking about Iraq and they were doing it when people were talking
about Iraq. The difference now is the bright light has been shined on both
parties.

And you also have something that didn't exist a decade ago; in the case of
Iran you have more than 25 nations now that have joined the diplomatic
effort to try to get the Iranians to renounce nuclear enrichment and
reprocessing. Similarly, you also have a growing band of countries within
the region that are united, working on the North Koreans. So what you have
that you didn't have some years ago is a large diplomatic front that
includes people who are most directly concerned, the neighbors of those
involved. So it is a significant difference.

Q Tony, could I follow on that point, which is the other argument that is
related to that, which is that the invasion of Iraq actually led to the
conclusion in North Korea and in Iran, we have to proliferate more quickly
to stave off an invasion, that the U.S. would not think about invading us
if we had a more advanced nuclear program, and therefore, it accelerated a
process that was underway and made them less inclined to follow a
diplomatic course?

MR. SNOW: As a factual matter, I'm not sure that it would be accurate, and
I'd have to leave it to intelligence analysts. And I'll go back and try to
get some better answers, David, on whether it's accelerated, or whether you
simply have a continuation of what's going on.

Again, the most significant factor from a diplomatic standpoint is that you
got a lot more diplomatic muscle than you've ever had on either of these
problems; people who in the past have said, we maybe don't want to deal
with this right away, now understand the sense of urgency and are working
together. And that's an important difference.

Q What's your response to Democrats like Biden who say that the President
should have engaged one-on-one with North Korea all along? And how much of
a campaign issue does this become?

MR. SNOW: That's up to people who want to criticize. We tried one-on-one.
That was what we tried in 1990s with the agreed framework. Point of fact
is, if we're going to deal one-on-one, we'd be playing a weaker hand, and
the President is not going to play a weaker hand, because the notion of
dealing one-on-one again gives the North Koreans a chance to try to split a
united coalition. That is not how you build strength. How you build
strength is to get the people who are directly involved to go ahead and
start using their influence, whether it be moral suasion, economy
sanctions, you name it, and to get much more directly involved, rather than
saying, oh, it's just the Americans' problem now.

The North Koreans now understand that it's not just the Americans' concern
or the Americans' problem, but you've got everybody in the neighborhood
directly concerned about this. That gives you far more leverage. That gives
you far more strength than if the United States were simply trying to play
it alone. Let me emphasize again, we do not have extensive ties of trade or
anything else with North Korea. We have less leverage than these guys do.
We have now brought into the diplomatic process the people who can make a
difference, and furthermore, they've said, we intend to make a difference.
That's an important step forward. And I would argue that you're much
stronger as part of a five-nation process than you are simply dealing
one-on-one.

Q Tony, the President has argued that Americans are safer, but not yet
safe. Does the President feel that his policies toward North Korea have
made Americans safer now than they were at the outset of his
administration?

MR. SNOW: I think what's happened, Cheryl, is that, for instance, at the
outset of this administration, we gave the North Koreans the benefit of the
doubt under the agreed framework. As it turns out, they'd been cheating.
They'd been enriching --

Q Slammed the door on them.

MR. SNOW: I'm sorry, what?

Q Slammed the door on them.

MR. SNOW: Oh, slammed the door on them, okay. So what had happened was that
they were cheating. And now I think you not only have a more realistic
assessment of what has been going on and what is still a government that is
shrouded in mystery, but you also have much more powerful diplomatic tools
at your disposal than you had before. So in that sense, you are safer.

Q Looking back, is there anything that the President would have done
differently? Does he believe he has made any mistakes in this?

MR. SNOW: Oh, my goodness, that's -- you know --

Q It's a fair question.

MR. SNOW: No, it's a silly question.

Q Why is that a silly question?

MR. SNOW: Yes, yes, it is a silly question because --

Q You just talked about --

MR. SNOW: Well, let me ask you -- give me some characterization of what you
might think. Because what typically happens is that any answer to that
question is spun into, "President Made Mistakes, Regrets." What you do as
President of the United States -- and I have said this repeatedly from this
podium and you need to give Presidents the benefit of the doubt when
national security is involved -- is the very best in their judgment of what
they can do.

Now, what will happen is over time, you find out, hmm, that data point
wasn't right, we need to adjust. So for every adjustment, sure, in perfect
hindsight, you would want perfect information and, therefore, perfect
policy. But instead what you do have in this administration and in prior
administrations is a full-on effort to do what you think, based on the
intelligence and the facts available to you, is going to be the most
effective way to secure the safety of the American people.

Q The notion that that's a silly question, when you have a President who
draws a red line three years ago and says, we will not tolerate nuclear
weapons, and now you have a country that just tested a nuclear weapon --
you don't think it's fair to ask for some accountability as to what
happened, or that there were mistakes made?

MR. SNOW: David, the accountability lies in North Korea, not in Washington.

Q That's it? There's no accountability for when this country engages in
diplomatic activity or warfare, it doesn't have anything to do -- there's
no accountability within this government?

MR. SNOW: This government is held accountable all the time. As a matter of
fact, the President even gets held accountable when gas prices fall beyond
his ability to influence --

Q You just said it was silly --

MR. SNOW: You know what, okay, let me --

Q -- it was silly ask whether lessons were learned --

MR. SNOW: Thank you. No, no, no -- it was silly to say, does he think he
made mistakes and that kind of thing.

Q Right. You think that's a silly notion, a silly question.

MR. SNOW: I think what it is, is a gratuitous question in the sense that
when it is asked, it is not asked in the context of, what are your
strategic considerations, what is brought to bear. Instead it is asked --
and maybe I'm being unfair, Cheryl -- in the context of a "gotcha" question
that is designed to paper over the immense difficulties that are involved
in the activities of dozens and dozens of people who devote their lives to
trying to get this right.

Q You assume that motive in the question?

MR. SNOW: Let me put it this way; when it has been reported, it has come
out that way. Now, if you have -- let me put it this way, and I think
you're right -- sorry to have cast doubt on your question. So let me -- if
you can come up with precise things. For instance, do you think it would
have been better to do X than Y? Again, that's second-guessing. But what I
want you to do when you ask a question like that is to have the presumption
that a President of the United States, when weighing the security of the
American public, is going to do everything in his or her power to make sure
that the American people are safe, and will be demanding everything of
those who work for him to work toward that goal, because that's what
Presidents do.

Q Doesn't mean they don't make mistakes, Tony.

MR. SNOW: That is absolutely -- we all make mistakes, David.

Q Right.

MR. SNOW: Go ahead, Cheryl.

Q In retrospect, does the President wish perhaps that he had engaged North
Korea more directly --

MR. SNOW: Oh, no.

Q -- early, at the outset of his administration?

MR. SNOW: No.

Q And does he wish that he had pushed for the six-party talks and this kind
of diplomacy more quickly?

MR. SNOW: I don't know -- we're the ones who pushed for the six-party
talks. I think what you're saying is -- what you're saying is, you came up
with a good innovation, do you wish you would have done it more quickly. I
don't know. But the fact is I think what you might want to think about is
studying what had happened -- because when you come in as a new
administration, you do take a look at what the prior administration had
done. You try to assess successes or failures. It's quite often, for
instance, you'll find Presidents who have critiques on the campaign trail
come in and say, wait, that did make sense. So you do take a look at what
is going on, and you try to figure out whether it's working.

Now, what happened is -- am I correct, Fred, 2002 -- when did we discover
the uranium enrichment? It became clear that there was uranium enrichment
going on, and we said to ourselves, we need to come up with a better way of
doing this, and a one-party solution, which we have tried, obviously is not
the cure. So, therefore, we're going to -- we think it's important to pull
it together.

So, Cheryl, I don't know if you want to try to engage on, should he have
come up with it first? The point is, he did come up with it, and that is an
important step forward. And now you're starting to see it leading to much
more assertive and unified diplomacy on the issue of North Korea.

Q Tony, may I ask about the Army before you run out of time?

MR. SNOW: Well, we won't run out of time. I want to make sure that people
who have a question on this topic get their chance to ask it, and then
we'll get to the Army.

Victoria, are you on this? Okay.

Q Not on this.

MR. SNOW: John are you on this?

Q Yes.

MR. SNOW: Okay.

Q Thank you, Tony. I'd like a follow-up question on the earlier point you
made about Japan. You said that the administration preferred no arms race
in the peninsula. Is that correct?

MR. SNOW: That is correct.

Q All right. When I ask you a similar question this summer regarding Japan
rearming, you said at that point, well, it was up to Japan and it was
hypothetical at that point. The new Prime Minister, Mr. Abe, has said he
would not only like to see the constitution rewritten to permit rearmament,
he'd like to do it in his own hand. With the recent developments, have you
changed your view on this now?

MR. SNOW: You know what, I'm not sure that the government has a view on
this, and when we have one, we'll be happy to share it with you.

Q It's the same as the summer, is that right?

MR. SNOW: Yes, we do not want an arms race in the peninsula.

Q So you're against what Prime Minister Abe is suggesting?

MR. SNOW: No, what I'm saying is that what you have is a statement about
what he might want in some future time, and I'm not the diplomat who has
that portfolio. I will be happy to put you in touch with people who
probably will not yet answer it because there will be conversations with
the Japanese about what is met. But for me to get up here and try to engage
in a conversation with a newly seated Prime Minister on a matter that is
that explosive I think you'll agree is something that could do far more
harm than good.

Q Tony, a question on what you said earlier about preferring to be part of
a five-power process in talking to the North Koreans -- if I understood --
what former Secretary of State Baker was saying over the weekend was that
at some point, it's important to engage directly with an adversary or an
enemy. Is there some difference here between you and Secretary Baker?

MR. SNOW: No, Secretary Baker is entitled to his opinion, but the other
thing he said -- and I'm leaping to the page -- because what he also says
is, "I can't make that judgment here this morning because I don't know what
the elements are involved in it." So what he was offering was a general
proposition and not a specific critique.

Q Several polls just out are showing the President's approval rating --

MR. SNOW: Okay, let me just -- I'm sorry, any more North Korea questions?
One last, and then we'll get --

Q Tony, it would seem that the only member of the six-party group that
really has clout with North Korea is China. And yet, during this whole
process, China has not been out in front. Do you feel they drag their feet?
Many believe that China unilaterally could bring North Korea to heel, and
they haven't been trying --

MR. SNOW: I'm not going to get into trying to speculate about
unilateralism. The Chinese -- we're working with the Chinese. We absolutely
understand their special ability to have influence, but whether they have
sole and unique ability, I don't know. I think, again, as I said before,
there's strength in numbers, and when you have all the members of the
neighborhood getting involved, your chances of diplomatic success increase.

Go ahead, Victoria.

Q Yes, Tony, several polls have just come out showing the President's
approval ratings dipping to well below 40 percent. And in addition, what
you're seeing is voters are saying that they will use their congressional
vote to vote their opposition to the President. You've got registered
voters to say they're twice as likely to vote against the President, and
independents three to one against. Is the President, first of all, aware of
this? And second of all, is he concerned that he could be a drag on the
Republican ticket?

MR. SNOW: The answer to the second is, no; and the answer to the first is,
yes.

Q -- does the White House approve of this $1-billion contract to this
private firm to come up with this Army slogan, "Army Strong"? That's one $1
billion, $200 million a year? And is this routine to go out to a private
firm?

MR. SNOW: I'll refer that to you to the Pentagon. I don't have an answer
for that, don't know.

Q I wondered what the White House felt about it.

MR. SNOW: I don't know what the White House thinks about it. It's the first
time the White House spokesman has heard of it.

Q Could you maybe look into it?

MR. SNOW: Well, yes, and when you have really arcane questions -- and this
would apply to any of you out there -- if you're going to have an arcane
question sort of that I might not prepare for, feel free to send me an
email and I'll try to have an answer, because that way you'll get an
answer, and I won't have to tap dance.

Q But if you could look into it, that would be great.

MR. SNOW: Yes. Connie, send me an email on it because I still don't know
what you're talking about.

Q All right.

Q Tony, RNC research notes that during the Bush administration, Democrats
have voted against missile defense nine times, while Chairman Mehlman
notes, "It is simply not credible that the same Democrats who've opposed
missile defense for decades have in the month before the election
discovered North Korea's long-range missile capability." And my question:
Does the President have any disagreement with these statements?

MR. SNOW: Can you read that again? (Laughter.) I was just -- that's
ping-ponging around there. I know. Let me -- I need to hear the whole
question. Go ahead.

Q Chairman Mehlman --

MR. SNOW: Yes.

Q -- notes, "It is simply not credible that the same Democrats who have
opposed missile defense for decades have in the month before the election
discovered North Korea's long-range missile capability." And my question:
Does the President have any disagreement with these statements?

MR. SNOW: Well, the President knows that all of these matters are going to
play a role when people are debating who they want to vote for, whether
they're voting for or against the President or for or against Republican
candidates.

Q What was the President's reaction to the George Soros funded Citizens for
Ethics and Responsibility, filing a Freedom of Information action demanding
information about Christian leaders who visit the White House?

MR. SNOW: You will deeply disappointed to know, Lester, that he is not
following that.

Q One last -- since there was 12 on the front row from one person.
(Laughter.) Just one last one.

MR. SNOW: They tended to be on the same topic, Lester.

Q I understand. The New York Times --

Q -- my question with sub-parts -- (laughter.)

Q Tony, The New York Times quoted Chris Wallace as saying that you, Tony --
(laughter) -- left television because you were interested in becoming a
radio star. Is this true or inaccurate? (Laughter.)

Q True or false?

Q Chris Wallace said -- Chris Wallace.

MR. SNOW: My goodness, I was interested in being a star in all the media,
but I've found something much better.

Q -- this is related -- you were absent on Friday to do good political
works for the Republican Party --

MR. SNOW: Right.

Q What's the policy that you've set? Did you take a vacation day? Will you
continue to do that? How many more on your schedule?

MR. SNOW: The answer is, I haven't figured out -- I suppose -- yes, I'll
take a vacation day.* The way it is, it's all paid by the RNC. They're open
press. I know that I'm doing -- I'm doing something in Wisconsin on
Thursday. And I'm doing events in Iowa and Chicago on Saturday.

Q One is for Hastert --

MR. SNOW: Yes, one -- it's sort of Denny Hastert's big deal.

Q Are you concerned at all, because of the Warner --

MR. SNOW: Wait, I'm sorry, what?

Q Are you concerned at all -- Friday was kind of a big news day, the John
Warner comments among other things --

MR. SNOW: Well, as I told you, I think Dana did a terrific job. But I do
think, as I've said if I --

Q -- maybe I shouldn't be out here?

MR. SNOW: No, because while it was something that generated a certain
amount of conversation -- let me put it this way -- if we had something
like North Korea, yes, I stay. It's one of those things where you figure
out, you use your judgment on it. And as I've said before, I understand
that this is -- people are going to be curious because it is new ground.
And the point I've made is if it does interfere with the day job and it
starts to detract from it, then I stop doing it.

Well, let me finish answering -- I'll get to it. And if you're asking for
specifics, I don't know yet.

Q I'm not done yet. Let me ask the question and --

MR. SNOW: Okay, well, let me finish answering because there was a question
also about sort of the general guidelines. And the guideline is to try to
stay above -- I'm not going and banging on Democrats by name, or even
trying to do so by implication, but instead trying to do a positive
discussion on what the President is doing and why.

Now, you.

Q I just wondered, Sunday you're going to be going to Denny Hastert's -- a
fundraiser for Denny, himself. Do you think that this launches you on your
political travels in a very awkward time?

MR. SNOW: No.

Q And what is the message that you might saying, then, standing with the
Speaker, who is embattled at this time?

MR. SNOW: Well, the message is that we're standing by the Speaker, and also
that I'm going to be telling people what the President is doing and why.

Q -- the President is going to -- still expected to be out of state with
the Speaker on Thursday --

MR. SNOW: I believe so, yes.

Q Tony, could I follow on Victoria's question?

MR. SNOW: Yes, we'll do one more and then the rest we'll gaggle informally.

Q How much does the Foley scandal have to do wi