Text 3705, 766 rader
Skriven 2006-11-29 23:31:10 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (0611293) for Wed, 2006 Nov 29
====================================================

===========================================================================
Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials
===========================================================================

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 29, 2006

Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials



Filing Center

Reval Hotel Latvia Riga, Latvia

11:40 A.M. (Local)

MR. SNOW: We will start on the record with a brief comment on the
President's NATO experience on the trip.

This has been a very good trip with productive meetings with the leaders of
Estonia and Latvia. In addition, the President came back encouraged last
night from his working dinner with fellow NATO heads of state. They talked
about the normal retinue of issues, most importantly, Afghanistan and on
coming up with a coordinated way forward. Again, rather than trying to give
you a full readout, I'll simply give you a characterization of how the
meetings have gone so far.

Any other details?

MR. BARTLETT: I would say, having done these NATO dinners, NATO sessions
for some time now, he was particularly pleased about the interaction,
substance and dialogue from last night. As was said, last night was
primarily a discussion about Afghanistan; a lot of today's talks will be
more of the political nature of NATO, new members, things like that, how
open NATO is going to be in the coming years. Those are the kind of thrusts
of the conversations today. But last night, Afghanistan. There will be a
communique that will report out about the way forward with NATO's
commitment to Afghanistan. What we heard around the table was a clear
understanding of the stakes in Afghanistan and the continued commitment of
NATO being very consequential for the future of that country.

If you want a few comments for tomorrow, we can do that.

MR. SNOW: We'll do a little of that, and then we'll go on background.

Q Can we get a on-the-record comment on the Hadley memo, or do you think
that the memo shows --

MR. SNOW: No, because, again, you're asking us to do a direct conversation
on a classified memo.

Q But just on the reported assessment.

MR. SNOW: What we'll say on the record is, the President has confidence in
Prime Minister Maliki. And also, the administration is working with the
Prime Minister to improve his capabilities in terms of dealing with the
fundamental challenges in Iraq, which are security concerns, economic
growth, political reconciliation, and regional diplomacy, so that you are
going to have an Iraqi government that has the ability to operate
independently, that can sustain, govern and defend itself, and can serve as
an ally in the war on terror.

MR. BARTLETT: And I would just add, as we set up this meeting -- I think
Steve had touched on this in some of the other briefings he's done -- is to
recall the last time the President and Prime Minister Maliki somewhat saw
each other in person through the video conference session they had. The
thrust of that conversation, again, was how can we grow the capability of
Prime Minister Maliki, particularly when it comes to Iraqi security forces
and him taking a more direct hand in dealing with the sectarian violence,
whether it be the Sunni-based insurgent aspect of it, or the illegal
militia aspect.

And both leaders tasked key members of their cabinet and their military to
work on a game plan to see how that could happen. And a key aspect of
tonight and tomorrow morning's meeting will be for the two leaders to get
updated on where those are -- where areas that we can accelerate and expand
Prime Minister Maliki's capacity to deal with these issues. So that will be
a dominate subject of today and tomorrow's meetings.

MR. SNOW: Let me add a couple more notes. We'll obviously be giving you
enough on the record here that we could -- Prime Minister Maliki also has
been very aggressive in recent weeks in taking on some of the key
challenges. You have seen him making changes at the Ministry of the
Interior. He has been taking a good, hard look at police forces and trying
to comb out those who have been involved in acts of violence, rather than
peacekeeping.

You also have the Prime Minister's avowed goal of developing great security
capability, because he understands that ultimately it is going to be the
Iraqi people who have to govern, sustain, and defend themselves.

The Iraqi people also have been working on a series of steps that are very
important. There was a conversation about de-Baathification; there are
conversations ongoing about the hydrocarbon law that would permit the
sharing of oil and natural gas revenues throughout the country, providing a
very powerful economic incentive for people in all regions and of all
backgrounds to work to sustain the Iraqi state.

You also have the fact that the Iraqi government, through a tough time, has
maintained its unity. And there's another important point, which is that
the Prime Minister and his entire government came into office really in
midstream when it came to the sectarian violence that was inaugurated by
the Samara mosque bombing in February. They have an enormously complex task
in front of them in terms of dealing with building a political apparatus in
a nation that has not had one previously, that is a free political
apparatus. They also have the difficulty of dealing with long pent-up
angers with different factions within the country. But at the same time,
they have demonstrated unity and determination.

And the Prime Minister, along with the Deputy Prime Minister and the
President, have all been out publicly stating their commitment to the goals
that we've outlined all along, which is building the kind of strength
within Iraq that will enable it, again, to sustain, govern, and defend
itself.

* * * * *

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With that, we'll go to questions. And we'll
play around with this. If we can keep stuff on the record to the best of
the ability, we will, but there are going to be some areas where we can't.

Q How does the President make al Maliki feel as though he's highly regarded
by the U.S., say, in the light of this memo?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he makes -- the way he makes him feel
highly regarded by the United States is that Prime Minister Maliki is in
regular consultation with our Ambassador, with the President, with General
Casey. Furthermore, the two governments have already been involved in
ongoing cooperation, as my colleague mentioned. And if you take a look at
key parts of the memo, including -- key parts of the memo, you have a
constant reiteration of the importance of strengthening the Maliki
government -- "need to work with him to augment his capabilities." This, in
fact, has become the focal point of U.S.-Iraqi cooperation -- helping
develop the capabilities necessary in unusually and incredibly challenging
time for the government of Iraq.

The President's conversations on a regular basis with Prime Minister Maliki
I think have not only provided the personal relationship that is very
important in this case, but also the ability of both men to talk candidly
about the challenges that the Maliki government faces. And the approach of
this government is, how can we help Prime Minister Maliki? And that
continues to be the way in which the President reaches out to him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd just add that I think a little bit of
getting beyond just the headline of the story and taking it in complete
context and tenor of the memo demonstrates that important questions and
obvious points of assessment are being made by the administration. But the
broad conclusion, as identified in that very memo is that the big
deficiency is capability. That's something that Prime Minister Maliki has
discussed publicly, as well as privately, with us; it's something that we
have acknowledged. One of the central tenets of this meeting is, how do we
increase his capability to turn his good intentions, as described in this
memo, into concrete action.

And everybody recognizes it, and those who understand the command and
control issues, when it comes to Iraqi security forces, they come under
MNFI authority and command. What he is looking for and what he is hoping to
demonstrate is more direct effect on the security situation, particularly
the sectarian violence. He believes he needs greater autonomy and control
over certain aspects of his security forces in order to accomplish that. A
lot of the work that has been done in the last month is to determine how
best to do that, and that's what the two leaders are going to be spending a
lot of time tonight and tomorrow morning on.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just say that while we're discussing
the memo I want this to be ON BACKGROUND. We can try to sort out things
beyond this.

Q Were those last comments on the record?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, those are background comments. We said
any comments about this was on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you ask about the memo, it's going to be
on background.

Q What about the troop levels? The memo talks about the possibility of
sending additional troops to Baghdad. Is the President leaning toward doing
that? Will he discuss that with Maliki?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No doubt it's going to come up, but also,
the President has made it clear that he will continue to base troop
assessments on what he hears from generals. The President has said, as you
know, recently that there's a possibility, for instance, as we continue to
embed U.S. forces helping to train Iraqis, that you might see some of the
troop levels go up. But this is -- as Steve Hadley noted yesterday, we're
not going to prejudge either up or down in terms of troop levels. Those are
very practical considerations that are made on the basis of conditions on
the ground.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And take -- the definition of troops
doesn't necessarily mean U.S. troops. It could be increased Iraqi troops.
You've seen some of the issues of the Baghdad Security Plan from over the
summer, is that some of the Iraqi security forces that had hoped to
materialize and be deployed in Baghdad have been slower than expected. So
some of the deficiencies may be filled with Iraqi security forces. So don't
rule that out when you say troops.

Q Can I get back to something the senior official on the left said?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Your left, or our left?

Q It makes clear that the deficiency is capability -- my left -- the
deficiency is capability, how to turn good intentions into concrete
actions. Doesn't the memo itself say that there is a question about the
Prime Minister's intentions

-- one of three -- whether his intentions are at fault; whether he's being
undermined; whether he simply doesn't have the capability -- isn't that a
question? And two, is this meeting between the President and the Prime
Minister, in fact, a response to the memo? Is Bush going to talk to the
Prime Minister to try and answer this question about whether, in fact, he
does have good intentions and they're simply being undermined?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll help you -- even though I'm on your
right and our left, I will take on the latter question, which is, no, this
is not -- the President is convinced of Prime Minister Maliki's
determination and good intentions. Again, you have a series of questions,
which, within the context of the memo, represents a very hard look, a
probing look at the situation in Iraq, and the one thing that has come up
is that we believe that it is a capability problem, and that the Prime
Minister understands a lot of the complexity of the situation that he faces
and is eager to address it.

Many of the joint collaborations that I and my fellow senior administration
official have referred to have taken place subsequent to the writing of
this memo.

Q I'm sorry?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The joint committees that were formed in
the video conference -- that the two agreed to form, those activities have
been ongoing. The bulk of those have occurred since the writing of the
memo.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd also add that in many respects, the
administration and the embassy, as well as commanders on the ground,
wouldn't be doing their job if we didn't raise these types of probing
questions and assessments. Anytime you're doing a fundamental assessment,
as we are, you're going to, of course, ask these questions. But if you read
carefully in the memo, based upon some of the recommendations that the memo
suggests, as well as some other -- where it says that reporting shows that
he is actually willing to address his party politics and his issues within
his political constraints

-- I think demonstrates that the assessment we have made is that it is a
capability issue. And that's why that's a bulk of the memo, in the back
discusses about increasing his capability.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And speaking of which, I know we're kind of
doing a Mutt and Jeff act here, but we'll try to get you as much as we can.
If you take a look at the memo, some of the actions that are already
mentioned and contemplated within the context of the memo have taken place.
For instance, Iraq has supported renewal of the U.N. MNF mandate, which was
renewed yesterday. I've already mentioned the discussion about
de-Baathification. It is clear that Prime Minister Maliki has begun taking
a very hard look at the Ministry of the Interior, particularly with regard
to police forces.

So a number of the action items mentioned in the memo already, for public
consumption, have begun to take place. So keep in mind that when you have a
situation -- when you're in wartime, you're going to ask tough questions.
You're also going to start outlining actions that you take in response to
challenges that are ongoing, and they continue to do that.

Q How is it anything other than a slap at al-Maliki to say that there are
three possibilities and one of them is that he is ignorant of what's
happening on the streets of his own country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because the bulk of the memo demonstrates
that the judgment is that it's a capability issue. Just because you raise
the range of possibilities doesn't mean you're casting judgment in
declaring that one aspect of that range. And the evidence is contrary to
that, when you look at the bulk of the memo and the assessments we have
made very clear, publicly, as well as, as we said, the itinerary or the key
agenda item for this meeting -- is not to say it's a slap in the face, but
it's, how do we grow his capability.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Furthermore, you have to address questions
that have been raised in the public square, and simply because one says you
have to ask the question does not mean that you have reached the conclusion
that it is one of those.

Q He wasn't raising his own questions, he was just echoing those he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, these are questions that sometimes
are going to be circulated and other people are going to raise, and that
you do need to acknowledge that those are questions that are -- that people
have raised to the President or within the broader foreign policy
community. And then if you go ahead and take a look -- and please do go
look through the rest of the memo -- you see that the emphasis is on
capability building.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's just what it says -- a range of
possibilities. But if you read the whole memo, it clearly gives the context
of the judgment that has been passed, and what we are telling you it's a
capability issue.

Q There's the list of the nine items that -- nine action items that he
should take in there. Do you know, were those shared with him before today?
And do you -- other than the two you mentioned, what else of that list have
there been action on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, many of the conversations have
centered around the action items. As we've noted, there are some that he's
taking action on. It will be a question about how more aggressively he can
be, how more comprehensive he can be. That will be a lot of the discussion
in which the President will talk about.

As we say in here, he has the proper vision and intent and understands the
issues that have to be dealt with, whether it be issues of oil, political
reconciliation, hydrocarbon law is mentioned in there, the issue of illegal
militias. What will happen in these meetings is an opportunity for the two
leaders to flesh that out in greater detail, determine the road map to
dealing with some of those issues in greater detail.

So, I'm not going to be -- we're not going to be in a position to sit here
and check off all nine and where -- and give you a grade of where they are
in each one of those. But that is the bulk of the conversation, to be
talking about these areas, because everybody recognizes the areas that need
to be addressed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Keep in mind, also, that Prime Minister
Maliki comes -- this all seems to be -- I want to caution against this
being one-sided. This is not the President dictating terms. Prime Minister
Maliki is the sovereign head of state. The President respects that. And
there are going to be things that Prime Minister Maliki thinks are going to
be helpful to him, and he is going to be sharing his thoughts.

Keep in mind that the Iraqis also have clear and practical thoughts about
how to deal with problems that are going on in their own cities and on
their own soil. And this is a very good opportunity for the two leaders to
talk in detail and very candidly about precisely what challenges they face
and how we can be of assistance.

But again, the point to underscore is that the United States position is in
support of Prime Minister Maliki, building capabilities, and enabling him
to put together the proper series of components that are going to enable
him to govern effectively within Iraq and his governing coalition to govern
effectively.

Q Among the steps that the memo says the U.S. should take is Secretary Rice
holding an Iraq-plus-neighbors meeting in the region in early December.
Does Steve anticipate that that would include Iran and Syria?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I'm not going to go into any detail
about these things. Obviously, if something like that should take place,
we'll let you know.

Q Has Maliki been briefed on the contents of this memo in advance of the
face-to-face meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Don't know.

Q This memo was written on November 8th, the visit occurred on October
30th. Nearly a month has passed since the visit. Can you tell us what --
has the administration taken any concrete steps so far as a result of this
Hadley visit and this memo to improve things? We've seen a deteriorating
situation there in the interim.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, what you've seen are attempts to
destabilize through acts of violence. But the notion --

Q But what has --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The answer is, we're not going to tell you
specifically simply because you have daily interaction. You have a
situation on the ground where it can be as practical as trying to figure
out how to secure and hold particular neighborhoods within Baghdad, to
security challenges in al Anbar. And quite often -- and those are tasks
that have been assigned by each head of state to their designees. Again,
this goes back to the conversation in the SVTC.

And so in terms of concrete action, you see them taking place each and
every day. It is not as if you simply allow things to sort of go rolling on
by themselves. Each and every day, there are conversations where the
generals on the ground make the adjustments they need, and obviously there
are conversations between the governments.

Q What about the President, though? Has he taken any particular steps since
--

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I think the key aspect of this was
the two leaders, in their video conference, tasked key members of both
U.S., as well as the Iraqi government, to work on a way forward to grow
capability, accelerate the handing over of capabilities to Prime Minister
Maliki. The whole purpose -- one of the key purposes of this meeting with
him is to receive an update -- a key update. Hopefully from that, they will
be able to -- there will be some greater consensus on how to do that.

Q And did those two meetings, the video conference and the upcoming meeting
in Jordan, flow out of this Hadley visit and memo?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think the memo says anything about
a visit.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. And furthermore, the video conference,
again, took place before the memo was put together.

Look, again, this is -- what you have to realize is that there are constant
efforts to assess what is going on in Iraq and how best to address the
problems that the government of Iraq is facing, and how to assist the
government in doing that. So this is sort of a natural piece of
consultation that would take place.

Q Could you discuss the political element of the memo in this respect --
regarding the Sadr faction, the memo raises the possibility of trying to --
I'm looking for the right word -- change the political base for the Prime
Minister away from this heavy reliance on Sadr's faction and to try to
bring more moderate Sunnis and others, and basically peel them away from
that faction. That seems to be the basic theory behind one possibility
where this could go. I was wondering if you can talk to that specific idea
in your talking with the Prime Minister today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, it's a possibility. And the purpose
-- one of the purposes of this meeting is to gain greater insight into how
Prime Minister Maliki is going to deal with a very thorny political climate
in Baghdad, which is not only one in which deals with illegal militias from
the Shia, but also Sunni inclusion to marginalize the insurgency. And how
you go about doing that, who has what voice, what leverage, and who sits at
the table to make those decisions, is something that is of great interest
to the administration, obviously. And Prime Minister Maliki put a lot of
thought to this, and that obviously will be a part of their conversations.

Q Do you think that the President would ask Maliki to repudiate Sadr and
basically try to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, I'm not going to describe with
the President may or may not ask of the Prime Minister. But I will say that
we recognize that the Prime Minister has a strategy to marginalize illegal
militias by -- through inclusion, and to isolate those who are acting
outside of the purview of the government and of the law of the land, and by
doing so, believes that it will be the most effective way to deal with that
scenario you just described.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And let me just add, he has made public the
fact that he's had conversations with al Sadr about this. Obviously, there
are cabinet ministers who are part of al Sadr's party. But the strategy has
been to say, you need to make a choice. The government itself should have
the exclusive authority for bearing arms and having armed organizations
trying to enforce the peace. And they've made it clear that they do not
condone militias. And he's had the conversations publicly; he's read out
conversations with al Sadr about this.

So a part of this is you're assuming that there's an either/or, that al
Sadr is necessarily in charge of all the militias that may claim to be part
of Mahdi Army. That is one of the things that has to be determined. But it
is also clear that the existence of militias is unacceptable.

Q If I could have one more follow-up. In terms of the meeting today, are
you guys going to be carrying specific new ideas? You kind of characterize
this as a listening session to kind of glean more insight into what the
Prime Minister thinks about things. But are you guys going to be carrying
your own ideas about what you could do to augment his capabilities, what
you guys could do, specific ideas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's going to be a natural give-and-take
in a conversation. That's how it's been every time they've met. It's always
going to be a sharing of ideas. It's not one way. But as the senior
administration official pointed out, he is the sovereign leader of a
government that controls, in many respects, the destiny -- future destiny
of that country. And it's going to be very important for us to listen to
the specific ideas he has for the way forward. Obviously, we're going to
have our own ideas, and it always has been a give-and-take process.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And that gets back to the point we were
saying before about consultation. To get back to Sheryl's question, in
dealing with the situation -- security and otherwise -- in Iraq, you have
to understand that there have to be constant adjustments. We've made this
point over and over.

You also -- it's also important to realize that there's a lot been going on
other than the violence. There have been attempts to build up economic
infrastructure. We've talked about the increased pumping of oil. There are
attempts to deal with reconciliation. The hydrocarbon statute and
de-Baathification are important parts of that. You have seen public
declarations in terms of trying to reduce the levels of violence, and also
to be supportive of the government by people from all factions within Iraq.

All of those things are taking place, as well. It's important to realize
that Prime Minister Maliki has -- and this is worth emphasizing -- an
enormously complex challenge in a nation that had been living under the
domination and oppression of a brutal and bloodthirsty dictator, and now
you have people who are coming to grips not only with the history within
the country, but also trying to deal with the challenge of being a new
democracy.

And so what we have seen is that Prime Minister Maliki, rather than
shrinking from making decisions, has been embracing the responsibility of
the head of state for taking on responsibility. And we find that not only
encouraging, but necessary, and we're going to do everything we can to
assist.

Q I'm assuming the President is aware that the memo was leaked. What was
his reaction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry?

Q I'm assuming that the President is aware the memo was leaked. What was
his reaction? Was there any concern that it will color the perception of
the talks with Maliki?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, the substance of the memo was an
obvious part of the agenda, so in that respect, no. But is the President
ever pleased when classified information is handed over to the public?
Obviously not, from that standpoint.

Q Was there any intention to share this with Maliki before their
discussions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's no question there will be
conversations, probably through the embassy, with Prime Minister Maliki,
but they're meeting tonight, a perfect opportunity to talk about the
contents of the strategy. Again, there's nothing --

Q Not the contents of the strategy, but the fact that this memo was leaked
to the press?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, look -- I'm sorry, go ahead.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The two leaders are not going to spend
their time worried about the process of this being leaked to the press. He
will be -- I'm sure the Prime Minister understands the memo has been
leaked. I mean, it's in The New York Times. I'm sure he's been made aware
of that. But the substance of the memo is already a key part of the agenda.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And again, if the Prime Minister is looking
through it, you see the constant focus on building capability, which is
precisely what he has been talking about and emphasizing in his
conversations with the President.

Q I'm sorry, can you just clarify, you said that you're sure that he is
aware of the contents --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Who?

Q Maliki, because it's in The New York Times?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sure -- I'm just assuming he is. But I
--

Q But you don't know for sure.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't verify that.

Q Okay. There's nobody in the administration that's alerted Maliki that
this is out in the press?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't verify that.

Q Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A lot of people on airplanes, the Prime
Minister is traveling, so I can't confirm that.

Q Just for the on-background record, you can confirm that the text of this
memo as published is accurate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is what it is. And I'm going to leave it
at that.

Q Is the text an accurate rendition of the memo?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to confirm classified
information that's been leaked.

Q So we assume it is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You've got my answer.

Q Did I mishear you when you say that Maliki is trying to gain further
control of the security forces?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, absolutely -- I mean, that's been a
stated objective for a long time. It's been -- I mean, he's --

Q I mean, it's a sovereign nation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But as part of the charter, the U.N.
Charter, and the part of the arrangement we have right now, the
multinational force, MNFI, has complete control, command and control over
both all forces on the ground, which include Iraq security forces.

Q There have been indications that he's not feeling very secure. How can
this make him feel more secure in office -- Maliki?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the very substance of the
conversations tonight and the commitment the President has made, and the
President publicly made as early as yesterday, demonstrating his confidence
not only in the government, but the fact that the United States of America
understands the stakes in Iraq and is committed to success.

Q You know, on one hand, you guys are always saying that the President has
confidence in Maliki. But on the other hand, you know, Maliki is not doing
enough, Maliki doesn't have control, as much control over the situation as
possibly he should, is he capable of turning things around --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me jump in there. I mean, Toby, the way
you frame this is a summary judgment that seems to imply negligence on the
part of the Prime Minister. And again, look, this is an enormously
complicated situation for which there is no cookbook answer. We have said
of ourselves that we're not doing well enough fast enough. And the fact is
-- so I don't want -- it's very important to make it clear, again, that
there is not summary judgment of Prime Minister Maliki, but instead there
is a great deal of respect for the enormity and complexity of the challenge
he faces. And it is worth it, as you do your work, to think through it,
too, because you start putting together the layout of the country, you take
a look at the different factions, you take a look at the history of the
country, you take a look at the novelty of democracy within it, you talk
about the importance of dealing with neighbors -- you talk about all of
those things in a time where there has been a concerted effort on the part
of various insurgencies to blow up the democracy -- not to vie for
authority, not to come up with a competing ideology, but simply to create a
failed state, and it is obvious that the Prime Minister has an enormous
challenge.

We understand it. We also understand the absolute importance of succeeding
in Iraq by creating -- by helping Prime Minister Maliki create a government
that can defend, sustain and govern itself, that can be an ally in the war
on terror, in many ways simply through the sheer fact of its existence and
stability. So you put all those together. We understand that more needs to
be done. We also understand that it is going to require the resourcefulness
and commitment of both sides, and both sides are, in fact, fully committed
to it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One more question on this topic.

Q Can we please go back to something --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Patiently waiting.

Q Yes, the memo, it says at a certain that despite the reassuring words of
Maliki, on the grounds there are reports of non-delivery of services to
Sunni areas, an intervention by the Prime Minister obvious to stop military
action against Shia targets. So how can you trust him, looking forward, if
your own military command show distrust in him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'll take -- and my colleague can add
to this -- but subsequent to this, you have, in fact, seen military
operations in Shia areas going after militias, and you have also seen very
aggressive activity, again on the part of the Ministry of Interior, and
that would involve police units that apparently have been involved in
collaborative efforts with militias. So if you want to find out -- if you
want to do it, you take a look at your own news clippings from the last
three weeks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I think one important point on that,
when it comes to targeting Shias, there has been high coordination on going
after death squad leaders. There are times when there has been -- there
could have been better communication about certain operations in which the
Prime Minister complained about, but he publicly made clear later that the
people we were going after were very -- it was justified, because there
were pre-cleared discussions about the specific people. But how and when
the operation took place, there could have been better coordination on, and
we've recognized that.

That's part of the conversations we'll be having, we talk about operational
control of security forces, how these issues are dealt with, because you
can't look at a military operation in a vacuum. They have political
consequences. And it's to make sure that the political strategy and the
military strategy are constantly integrated and linked up. And that's one
of the key issues which they'll address, because as you give greater
control and autonomy to Iraqi security forces you have a lot of complicated
issues with regards to that -- embedded U.S. troops, how they will conduct
operations vis-a-vis coalition operations. There are a lot of details that
have to be worked out, and there will be a lot of time that the two men
spend talking about today and tomorrow.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But even though the focus of that
particular language is Shia militias, let's not lose sight of the fact that
there have been other organizations, including al Qaeda, within the country
that are trying to destabilize, and the Prime Minister also is committed to
going after them, as are we.

Q Does this memo, in any way, diminish the ability of the President to work
with al-Maliki?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q And does Hadley's statement from a week ago that no big, bold
announcement is forthcoming from these meetings, does that still hold?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we'll find out.

Q At what point precisely did you go on background?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Everything -- every question with regards
to the memo is on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I mean, that goes back to quite awhile
ago.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The opening -- the opening remarks we made
before we went to questions, because the questions started on this topic,
we made very clear that answers to these questions about -- specifically
about the memo are on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can either consult the recording, or
transcript.

Q Let's go back to something you said earlier. You talked about the bulk of
the memo being -- addressing how to shore up Maliki's capabilities. But if
you read this, the memo says, "There does seem to be an aggressive push to
consolidate Shia power, influence. It is less clear whether Maliki is a
willing participant." It goes on to say, "His intentions seem good when he
talks with Americans -- the reporting suggests he's trying to stand up to
the Shia hierarchy, but the reality on the streets suggest Maliki is either
ignorant of what's going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his
capabilities are not yet sufficient."

Are you saying that the President is, in effect, rejecting those first two
possibilities in favor of the third, that his capabilities are not yet
sufficient?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's evidenced by the rest of the
memo that the judgment being made by us, whether it be Steve Hadley or
other members of the administration, is that the issue is predominately one
of capability. And that's exactly what's going to be the bulk of the
conversations tonight and tomorrow.

Q It seems to fly in the face of what Hadley has written here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a range -- it's like what we said to
Mark -- it's a range of possibilities. It is not a, as you said, summary
judgment.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And, Sheryl, if you take a look through the
rest -- what you've done is you've read off the beginning, and then you go
back through the steps both sides can take, and those are all about
capability building.

Q It's all in the conditional. If Maliki is willing to move decisively,
this is how we can help him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, but as we --

Q It suggests a disbelief or a feeling that you're really not sure who
Maliki is and how committed he is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think -- again, if you take a look at
what we've discussed in terms of measures that have been taken in recent
weeks, and furthermore, what you're seeing with Prime Minister Maliki is
somebody who has made it clear that he is eager to assume greater
responsibility in these things. The President has made that clear in recent
conversations, and Steve talked about it as recently as yesterday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But as I previously said, you would expect
us to probe these very issues during an assessment period that's going on
right now. These are important questions that have to be raised,
possibilities have to be entertained. But the judgments that are being
rendered and are being demonstrated and what we're actually doing we
believe concludes that we think this is an issue of capability, not intent
or vision.

Thanks everyone.

END 12:20 P.M. (Local)

===========================================================================
Return to this article at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061129-3.html

 * Origin: (1:3634/12)