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Skriven 2007-01-11 23:31:16 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (070111) for Thu, 2007 Jan 11
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Briefing by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
January 11, 2007

Briefing by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 450
Dwight D. Eisenhower Executive Office Building



8:42 A.M. EST

SECRETARY RICE: Good morning. Today Secretary Gates and I will head to
Capitol Hill to discuss with the Congress the new strategy for Iraq that
President Bush outlined last night. All Americans know that the stakes in
Iraq are enormous, and we all share the belief that the situation is
currently unacceptable. On this we are united.

The President has outlined a strategy that relies on three main points.
First, and most importantly, the Iraqis have devised their own strategy --
political, economic, and military -- and our efforts will support theirs.
Among Americans and Iraqis, there is no confusion over one basic fact: It
is the Iraqis who are responsible for what kind of country Iraq will be; it
is they who must decide whether Iraq will be characterized by national
unity or sectarian conflict. The President has conveyed to the Iraqi
leadership that we will support their good decisions, but that Americans'
patience is limited.

Second, we will further decentralize and diversify our civilian presence in
Iraq to better assist the Iraqi people. Iraq has a federal government. We
must therefore get our civilians out of the embassy, out of the Green Zone,
and into the field across Iraq, to support promising local leaders and
promising local structures. This will enhance and diversify our chances of
success in Iraq.

The mechanism to accomplish this is the provincial reconstruction team, or
PRT. The logic behind PRTs is simple: Success in Iraq relies on more than
military efforts, it requires robust political and economic progress. Our
military operations must be fully supported and integrated with our
civilian and diplomatic efforts across the entire U.S. government to help
Iraqis clear, hold and build throughout all Iraq.

We in the State Department fully understand our role in this mission and we
are prepared to play it. We are already trying -- we are ready to
strengthen, indeed, to surge our civilian efforts. We plan to expand our
PRTs in Iraq from 10 to at least 18. In Baghdad we will go from one PRT to
six, and in Anbar province, from one to three, because local leaders are
taking encouraging steps there to confront violent extremists and to build
hope for their people.

To oversee our economic support for the Iraqi people, and to ensure that it
is closely integrated with our political assistance and our security
strategy, I am pleased to announce today that I am appointing Ambassador
Tim Carney to the new position of Coordinator for Iraq Transitional
Assistance. Ambassador Carney is formerly our Ambassador to Haiti. He has
enormous experience in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction and
development. He will be based in Baghdad where he will coordinate and work
closely with his Iraqi counterparts.

Finally, we are anchoring our efforts in Iraq within a regional diplomatic
strategy, as the Iraq Study Group recommended. We are supporting the Iraqi
government in crafting an international compact with the international
community based on mutual obligations. And we are working with Turkey and
Iraq on concerns about terrorism from the Kurdish Workers Party.

Iraq is central to the future of the Middle East. The security of this
region is an enduring vital interest for the United States. And our
continued leadership in this part of the world will contribute greatly to
its stability and success.

Our regional diplomacy is based on the substantially changed realities in
the Middle East. Historic change is unfolding in the region, unleashing old
grievances, new anxieties, and some violence, but is also revealing a
promising new strategic realignment in the Middle East. This is the same
alignment that we see in Iraq. On one side are the many reformers and
responsible leaders who seek to advance their interests peacefully,
politically, and diplomatically. On the other side are extremists of every
sect and ethnicity who use violence to spread chaos to undermine democratic
governments and to impose agendas of hate and intolerance.

Our most urgent diplomatic goal is to empower reformers and responsible
leaders across the region, and to confront extremists. The proper partners
in our regional diplomacy are those who share these goals -- our allies,
Israel and Turkey, of course, but democratic reformers and leaders in
places like Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and Iraq, and the
responsible governments of the Gulf States, plus Egypt and Jordan, or the
GCC plus two.

Tomorrow, I leave for the Middle East to continue consultations with our
partners. Two governments have unfortunately chosen to align themselves
with the forces of extremism -- both in Iraq and across the Middle East.
One is Syria. Despite many appeals, including from Syria's fellow Arab
states, the leaders in Damascus continue to support terrorism and to
destabilize Iraq and their neighbors. The problem here is not a lack of
engagement with Syria, but a lack of action by Syria.

Iran is the other. If the government in Tehran wants to help stabilize the
region -- as it now claims -- then it should end its support for violent
extremists who destroy the aspirations of innocent Lebanese, Palestinians
and Iraqis. And it should end its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

I repeat an offer that I've made several times, today. If Iran suspends its
uranium enrichment -- which is an international demand, not just an
American one -- then the United States is prepared to reverse 27 years of
policy. And I will meet with my Iranian counterpart any time, anywhere.
Thus we would have the possibility to discuss every facet of our countries'
relations. Until then, the international community must continue to hold
the Iranian government accountable.

Syria and Iran should end their destabilizing behavior in the region. They
cannot be paid to do so. That would only embolden our enemies and
demoralize our friends, both in Iraq and across the region, all of whom are
watching to see whether America has the will to keep its commitments. The
United States will defend its interests and those of our friends and allies
in this vital region.

And now I'm happy to turn the podium over to Secretary Gates, who will talk
about the military aspect of the plan.

SECRETARY GATES: Thank you, Secretary Rice. This afternoon, General Pace
and I will appear before the House Armed Services Committee to discuss the
military aspects of the Iraq strategy announced by the President last
night. Tomorrow we will appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The security plan is designed to have Iraqi forces lead a campaign, with
our forces in support, to protect the population of Baghdad from
intimidation and violence instigated by Sunni and Shia extremist groups,
and to enable the Iraqi government to take the difficult steps necessary to
address that nation's underlying issues. This means, above all,
strengthening those in Iraq who are prepared to address its problems
peacefully against those who seek only violence, death and chaos.

The term "surge" has been used in relation to increasing U.S. troop levels,
and an increase certainly will take place. But what is really going on, and
what is going to take place, is a surge across all lines of operations --
military and non-military, Iraqi and coalition. The President's plan has
Iraqis in the lead and seeks a better balance of U.S. military and
non-military efforts than was the case in the past. We cannot succeed in
Iraq without the important non-military elements Secretary Rice just
mentioned.

The increase in military forces will be phased in. It will not unfold
overnight; there will be no D-Day; it won't look like the Gulf War. The
timetable for the introduction of additional U.S. forces will provide ample
opportunity early on and before many of the additional U.S. troops actually
arrive in Iraq to evaluate the progress of this endeavor and whether the
Iraqis are fulfilling their commitments to us.

This updated plan builds on the lessons and experiences of the past. It
places new emphasis on and adds new resources to the holding and building
part of the clear, hold, and build strategy. At this pivotal moment, the
credibility of the United States is on the line in Iraq. Governments in the
region, both friends and adversaries, are watching what we do and will draw
their own conclusions about our resolve and the steadfastness of our
commitments.

Whatever one's views on how we got to this point in Iraq, there is
widespread agreement that failure there would be a calamity that would
haunt our nation in the future, and in the region. The violence in Iraq, if
unchecked, could spread outside its borders and draw other states into a
regional conflagration. In addition, one would see an emboldened and
strengthened Iran, a safe haven and base of operations for Jihadist
networks in the heart of the Middle East, a humiliating defeat in the
overall campaign against violent extremism worldwide, and an undermining of
the credibility of the United States. Given what is at stake, failure in
Iraq is not an option.

I would like to conclude my remarks with two announcements. First, the
President announced last night that he would strengthen our military for
the long war against terrorism by authorizing an increase in the overall
strength of the Army and the Marine Corps. I am recommending to him a total
increase in the two services of 92,000 soldiers and Marines over the next
five years -- 65,000 soldiers, and 27,000 Marines. The emphasis will be on
increasing combat capability.

This increase will be accomplished in two ways. First, we will propose to
make permanent the temporary increase of 30,000 for the Army, and 5,000 for
the Marine Corps. Then we propose to build up from that base in annual
increments of 7,000 troops a year for the Army, and 5,000 for the Marine
Corps, until the Marine Corps reaches a level of 202,000, and the Army
would be at 547,000.

We should recognize that while it may take some time for these new troops
to become available for deployment, it is important that our men and women
in uniform know that additional manpower and resources are on the way.

Second, for several months, the Department of Defense has been assessing
whether we have the right policies to govern how we manage and deploy
members of the Reserves, the National Guard, and our active component
units. Based on this assessment and the recommendations of our military
leadership, I am making the following changes in Department policy.

First, the mobilization of ground Reserve forces going forward will be
managed on a unit, instead of an individual basis. This change will allow
us to achieve greater unit cohesion and predictability in how Reserve units
train and deploy.

Second, from this moment forward, from this point forward, members of the
Reserves who are -- will be involuntarily mobilized for a maximum of one
year at a time, in contrast to the current practice of 16 to 24 months.

Third, the planning objective for Guard and Reserve units will remain one
year of being mobilized, followed by five years demobilized. However,
today's global demands will require a number of selected Guard and Reserve
units to be remobilized sooner than this standard. Our intention is that
such exceptions be temporary. The goal for the active force rotation cycle
remains one year deployed for every two years at home station. Today, most
active units are receiving only one year at home station before deploying
again. Mobilizing select Guard and Reserve units before this five-year
period is complete will allow us to move closer to relieving the stress on
the total force.

Fourth, I'm directing the establishment of a new program to compensate
individuals in both the active and Reserve components who are required to
mobilize or deploy early, or extend beyond the established rotation policy
goals.

Fifth, I am also directing that all commands and units review how they
administer the hardship waiver program to ensure that they are properly
taking into account exceptional circumstances facing military families of
deployed service members.

It is important to note that these policy changes have been under
discussion for some time within the Department of Defense and would be
needed independently of the President's announcement on Iraq last night.
And there will be a handout afterward on the details of these changes since
they are a little complicated.

Finally, I'm pleased to report that all active branches of the United
States military exceeded their recruiting goals for the month of December,
with particularly strong showings by the Army and the Marine Corps. Our
nation is truly blessed that so many talented and patriotic young people
have stepped forward to defend our nation, and that so many servicemen and
women have chosen to continue to serve.

Thank you, and we'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Secretary Gates, how long do you expect to maintain the surge in Iraq?
And what happens if the Iraqis do not live up to their commitments?

SECRETARY GATES: Well, as I indicated, we're going to know pretty early on
whether the Iraqis are meeting their military commitments, in terms of
being able to go into all neighborhoods, in terms of the Iraqis being in
the lead and carrying out the leadership and the fighting, and for there
not to be political interference in the military operations that are going
forward. As I say, this is going to unfold over a period of time, and so I
think that as I indicated in my remarks, before very many American soldiers
have been sent to Iraq, we'll have pretty good early indications of their
performance. We'll have to see, in terms of the length of time. It's really
hard to say at this point. It's viewed as a temporary surge. But I think no
one has a really clear idea of how long that might be.

Q Can you define what success will be then, sir? If you don't know how long
it will be -- I know one of the things over the last few months, the
President was saying, we're winning in Iraq, we're winning in Iraq,
suddenly he didn't think we were, so how do you define success? How do you
know if it's not working? Certainly, there will be a period where it's
bloodier, more violent. But at what point do you really know it's working?

SECRETARY GATES: Well, let me take a crack at it and then invite Condi to
comment. I think that what we will see over time is a lessening of violence
in Baghdad. If this strategy is successful, over time we will see a
lessening of violence in Baghdad. We're going to be, to a certain extent,
the prisoners of anyone who wants to strap on a bomb and blow themselves
up. But if the environment in Baghdad improves to the point where the
political process can go forward, where the reconciliation process can go
forward, where an oil law can be passed for the distribution of the
revenues from the oil sales, where provincial elections can go forward, and
where the government is actually beginning to make its writ felt outside
Baghdad and we see the government of Iraq beginning to operate more
effectively -- I think all of these things -- as the President said last
night and as I suggested this morning, it isn't going to be like anything
we've experienced before in terms of when we'll know whether or not we're
being successful. It's going to take a little time, and we will probably
have a better view a couple of months from now in terms of whether we are
making headway in terms of getting better control of Baghdad, with the
Iraqis in the lead and with the Iraqis beginning to make better progress on
the reconciliation process.

But let me ask Secretary Rice to offer her thoughts.

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I would underscore the point about political
reconciliation. I do think the Iraqis obviously have to pass an oil law,
they have to follow through on the promises that they've made to their own
people about the inclusiveness of the political process.

I think as to -- I'd make one point about Baghdad and one point about the
rest of the country. What has really happened in Baghdad -- and Prime
Minister Maliki said this to the President -- is that the Iraqi people have
lost confidence in the ability of their government to defend them in their
capital, to protect them in their capital. And in fact, there are some,
because of the sectarian overtones, who wonder if, in fact, their
government is willing to protect them if they come from one sect or
another.

And I think what the Iraqi government is trying to do and needs to do is to
reestablish civil order, in the sense that they are, in fact, willing to,
and capable of protecting all Iraqis who live in Baghdad. That means the
kinds of activities that take place in these neighborhoods wouldn't be
tolerated and they would, in fact, go after some of the violent people on
either side who are causing the problems. And I think that will be a
measure of how well they are doing.

In the provinces, it's also important to recognize that not everything --
as important as Baghdad is, not everything rests on Baghdad. One reason
that we're diversifying and decentralizing into the provinces and the
localities is that you want to strengthen the governance from the bottom
up, as well. And we've learned that it is somewhat more effective to be
able to deliver governance and economic development and reconstruction at a
more local level.

And I think it's starting to have an effect. We've seen it work in Mosul,
we've seen it work in Talafar, and as the Secretary said -- as Bob said, in
Anbar, we're beginning to get some signs that the tribal sheiks there want
to fight the violent extremists. And we've been in Anbar for awhile now
working politically. So I think you should think of what the government
needs to show in Baghdad, but also the building of governance structures
outside of the country.

Q Secretary Rice, can I ask you a more fundamental question that applies to
Secretary Gates, as well? If you look at the -- what's happened in Iraq,
even recently -- I mean, the spectacle of the execution of Saddam Hussein,
the trouble in the police ranks, and there's other examples -- why should
the American people believe at this point that the Iraqis want
reconciliation and a stable democratic government as much as the United
States wants it for them?

And for Secretary Gates, I have a tactical question. Is the United States
military and/or the Iraqi government prepared now to arrest or kill Muqtada
al Sadr as part of this new increase?

SECRETARY RICE: David, on the first point, obviously this is a country that
has had years and years of tragedy in which certain people were oppressed
by other people. And it's perhaps not surprising that the passions and the
anger runs pretty deep, and sometimes it expresses itself in ways that I
think are not appropriate -- but it expresses itself. The Saddam trial was
extremely unfortunate -- the Saddam hanging was extremely unfortunate. But,
of course, we have to keep in mind, too, the victims and remember them
first. But these passions do get expressed.

But as to whether the Iraqi people want to live in peace, I think that 12.5
million of them went out and voted against a lot of terrorist threats
because they wanted a single Iraq. I think that you have to look at the way
that their leaders are trying to work together. One of the things that's
interesting about this national oil law, to which they are close, is that
that's a very good sign of overcoming sectarian differences for a larger
political purpose. And it's not as if they're not sacrificing for this
unified Iraq. Tariq al Hashemi, who is the leading Sunni leader, has lost
two brothers and a sister -- not actually to sectarianism, but to
insurgents who do not want Sunnis to be a part of the process -- and, yet,
he remains a part of the process.

So I think both at the level of the population and at the level of the
political class, you have people who are intent on staying together in one
Iraq, trying to overcome their differences with these fragile, new
political institutions, and who are being buffeted and challenged in that
by violent people on the extremes who are using sectarian purpose to kill
innocent Iraqis. And what the Iraqi government has to do is to demonstrate
firmly that it is fully committed to the protection of all Iraqis; it is
fully committed to the punishment of any Iraqi who is engaged in killing
innocents. And I think then you will begin to see more room for the kind of
national reconciliation process that's been going on, but I think has,
frankly, been undermined by the sectarian violence since February of '06.

SECRETARY GATES: I think a source of frustration for both Iraqi and
American forces in the past has been political interference during clearing
operations. And there are a number of instances that we've heard about of
someone being detained and then a call being placed from some office in the
government and, all of a sudden, that person is released because of
political influence.

I think one of the most important commitments that the Prime Minister has
made is that in this offensive, the military will have the authority to go
after all law-breakers, there are no exceptions -- I'm not going to hang
specific targets on specific people, but all law-breakers are susceptible
to being detained or taken care of in this campaign.

Q But, sir, why be vague on the -- Sadr, because he has a long history here
in this conflict as being on a most wanted list of the United States. Then
the Iraqis persuaded the U.S. not to arrest him. He leads the Mahdi Army. I
mean, this is the bad guy that the United States makes clear is helping to
bring down this government. So why not commit to what our posture is with
regard to him now?

SECRETARY GATES: What I will say is that all parts of Baghdad are going to
be involved in this campaign, including Sadr City.

Q Could I ask the Chairman a question?

SECRETARY GATES: Please, let the Chairman --

Q We have heard repeatedly over the past year, and President Bush was
fairly explicit about it last night, that Iran has been supplying ordinance
that has been killing American troops. If this is so, why are we not
matching Iranian force with force of our own? And why are we content to
continue issuing statements of displeasure -- what do we think that's going
to accomplish? And have you made any recommendations along these lines?

GENERAL PACE: What we've been doing, and will continue to do, is to track
the networks of individuals, regardless of their nationality, inside of
Iraq that are providing weapons that are designed to kill our troops. I
think it's instructive that in the last couple of weeks two of those raids
that we conduct to go after these folks that are providing these kinds of
weapons -- two of those raids had policed up Iranians. So it is clear that
the Iranians are complicit in providing weapons, and it's also clear that
we will do all we need to do to defend our troops in Iraq by going after
the entire network, regardless of where those people come from.

Q Are you going after them in Iran? Why not go to the source?

GENERAL PACE: We can take care of the security for our troops by doing the
business we need to do inside of Iraq. And there are other methods,
especially the kind that Secretary Rice has outlined, to deal with
government-to-government relationships with Iran. But with regard to those
who are physically present trying to do harm to our troops, regardless of
nationality, we will go after them and defend ourselves.

Q One last attempt at this, let me take one last, different way. Has anyone
in the military recommended operations inside Iran?

GENERAL PACE: No.

Q General Pace, can I just ask you a question, as long as he is at the
podium?

Q Secretary Rice --

SECRETARY RICE: Why don't you go ahead while he's still at the podium, and
I'll referee. (Laughter.)

Q Okay. General Pace, can you talk about the numbers? The President,
Secretary Gates, everyone has said this is the most important operation;
you have to succeed in there. So why just 20,000 troops? The studies from
RAND show a much greater number would probably be needed. Why just 20,000,
and is it because we don't really have more troops to go in there? And were
there recommendations for much larger numbers of troops within the Joint
Staff?

GENERAL PACE: First of all, this is not a re-invasion of Iraq, this is
looking at the problem areas, specifically Baghdad and al Anbar, to
determine what we can do to help the Iraqi government to protect their own
people. In doing the military analysis of that -- let's take Baghdad, for
example -- we looked at the Iraqi plan, which is a commander, two division
commanders, nine districts, each of which would have an Iraqi brigade at
its lead, and then our ability to reinforce each of those brigades with a
battalion of our own, and also provide additional advisors inside those
battalions.

When you then take a look at the activities that they must conduct -- the
patrolling, the checkpoints, the quick reaction forces, the going
door-to-door to see the people and let them know that there is a security
presence, when you look at those kinds of activities, and you do what we
call a "troop-to-task analysis," you end up needing more forces in Baghdad
than are currently there -- preferably Iraqi forces, and the Iraqis are
going to provide additional forces -- but when you look at capacity, there
are still unique capabilities that the U.S. Armed Forces have that are
useful to assisting the Iraqi government. And that's how our commanders on
the ground did the analysis, and that's why General Casey and his
commanders came forward and asked for additional forces. They asked for
additional forces for Baghdad, and they asked for additional forces for al
Anbar.

In fact, we have put into the pipeline to go more forces than their
analysis on the ground indicated they would need initially to ensure that
as the enemy makes decisions and decides what they're going to do, that we
have the capacity available to our commanders on the ground to get the job
done.

Q -- the fact that we're so stretched.

GENERAL PACE: Being stretched is part of the equation, but it does not
impact the recommendation about how many troops are needed. We have
sufficient capacity inside the U.S. Armed Forces to be able to do this
plus-up. But we should not -- we must be mindful of the fact that our
active forces have been rotating in and out at about one year in, one year
out. And our Guard and Reserve forces have been going in at about one year
and coming out for about five. The total force mix of the United States the
Secretary talked about is available to solve this problem in Iraq and also
to handle any other problems. So it very much is on our mind as far as how
we resource this plus-up. But it had nothing to do with the division --
with the decision of the commanders on the ground as far as how many troops
are needed.

They tell us here in Washington how many they need, and once that is
accepted as the requirement, then we have the responsibility to find the
proper mix of forces to go do that. And that's what General Schoomaker in
the Army and that's what General Conway in the Marine Corps will be doing.

Q To be clear, if it appears that the Iraqis are not meeting the
commitments they have made, will we withhold sending these troops on this
phased-in process?

SECRETARY GATES: I think that if we get some indication that the Iraqis are
not fulfilling their commitments, the way this is going to unfold, we are
going to have a number of opportunities to go back to the Iraqis and point
out where they have failed to meet their commitments, and to move forward.
I think that, frankly, based on the President's conversations and the
conversations that our Ambassador and General Casey have had, not just with
the Prime Minister but with President Talabani and with other leaders in
the Iraqi government, that there is a broad commitment in the Iraqi
government across several different groups in the government to make this
work. So I think our assumption going forward is that they have every
intention of making this work, of fulfilling their commitments.

And, frankly, the notion that the Iraqis are standing by while we're doing
the fighting is really not an accurate statement. In fact, one of our
military folks told me the other day that now more than half of the
casualties coming into U.S. military hospitals in Iraq are Iraqi military,
so they are fighting. And as we saw in the streets of Baghdad just in the
last couple of days, they are fighting. So I think that our belief is they
will fulfill these commitments. But if we see them falling short, we will
make sure that they know that and how strongly we feel about it.

Q Secretary Rice, there's been a great deal of emphasis on Maliki's
government performing and whether or not there's too much pressure being
put on him. If you would, in all fairness, respond to a Reuters wire that's
just crossed, comments that Reuters reports that was made in an open
microphone between television interviews this morning, it quotes you
saying, "I don't want to descend on the Maliki government and look like
just sort of beat their brains out. The President was pretty tough last
night, and we'll be pretty tough today. Give them a little time now to do
something, a little breathing space."

Are these accurate comments from Reuters? And is there a sense or a risk of
being too hard on Maliki?

SECRETARY RICE: I don't think there is a sense of not being very tough
about the commitments and the obligations that we expect. And, yes, it's an
accurate quote. It was an open mike, but it was an accurate quote.

And the point was, I was asked, are you going to go to Baghdad right away.
And I said that I thought it was important to have the Maliki government
have a little time now to make its plan work. After all, this is the Maliki
government's plan. They came to the President with this plan in Amman. They
said, we need to put together a plan that will help us to deal with the
problem that our population doesn't believe that we can secure them. I
believe that Bob's point about "they're sitting on the sidelines" is just
not the right view.

However, they haven't performed in the past, and so the President is
absolutely right -- and we have all been saying to them, you have to
perform. I do think now Prime Minister Maliki needs to work with his
government, get his Baghdad commander in place, get his forces in place,
get his reconstruction coordinator appointed, and then I fully expect at
that time, probably in not very long, to go to Baghdad and to work with
them. But I do think it's important to give them a little time to get
organized.

Q And when you say "breathing space" or, "a little time," do you have a
certain sense of the timetable? Is that months?

SECRETARY RICE: No. They have to get organized right away, and they are. He
announced a Baghdad commander. They're going to put this in place. I think
their forces start to flow in on February 1st, so this is coming in very
quick order. But again, the question was, are you going to go immediately
to Baghdad, and my point was that I think we've made very clear what the
expectations are of the Maliki government, very clear both in public and in
private what those expectations are. And now I expect the Maliki government
is going to organize itself to carry out those obligations.

Q Can I turn back to Iran for just a second and get a little bit back into
what James was talking about? The President's language last night was
rather muscular, when he talked about seek and destroy these networks. Does
that extend beyond the kinds of operations that General Pace -- if you both
could answer this, actually -- beyond the kinds of operations that General
Pace was talking about? Was the raid this morning, for instance, part of
that? Will we see more of that in the coming days? Can you explain a little
bit more about what he meant when he used that language last night?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think General Pace has spoken to what we think the
necessity is and what it is we intend to do. We've made very clear to the
Iranian government, and the Syrian government, for that matter, that we
don't expect them to continue to engage in behavior that is destabilizing
to the Iraqi government, but also that endangers our troops, and that we
will do what is necessary for force protection. But we leave to those who
deal with issues of force protection how these raids are going to be taken
out.

I think you got an indication of that in what has been happening, which is
the networks are identified, they are identified through good intelligence.
They are then acted upon. It is without regard to whoever is in them,
whatever the nationality. And we're going to protect our troops.

Now, as to state-to-state relations or the lack thereof in 27 years, that's
a different matter. And we've been very clear with the Iranians that --
through others and publicly -- that they need to stop pursuing a nuclear
weapon -- we have a policy on that -- that we have a Chapter Seven
resolution, and that we believe that puts Iran in a very unfavorable
category of states. And therefore, that people ought to be careful in how
they deal with financial relations with the Iranians. And you'll continue
to see those efforts, too. But I think General Pace has spoken to what we
think we need to do in Iraq.

Q Secretary Rice, could I ask you about the future shape and role of the
international coalition in Iraq? And also, the idea of a regional
conference for Iraq?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, as to the future shape and coalition, there continue
to be coalition forces operating in Iraq. The South Koreans, the Japanese,
others, have re-upped their forces again to continue operating in Iraq. And
there is a NATO training mission for officers in Iraq. And so I think
you'll continue to see that kind of international support.

Now, the international compact for Iraq is a framework in which there can
be real support for Iraq that is, in fact, a kind of conditional support
the Iraqis undertake to do certain obligations. We undertake, as an
international community, to match those obligations with resources. Many of
the states that, for instance, the Iraqis owed debt to have agreed to very
favorable terms -- 80 percent of debt reduction. We've agreed to 100
percent of debt reduction. And I think you'll see more of that.

Now, I'm going to the Middle East with the GCC because I feel very strongly
that those states that are part of an alignment that understands that there
are extremist forces that need to be resisted need to be mobilized and
rallied in support of this Iraqi government. The states, like Saudi Arabia
and Jordan and others, have been helping with Sunni outreach. I hope that
they will help with more. But I think the international compact is the
right framework for now because it is an international effort that is
actually led by the Iraqis and the United Nations, which is really the
proper way for Iraq to engage its neighbors.

Q -- for anyone. Is there anything you could do for protection of foreign
workers in Iraq, including Russians? Russians have a fair number of workers
there.

GENERAL PACE: I think each country that has civilians there is responsible
to provide security for their own folks. So if the Russian have folks there
that they want to have doing certain activities, I'm sure that they've
taken to account the kind of security they need to provide for them.

Q Secretary Gates, can you explain the practical effect of the mobilization
changes you announced today? Does it wipe the slate clean for Guard members
who have already gone to Iraq? And do you anticipate having to mobilize
units that have already done tours there again?

SECRETARY GATES: Let me ask General Pace to answer that question.

GENERAL PACE: There will be remobilization of forces, and that
remobilization has been contemplated before the announcement of these
additional forces, because we have a rotation base of active forces that we
try to maintain, one year overseas, two years home. And that rotation has
gone to one year overseas, one year home.

On the Guard and Reserve side, we try to get one year mobilized and five
years demobilized. It's really been more like a year-and-a-half to almost
two years mobilized, and then -- so the Secretary's comments not only allow
us to remobilize forces that we need to assist in the total force effort
that we've got going on in Iraq, but also, significantly, ensure that when
we do remobilize -- or for those who have not yet been mobilized, when we
mobilize them -- that their time will be one year from the time we call
them to active duty, they train up, they deploy, do their mission, come
home and demobilize, all inside of one year, which is a significant
planning factor for the folks who have been enormously effective and
critical to the success of our overall mission. The Guard and Reserve have
been wonderful in the way that they perform their assignments.

Q But is the 24-month cumulative requirement that many Guard members have
come close to meeting or met already, is that wiped clean now? And are we
starting from ground zero in terms of eligibility of Guard members that
will be mobilized and report?

GENERAL PACE: Inside the policy of one year mobilized and five years
demobilized -- that one year would have been part of the cumulative
process. When you have your -- what we call "dwell time" at home, you're
not mobilized. When you start again, you're starting again. We're not
adding that to the previous. So I'm not sure I'm answering your question
exactly accurately, but for any one mobilization we are constrained not to
keep anybody more than 24 months. For subsequent mobilization, we're
constrained not to keep anybody more than 24 months. What we're committing
to is that we will not keep anybody more than one year on a subsequent
mobilization.

Q So if you've already been mobilized for 18 months, and you've gone to
Iraq for a tour, and your unit gets mobilized, and there's still -- and
it's -- you still have -- you went to Iraq -- I'm sorry, but this gets very
complicated -- and you went to Iraq fewer than four years ago, you could be
mobilized again and have to go. Is that correct?

GENERAL PACE: That is correct. But your time, as the Secretary has
indicated, will be no more than 12 months when you go the second time, or
if you happen to be a new recruit and you go the first time, it will still
be for 12 months.

END 9:21 A.M. EST
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