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Skriven 2007-05-04 23:31:06 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (0705042) for Fri, 2007 May 4
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Press Briefing on the Third Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Report on Climate Change
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For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary May 4, 2007

Press Briefing on the Third Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Report on Climate Change Via Teleconference

˙˙Press Briefings

PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Harlan Watson, U.S. Senior Climate Negotiator And Special
Representative, U.S. Department Of State
Jim Connaughton, Chairman, White House Council On Environmental Quality
Stephen Eule, Director Of The Climate Change Technology Program, U.S.
Department Of State

6:13 A.M. EDT

DR. WATSON: Just on a rundown for those of you who are not familiar with
the IPCC working group three, this is the group that assesses the
technological and economic aspects of the mitigation of climate change,
primarily focused on reductions of greenhouse gas emissions.

This report involved several hundred scientists, engineers, economists from
around the world, including a - probably on the order of 50 or so of those
were U.S., and their job was to survey recent literature, recent
(inaudible) over the last five years of all of the issues underlying
mitigation of climate change. They have produced a huge report, which will
be released - underlying report of over a thousand pages, which will be
released, probably in about six weeks, after it's edited. And the focus of
this meeting was the summary for policymakers - (inaudible) all of the very
complex and detailed information in approximately 25 pages of text,
including figures and diagrams, providing information that's relevant to
the policymakers.

Again, the purpose of this exercise is not to make judgments, not to be
prescriptive, but rather it provides a broad survey of options that are in
the literature and provide, again, information on which policymakers can -
on what the best knowledge is out there. This is the third in a series of
reports, and this will be followed up by a later report this year.

I might highlight just a few of the findings, I think the most relevant. It
first of all does a survey on where emissions have been over the last
30-plus years. It gives forecasts - or it gives a range of, again, drawing
from the literature, a range of projections of where emissions might go
over the next 25 to 50 years and even further out. And then a range of
technologies, addresses a range of technologies over a broad range of
sectors - transportation, electricity production, et cetera, all the way
through agriculture, waste management - that might be coming on line that
are either in the marketplace, here in the marketplace, or it might be in
the research phase, it might be coming on line to address mitigation of
greenhouse gases and gives a survey of the cost estimates of these various
technologies or combinations of technologies; and also addresses the policy
issues, areas of policy which, again, point back to the broad economic
engineering literature of re-doing that and summarizing the various
approaches that are being studied in the literature, itself.

I think one of the most important points that are being highlighted that,
of course, the nations have grown and will be growing in a wide range,
overall existence - scenarios, that some two-thirds to three-fourths of
that growth is going to come from developing countries, primarily to the
increase and (inaudible) for electricity generation inside of India that if
we're indeed going to address climate change in the long run, we have to -
(inaudible) -- growth in global emissions. And that we need to - the best
way to do this is to do a broad portfolio of options across many, many
sectors of - nations are growing in many sectors, there's no one sector
which could be addressed, that would solve the problem, nor would any one
technology - there is no silver bullet.

And there is also, I would suggest - also summarized there's a broad range
of national policies and (inaudible) out there that would create greater
incentive to (inaudible) technologies into the marketplace, voluntary
regulatory financial incentives, et cetera.

I guess broadly I would say that in terms of the near-term options the
focus, the most benefit obviously would come at the least cost, would come
from energy efficiency improvement - things that are already in the
marketplace or near the marketplace. Also, large opportunities in the area
of renewables. But if we're really going to get at the issue, we have to
develop, particularly more -- we need more nuclear, and particularly new
clean coal technologies, and in particular, carbon capture storage.

I just might want to note that we view this report as really highlights
again the importance of deploying a portfolio of energy technology
globally, totally consistent with President Bush's approach to addressing
climate change. And we have been leading the world in development,
employing a wide range of technologies that is scientific and economic
technical experts from around the globe that now agreed we can provide the
solution to reducing emissions (inaudible) and economic growth.

I think with that I will stop and I will turn it over to Jim in Berlin; Jim
Connaughton.

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: Thank you, Harlan. This is Jim Connaughton, Chairman
of the White House Council on Environmental Quality. Again, I'm in Berlin,
participating in the preliminary meetings leading up to the G8 summit,
which Germany will be hosting in just a few short weeks, following a very
successful U.S-EU summit that just transpired earlier this week, where we
set out a very constructive agenda for action on energy security and
climate.

I want to do two things. One is I just want to underscore the importance of
today's IPPC report, it is probably the most substantial and most practical
of the reports, in terms of reflecting five years of fairly dramatic new
experience with technologies, with economics and with policy measures that
are taking place around the globe, as the world orients itself towards
sensible strategies to reduce emissions.

I also want to underscore the importance of the findings of the
inter-linkage between energy security needs, clean development needs and
climate change. This is a concept and a philosophy that has really emerged
in the discussions over the last five years, and has been reflected in the
leaders' statements by the G8 two years ago. It was reflected again in the
recent U.S.-EU summit declaration. And it is now sort of becoming an
accepted philosophy for a constructive path forward.

I'd also like to highlight two other reports that are being issued today.
These reports are the submission by the United States - it's U.S. climate
action report, which is a report that we provide periodically to the United
Nations, describing our efforts - and, again, this would be over the last
four to five years - and then also today is the federal - is the annual
federal climate expenditures report to Congress, which outlines the more
than $7 billion worth of programs just at the federal taxpayer level that
we undertake each year to improve our energy security and help reduce the
growth of greenhouse gases. I'll be happy to take any questions on either
of those reports, as well.

The ultimate conclusion of the climate action report is through a wide
range of policies that include regulatory mandates, incentives, technology
partnerships, and international engagements. The U.S. is on track to
meeting the President's goal of reducing greenhouse gas intensity our
economy, 18 percent by 2012.

So thank you all and I look forward to your questions.

Q Thank you for doing this. At the risk of being a little presumptuous, I'm
going to make this a two-part question. First, there - in the SPN you
essentially have three different stabilization levels - the 590 to 710 PPM,
the 535 to 590, and the 445 to 535, with a very large range in GDP
reduction, depending on which one you choose. Which does the administration
think is the most feasible one? Is there one that the administration thinks
is unfeasible?

And then the other question is on Table SPM-3, when it talks about
mitigation strategies that are currently available. Under energy, the
second one it says point blank is switching from coal to gas, which is not
exactly where the administration, the U.S. is going right now. How does the
U.S. feel about - how does the U.S., I guess, reconcile what the IPCC is
saying about that being a mitigation strategy and plan, both in the U.S.
and China (inaudible) coal?

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: Let me speak in terms of a policymaker who would be
the recipient of today's report. The report gives us scenarios, and so it
gives us scenarios ranging from very aggressive strategies to stabilize a
very low concentrations, to scenarios for how you might take a little more
time that may result in a higher concentration, all oriented towards
stabilizing greenhouse gas in the atmosphere. So the usefulness of the
report is to let us assess the relative timeframes and costs of those
various strategies.

So you gave a few examples of what we see as a broad range. There are
measures that are recommended that can come at relatively little economic
cost and produce potentially significant economic and health benefit. So
this would be measures such as efficiency, or measures that work to control
air pollution that you can quantify the harms of, that also produce climate
benefits.

On the other hand, there are measures that come currently at an extremely
high cost because of the lack of available technology. For example, the
technology for producing power from coal with no emissions is much more
expensive than anyone can afford right now. So if you pursued that as a
policy strategy, you'd have to understand the expense of that. And so you
see ranges - you know, GDP ranges as high as 3 percent to achieve certain
scenarios - well, that would, of course, cause a global recession, so that
is something that we probably want to avoid.

On the second part of your question, then, the report is very useful to
give you a scenario such as stopping the use of coal and switching to
natural gas and what that would mean from a greenhouse gas perspective,
it's also then important to understand what that would mean from an energy
security and economic perspective. So while switching to natural gas may be
one path, the challenge of that is coal is very affordable, it is also a
highly secure energy resource. And if the world switched overnight to
natural gas, natural gas prices would go through the roof because of the
lack of available supply, and that would create a huge negative impact on
jobs and human welfare.

So what's instructive about the report is to look at some of these options,
see what the cost profiles are and figure out how to create a balanced
portfolio of strategies for advancing technology. And certainly it's
important - China will use its coal to develop, the United States will use
its coal as part of our overall energy profile. We need to find a pathway
to make coal very low emission, and the United States is leading the world
in that effort with a multi-billion dollar program to make that technology
happen.

Q So to follow up, you're saying that the 445 to 535, which specifically
mentions a range of GDP reduction greater than 3 percent - that is what
you're saying is something that it would cause a global recession and
something we'd probably avoid - that scenario with the 445 to 535
stabilization level?

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: That's an accurate description of that scenario.
Again, I want to differentiate between what is happening, what will happen
and these various scenarios for what might happen. And certainly there is
no leader in the world that is going to be pursuing a strategy that would
drive their economies into a deep recession. I think the leaders of the
world are focused on strategies that grow economies, that pay for these
technologies that make the solution possible.

Q I guess I'm just trying to translate that. In other words, you're not
aiming for that 445 level there - you're more aiming toward the other
level?

MODERATOR: We'll take another question at this point. Thank you so much.
Next question, please.

Q Good morning, gentlemen. With all the concern over China and India, I
guess why not aggressively negotiate with them on this issue, outside of
any regular efforts, like the Asia Pacific partnership or any annual energy
dialogue?

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: We are actually working very closely with them inside
the Asia Pacific partnership and have actually very constructive
engagement, where we've broken the problem down into core sectors focusing
on power, focusing on energy intensive industries like steel and aluminum
and cement production, and even focusing on day to day issues like
buildings and appliances. We have found this is a very effective approach
for sharing technology experience, as well as sharing policy experience in
how to make forward progress.

Q (Inaudible.)

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: Harlan, do you want me to take that, or do you want
it?

DR. WATSON: Well, I couldn't understand or hear the question, Jim.

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: Okay, I think I got it. Again, the report lays out
different scenarios for achieving different concentrations at different
points in time. I think the main - the questioner has pointed to the fact
that the report underscores the importance of a strong curve of slowing the
growth of emissions, stopping them and then reversing them.

I think what we're given is the fact that you have the developed world
responsible for the majority of emissions today. You have the developing
world, the major emerging economies who represent most of the growth of
emissions in the coming decade or so and it underscores the need for
collective action, it underscores the need for action across all sectors of
the economy and it underscores the very compelling need that in order to
reach some of these scenarios - such as the one the questioner laid out -
we're going to have to work on some breakthrough technologies, especially
in the area of fossil fuel power generation, as well the area of fuels.

The United States, just for example on fuels, is committed to one of the
most ambitious programs of replacing gasoline with alternative fuels -
mainly renewables - that will have a significant impact on reducing the
emissions associated with motor vehicle use. That's just one of what would
be dozens of examples of work that we have to undertake together as we look
beyond 2012, which is when Kyoto ends. But I would note that work is
occurring now; so we're not waiting until 2012 to act, those discussions
are underway and those actions and investments are occurring even as we
speak.

Q Given the emphasis that you just placed in the opening remarks, Dr.
Watson, on carbon capture and sequestration, I'm curious why haven't we
initiated more pilot projects that try to do this sort of thing already?
It's been clear for the last few years that this is big technology. As far
as I'm aware, there's only a few efforts underway - shouldn't there much
more being poured into this right now?

DR. WATSON: Well, certainly we're pursuing it on several fronts. First of
all, through the U.S. Department of Energy we're pursuing a broad range of
carbon capture and storage activities, including FutureGen - and, in fact,
I'm going to let Steve Eule, the Director of the Climate Change Technology
program, talk about some work there.

DIRECTOR EULE: Yes, I'd be happy to. The Department of Energy has initiated
seven carbon sequestration regional partnerships, these involve about 240
organizations, spanning about 40 states. And we're looking at a number of
things. We're looking at - in those partnerships we're looking at where
would be the appropriate geological formations to store the carbon, what
would be the regulatory issues that would have to be addressed in order to
make it work. That was phase one.

We're right now at phase two, where we're doing about 20 pilot projects.
And we hope to move to phase three in fiscal year '08 and undertake some
large-scale demonstration projects on the order of about a million tons a
year.

So this thing is moving in phases, and we're investing quite a bit of money
in it and we think that this - what we're learning through these pilot
projects and through these other demonstrations will certainly have an
impact on the FutureGen project, which is going to be the
near-zero-emission coal-fired power plant and hydrogen production plant
that will incorporate carbon sequestration technologies into it -

Q So it will make -

DIRECTOR EULE: So we have a plan that's in place and we're moving forward.

Q So how many holes in the ground right now? I mean -

DIRECTOR EULE: How many holes in the ground?

Q Yes.

DIRECTOR EULE: Let me give you the larger picture, in terms of projects and
budgets. The current - our current carbon sequestration is aiming to about
20 or more projects across the nation within the next three years, with a
public expenditure of about $200 million, which is matched by the private
sector in roughly equal amounts. So this is a very significant
public-private partnership.

The FutureGen project will be more than a billion dollars, also divided
between the public sector and the private sector, which is why, you know,
how these things work. At the same time, just this year we released $1
billion in tax credits, which together with another $650 million in tax
credits this year will leverage in excess of $10 billion of private
investment to build the kinds of coal-fired facilities that may make carbon
capture possible. So there's a multi-billion dollar effort there and that
could be anywhere from - you know, currently it's nine projects have been
proposed, and we hope it will get up to 12 or 15 projects. That's just in
the U.S.

In addition, DOE is partnering with a few utilities, one of them is a
southern company, and they're building some of the - you know, in a grant
basis, I think it's a $500 million project, building one of these plants in
Florida. That's just the U.S.

And then the European Union, as part of their new energy strategy, in close
consultation with us over the last year-and-a-half, they have committed to
the construction of 12 advanced facilities by 2015, and they are going to
be increasing their budget expenditures on carbon capture and storage, as
well. And then we are looking forward in future discussions with China, and
hopefully with India, to see if both of those countries, who are heavily
reliant on coal, can make similar investments.

We are going from virtually no - you know, very limited, a few million
dollars investment in this subject back in 2000, and very little
conversation on the subject back in 2000, to worldwide understanding that
we've got to solve the carbon capture and coal issue and we've got to solve
it fast. And I think the dramatic ramp up in both budget, scientific work
and construction, actual construction, is a sign of the seriousness of
global engagement on this issue.

Q Thanks for the presentation. Talking to economists about the (inaudible)
on GDP, one of the things they say is that, (inaudible) figure, for
example, is over a 20-year period. So their, sort of, bottom line view is
that getting richer slightly slower - (inaudible) - what's wrong with that,
or what's the problem with that?

DR. WATSON: Well, I think, you know, who's getting richer and at what pace
and who's not getting richer at what pace - and so, you know - well, I'll
just leave it at that. You know, there's basically, you know, a society
trade-off on that. You have to realize, once again, that these are very
stylized, idealized economic modelings they do assuming a lot of perfection
out there - they're assuming that we can bring on line technologies which
are currently very expensive now and we're working very hard to get their
costs down so they can become cost competitive and enter the marketplace.
They're assuming that's going to happen in a certain point of time. And, of
course, we hope that happens; we're investing a lot of funds trying to make
that happen, but in the real world it doesn't always turn out that way.

And so, once again, these are very stylized, idealized models. It gives you
- it helps inform the policymaker on direction, but you know, you have to
deal with those - again, those trends and so on, taking those trends, and
you obviously can't take those as perfect predictions and predictors of
what might happen in the future. First, they don't present them to be
anything except stylized models to give you a sense of the trend and the
trade-offs that you might get among the different technologies.

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: And I would add, what's important - the report makes
clear there are some opportunities that are at hand, such as efficiency,
that really can be achieved and add to economic growth and social welfare.
There are other approaches that are on the horizon that are currently
excessively costly if you were to try to impose them on an economy today.
And that does have - as policymakers we have to be concerned about the real
world impacts of that, not the theoretical, macroeconomic issues of that.

If you have poor consumers in urban environments who see 20 or 30 percent
increases in their electricity bills, that has significant social
consequences. If you see energy intensive manufacturing operations seeing a
significant increase in their energy bills, that could force them to shut
down or move their location to other regions of the world that have cheaper
energy.

So those create very real local impacts that policymakers have to think
through before they select policies that would cause such impacts. So
that's not to take away from the fact that over time, as we grow our
economies, we will be wealthier as a world, which means we can afford these
technologies as they come on line and we bring the cost down. So this is a
dynamic opportunity and we just have to be sensitive to its interim
impacts, in terms of energy costs, job losses and, sort of, forced
shuttering of work in one location in order to open it up someplace else
and simply moving emissions around. Our goal is reducing emissions and
growing economies. And we'll take the information from the report to make
sound judgments in order to achieve those two objectives.

Q Quick follow up. What's the sense in Europe, or what's the view in Europe
and developing countries as to how fast CCS can come on line?

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: How fast carbon capture and storage?

Q Correct. Sorry, carbon capture and storage.

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: I guess - Steve, why don't you speak to that, what
the (inaudible) are, and then I'll pitch in on top.

DIRECTOR EULE: What -

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: How fast can carbon capture and storage come on line?

DIRECTOR EULE: It depends on the scenarios that are used, but most people
probably don't think it will be widely available before 2020 to 2030
timeframe, depending on the model.

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: And I would note that's because we are now
aggressively going after it, which is important. So if we continue to see
the increased interest - especially if China and India join in on the
technology development effort - we can hope to achieve that kind of a
timeframe, which is important, because obviously their coal use is going up
dramatically - Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, their coal use is
going to go up significantly. We need this technology if we want to
continue to provide affordable energy through coal, while reducing air
pollution and greenhouse gases.

DIRECTOR EULE: If I could just add, you know, the cost of carbon capture
and storage is very, very high at this point. The goal at the Department of
Energy is to reduce that cost to the point where, combined with things like
energy efficiency, it wouldn't add more than 10 percent to the cost of
electricity. That's very, very aggressive technology, but it's one we're
working hard to achieve.

Q Thank you very much for doing this. I wonder if we could sort of look at
this from sort of the atmosphere's perspective at the moment. It seems to
me that, at least the summary, as you folks have pointed out, gives us a
range of concentration of possibilities, I guess. Given what at least some
folks think are sort of the dangerous thresholds, the two to three degrees,
and the concentrations required to get there by a specific period of time
in order to avoid sort of the worst effects - what is the administration's
sense of a reasonable atmospheric level? And how consistent is greenhouse
gas efficiency - how consistent is that approach, in terms of getting
there? I realize that every bit helps, but even with efficiency, even with
improvements in efficiency, you're still pumping this long (inaudible) gas
into the atmosphere.

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: I'll take the back end of the question and then turn
over the other piece back to Harlan.

The practical fact is that the first step in any enterprise is to slow the
growth of what you're doing. That's what we did on air pollution back in
the '70s. Greenhouse gases are rising and you have to slow that down, and
so efficiency is a very good measure to figure out whether you're slowing
it down in a way that's consistent with growing an economy, and whether
you're slowing it down and actually getting real reductions. And let me
explain that.

We can get reductions by putting people out of work - that's not very
viable and I don't think people feel they're better off if they're being
put out of work to reduce emissions. We could reduce emissions by moving
energy-intensive activities from America to another country that doesn't
have a similar commitment on greenhouse cases. That creates the job loss,
but it also probably leads to an increase in greenhouse gases someplace
else. So efficiency is a very good way of judging strategies that are
producing real investments in technology that are producing real reductions
in the growth context. So it's just a tool.

Over time, emissions will stop. And it's still useful, though, to
understand are you stopping a more efficient output. And then over time,
the emissions will decrease. And, again, efficiency is a good way to
understand the approaches that are causing decreases in emissions that are
valuable versus, again, economic losses or other approaches that are not
favored.

So they're perfectly consistent, you just have to look at absolute measures
on the one hand, to see how you're doing, and then look at efficiency on
the other hand to see are you doing it right. And that's why you'd need to
look at both.

Harlan, do you want to speak to the - generally to the concentration issue
and how that - you know, the open question on how we can think about that?

DR. WATSON: Well, I mean, certainly as he said, in the report there are a
broad range of concentration levels being looked at. And, of course, a
range of climate models which then take those ranges of concentration and
translate them into, you know, various ranges of temperatures.

One of the problems is, of course, A, we don't know how the concentration
level (inaudible) the temperature the well. There is still a lot of
uncertainty in that. We're also using a rather crude (inaudible) -- talking
about atmosphere, average global atmospheric temperature changes, and that
doesn't really mean - what you're really concerned about are the impacts on
a regional level, or at least at the regional level and sometimes even a
smaller grid than that. And we simply are not - we're simply not there yet,
in terms of scientific ability to do that, and that's one of the reasons
we're (inaudible) climate change science. Our effort is something on the
order of nearly -- as much as $2 billion in some years, because there's a
lot of unknown on how to do that.

We say - and I say most of the - at least the people that I've talked to
have been - (inaudible) - having the ability to get down to the recent
level is probably going to be at least five years down the road -
(inaudible) - emphasis in the scientific community and increasing amount of
research, and I think we're going to see a great explosion, actually, of
literature coming out in the next few years on how to get to grips with
this regional issue, regional impact. And then I think we'll know - have a
lot better understanding, much better than where we are now on what that
means in terms of specific concentration levels.

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: Let me put it from the perspective of policymaker.
Just as we see current geo-political risks as justifying strengthened
action to reduce our dependence on foreign oil, the report today
underscores undertaking a strengthened action to reduce greenhouse gases.
We can do that in combination.

The President's State of the Union commitment to replace gasoline use by 20
percent in the next 10 years is a good example of an aggressive level of
ambition. And you're seeing countries around the world looking at that kind
of an approach themselves.

So you can look at all these ranges, you can look at all these timelines -
what it gets down to for a policymaker is we are and will be taking the
next steps (inaudible) action. And at least for the U.S., we've begun that
process already through the State of the Union and other initiatives.

Q I wanted to get back to the concentration levels. I know it's been
hammered out quite a bit. But, Harlan Watson, I think if I understood
correctly you said that it's not clear, the link - there's still
uncertainty surrounding the link between concentration of gases and the
associated temperature change. But working group one of the IPCC you said
it's likely that climate sensitivity is in the range of two to
four-point-five degrees, with a best estimate of three degrees, and it's
very unlikely to be less than one-point-five degrees. So there is a certain
degree of uncertainty there. So I guess the question is, the EU has said
that to aim for this two degree temperature target, we should be aiming for
450 PTM. And I find it strange the U.S. doesn't have an idea of what sort
of concentration of greenhouse gases we should be aiming for.

DR. WATSON: You have to realize that, of course, concentrations and
emissions are two different things. If the United States, for example,
reduces emissions to zero, concentration levels are still going to be
growing, simply because we have to (inaudible) ability, we would have to
have as much (inaudible) gases coming out of the atmosphere through
absorption in the oceans or in trees and forests as are produced globally.

So in terms of what emissions levels or what concentration level we were
globally, you know, again, that's totally unclear. Now, you - again, you
mention the broad range, and that's the state of the science now - A, the
broad range of what this particular concentration level translates into
what temperature - and, again, we talk about global mean temperatures as
opposed to what's relevant to, I would say to any policymaker and what does
it mean for - what does it mean where I live. And so, once again, you have
a broad range of uncertainties, of which we're working very hard and
funding science to try to narrow those differences. The point is, we do see
the necessity of reducing our emissions, which we're doing. And, of course,
Jim talked about a lot of the activities that we are doing.

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: I would note, again from a policymakers perspective,
what the U.S. tends to do is focus on more practical goals - amounts of
emissions, or, for example, amounts of renewable fuel over a period of time
that we'd like to see. And then we design a program and then figure out
what it is that we can achieve and then set the goal based on that.

And so while these debates over temperature levels and these discussions
over concentration levels are very useful guides, as the questioner
suggests, in terms of ranges, as policymakers we still have to translate
that into the kinds of objectives that people can take action in relation
to. In America, culturally, our people are just much more responsive - tell
me how much I need to achieve in a particular sector by when. And so we
tend to focus very specifically on specific outcomes. Other countries are
more readily in - the EU, in particular, for example, you know, likes to
set these outer goals that do not have programs associated with them. But
in practical terms, the EU ends up doing what the U.S. does - the EU ends
up setting sector based objectives, like they did in the recent energy
plan, and you know, the broad goal is effectively untethered, it's
unrelated to the more specific goals, but they use it as a guide to
motivate action. People in America are motivated to action, they're just
looking for concrete programs to deliver concrete results.

Q So what I want to know is, when you set these concrete programs, you
don't have any specific emissions levels -- not emissions, atmospheric
concentration levels in mind?

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: We stick with the goal of -- the overarching goal,
which is to stabilize greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level to
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference. That is a guidepost that has
actually guided our actions, really, since 1992. As a guidepost, that is as
effective a guidepost as picking a temperature number or picking a
concentration number, because when you translated the policy, you still
have to sit down and say, what is reasonably achievable in each sector over
a given period of time. So the urgency is clear, the need for strengthened
action is clear, and I think you're seeing that translate into policy.

I think the more interesting place to look is, what ranges of policies are
being implemented, and how are they working. That, to me, is one of the
most interesting pieces of what will be the larger report later this year,
which is showing how different market-based instruments work or don't work
in different national circumstances. In America we have strict fuel economy
regulations, in Europe you have high taxes on fuel. What are the relative
advantages of those two approaches in advancing fuel economy? These are the
very questions that are before us, and it's a very exciting time to be
doing policy in this area.

MODERATOR: We have time for one last question.

Q There's been a lot of emphasis on nuclear energy as one of the solutions.
And I'd like to know how much, in terms of U.S. government policy, other
sources, like solar energy, are being explored? And this is something Mr.
Eule may jump in on this. Also, I'm wondering, the technologies for -- if
nuclear energy does become more and more (inaudible), what are the
technologies for storing the nuclear waste? Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CONNAUGHTON: Steve Eule, I'm going to take the nuclear question,
but I think it would be great if you could then describe the advanced
energy initiative on solar and the other renewables.

On nuclear, it is now well understood by policymakers that if you, in fact,
intend to be serious about climate change and reducing greenhouse gases,
you have to be serious about a significant expansion of the world's use of
zero-emission nuclear energy. That is a technology that is proven, it is
safe, it is reliable in the countries that have the capacity to use that
source of energy, and those that do have the capacity to use the energy
have an obligation to do so if we want to take a nice dent out of the
growth of greenhouse gases.

Now, it's not the only technology. So the question, you're correct -- right
now, I think it's not well known, Europe and the United States each have --
I guess the United States has about 6 percent of its energy in renewables
now. I actually think Europe is less than that. In Germany, where I am
right now, Germany has about 6 percent renewables. And so we are the two
countries that are leading the way in actually building renewable energy
that's actually providing electricity to people. And that's increasing
dramatically in Germany and in the United States, and elsewhere around the
world.

But for the moment, and actually in the near future, that will be a small
piece of the overall energy mix. And so the challenge on nuclear waste is
with a growing and technologically advancing civilian nuclear energy
sector, we will perfect the technologies that allow us to recycle the spent
fuel as much as we can and reuse it, and then what's left, we are
aggressively working on the technologies that will make what is left
relatively benign.

It is the case that we can store what is left safely, and with a tiny,
tiny, tiny, tiny geographic footprint, especially if you compare it to you
the hazardous waste sites around the world for municipal waste and other
material, or when you compare it to other waste storage related to
municipal water treatment and other things.

So when it comes to nuclear, the waste can be safely managed, you just need
the political will to do so, and that's clearly -- clearly, the political
landscape is changing significantly around the world because of this
renewed focus on energy security, and this renewed focus on wanting greater
alliance on zero-emission sources.

Steve, why don't you talk about the advanced energy initiative.

DIRECTOR EULE: I'd be happy to, Jim. Any aspects of the advanced energy
initiative are in a climate change technology program, which is headed up
by the Department of Energy, includes 10 federal agencies. We have already
a portfolio of about $3 billion a year. It covers a broad range of
technologies. And in the advanced energy initiative, the President was
looking at ways that we could alter the way we fire our homes, automobiles
and businesses within about 20 years.

And in his FY08 budget, we requested about a 26 percent increase in the
technologies under the advanced energy initiative. And they include such
things as the (inaudible) America initiative, the biofuels initiative. And
in the biofuels area, for example, it's going to be very important to
support the President's 20 in 10 proposal. And recently we announced the
$385 million for six new (inaudible) refining plants that could produce as
much as 130 million gallons of clean ethanol.

This budget also includes over $300 million for the President's hydrogen
initiative. He announced that initiative in the State of the Union address
in 2002. He pledged $1.2 billion for that initiative in this year's budget
to fulfill that commitment.

We're also taking a look at advanced batteries. And I mentioned earlier the
near zero emissions coal fired power plant, the FutureGen project. And of
course, we're taking a look at nuclear power, in our nuclear 20 in 10
program, and looking at (inaudible) and siding issues, and we're happy to
learn that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently announced two early
site permits for nuclear power plants.

We're not only looking at developing the technology, but we're looking at
ways we can get these out into the marketplace and accelerate the pace.

CHAIRMAN CONNOUGHTON: If you do get a hold of the climate expenditures
report, you'll see just in 2007 alone -- so just this year, on the tax
side, we are going to have $1.7 billion of favorable tax treatments, in the
form of tax credits and other incentives, that will go -- that will get
these emerging technologies actually into the marketplace. It's one thing
to perfect them (inaudible), it's another thing to get consumers to buy
them.

So all told, on efficiency and renewable power technologies, you're looking
at about $1.7 billion just this year alone. No country comes close in its
assistance in this regard.

Q Are those reports available online, the two that you mentioned?

MODERATOR: They are available at www.state.gov. That's where the Climate
Action Report is, and there's also a media note related to the IPCC report
that will be available under issues on the State Department website.

Q Okay, thank you very much.

MODERATOR: Thanks very much. That concludes the call at this time.

END 7:04 A.M. EDT

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