Text 4978, 812 rader
Skriven 2007-07-12 23:31:16 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (070712) for Thu, 2007 Jul 12
===================================================
===========================================================================
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report
===========================================================================
For Immediate Release
July 12, 2007
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report
˙˙White House News
˙˙˙˙˙ Press Conference by the President ˙˙˙˙˙ National Security Council
˙˙˙˙˙ In Focus: National Security ˙˙˙˙˙ In Focus: Renewal in Iraq
PDF (25 pages, 147kb)
This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1314 of the
U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the >Act_). It
includes an assessment of how the sovereign Government of Iraq is
performing in its efforts to achieve a series of specific benchmarks
contained in the Act, as well as any adjustments to strategy that may be
warranted in light of that performance. This is the first of two reports to
be submitted consistent with the Act and has been prepared in consultation
with the Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National
Forces-Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander of
United States Central Command, consistent with Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the
Act. This assessment complements other reports and information about Iraq
provided to the Congress and is not intended as a single source of all
information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United
States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq.
Introduction
Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery,
and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) states
that the President is to submit to Congress two reports assessing the
status of each of the 18 benchmarks contained in the Act and declaring
whether, in the President's judgment, satisfactory progress is being
achieved with respect to those 18 benchmarks.
These benchmarks relate to Government of Iraq actions believed to be
important to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, to improve the
security of the Iraqi population, to provide essential services to the
population, and to promote its economic well-being. These efforts
complement other U.S. and Iraqi collaborative actions as part of the New
Way Forward.
Current U.S. Strategy: New Way Forward
Current U.S. strategy -- the New Way Forward -- recognizes that the
fulfillment of commitments by both the U.S. and Iraqi Governments will be
necessary to achieving our common goal: a democratic Iraq that can govern,
defend, and sustain itself, and be an ally in the War on Terror. The
building of a strong strategic partnership with the Iraqi Government will
be an important part of the effort to achieve this end state, which remains
a long-term goal, and requires the application of all elements of national
power, including especially diplomatic, economic, and political power.
While our overarching strategy continues to emphasize a transition of
responsibility to the Iraqi Government and its security forces, the New Way
Forward recognized that, in response to the upsurge in sectarian violence
in 2006, it was necessary for Coalition Forces to temporarily play a
greater role, in conjunction with the Iraqi Security Forces, in securing
the Iraqi population. This is not meant to replace Iraqi efforts to provide
security, but to help provide the necessary time and space with which the
Iraqi Government can continue to build its own capacity, can intensify
efforts against the accelerants of the violence, especially al-Qaida in
Iraq and some segments of the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), and can meaningfully
address the all-important issue of reconciliation among the various
segments of Iraqi society. The strategy recognizes that the levels of
violence seen in 2006 undermined efforts to achieve political
reconciliation by fueling sectarian tensions, emboldening extremists, and
discrediting the Coalition and Iraqi Government. Amid such violence, it
became significantly harder for Iraqi leaders to make the difficult
compromises necessary to foster reconciliation.
At the same time, we have increased our efforts to help build the capacity
of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Relying on lessons learned from our
experience in training and equipping the ISF, we have significantly
enhanced our training and mentoring commitment. We will continue this
commitment through a combination of partnering Coalition units with Iraqi
Army and Police organizations and embedding transition team personnel with
the majority of ISF units. U.S commanders are committed to helping the
Iraqi government expand the size of the ISF to make it a more capable
counter-insurgency force.
We are also increasing our efforts to build Iraqi governmental capacity not
just at the national level, but at the provincial and local levels as well.
Most notably, this has required an expansion of our Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) program with 10new civilian PRTs paired with
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), and giving PRT leaders and BCT commanders
additional authorities, resources, and personnel. These leaders are charged
with supporting moderate elements against extremists in their areas of
responsibility and launching projects that have an immediate impact in
areas cleared of terrorists and insurgents.
Expansion of the PRT program is not yet complete, with only about half of
the approximately 300 additional PRT personnel deployed to date. The full
complement of >civilian surge_ personnel will be completed by December
2007. In addition, economic assistance funds provided by Congress in the
Act for Iraq have yet to be released. As provided for in the Act, the
President has waived certain restrictions on a portion of these funds in a
determination, which is being provided to Congress separately.
As the President explained in January, all of these efforts, together with
a new diplomatic offensive in the region, are designed to set the
conditions for U.S. troops to begin coming home, without risking a
humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, sanctuaries for international terrorist
networks, or a broader regional conflict that would threaten U.S. national
security interests for generations. (The strategy is explained in greater
detail at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf)
While all of those conditions have not yet been met, and the new strategy
is still in its early stages, there are some encouraging signs that should,
over time, point the way to a more normalized and sustainable level of U.S.
engagement in Iraq, with a decreasing number of U.S. combat forces
increasingly focused on a core set of missions, such as those set out by
the bipartisan Iraq Study Group.
Summary of Achievements and Shortfalls
This report provides, consistent with the Act, an assessment of how the
Iraqi Government is performing on 18 specified benchmarks, rather than the
effects being generated. Some of the benchmarks may be leading indicators,
giving some sense of future trends; but many are more accurately
characterized as lagging indicators, and will only be achieved after the
strategy is fully underway and generates improved conditions on the ground.
For example, local political accommodations have dramatically improved
conditions in what had been some of Iraq's most violent areas, and we are
deploying our resources to help ensure that these trends continue and
spread. It will take time, however, for improved conditions locally to
translate into broader political accommodations at the national level; what
is important is the overall trajectory, which, under our present strategy,
has begun to stabilize, compared to the deteriorating trajectory seen over
the course of 2006. Thus, the assessments in this report should be viewed
in a larger context: the discussion below provides a snapshot of
achievements and shortfalls that can round out the picture given in the
detailed assessment section of this report.
Security: The security situation in Iraq remains complex and extremely
challenging. Iraqi and Coalition Forces continue to emphasize population
security operations in Baghdad, its environs, and Anbar province to combat
extremist networks, and create the space for political reconciliation and
economic growth. As a result of increased offensive operations, Coalition
and Iraqi Forces have sustained increased attacks in Iraq, particularly in
Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. Tough fighting should be expected
through the summer as Coalition and Iraqi Forces seek to seize the
initiative from early gains and shape conditions for longer-term
stabilization. These combined operations named Operation Phantom
Thunder were launched on June 15, 2007, after the total complement of
surge forces arrived in Iraq. The full surge in this respect has only just
begun.
These new operations are targeting primarily al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) havens
in Baghdad, Babil, Diyala, and Anbar provinces. While AQI may not account
for most of the violence in Iraq, it is the organization responsible for
the highest profile attacks, which serve as a primary accelerant to the
underlying sectarian conflict. We presently assess that degrading AQI
networks in these critical areas together with efforts to degrade
Iranian-backed Shi'a extremist networks is a core U.S. national
security interest and essential for Iraq's longer-term stability. Since
January of this year, AQI has proven its resiliency and ability to conduct
high-profile, mass-casualty attacks, mostly targeting Shi'a population
centers through suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIEDs)
attacks. The number of suicide and SVBIED attacks in March and April
approached all-time highs, further exacerbating sectarian tension and
making political deals more difficult to close. These incidents have shown
a decrease in May and June, which may be the result of aggressive Coalition
and Iraqi operations into former AQI havens. The surge of additional U.S.
forces into these areas allows us to better combat AQI and other
terrorists. We should expect, however, that AQI will attempt to increase
its tempo of attacks as September approaches in an effort to influence
U.S. domestic opinion about sustained U.S. engagement in Iraq.
In Baghdad, an overall decrease in sectarian violence is due in part to
intensified Iraqi and Coalition operations focused on population security.
An apparent decision earlier this year by the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia
to largely stand down its operations appeared to have a temporary effect,
but a breakdown in Muqtada al Sadr's ability to control JAM or elements
thereof coinciding with the return of JAM fighters from Iran after
receiving training in combat and explosives has spawned a recent increase
in attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces. Iran continues to train, fund,
and equip extremist groups, both Shi'a and Sunni, that attack Iraqi and
Coalition forces in and around Baghdad and the provinces in southern Iraq.
JAM >secret cells_ are a major recipient of that assistance and are
responsible for some of the most sophisticated attacks on Iraqi and
Coalition Forces. As stated in the President's January 10, 2007, speech
announcing the New Way Forward: >We will interrupt the flow of support from
Iran. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced
weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq._ Operations against these
networks are ongoing and will continue.
In Anbar province, the local population is turning against AQI and seeking
support from the Coalition. At the same time, U.S. military operations and
cooperation with local tribal leaders have created openings for local
political compromise and more effective civilian assistance. To reinforce
these early signs of success, the President ordered additional U.S.
military and civilian resources to Anbar. The trends have remained
positive. The provincial government for the first time in a year is
now able to meet in the province and recently approved a comprehensive
provincial budget that appropriates virtually all of its $107 million
allocation for capital expenditures. Attack levels have reached a 2 year
low and some families that had fled Anbar are beginning to return. These
developments have been noted in other primarily Sunni areas of Iraq, such
as Salah ad-Din province, and areas around Baquba, in Diyala province,
where efforts are underway to build on the Anbar experience.
The ISF continues to show slow progress. ISF capability is increasing, but
further ISF proficiency, improved logistics, and expanded forces are needed
in order to assume more responsibility from Coalition Forces. Comprehensive
data and statistics on the ISF -- including its projected growth -- can be
found in the report Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, submitted
quarterly to Congress by the Department of Defense, pursuant to Section
9010 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law
109-289). It should be noted that Iraqi Security Forces bear the brunt of
attacks from insurgents and terrorists. Despite casualty rates two to three
times that of Coalition Forces, Iraqi Security Forces continue to fight
bravely for their country.
Political Reconciliation: Moving key legislation depends on deal-making
among major players in a society deeply divided along sectarian, ethnic,
and other lines. Meaningful and lasting progress on national reconciliation
may also require a sustained period of reduced violence in order to build
trust. For this reason, most of the major political benchmarks identified
in the legislation - i.e., final passage of monumental pieces of
legislation through Iraq's Council of Representatives by consensus - are
lagging indicators of whether or not the strategy is succeeding or is going
to be successful.
As demonstrated by our PRT initiatives and moving resources outside of
Baghdad and into the provinces, our strategy envisions >bottom-up_
reconciliation to be as important, if not more important, than top-down
reconciliation. Bottom-up reconciliation involves working at the local and
provincial level, seeking local political accommodations and getting more
Iraqis to invest in the future of a united and democratic Iraq. Bottom-up
reconciliation can take many forms: in Anbar, we have seen greater
involvement of tribal groups; in Salah ad Din, it is involving local and
provincial leaders taking greater responsibility for their political and
economic future; in Baghdad, it has involved local neighborhood councils
working with newly deployed Coalition and Iraqi units to identify and
isolate extremists. All of the new resources devoted to this strategy --
the arrival of military reinforcements, the expansion of PRTs, and the
diplomatic surge - can be leveraged to produce bottom-up reconciliation.
Over time, we expect bottom-up reconciliation to be reflected in, and latch
up with, progress on top-down measures.
Effective steps toward national reconciliation will require national
leadership from all communities and expression of a common national
political will, or >vision,_ that has so far been lacking. The consensus
nature of Iraqi politics, and the checks and balances built into the Iraqi
governance structure, inhibit Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ability to
govern effectively and would pose obstacles to any prime minister.
These inhibitors slow progress on high-priority legislative benchmarks,
although they are designed to create a decision-making process through
which all major communities have a voice and a stake. The increasing
concern among Iraqi political leaders that the United States may not have a
long-term commitment to Iraq has also served in recent months to reinforce
hedging behaviors and made the hardest political bargains even more
difficult to close.
Nonetheless, there have been recent events that provide hope for the
ability of the Government of Iraq to overcome these inhibitors. For
example, the response to the June13, 2007, bombing of the al-Askari Mosque
in Samarra was a well orchestrated unison of statements of condemnation and
calls for calm by Prime Minister Maliki, President Jalal Talabani, Vice
President Tariq Hashimi, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and other leaders.
This indicates that when necessary, the Government of Iraq and major
political figures can overcome the dynamics that otherwise inhibit
effectiveness. Iraq's Council of Representatives on July 8 voted to extend
its present term through July 31, and for working sessions to last 6 days a
week from July 16 through July 31 (taking only Fridays off). We will be
working closely with Iraqi leaders and members of the Council of
Representatives to move important pieces of legislation forward during this
time frame taking account of the extended legal process mandated by
Iraq's constitution for moving a law to final passage.
Diplomatic Engagement: Iran and Syria have continued to foster instability
in Iraq. As noted, Iran funds extremist groups to promote attacks against
Coalition and Iraqi forces, and the Iraqi Government. We see little change
in Iran's policy of seeking U.S. defeat through direct financial and
material support for attacks against U.S. military and civilians in Iraq.
Iran is engaging in similar activities in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, foreign
fighters (especially suicide bombers) continue to use Syrian territory as
their main transit route to Iraq. The Syrian Government also allows major
insurgent organizers and financiers to operate in Damascus. We continue to
assess that nearly 80 percent of suicide bombers are foreign fighters --
with the vast majority traveling to Iraq through Syria -- and to Syria from
their home countries by air travel to Damascus. This Syria-based network is
able to supply some 50 to 80 suicide bombers to AQI per month. Since
January, there have been nearly 280 suicide events in Iraq, accounting for
nearly 5,500 casualties, mostly innocent Iraqis going about their daily
lives. Syria can and must do more to shut down these networks.
The signing of the International Compact with Iraq, an initiative jointly
sponsored by the United Nations and the Iraqi Government, and the Expanded
Neighbors ministerial conference, with attendance by the Permanent Five
members of the U.N. Security Council, the Arab League, the Organization of
Islamic Conference, and the G-8, on May3 - 4 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt,
helped provide more public international and regional support for Iraq.
Compact implementation, including debt relief, will be our near-term focus.
The Neighbors Process energy working group had a successful meeting in
Istanbul, Turkey, last month, and the other two working groups are planning
to meet later this summer. We expect the next Expanded Neighbors
ministerial to be held later this summer or early fall in Istanbul.
Economics and Essential Services: The economic picture is uneven. Key
economic indicators paint a modestly improved picture unemployment has
eased slightly and inflation is currently abating. Government revenue is
steady due to high oil prices, but the Iraqi Government has not yet made
needed investments to increase oil and refining output. Private-sector
activity is picking up in some areas, notably the more than $1 billion that
have been invested in wireless telecoms, but investors remain wary due to
poor security and the continuing need for a stronger legal framework. The
Iraqi Government has begun to show resolve in initiating budget execution
and capital investment to restore services, but citizens nationwide
complain about government corruption and the lack of essential services,
such as electricity, fuel supply, sewer, water, health, and sanitation.
At the provincial level, the economic governance picture is a patchwork,
with some provinces performing better than others. Security conditions,
ethnic and sectarian divisions, political dynamics, corruption, and
leadership qualities of key political actors vary significantly by
province. As a result, provincial governments vary greatly in the
effectiveness of using their central government budget allocation to
provide services for citizens. Where security is improving, such as in
Anbar province, we see positive trends in governance, delivery of
government services, and the efficacy of U.S. assistance.
The International Compact with Iraq provides the framework through which
the Iraqi Government will reform its governance, budget execution, and
fiscal management, as well as improve service delivery. The Compact sets
out the roadmap of reforms Iraq will need to implement over the next 5
years to be economically self-sufficient. Iraq's IMF Stand-by Arrangement
is on track and has been extended to September 2007. For a follow-on IMF
program, Iraq will need to continue increasing fuel prices.
Congressional Benchmarks
This background discussion provides a context for assessing the performance
of the Iraqi Government with respect to the 18 benchmarks. The Iraqi
leaders face a challenging situation, and they and their families run great
risks on a daily basis. We continue to encourage and press them to achieve
the established benchmarks, since we believe that those efforts will
contribute to Iraq's stability, its ability to provide for its own
security, and to the international effort to counter violent extremism.
Nonetheless, our efforts in Iraq extend far beyond these benchmarks. Every
day, our Embassy and military officials are working with Iraqis to
encourage stability and reconciliation in ways that are not easily measured
by these benchmarks. As Congress has requested, in September General
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will report on these efforts and provide a
more comprehensive assessment of the situation in Iraq, including an
assessment of the 18 benchmarks measured herein. This assessment will
provide a clearer picture of how the new strategy is unfolding, and what if
any adjustments should be made.
Standard of Measurement: Section 1314(b)(2)(A) states: >The President shall
submit an initial report to Congress, not later than July 15, 2007,
assessing the status of each of the specific benchmarks established above,
and declaring, in his judgment, whether satisfactory progress toward
meeting these benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved._ In order to make
this judgment (e.g., whether >satisfactory progress . . . is, or is not,
being achieved_), we have carefully examined all the facts and
circumstances with respect to each of the 18 benchmarks and asked the
following question: As measured from a January 2007 baseline, do we assess
that present trend data demonstrates a positive trajectory, which is
tracking toward satisfactory accomplishment in the near term? If the answer
is yes, we have provided a >Satisfactory_ assessment; if the answer is no,
the assessment is >Unsatisfactory._ For those benchmarks receiving the
latter assessment, we have explained what, if any, strategic adjustments
may be required to improve the present trajectory. The present analysis and
assessment of these 18 benchmarks follows.
Assessment of the Benchmarks
Section 1314 (b)(2)(A) The President shall submit an initial report, in
classified and unclassified format, to the Congress, not later than July
15, 2007, assessing the status of each of the specific benchmarks...and
declaring, in his judgment, whether satisfactory progress toward meeting
these benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved.
Section 1314 (b)(2)(C) If the President's assessment of any of the specific
benchmarks established above is unsatisfactory, the President shall include
in that report a description of such revisions to the political, economic,
regional, and military components of the strategy, as announced by the
President on January 10, 2007. In addition, the President shall include in
the report the advisability of implementing such aspects of the bipartisan
Iraq Study Group, as he deems appropriate.
Section 1314 (b)(1)(A) The United States Strategy in Iraq, hereafter, shall
be conditioned on the Iraqi Government meeting benchmarks . . . including:
(i) Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the
constitutional review.
The Council of Representatives (COR) formed the Constitutional Review
Committee (CRC) on November 15, 2006. The Constitutional Review is now
underway. The CRC presented a partial list of recommendations on May 23,
2007, in an interim report and received an extension from the COR until the
end of August to resolve outstanding issues concerning: (i)Presidential
powers, (ii)the powers of the regions vs. the central government, and
(iii)the status of Kirkuk (Article 140 of the Constitution). The political
blocs still need to reach an accommodation on these difficult political
issues.
The Embassy will continue to discuss with the CRC Chairmen and the COR
Speaker and Deputy Speakers the need to develop a well-defined plan for the
COR debate of the report. The Embassy is also continuing to discuss with
the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) the necessary
preparatory steps for a public referendum on proposed constitutional
revisions. As noted in the Iraq Study Group Report Recommendation 26, there
is a role for UNAMI in the constitutional review process.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has madesatisfactory progress toward
forming a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) and then completing the
constitutional review. The CRC has been formed, and, while difficult issues
remain, significant progress has been made on many substantive issues and
technical details involved in the constitutional review process. The CRC
has requested an extension to resolve remaining issues, and its Chairman
remains committed to moving the process forward. While the progress on this
benchmark has been satisfactory, the achievement of the desired
reconciliation effect depends on progress with respect to several other
benchmarks as well as this one.
(ii) Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification reform.
De-Ba'athification reform is among the most sensitive pieces of legislation
being considered as it involves competing conceptions of justice,
accountability, reconciliation, and economic compensation. Senior Iraqi
political leaders remain at odds over some of the most fundamental aspects
of de-Ba'athification reform, including over which categories of former
Ba'ath party members would be proscribed by the law. For example, there is
division among political and ethnic groups regarding what rank of
ex-Ba'athists should be allowed to return to civic life. While leaders have
been discussing the law, a public discussion on the accommodations that
different parts of Iraqi society will have to make with each other is not
yet underway. An inflexible timeline on this issue could be detrimental, as
a bad law would not improve prospects for reconciliation.
Reintegration of former Ba'athists who have not committed crimes has
already begun; however, a sweeping, government-led, legislated, and
institutionalized reform program over time would send a positive signal in
favor of reconciliation. Alternatively, allowing former Ba'athists who do
not accept a democratic Iraq into the government or security services could
undermine the Iraqi government and embolden the insurgency. Many Iraqis are
understandably frightened by the prospect of their former Ba'athist
tormentors replaying their previous rise to power by subverting the
government from within.
In Recommendation 27, the Iraq Study Group emphasizes the need for United
States Government support of reintegration of former Ba'athists and Arab
nationalists into civic life. The New Way Forward strategy makes
de-Ba'athification reform an integral part of the United States
Government's Iraq policy. The Embassy has pressed hard on all political
elements to move forward.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress
toward enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification reform.
This is among the most divisive political issues for Iraq, and compromise
will be extremely difficult. Given the lack of satisfactory progress, we
have not achieved the desired reconciliation effect that meaningful and
broadly accepted de-Ba'athification reform might bring about. This does
not, however, necessitate a revision to the current plan and strategy.
De-Ba'athification remains a core priority of U.S. political engagement,
and pushing reforms too fast or in a manner that results in a poor law
could be detrimental to our overall reconciliation objectives.
(iii) Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable
distribution of hydrocarbon resources to the people of Iraq without regard
to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing
legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni
Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.
The final draft of the Revenue Management Law must be approved by the
Council of Ministers (COM) and vetted by the Iraqi Government's legal
office before submission to the COR. The United States has provided
technical advice to the Iraqi Government and is actively engaged in
encouraging both sides to expeditiously approve the draft law in the COM
and move it to the COR. Prime Minister Maliki intends to submit the Revenue
Management Law to the COM soon, for subsequent consideration by the COR
along with the framework Hydrocarbon law.
Assessment: The current status is unsatisfactory, but it is too early to
tell whether the Government of Iraq will enact and implement legislation to
ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources to all Iraqis.
The Government of Iraq has not met its self-imposed goal of May 31 for
submitting the framework hydrocarbon and revenue-sharing laws to the COR.
Although the KRG and the Shi'a parties have agreed to the text of the
Revenue Management Law, Council of Ministers' approval has been delayed by
a Sunni party boycott. The effect of limited progress toward this benchmark
has been to reduce the perceived confidence in, and effectiveness of, the
Iraqi Government. This does not, however, necessitate a revision to our
current plan and strategy, under which we have assigned a high priority to
this subject, and the process overall has continued to move forward.
(iv) Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form
semi-autonomous regions.
The COR enacted a law in October 2006 that establishes procedures to form
regions. Under the Iraqi constitution, regions have certain powers, such as
control over regional security forces, that provinces do not. The law will
come into effect 18 months after being passed, which means no steps can be
taken to form regions before April 2008. The United States Government
encouraged Iraqi political parties to reach a compromise on this law and
believes that the 18-month delay in implementation is in the interests of
Iraq and the United States, given current political conditions in Iraq.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward
enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous
regions. The regions law has been passed. Implementation of this
legislation should take place after provincial elections are held and after
the passage of an updated elections law. The procedures are in place, but
whether establishment of additional regions (in addition to the
already-recognized KRG) is desirable depends on a number of factors,
including the outcome of efforts at constitutional reform. The progress
toward this benchmark has been satisfactory, and the effect is that this
potentially contentious issue has not been a source of discord.
(v) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High
Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council
authorities, and a date for provincial elections.
On January 23, 2007, the COR passed the Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC) Law, which the Presidency Council (the President and two
Deputy Presidents) approved on February 27, 2007. On April 28, 2007, the
COR appointed the nine IHEC Commissioners in a process that the U.N. deemed
fair and transparent. The Commissioners have completed appropriate training
and are in the process of selecting representatives to oversee elections in
the provinces. A Provincial Powers Law that defines the authorities and
structures of local governments has been read twice in the COR, but changes
are being considered, particularly related to the powers of the governor
and the reach of the central government at the local level.
At the highest levels, the Embassy is urging the Iraqi Government to take
the legislative and administrative action necessary to ensure timely and
fair elections. The Embassy is intensively engaged with the GOI and the COR
at all levels to expedite legislation or amendments to existing legislation
that will allow provincial elections to take place. New legislation or
amendments to the existing law are required to set a date and secure
funding for elections, as well as to establish the electoral system to be
used for the vote, among other issues.
In cooperation with the U.N., the United States Government is providing
program support to the new IHEC in three areas: (i) building immediate IHEC
staff capacity, particularly in public outreach and internal organization;
(ii) building database capacity that will support the new voter registry;
and (iii) standing up provincial, district, and precinct-level election
bodies. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are monitoring political and
security conditions in provinces that may affect elections.
In Recommendation 29, the Iraq Study Group emphasizes the need for
provincial elections at the earliest possible date. The United States
Government and UNAMI are working closely with the Iraqi Government to
accelerate the drafting and passage of the Provincial Powers Law and set a
date for provincial elections. Additionally, the United States Government
is working with Iraq Security Forces to ensure that they are adequately
prepared to provide security for free and fair elections.
Assessment: There are multiple components to this benchmark, each deserving
its own assessment:
ū Establishing the IHEC Commission: The Government of Iraq has made
satisfactory progress toward establishing an IHEC Commission. The
Commission has been established.
ū Elections Law: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory
progress toward establishing a provincial elections law. Drafting of
the law has just begun.
ū Provincial Council Authorities: The Government of Iraq has not made
satisfactory progress toward establishing provincial council
authorities. The COR is working on legislation, which has had its
second reading; however, the COR committee continues to work on
revisions to the draft law, and it remains unclear when the legislation
will come to a third and final vote by the full COR.
ū Provincial Elections Date: The Government of Iraq has not made
satisfactory progress toward establishing a date for provincial
elections. Legislation required for setting the date has not been
enacted.
The effect is that there is still no mechanism in place to address the
under-representation of Sunnis in provincial councils that was caused by
past Sunni election boycotts. However, at this time, this does not
necessitate a revision to our current plan and strategy, under which we
regard movement on this issue as one of the highest priorities, and have
seen progress in key areas _ particularly with respect to the IHEC, which
is a critical building block to holding genuine and credible local
elections with U.N. assistance and support.
(vi) Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.
There is little progress toward legislation establishing amnesty for those
who fought against the government since 2003 or who committed crimes in the
name of the Iraqi Government. Neither the GOI nor the COR are pressing
forward the passage of amnesty legislation.
At some point, Iraq's process of reconciliation would benefit from an
amnesty that recognizes the need to avoid criminal prosecution of certain
acts of a military nature committed since 2003. However, a general amnesty
program would be counterproductive in the current environment. As long as
violence remains extensive and no major armed group has signaled a
willingness to cooperate with the Iraqi Government and renounce violence,
there is no group for which amnesty would be appropriate.
Opportunities to offer amnesty locally, to specific populations and
individuals, may appear quickly and will require Iraqi Government
legislation or programs to exploit the willingness of fighters to abandon
violence. Such actions could serve as a model for a wider amnesty program.
United States officials have made clear to Iraqi leaders that any amnesty,
when it comes, should not distinguish between acts against Coalition Forces
and acts against Iraqis.
In a token of progress, an amnesty workshop was conducted on May 12, 2007,
in Baghdad. Political-party representatives and academics gathered to
discuss amnesty concepts. From this small workshop, 10recommendations were
developed and forwarded to various government representatives for comment,
thus beginning a dialogue on amnesty.
In Recommendations 31 and 37, the Iraq Study Group advised three elements
for any amnesty legislation: 1) it must be far-reaching, 2) it must involve
reconciliation by those in government with their enemies, and 3) the
legislative and executive branches of the United States Government must not
undercut it. However, the Study also notes, as mentioned in the assessment
above, that >there are many armed groups within Iraq, and very little will
to lay down arms._
Assessment: The prerequisites for a successful general amnesty are not
present; however, in the current security environment, it is not clear that
such action should be a near-term Iraqi goal. The Government of Iraq has
established a high-level Government of Iraq Reconciliation Committee to
support and oversee efforts of groups that want to oppose AQI and other
extremist elements working with a joint U.S. Embassy/MNF-I group that
is facilitating such actions in coordination with units on the ground.
These efforts are more relevant at this point than are general amnesty
initiatives. Nonetheless, the Government of Iraq should develop amnesty
programs later in the year, so they are ready to be implemented if
opportunities arise. Given the absence of the necessary conditions for
amnesty, the absence of amnesty legislation has had no effect. The current
plan and strategy calls for the passage of such legislation when the
necessary conditions are present.
(vii) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia
disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable
only to the central government and loyal to the constitution of Iraq.
The COR included $150 million in its 2007 budget for Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), but the Ministry of Finance (MOF)
is waiting to release the funds pending development of a Government of Iraq
plan for DDR. However, the COR has not moved toward passage of legislation
to establish a disarmament program, nor are senior Iraqi officials or
political-party leaders focused on passing such a law. There is
disagreement among Iraqi experts as to whether new or additional
legislation is necessary as militia and other illegal armed-group activity
is already against Iraqi law. Although the Iraqi Government has formed a
DDR Committee, there is no momentum in the Government of Iraq toward
developing and implementing a comprehensive disarmament program for militia
members. No armed group has yet committed to disarmament. The necessary
preconditions for a DDR program, such as political reconciliation and
security provided by the government, do not yet exist despite considerable
efforts by the Iraqi Government, MNF-I, and the Embassy.
The resources and personnel currently dedicated to the DDR effort would be
better used elsewhere in the process of reconciliation that will ultimately
lead armed groups to lay down arms. In the meantime, other measures to give
young men alternatives to committing violence, such as a vigorous
vocational-training program, micro-financing opportunities, education
programs within the theater detention system, and jobs creation programs,
should and are being pursued. Improved use of these tools to take advantage
of localized security gains will require further planning by the Iraqi
Government.
In Recommendation 38 and 39, the Iraq Study Group proposes that neutral
international experts act as advisors to the Iraqi Government and that the
United States Government fund and support a single office to provide
assistance to these experts. The study also notes >_solving the problem of
militias requires national reconciliation_ and states that, as a party in
the conflict, the United States Government should not be directly involved
in a DDR program's implementation.
Assessment: The prerequisites for a successful militia disarmament program
are not present. In fact, international experts, including the U.N., have
expressed reservations to advancing this proposal at the present time. The
U.N. DDR Advisory Mission to Baghdad Report (April 25 - May 2, 2007)
stated, >The Iraq environment makes it most unlikely that traditional DDR
can take place, and planning should take this into account._ Likewise, a
State Department internal review has shown that the timing is not right for
a full-scale DDR program in Iraq. Given the absence of the necessary
conditions for DDR, the absence of legislation on militia disarmament has
had no effect. The current plan and strategy calls for the passage of such
legislation when the necessary conditions are present
(viii) Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services
committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.
As part of Operation Fardh Al-Qanun (FAQ), the Iraqi Government established
an Executive Steering Committee (ESC) to better coordinate and synchronize
the non-kinetic aspects of FAQ with security operations. The ESC is chaired
by the Prime Minister and meets weekly to discuss appropriate issues. In
support of the ESC, six sub-committees have been formed to address topics
of economics, services, political issues, media, popular mobilization, and
security. These subcommittees are chaired by Iraqi Government leaders and
are supported by United States Government officials. Additionally, the
Iraqi National Security Advisor is responsible for the ESC secretariat and
coordinates weekly planning meetings with the subcommittees. While the
secretariat and subcommittees vary in their effectiveness, the overall
level of coordination and focus on non-kinetic aspects is significantly
higher than previous efforts.
While establishing political, media, economic, and services committees is
important, it is even more vital that the Iraqi Government steadily
increase its relevance to Iraqis outside the International Zone through
proper provision of services, security, and offering a viable alternative
to militias.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward
establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees
in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. The establishment of the ESC and
related subcommittees meets the requirement of the benchmark. Nevertheless,
both the U.S. Mission and MNF-I will remain intensively engaged with the
ESC to continue to improve its effectiveness and ensure that the
subcommittees fulfill the purpose for which they were created as their
contribution to date has not been adequate. Progress toward achieving this
benchmark has been satisfactory, and we will continue to monitor and engage
with the committees to produce a satisfactory effect over the next 60 days.
(ix) Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad
operations.
The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) had difficulty deploying three
additional full Iraqi Army (IA) brigades at sufficient strength to Baghdad,
but compensated by pulling units from a variety of IA divisions to provide
the equivalent additional force. Since the initial deployment, the IGFC has
continued to generate the required additional forces by first extending a
brigade from 1 IA Division and battalions from 4 IA Division in Baghdad and
then identifying and deploying a replacement brigade from 1 IA Division and
battalions from 4 IA division to relieve other units by mid-June 2007.
Manning levels for deploying units continue to be of concern. However,
MNF-I is working with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) to implement
policies to improve present-for-duty numbers, and in the current 30-day
period, for example, over 10,000 soldiers will have completed basic
training and been assigned to units.
Iraq Study Group Recommendations 20 and 21 call for the Iraqi Government to
shoulder a greater share of the security mission in Iraq, and ultimately
take it over. Iraq Study Group Recommendation 25 calls for the Iraqi
Government to establish milestones for reconciliation and improve security.
Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad
operations reflects implementation of these recommendations.
Assessment:The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward
providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad
operations. While manning levels for the deployed Iraqi units continue to
be of concern, the Iraqi Government has provided the equivalent of three
additional brigades to Baghdad and has made provisions to sustain this
level of effort and to address manning issues in addition to steadily
increasing the strengths of Iraqi units already deployed in Baghdad. The
progress toward this benchmark has been satisfactory, and the effect is
satisfactory in that the three brigades are operating in support of Baghdad
operations.
(x) Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan
and to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S.
Commanders without political intervention to include the authority to
pursue all extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.
The Prime Minister has given Iraqi (and MNF-I) commanders the necessary
authority to conduct security operations and has taken initial steps to
reduce political interference in decisions on military actions. Coalition
military leaders work closely with their Iraqi counterparts to plan and
carry out security operations. Coalition military forces also contribute to
the operation of joint security stations and provide the embedded
transition teams that mentor Iraqi military and police counterparts. New
Rules of Engagement for the Baghdad Operational Command have come into
effect. There have been no reported instances of political interference in
operations that U.S. commanders have recommended against Sunni Arab
insurgents or AQI since the start of Operation Fardh al-Qanun. There have
been concerns, however, about political interference (though not at the
Prime Minister's level) in some operations to target Shi'a extremist
networks, especially JAM. In recent engagements, particularly in some areas
in southern Iraq, Iraqi forces were called upon to quell JAM-fueled
violence and performed admirably. The Iraqi Army continues to be a more
nationally oriented institution than the Iraqi National Police or local
police forces.
ISF forces are currently fighting alongside Coalition Forces and jointly
manning Joint Security Stations (JSS) throughout Iraq. In most cases,
tactical commanders act on mission orders issued by their chain of command
or coordinated locally with MNF-I forces. In addition, the ISF has done a
reasonably good job policing its own ranks by reporting infractions and
removing guilty parties.
There continues to be evidence of sectarian bias in the appointment of
senior military and police commanders, which in turn gives rise to
suspicions that political considerations may be behind Iraqi commanders'
decisions on which operations to undertake or support. Prime Minister
Maliki is willing to take action when evidence of this is clear. Seven of
nine National Police Brigade Commanders and 16 battalion commanders have
been relieved in the past 7 months due to concerns over sectarian
activities; however, sectarian-based decisions continue to be evident
through intelligence channels. There is evidence of target lists emanating
from the Office of the Commander in Chief that bypassed operational
commanders and directed lower-level intelligence officers and commanders to
make arrests, primarily of Sunnis. Authority to make tactical and
operational decisions without political interference is an issue of trust.
Iraq Study Group Recommendation 25 calls for the Iraqi Government to
establish milestones for reconciliation and to improve security. This
benchmark helps establish the conditions for reconciliation by pursuing
non-sectarian security policies without political intervention, in line
with this recommendation.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress
toward providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan
and to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S.
Commanders without political intervention to include the authority to
pursue all extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. Iraqi
and coalition forces have been giv
|