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Ärende: Press Release (0707177) for Tue, 2007 Jul 17
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Press Briefing by White House Homeland Security Advisor Fran Townsend
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For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary July 17, 2007

Press Briefing by White House Homeland Security Advisor Fran Townsend James
S. Brady Briefing Room

˙ /news/releases/2007/07/20070717-7.wm.v.html ˙˙Press Briefings
˙˙Audio


11:04 A.M. EDT

MS. TOWNSEND: Good morning, everybody. Earlier today, the Director of
National Intelligence briefed the President and senior staff on the new
National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat to the homeland. The
DNI has delivered the NIE to Congress and has released the unclassified key
judgments, which you should now have. The Office of the DNI has already
briefed the media this morning on the report and the key judgments and so I
will not go into much of that detail.

What I would like you to know is how we are responding to the threat noted
in the report. It is important to understand what the NIE is and what it is
not. The NIE is an intelligence community product that lays out baseline
judgments and assessments on a particular topic. While there are things --
many NIE's and many intelligence products over the last six years that
focus on the threat faced from al Qaeda and terrorism, this NIE is the
first ever focused on the terrorist to the U.S. homeland.

It is intended to provide a strategic understanding of the terrorist threat
to the homeland over the next three years, and to give the intelligence
community's baseline judgments in order to help policymakers develop and
prioritize government actions. That said, it is not a document that
specifically focuses on daily tactical threat reporting and the
government's operational response. It is a strategic assessment.

Early last week, a classified report was leaked to the press entitled, "Al
Qaeda Better Positioned To Strike The West." While I will not discuss the
contents of that classified document, it is important to note that the
report referenced an important trend and development for decision-makers to
action. Trends develop over time, so the analysis and the facts in the NIE
and the classified report were not a surprise to decision-makers and have
been the subject of extensive discussion, planning and action over a
considerable period of time.

To those responsible for protecting the homeland from al Qaeda and the
threat of terrorism, the information in these reports is not new. On the
contrary, the NIE reenforces the seriousness of the terrorist threat
against the homeland and confirms much of what the President has been
saying since September 11th. We are facing a persistent terrorist enemy led
by al Qaeda that remains driven and intent on attacking the homeland, and
that continues to adapt and improve its capabilities.

Our greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts since September
11th have constrained the ability of al Qaeda to attack the U.S. again and
have led terrorist groups to view the homeland as a harder target to strike
than it was on 9/11. Our worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past
five years have helped disrupt a number of plots against the U.S. At the
same time, the NIE notes concern that this level of international
cooperation may wane as 9/11 becomes a more distant memory and perceptions
of the terrorist threat diverge.

Al Qaeda will continue to attempt visually dramatic mass casualty attacks
in the homeland, and they will continue to acquire and employ chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear materials, and will not hesitate to
use them if they develop sufficient capability.

The NIE assesses that al Qaeda will enhance its capabilities to attack the
homeland through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups. Of
most concern is that al Qaeda will try to exploit the conflict in Iraq and
leverage the contacts and capabilities of al Qaeda in Iraq, its most
visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a
desire to attack the homeland.

We will face challenges from the spread of radicalization tied to the
global violent Islamic extremist movement, with the possibility for some
within the homeland to become sufficiently radicalized so as to view the
use of violence in the homeland as legitimate.

The NIE also refers to the homeland threats from Lebanese Hezbollah, the
state-sponsored and supported by Iran, and the threat from single-issue
groups, as well as the challenge of adapting our homeland defensive efforts
and tools to detect and disrupt plots in an era of globalization and
technological advances. The NIE notes the al Qaeda and its affiliates have
sought safe haven in the federally administrated tribal areas of Pakistan
and replaced senior leaders and operational commanders that have been
captured or killed.

Al Qaeda continues to attempt to create global terrorist alliances, raise
resources, and recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for homeland
attacks. Importantly, the NIE assesses that al Qaeda has protected or
regenerated three of four key elements in planning an attack on the
homeland: a safe haven in Pakistan, operational lieutenants, and top
leadership. The NIE found, although we have discovered only a handful of
individuals in the U.S. with ties to al Qaeda's senior leadership since
September 11th, al Qaeda will intensify its efforts to place operatives
here in the homeland.

As a result of these factors, the NIE concludes that we are currently in a
heightened threat environment. I hasten to add we have no credible
information pointing to a specific imminent attack, or the timing or
execution of such an attack. But the warning is clear, and we are taking it
seriously.

We should be clear that despite a resurgent al Qaeda threat and some of
their capabilities, they are weaker today than they would have been if we
had not taken strong action against them over the last five-and-a-half
years. Furthermore, when we discuss al Qaeda's capabilities, we must put it
in the context of a stronger, more capable U.S. government. Because of the
President's commitment to our homeland security, we have more and better
intelligence, military and law enforcement resources, and the capability to
confront an enemy who is weaker now than it would have been absent our
aggressive effort to confront and defeat them.

So what are we doing to confront the threat outlined in the NIE and the
near-term threat from al Qaeda? First, I want to be clear that we will talk
about as much as we can, but consistent with our need to protect our most
important and effective tools in our fight, this means we can speak of some
things in only general terms, and others not at all.

Second, to place in context what we are doing, I should explain how this
fits into ongoing counterterrorism efforts. Almost six years after
September 11th, we have not been attacked, and I am often asked why.
Because the President has made clear that job number one is to protect the
American people from an attack, and his strategy for doing this has been
clear and unambiguous. We have gone on the offensive, attacking our enemies
and the things that they need to operate and survive. We have strengthened
our defenses through a host of homeland security programs, including
increasing our intelligence, military and law enforcement resources,
ensuring greater information sharing with state and local officials,
increasing grant programs, protecting critical infrastructure, and
strengthening our border security.

At the same time, we have strengthened our government institutions and our
laws. We established DHS, we established national security divisions at
Justice and the FBI. We have a DNI, we have a National Counterterrorism
Center, and we have enacted legal regimes like the Patriot Act. This is why
we now urge Congress to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, to update an antiquated law so that it is technologically neutral, so
that we can effectively fight a 21st century enemy.

But there is yet another factor, and it is the most difficult to explain.
It is what we do not know. What is our enemy's calculation? Is it a large,
spectacular, mass casualty attack? Or smaller, multiple explosive devices,
like the ones we saw recently in London and Glasgow. We cannot know the
enemy's calculation, nor when it will shift. We prepare for and anticipate
both, with the realization that the enemy only has to be right once, while
we must be right every day, all the time.

It is important for the American people to know that focusing our
government's attention and resources to the threat from al Qaeda is not new
and is not a reaction to the NIE or to any other single report. Our
intelligence, military, law enforcement and homeland security communities
are constantly evaluating the threat and making determinations on how best
to respond.

Three times a day at the National Counterterrorism Center, our intelligence
-- military, law enforcement and homeland security communities -- review
current threats and how we are addressing them. Every day in the field, law
enforcement and homeland security officials are working side by side with
state and local police and authorities to uncover leads and information to
thwart any ongoing terrorist activity. Every week, senior counterterrorism
officials meet here at the White House to discuss the current and strategic
threats, and to organize efforts to wage the war on terror.

The President's daily briefings, intelligence briefings routinely include
terrorism matters and he gets counterterrorism and homeland security
updates from Cabinet Secretaries and agency heads.

In addition to all of that, as we have done during other periods of
heightened threat, we have focused additional attention and resources on
this. In this case, the White House assembled relevant principals and
deputies earlier this year to review regional terrorist threats, for
example, in Europe, the Arabian Gulf and North Africa, as well as on the
current and strategic threat from al Qaeda. As a result of those meetings,
the President directed actions to be taken regarding priorities and
engagement with our regional allies. The President personally raised his
concern over the emerging al Qaeda threat with heads of state in June, on
the margins of the G8. And as a result of those discussions, FBI, CIA, DHS
have engaged their European counterparts. In addition, senior interagency
officials have met with their counterparts in Italy and Germany already,
and a similar meeting is scheduled in Paris later this month.

As a result of the Homeland Security Council principals' meeting in May, we
established an interagency task force, under the leadership of the National
Counterterrorism Center, to develop additional options and for measures for
requiring information and disrupting potential terrorist attacks on the
homeland. The task force is charged with evaluating new intelligence and
considers measures that may help disrupt a threat. This group reports to
the White House Homeland Security Council deputies and principals'
committees on a regular basis.

As part of this effort, departments and agencies have been reviewing their
current operations and, based on intelligence, are enhancing where
necessary efforts to better respond and address the heightened threat
environment. These efforts span across departments and agencies, and
involve a broad range of activities. Some of the measures that we have
taken will be visible, and others will not. The visible ones, like the
increase in transportation-related security in the wake of the failed
attacks in London and the attack on Glasgow airport, you will see. Others
will not be visible, focusing instead on gathering more intelligence and
leads.

In addition to our expanded efforts to disrupt tactical plotting, national
security and homeland security officials have been focusing for the past
several weeks on additional steps that can be taken to constrict al Qaeda's
global reach. To do this, we are strengthening our cooperation with
partners in key regions to undermine al Qaeda's attempts to tap into and to
coopt regional networks for their own strategic purpose. For example, we
continue to work with President Musharraf and the Pakistani government to
capture key al Qaeda operatives and pressure al Qaeda and the Taliban in
the federally administrated tribal areas. Al Qaeda has made several
attempts to assassinate President Musharraf, and the Pakistanis understand
the threat that al Qaeda and violent Islamic extremism pose to their
country. We will continue to press them to take action to ensure that no
part of Pakistan remains a safe haven for terrorists.

In North Africa, we are working with our partners to counter al Qaeda's
expansion into the Maghreb, evident in the emergence of al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb. This group has claimed responsibility for recent terrorist
bombings in Algeria, including the April 11th and July 11th attacks. As you
know, at the President's direction, I am just back from discussions with
our allies in Morocco, Algeria and Libya to discuss these very concerns.

In the Arabian Gulf, we continue to strengthen efforts to dismantle
terrorist cells, stem terrorist financing and undercut the ideology used by
al Qaeda and its supporters to justify the murder of innocents. This year,
for example, Saudi Arabia has made an important series of terror finance
arrests and are investigating the brutal murder of a senior -- officer at
the hand of al Qaeda related cell. Their investigations are continuing, and
we continue to work with them. On my trip, I met with the Saudis with whom
I consult approximately four times a year, and I also met with the Qataris.

In Europe, as I mentioned, we are building off already strong relationships
to increase information-sharing and counterterrorism cooperation, while
building awareness of the nature of the threat and the challenges posed to
Europe. We have also looked at additional ways of disrupting al Qaeda's
network. This includes countering al Qaeda's violent message and the
group's attempts to exploit grievances and suffering of local groups for
its own benefit.

Thwarting the short- and long-term threats to the homeland from al Qaeda
and its like-minded adherents requires real and often hard international
commitments and actions from our partners and allies. This is why we have
not relented in our engagement with foreign counterparts to ensure that we
are taking steps to increase information-sharing and joint actions to
dismantle and discredit terrorist cells and their networks.

We must remember terrorism is not a threat we face alone. It is a threat
faced by our allies around the world -- in London, in Bali, Madrid, Riyadh
and Islamabad. We cannot win this war alone; we need our allies to win.
They fight the threat just as we do. And just as our heroes on the
battlefields around the world are injured and die in the fight, our allies
fight and die, as well.

I have outlined some of the steps that are being taken to address the
heightened threat environment. But this is not just a federal
responsibility. This must be a national effort. This means that all parts
of our society have a responsibility and a role to play. State and local
officials have a direct responsibility to protect their citizens, and we
will continue to work with them, as we do on a daily basis, to share
information and take collective action to protect the homeland.

As I mentioned, we need Congress's continued support to ensure that we have
the necessary tools and resources to protect the homeland. And this much
include passing a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act modernization bill
that will make America safer by improving our intelligence capabilities
while protecting the privacy interests of Americans.

And to the American people, this means being better informed and more
aware, reporting suspicious activities to local authorities, just as a
store clerk did in New Jersey, which ultimately helped unravel the Fort Dix
plot in May.

We must be clear: While the NIE addresses the continuing threat to our
homeland from al Qaeda, we work to disrupt and defeat terrorist plots every
day, while anticipating and preparing for future attacks. Our efforts
develop as the trends and threats develop, and we will continue to fight
this way as long as we are threatened by an enemy who seeks to do us harm.

I'm happy to take your questions.

Q Fran, why has the administration continued to say things as the President
said in 2005, we have put the enemy on the run and now they spend their
days avoiding capture, given that they have now regenerated elements of
their homeland attack capability and they have safe haven in Pakistan? How
can the administration have said these things?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, they're not inconsistent, Martha. Actually, we have
kept them on the run. They do seek to avoid capture every single day. The
fact is, look, you're looking at a developing --

Q You can't paint a very cheery picture about what's going on, given what
you see here today. You may have kept some of them on the run -- you talked
about leadership, taking out the leadership over the years --

MS. TOWNSEND: Two-thirds of al Qaeda's leadership from 9/11 has been
captured or killed. That's absolutely right.

Q But they've regenerated.

MS. TOWNSEND: That's right. And they bring up people who have less
operational experience, because they want to do us harm. They're intent to
do it. And they also have tried to be adaptive, just as we have tried to be
adaptive to the techniques that we know that they use. There should be no
question in anybody's mind, despite our successes, this is an enemy that
remains determined. And it remains determined to try and understand, if
there are vulnerabilities that they may exploit, it requires us to be
equally adaptive at capturing or killing.

Q There's a report out that one of two known al Qaeda leadership councils
are meeting regularly in Iran. I was wondering if you could confirm that or
say that it's not true, or maybe just expound on that a little bit. And
then, secondly, the first bullet does mention that the administration
worries that the international cooperation will wane. With all that you say
that you're doing, why would the administration be worried about that?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, the NIE highlights a concern that international
cooperation may wane as -- two things -- we get more time and distance from
the September 11th attack, and as views of each country diverge on what the
actual threat is. The threat takes different forms in different places. I
mentioned the assassination attempts on Musharraf. In London, it's clearly
less sophisticated attacks targeting civilians. As you see the threat
differently, the concern I think that the NIE is trying to articulate is
that the international cooperation may differ.

We work very hard to make sure that's not true. I was in seven countries
over the course of eight days talking to our allies around the world. I
will tell you that I'm not, in the near-term, concerned about a waning of
international cooperation; it's actually as strong as it's ever been.

On your earlier question about this -- I'm sorry, say it again?

Q It's one of two known al Qaeda leadership councils are apparently meeting
regularly in eastern Iran. And am wondering if that is accurate or not.

MS. TOWNSEND: I've not seen the report that you're referring to. We have
heard reports over the years that there are al Qaeda, senior al Qaeda
leadership members in custody in Iran. As you know, Iran is a state sponsor
of terrorism with Hezbollah, and we do not have counterterrorism
cooperation from the state of Iran. So it's difficult for me to make a
comment on internal Iran matters.

Q -- in the NIE, though. And I think there's only one little reference to
Iran in the unclassified version.

MS. TOWNSEND: Right. And you'll be stunned to know I'm not going to refer
to anything in the classified version.

Q I wonder if you could explain what possible reason there could be for al
Qaeda's ability to reconstitute itself, aside from U.S. strength is being
diverted in Iraq -- special ops forces and various other military means --
and the U.S. diplomatic abilities, if you will, are compromised in
countries that oppose our operation in Iraq? What else could account for al
Qaeda's ability to regenerate?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, there's no question -- I think there's a tendency to
try and suggest that al Qaeda core and al Qaeda in Iraq are two separate
things. Let's step back for a minute, because I think that is not accurate.

Clearly, what we know is the al Qaeda that attacked us on September 11th
was an al Qaeda that is led by Osama bin Laden and caused the killing of
3,000 Americans -- that same al Qaeda, headed by bin Laden, is the same al
Qaeda that Zarqawi, when he becomes the emir of al Qaeda in Iraq, swears
biot, or loyalty, to. So it's the same organization. This isn't a question
of diverting.

We also know from intelligence -- and the President referenced this when he
gave the speech at the U.S. Coast Guard commencement -- we also know that
bin Laden communicates to Zarqawi to create a cell inside Iraq that will be
used to plan and plot attacks against the American homeland. And, by the
way, that wasn't just a one-off, because we also know that they tried to
move Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi from Afghanistan to Iraq.

These aren't separate conflicts. These are clearly a single conflict by a
single determined enemy who is looking for safe haven. And if they don't
have safe haven in Afghanistan, they look for safe haven someplace else.
They'd like to find it -- and bin Laden has been quite clear -- they'd like
to find it in Iraq. But if they don't find it in Iraq, they're going to
look someplace else, whether that's northern Mali, in the Maghreb or that's
Somalia in West Africa.

Q So a Senate intelligence report came out in May, saying the President was
warned before the war in Iraq that if you go in and invade Iraq, you're
going to give al Qaeda more opportunities to expand its influence. Now you
were just laying out a moment ago how bin Laden was talking to al Zarqawi,
trying to expand his influence in Iraq after the war began. And now you're
also saying today, this report clearly says that al Qaeda is going to try
to take advantage of the gains it's made in Iraq to strike the U.S.
homeland. So doesn't this report show that the war in Iraq has made America
less safe?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, let's -- as long as we're going to talk about what the
NIE says about Iraq, let me quote it directly: "We assess that al Qaeda
will probably seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al Qaeda in
Iraq, its most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have
expressed a desire to attack the homeland." It's not talking about gains in
Iraq. What it's talking about is capabilities in Iraq. That's not --

Q Leverage contacts and capabilities.

MS. TOWNSEND: Right, contacts and capabilities. These are people who have a
relationship with al Qaeda core. These are people who are in Iraq,
attacking us there, and they've made Iraq their end-all, be-all. They don't
--

Q It says, to energize a broader Sunni extremist community, raise
resources, and recruit and indoctrinate operatives. You don't consider
those gains for al Qaeda?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, there's no question that their objective. There's no
question, in any war, whether it's this war or historical wars, that our
enemy seeks to take advantage for propaganda purposes of activities on the
battlefield and actions on the battlefield. This doesn't --

Q The President was warned before the war that that would happen, that al
Qaeda would try to use the war for recruitment, to expand its influence.

MS. TOWNSEND: Okay, so what's the answer to that? So we should leave them
and we should not disturb our enemies anywhere in the world because they
may use it for propaganda value? I don't think so.

Q -- the President was warned before the war that this was actually going
to help al Qaeda gain influence. And now you have a report suggesting maybe
it has gained influence from the war in Iraq. Isn't that something that the
President ignored?

MS. TOWNSEND: But you're assuming it's a zero-sum game, which is what I
don't understand. The fact is we were harassing them in Afghanistan, we're
harassing them in Iraq, we're harassing them in other ways, non-militarily,
around the world. And the answer is, every time you poke the hornet's nest
they are bound to come back and push back on you. That doesn't suggest to
me that we shouldn't be doing it. It suggests -- you hardly need to be
warned that they're going to use this for propaganda purposes. They're
going to.

Q Did the tie exist between Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden before we went into
Iraq?

MS. TOWNSEND: Martha, this is ground long covered and it's not --

Q -- because you're talking about --

MS. TOWNSEND: Martha, I'm not --

Q -- Zarqawi and OBL. Did that happen before we went into Iraq?

Q Two questions. Following what Ed was just discussing, can we at least
acknowledge that al Qaeda has become more battlefield proficient based on
what's happening in Iraq, that they are having much more opportunity to
test and practice their operational capabilities because of the conflict
there?

MS. TOWNSEND: There's no question that everyplace they seek to fight, when
they're fighting they are honing battlefield capabilities. Let's step back
for a second. We've seen a recent spate of bombings in Pakistan against the
Pakistani military. They're honing their skills there. We've seen a spate
of car bombings in Algeria; they're honing their skills there. Everyplace
they fight and they confront government forces, they're honing their
abilities.

Are they honing their abilities in Iraq? Absolutely, just as they are in
other places where they bomb innocent civilians around the world.

Q My second question, if I could -- for the citizen watching this and
hearing that in Pakistan there is a safe haven, why should that American
citizen not say, well, why don't we go into Pakistan and deal with it that
way?

MS. TOWNSEND: There's no question the President has made perfectly clear if
we had actionable targets anywhere in the world, putting aside whether it
was Pakistan or anyplace else, we would pursue those targets. There's a
number -- but it's hard for me to say to you, what is the target, what is
the opportunity, what is the likelihood of success, what is our confidence
in the intelligence. You'd have to know all those things for me to
accurately sort of predict for you, and that's one of those things you're
only going to know when all those factors come together.

But there's no question President Musharraf is taking on extremism. He gave
a speech after the seizure of the Red Mosque and said, we're going to
battle extremism in every nook of Pakistan and we are going to rid
Pakistan, all of Pakistan, of extremism. So he's clearly committed to
taking it on.

In the last -- just this month, they've lost upwards of 80 soldiers in the
fight. So there should be no question that Pakistan takes it seriously for
their own reasons. And we're working with them to encourage them to deny
Pakistan as a safe haven. They don't want Pakistan as a safe haven,
themselves.

Q Let me try another approach on the Iraq issue. To what extent has the war
turned Iraq into an unprecedented training ground, breeding ground, for
terrorists? You didn't have the sophistication with the IEDs and the other
things that this war has developed.

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, there's no question that we've watched developing
tactics, but they're also being fed -- lest we suggest, that al Qaeda in
Iraq is the only enemy inside Iraq. It's not. We know very well, and you've
heard briefings from DOD about the transfer of advanced technology into
Iraq to advance some of this by Iran. So this is not -- al Qaeda in Iraq is
not the only enemy in Iraq. And interestingly enough, recently we've seen
Sunni tribal groups walk away from al Qaeda in Iraq.

Q But that's the enemy that you emphasize in this report.

MS. TOWNSEND: That's right. I mentioned that just to put it in context,
that it's not the only enemy we face in Iraq.

In the back.

Q Fran, years ago this administration had said something about the fact
that Osama bin Laden wasn't really the major threat anymore, he was just
trying to maintain and survive. Now you're saying that he's feeding into --
we know that he's feeding into the Iraq al Qaeda, and not only that, that
they've pledged allegiance to him. What is the NIE -- the unscrubbed
version of the NIE saying about Osama bin Laden and the threat by Osama bin
Laden? Because this administration does not talk about him. They keep
talking about al Qaeda as a whole, not about the man who attacked the
United States on 9/11 and the threat that he poses now.

MS. TOWNSEND: Okay. First, obviously, what is declassified from the NIE is
not a decision I made, and so if you want more out of that NIE, you're
talking to the wrong person.

Q How many pages was the NIE compared to this couple pages that we got,
scrubbed? And we need to know what is in it about Osama.

MS. TOWNSEND: You've got -- the unclassified judgments are a
page-and-a-half, I think. The classified -- to give you a sense, the
classified key judgments were about two-and-a-half pages. But again, I'm in
the awkward position, I can't talk to you about what's classified. And so
there was a briefing today by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence. I can't talk to you about what's in there. Let me step back
for a second, though, and talk to you about --

Q Can you acknowledge that he was in there in those stages, his presence,
what he represents to al Qaeda, the significance to al Qaeda in Iraq and
Pakistan? Can you at least make that acknowledgment?

MS. TOWNSEND: You need to talk to the Director of National Intelligence.
I'm not going to refer to you -- we're not going to do this -- there will
be one question at a time about, well, is bin Laden in there, and the next
question will be, is Zawahiri in there.

Q You brought him up from that podium, Fran --

MS. TOWNSEND: That's right.

Q -- respectfully, a minute ago.

MS. TOWNSEND: That's right.

Q And we want to go in as reporters trying to find out what is this man
posing to this nation. You're saying we're at a high level, and he's still
the head -- he's not the head on the run the way you're talking anymore. A
couple years ago they said he was somebody on the run, just trying to
maintain. Apparently not anymore. He is a threat.

MS. TOWNSEND: There is no question that al Qaeda core -- bin Laden and
Zawahiri -- have worked to regenerate their ability to communicate. This is
what the NIE references when it talks about top leadership. There's no
question that bin Laden and Zawahiri continue to be a threat to the
security of the American homeland, not to mention the security of innocents
around the world.

There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that capturing or killing bin
Laden continues to be the highest priority for this country. The President
is regularly briefed on it. There are enormous resources -- military and
intelligence -- that are devoted to it, and we'll continue to be devoted to
it until we're successful.

Q Two questions. Has American intelligence improved at all over the few
years? And also you talked about actionable targets. If there are
actionable nuclear targets in Iran, would the U.S. go after them?

MS. TOWNSEND: Okay, let's back -- let me start with the last one, first.
Obviously, Iran's nuclear capability is not the subject of the NIE. The NIE
does not talk about Iran's nuclear capability. So it's just not relevant to
this whole discussion, frankly.

Q But you said that about actionable targets. If there are actionable
targets --

MS. TOWNSEND: We were talking about actionable terrorism targets. If there
are actionable terrorism targets, we work against them with our allies and
we -- there are no options off the table on actionable intelligence
terrorism targets.

Now, what does that mean? And we ought to be clear about what it means. It
means that we work with our allies around the world. We will work with our
partners to use their capabilities and ours and the most effective tools to
address those targets, wherever they are.

Q And I asked whether our intelligence has improved.

MS. TOWNSEND: Our intelligence has absolutely improved. We have increased
the amount of resources. Obviously, I can't talk about the top line of the
intelligence budget, because it's classified. We have increased our
intelligence resources, particularly in the area of our collection
capability. And I will tell you, it should not go unnoticed here as we talk
about the content of the NIE -- we are in a better position, we have a
better feeling and talk more particularly about the intelligence threat,
the terrorism threat, because our intelligence has improved. We have far
and away a better sense out of the intelligence community about the threat
we face today than we have at any other time in the last six years.

Q Can you talk a little bit about the internal threat? The NIE says that
the internal Muslim terrorist threat is not as likely to be as severe as it
is in Europe. What should Americans who are concerned about the so-called
homegrown terrorism take from that?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, I think it's obvious that we worry about domestic
radicalization. We've seen sort of like-minded inspired groups, whether
it's the JFK plot or the Fort Dix plot -- people, Americans rightly worry
about that.

I will tell you that -- the President was, as you know, at the Washington
Islamic Center -- most Muslim Americans worry about it, too, and want to
understand what our goals and objectives are and how they can assist us,
because it's a threat to them, just as it's a threat to any other American.
This is not -- and the President has said it -- this is not an effort
directed at Muslims or against Muslim Americans in this country. It's
directed at a very small fraction of violent extremists who believe that
the use of violence is a legitimate tactic. And so we worry about it here.
But we've only seen it in a limited sense -- not in the larger sense that I
think our allies, say, in London or Paris have seen.

Q Madam, well, credit goes to the law enforcement authorities, as far as
any deaths have not taken place here in this country. But also there is a
report that U.S. is fighting this war outside the U.S. My question is that
now you are confirming that Osama bin Laden, which we have not been talking
about for some time, is now alive and he is the head of the al Qaeda, and
most of the attacks taking place under his leadership. And I'm sure
somebody knows where he's hiding, and also you confirm that al Qaeda are
not taking safe haven in Pakistan. Pakistani government has told the U.S.
that they will not allow under any circumstances anybody to enter that area
where al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden is. So where do we stand? What is the
future catching Osama bin Laden and all those hiding in safe haven in
Pakistan?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, there is no question -- and when we talk about Pakistan
and bin Laden, we're talking about the federally administrated tribal
areas. As you know, President Musharraf, in an effort to extend the writ of
the Pakistani government in a way that has never been before, entered into
this agreement with tribal leaders in the area. It hasn't worked for
Pakistan. It hasn't worked for the United States. It's clear that President
Musharraf is serious about taking action in the tribal areas. We've seen a
whole spate of activity over the course of the last several weeks. And I
think it is fair to say President Musharraf is committed to the fact that
he will not permit that to be a safe haven. And we will work with him to
ensure that safe haven is denied to them.

Q -- as President Karzai of Afghanistan is coming to meet with President
Bush -- he has been complaining that al Qaeda is coming across the border
from Pakistan into Afghanistan. His government is in trouble also because
they want to destabilize the freedom -- the democracy in Afghanistan. Where
do we stand as far as dealing with al Qaeda in Afghanistan?

MS. TOWNSEND: As you know, when both President Karzai and President
Musharraf were here with the President, the President encouraged greater
intelligence and cooperation across the board. We had tried to assist in
facilitating that cooperation. We have seen greater cooperation. I think
the President looks forward to getting a sense from President Karzai of his
take on it.

Q Fran, is it a fair reading of the key judgments that you released today
that the federally administered tribal areas you discussed is, in fact, the
central front in the war on terrorism, to use the President's phrase? And,
if so, tell us how, if at all, you have renegotiated your own operational
arrangements with General Musharraf, President Musharraf, so that we would
have greater access in there.

MS. TOWNSEND: Okay. Well, to use the President's phrase, Iraq is the
central front in the war on terror. And --

Q Is that supported by the key judgments, then?

MS. TOWNSEND: There is no question, based on the statements of bin Laden,
himself, not to mention others and al Qaeda, that they regard Iraq as the
central front in the war on terror.

The other piece to this -- you asked me about arrangements with President
Musharraf. It is no secret there have been a series of very senior-level
U.S. government officials to engage with President Musharraf and address
this very issue, beginning with the Vice President. And, obviously, there
are conversations between the President and President Musharraf. Secretary
Gates has been out, Deputy Secretary Negroponte, and a raft of senior
intelligence officials.

We will continue to work with the Pakistani government to address the
threat that comes from the tribal area. It is a serious one, but it's not
only a serious threat to us, it's also a serious threat to the stability of
Pakistan. I'm obviously not going to go into the details of it, because I'm
not going to put our people, or Pakistani officials, at risk. In the last
two weeks they've had nearly 80 killed, and I'm not going to do that.

Q Fran, when the report speaks of al Qaeda, the judgment that al Qaeda will
intensify its efforts to put operatives here, is that implicitly saying
that there are ongoing efforts to put operatives here? What can you say
about that?

MS. TOWNSEND: There is no -- we assume, because we have to, that they're
trying to place operatives here. It's their way of being able -- it's one
of their critical enablers. You know, you heard me talk about, what do they
need to operate and survive. You need people to launch attacks. And so we
assume that they are doing that or they're attempting to do that.

I will tell you, that goes a long distance, I should think, in explaining
the President's absolute passion for comprehensive immigration reform. What
we want to do is take agents and have them focused on the terrorism threat
and the infiltration threat so that they're not worrying about illegal
migrants who are coming for economic reasons.

There is huge effort devoted to -- whether it's in the Department of
Homeland Security, whether it's by the Transportation Security Agency,
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement -- devoted at addressing that threat.
And frankly, it is frequently cued and enabled by other federal government
partners, whether that's the CIA, the FBI, and their colleagues in the
government.

Q Well, can I ask you, then, as a follow-up, if you assume these things,
how much comfort should that lend people that you really don't know what's
going on?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, it's not -- I am assuming you're not suggesting that I
should wait until I know that they've infiltrated somebody. A lot of the
reason we assume it is based on -- look, we have thousands of men and women
in the international community around the world, 24 hours a day, collecting
intelligence to help us cue our screening and enforcement efforts. It's not
that we sort of have no clue and so we blindly do this. We do it based on
better intelligence than we've ever had before, so our efforts are quite
focused.

Q Fran, you said that we've not been -- "in the six years since the
September 11th attacks, we've not been attacked, and I'm often asked why"
-- are we any closer to finding out who carried out the anthrax attacks
that followed the September 11th attacks?

MS. TOWNSEND: Obviously that's an ongoing investigation. I'm sure Director
Mueller would be delighted to answer. (Laughter.)

Q But doesn't that count as a terrorist attack? I mean, that is a
subsequent event, right, so it's --

MS. TOWNSEND: It does in my mind.

Q Is it shorthanding it too much to say that General Musharraf, through his
efforts in the tribal areas there against al Qaeda, is the key person, the
point man in protecting the United States, and whether he has success there
or not is the whole ball game?

MS. TOWNSEND: No, it is not accurate, because we work together as a
partner. We work jointly, whether it's with his intelligence service, his
military, our military. We work together as partners. To suggest that it's
kind of all on his shoulders, I just don't think is -- I don't think it's
fair and I don't think it's accurate.

Q Does he give us all the operational capability the United States would
like to have?

MS. TOWNSEND: You know, it's funny -- I'm glad you asked me that, because
frequently when people ask me about our counterterrorism cooperation and
our allies around the world, the suggestion is, do they give you everything
you want. That is almost never the case. And you know what? If I only
cooperated with those who gave me a hundred percent of what I thought I
needed or wanted, I wouldn't have a whole lot of allies around the world.

Every ally is important. Every ally comes to the table in the fight against
terrorism through the lens of their own national interest: What do they
need to get in the fight? What's a threat to their own international
security or the security of their own people? And so we always work to
strengthen those alliances, we always work to find more common ground so
that we're more closely aligned. But it doesn't mean that we get everything
we want. But we also can't walk away from people just because we don't get
everything we want when we want it.

Q What kind of percentage do we get from Musharraf?

MS. TOWNSEND: I'm not going to -- I'm not -- it's really a tempting
invitation; I'm not going to do it.

Q Fran, I have a question about your trip to Libya. Why were you there? And
what happened in your exchange with Ghadafi that led the U.S. to send an
ambassador back there after you delivered the letter?

MS. TOWNSEND: What led me to be there is the President sent me. The
President asked that I deliver a letter while I was traveling through North
Africa. The letter -- the contents of the letter is not public. I
understand some of it has been made public. We raised -- first of all, we
acknowledged, of course, the historic decision to renounce terrorism and to
turn back his weapons program.

On the other hand, as with all of our allies around the world, we have
issues of concern. We handle them privately and bilaterally, but they
include things like making sure that the victims of the La Belle disco
bombing and Pan Am 103 get fully compensated -- among others. There were
other issues of concern.

We will continue to work with the Libyans. I also raised, as you can
imagine, given al Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, the Libyan-Islamic
Fighting Group, and al Qaeda's attempt to extend it reach -- ongoing sort
of regular counterterrorism matters that we believe are a common threat
both to the Libyans and us. The Libyans have agreed to accept an
ambassador. But there are more issues, and we need more progress. And I
think it's fair to say that both the Libyans are frustrated and we're
frustrated because we both want more out of that relationship. But it's
going to take time. This is a country on whom we had imposed sanctions for
a long period of time. I think we have to be patient and have slow and
small confidence-building measures, and we're prepared to begin down that
path to see that kind of progress.

Q Did you ask for the release of the Bulgarian nurses?

MS. TOWNSEND: I'm not going to go -- I think there's been a readout of some
of the things that were contained in the letters. Of course, we are
concerned about the Bulgarian nurses. I'm not going to go into details of
that private conversation.

Yes, Sheryl.

Q Fran, I think a lot of Americans watching this will have two very simple
questions: Where is Osama bin Laden? And why, nearly six years after the
President said we would get him, dead or alive, do we not have him? How has
he possibly eluded our grasp?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, there is no question that we have put extraordinary
resources against finding him. If I could answer directly, with a pinpoint
on a map where he was, he wouldn't be there. So the question is, does he --
it presumes, frankly, that he sits in a single place with an address, a
street address and a phone number, so it should be easy for us to go and
get him. I wish, Sheryl, that it were that easy. It's not.

You can assume, just based on sort of operational security behavior, that
he's moving around, he doesn't make it easy, he doesn't have a lot of
contact, and he is in a very remote area that is not easily accessed
certainly by Americans, and frankly, by the Pakistanis, themselves.

And so the President has made perfectly clear, we will be relentless. He
will be captured or killed. And it is a huge priority for us, for our
intelligence and military. And we will continue until we're successful.

Q Can you talk about the extraordinary resources? What kind of resources?

MS. TOWNSEND: Military, intelligence and law enforcement resources.

Q -- operations you can share with us?

MS. TOWNSEND: No.

Q Fran, do you know if Osama bin Laden is still on a dialysis machine, is
he still ill? What? I mean, could you tell us about that? I mean, because
-- it might be laughable, but people are finding it hard, six years this
man is sick, moving around from cave to cave, and can't be found -- with a
dialysis machine?

MS. TOWNSEND: Have you ever been to the tribal areas? I suspect not.

Q No, I haven't, but I've seen some great pictures from Ken Herman as to
the rough terrain over that way. (Laughter.)

MS. TOWNSEND: It's not exactly easy. If it were easy he'd be dead.

Q But it's not easy for him to travel around with medics and machinery if
he's sick. I mean, is he -- do you know from your intelligence if he's
still sick? What do you know about that?

MS. TOWNSEND: I'm not going to talk about that.

Thank you.

END 11:54 A.M. EDT

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