Text 28789, 154 rader
Skriven 2007-05-16 22:12:00 av Jeff Binkley (1:226/600)
Ärende: WSJ
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An excellent article in the WSJ today....

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http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110010080

AT WAR

Was Osama Right? 
Islamists always believed the U.S. was weak. Recent political trends 
won't change their view. 

BY BERNARD LEWIS 
Wednesday, May 16, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT 

During the Cold War, two things came to be known and generally 
recognized in the Middle East concerning the two rival superpowers. If 
you did anything to annoy the Russians, punishment would be swift and 
dire. If you said or did anything against the Americans, not only would 
there be no punishment; there might even be some possibility of reward, 
as the usual anxious procession of diplomats and politicians, 
journalists and scholars and miscellaneous others came with their usual 
pleading inquiries: "What have we done to offend you? What can we do to 
put it right?"

A few examples may suffice. During the troubles in Lebanon in the 1970s 
and '80s, there were many attacks on American installations and 
individuals--notably the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut in 
1983, followed by a prompt withdrawal, and a whole series of kidnappings 
of Americans, both official and private, as well as of Europeans. There 
was only one attack on Soviet citizens, when one diplomat was killed and 
several others kidnapped. The Soviet response through their local agents 
was swift, and directed against the family of the leader of the 
kidnappers. The kidnapped Russians were promptly released, and after 
that there were no attacks on Soviet citizens or installations 
throughout the period of the Lebanese troubles.





These different responses evoked different treatment. While American 
policies, institutions and individuals were subject to unremitting 
criticism and sometimes deadly attack, the Soviets were immune. Their 
retention of the vast, largely Muslim colonial empire accumulated by the 
czars in Asia passed unnoticed, as did their propaganda and sometimes 
action against Muslim beliefs and institutions.
Most remarkable of all was the response of the Arab and other Muslim 
countries to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. 
Washington's handling of the Tehran hostage crisis assured the Soviets 
that they had nothing to fear from the U.S. They already knew that they 
need not worry about the Arab and other Muslim governments. The Soviets 
already ruled--or misruled--half a dozen Muslim countries in Asia, 
without arousing any opposition or criticism. Initially, their decision 
and action to invade and conquer Afghanistan and install a puppet regime 
in Kabul went almost unresisted. After weeks of debate, the U.N. General 
Assembly finally was persuaded to pass a resolution "strongly deploring 
the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan." The words "condemn" and 
"aggression" were not used, and the source of the "intervention" was not 
named. Even this anodyne resolution was too much for some of the Arab 
states. South Yemen voted no; Algeria and Syria abstained; Libya was 
absent; the nonvoting PLO observer to the Assembly even made a speech 
defending the Soviets.

One might have expected that the recently established Organization of 
the Islamic Conference would take a tougher line. It did not. After a 
month of negotiation and manipulation, the organization finally held a 
meeting in Pakistan to discuss the Afghan question. Two of the Arab 
states, South Yemen and Syria, boycotted the meeting. The representative 
of the PLO, a full member of this organization, was present, but 
abstained from voting on a resolution critical of the Soviet action; the 
Libyan delegate went further, and used this occasion to denounce the 
U.S.

The Muslim willingness to submit to Soviet authority, though widespread, 
was not unanimous. The Afghan people, who had successfully defied the 
British Empire in its prime, found a way to resist the Soviet invaders. 
An organization known as the Taliban (literally, "the students") began 
to organize resistance and even guerilla warfare against the Soviet 
occupiers and their puppets. For this, they were able to attract some 
support from the Muslim world--some grants of money, and growing numbers 
of volunteers to fight in the Holy War against the infidel conqueror. 
Notable among these was a group led by a Saudi of Yemeni origin called 
Osama bin Laden. 

To accomplish their purpose, they did not disdain to turn to the U.S. 
for help, which they got. In the Muslim perception there has been, since 
the time of the Prophet, an ongoing struggle between the two world 
religions, Christendom and Islam, for the privilege and opportunity to 
bring salvation to the rest of humankind, removing whatever obstacles 
there might be in their path. For a long time, the main enemy was seen, 
with some plausibility, as being the West, and some Muslims were, 
naturally enough, willing to accept what help they could get against 
that enemy. This explains the widespread support in the Arab countries 
and in some other places first for the Third Reich and, after its 
collapse, for the Soviet Union. These were the main enemies of the West, 
and therefore natural allies. 

Now the situation had changed. The more immediate, more dangerous enemy 
was the Soviet Union, already ruling a number of Muslim countries, and 
daily increasing its influence and presence in others. It was therefore 
natural to seek and accept American help. As Osama bin Laden explained, 
in this final phase of the millennial struggle, the world of the 
unbelievers was divided between two superpowers. The first task was to 
deal with the more deadly and more dangerous of the two, the Soviet 
Union. After that, dealing with the pampered and degenerate Americans 
would be easy.

We in the Western world see the defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union 
as a Western, more specifically an American, victory in the Cold War. 
For Osama bin Laden and his followers, it was a Muslim victory in a 
jihad, and, given the circumstances, this perception does not lack 
plausibility.





From the writings and the speeches of Osama bin Laden and his 
colleagues, it is clear that they expected this second task, dealing 
with America, would be comparatively simple and easy. This perception 
was certainly encouraged and so it seemed, confirmed by the American 
response to a whole series of attacks--on the World Trade Center in New 
York and on U.S. troops in Mogadishu in 1993, on the U.S. military 
office in Riyadh in 1995, on the American embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania in 1998, on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000--all of which evoked 
only angry words, sometimes accompanied by the dispatch of expensive 
missiles to remote and uninhabited places.

Stage One of the jihad was to drive the infidels from the lands of 
Islam; Stage Two--to bring the war into the enemy camp, and the attacks 
of 9/11 were clearly intended to be the opening salvo of this stage. The 
response to 9/11, so completely out of accord with previous American 
practice, came as a shock, and it is noteworthy that there has been no 
successful attack on American soil since then. The U.S. actions in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq indicated that there had been a major change in 
the U.S., and that some revision of their assessment, and of the 
policies based on that assessment, was necessary. 

More recent developments, and notably the public discourse inside the 
U.S., are persuading increasing numbers of Islamist radicals that their 
first assessment was correct after all, and that they need only to press 
a little harder to achieve final victory. It is not yet clear whether 
they are right or wrong in this view. If they are right, the 
consequences--both for Islam and for America--will be deep, wide and 
lasting.

Mr. Lewis, professor emeritus at Princeton, is the author, most 
recently, of "From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East" 
(Oxford University Press, 2004).


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