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Skriven 2008-02-11 17:47:26 av Alan Hess
Ärende: nuclear terror overblown?
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The problem is if Chapman is wrong.
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www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-op.chapman11feb11,0,4499235.story
baltimoresun.com
The implausibility of nuclear terror

Steve Chapman

February 11, 2008

"Death tugs at my ear and says, 'Live, I am coming.'" Were Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. alive today, he might ascribe that line not
to death but to nuclear terrorism.

Ever since Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have had to live with the knowledge that
the next time the terrorists strike, it could be not with airplanes capable of
killing thousands but atomic bombs capable of killing hundreds of thousands.

The prospect has created a sense of profound vulnerability. It has shaped our
view of government policies aimed at combating terrorism (filtered through Jack
Bauer). It helped mobilize support for the Iraq war.

Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material
may be smuggled out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is
trying to acquire nuclear weapons. A layperson may figure it's only a matter of
time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard's Graham Allison, in his
book Nuclear Terrorism, concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is
inevitable."

But remember: After 9/11, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet
al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike.

Given their inability to do something simple - say, shoot up a shopping mall or
set off a truck bomb - it's reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at
something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State
University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of
Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic
bomb seems to be vanishingly small."

The events required to make that happen consist of a multitude of Herculean
tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps
from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one
would have already gone missing.

Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, because weapons that
are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what
one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a
Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other
safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state
has ever given a bomb to an ally - for reasons even the Iranians can grasp.

Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals
inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their lives. The
terrorists, notes Mr. Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles
out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by
security forces."

Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with
spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a
haven and advanced equipment - plus people with specialized skills, lots of
time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a
prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work,
and there is no way to test it.

Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver
the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the
time - but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible
exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means
expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance
someone will blab, back out or screw up.

Mr. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt
to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to
be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a
very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has
to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong.

That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he
has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds,
he probably won't bother.

None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing
nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port
screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the
worst eventuality is one that will never happen.

Steve Chapman is a columnist for the Chicago Tribune. His column appears
Mondays and Fridays in The Sun. His e-mail is schapman@tribune.com.

Copyright + 2008, The Baltimore Sun

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