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Skriven 2006-09-26 23:31:28 av Whitehouse Press (1:3634/12.0)
Ärende: Press Release (0609267) for Tue, 2006 Sep 26
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Press Briefing by Homeland Security Advisor Frances Fragos Townsend
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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
September 26, 2006

Press Briefing by Homeland Security Advisor Frances Fragos Townsend
Via Conference Call


˙˙˙˙˙ Office of the Director of National Intelligence

5:26 P.M. EDT

MS. TOWNSEND: Good evening, everybody. Given the leak this weekend of
classified information regarding the National Intelligence Estimate dated
April 2006 and entitled "Trends and Global Terrorism: Implications for the
United States," the President ordered Ambassador Negroponte, the Director
of National Intelligence to declassify the text of the key judgment section
of that report to the extent consistent with national security interests.
And as he said today, in an effort to stop the speculation about what was
in the key judgments.

The now declassified -- the declassified key judgments are now available to
the press and the public on the DNI website, www.odni.gov. Let me be clear
that, you know, with every unauthorized disclosure of classified
information it does harm to our national and homeland security. Every leak
is a victory for our enemies who plot to kill us, because we tell them
something about our knowledge, our intelligence capability and our
perspective on their capability.

I should be clear that you, by and large, have the text of the key
judgments. All decisions on declassification were made by the office of the
DNI. All of the portions related to the key judgments on Iraq, you have. I
should tell you that there is probably just a handful, maybe two or three
paragraphs that have been redacted in the interest of national security.
And to the extent to have questions regarding those decisions, I would
direct you to the DNI's office.

Let me just briefly walk you through the key judgments. As you know, it
opens by acknowledging that the United States-led counterterrorism efforts
have seriously damaged the leadership of al Qaeda and disrupted its
operations. However, we judge that al Qaeda will continue to pose the
greatest threat to the homeland and U.S. interests abroad by a single
terrorist organization.

It goes on to talk about networks and cells that are spreading and adapting
to our counterterrorism efforts, as well as further down that the global
jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global strategy and is
becoming more diffuse.

As you know, the President's newly released National Strategy for
Counterterrorism, on page four of that, does reference this point,
remarking that the terrorists today are more dispersed and less
centralized. The President, in his speech on September 5th, noted that the
terrorist threat is more dispersed and self-directed.

The key judgments go on to remark that greater pluralism and more
responsive political systems in Muslim majority nations would alleviate
some of the grievances the jihadists exploit, and that over time such
progress, together with sustained, multi-faceted programs targeting the
vulnerabilities of jihadist movements and continued pressure on al Qaeda
could erode support for the jihadists.

The President has frequently made the point that freedom is the antidote to
terror. He's done that on numerous occasions, and as you know, that really
is the key point in the National Security Strategy, on pages nine to 11, of
our long-term strategy to combat terror.

The key judgments go on to say that we assess the operational threat from
self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to U.S. counterterrorism
efforts, particularly abroad, but also here at home. Again, the President
talked about the threat from home-grown cells in his speech on September
5th, and acknowledged their responsibility for attacks and planning in both
Madrid and Canada.

Now in the next section -- this is the Iraq section in the key judgments,
where the key judgments note, "Perceived jihadist success would inspire
more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere." The key judgments goes
on to say that "the Iraq conflict has become a cause c l bre for jihadists,
breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world, and
cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement." It then says,
"Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves and be perceived to have
failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight."

This really underscores the President's point about the importance of our
winning in Iraq. On September 5th, the President, in his speech, said,
"Iraq is not a distraction from their war on America, it is the central
battlefield, where the outcome of this struggle will be decided." We've
heard the President say that repeatedly. Also, in the National Security
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, on page four, in the challenges section,
we make the point that the ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been
twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry.

And then later on in the strategy we make the point -- in the section on
safe havens, on page 16 -- that terrorists see Iraq as the central front in
the fight against the United States, and this is why, in helping the Afghan
and Iraqi peoples forge effective democracies is vital.

The key judgments go on to talk about the underlying factors fueling the
spread of the movement, and that those factors outweigh its
vulnerabilities. It goes on to enumerate both the four underlying factors
of fueling -- those are entrenched grievances such as corruption,
injustice, and fear of Western domination, which lead to anger,
humiliation, a sense of powerlessness; second, Iraq jihad; third, the slow
pace of real and sustained economic, social and political reforms in many
Muslim majority nations; and, fourth, pervasive anti-U.S. sentiment among
most Muslims, all of which jihadists exploit.

On the vulnerability side, it goes on at some length that the jihadist
movement, if these vulnerabilities are fully exposed and exploited, could
slow the spread of the movement. And they include dependence on the
continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of jihadists'
radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation, and
criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens.
It notes the jihadists' greatest vulnerability is their ultimate political
solution, which is an ultra-conservative interpretation of the sharia-based
governance spanning the Muslim world.

It is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. It notes recent
condemnations of violence in extremist religious interpretations by a few
notable clerics, signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of a
constructive alternative to the jihadist ideology, notably peaceful
political activism. And that, in this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as
the most powerful weapon in the war on terror.

The key judgments also note the importance of our allies around the world.
And says that countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require
coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture
or kill terrorists.

We've heard the President speak to this issue on a number of occasions. Not
only is that noted in the National Security Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, it is also noted in numerous speeches of the President, noting
our important allies in the war on terror, both in Western Europe, our
British colleagues, but also in the Muslim world, in Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia.

The next section of the key judgments really speaks to the role of the
Zarqawi network in exploiting the situation in Iraq. I would note for you
that because this is published in April of 2006, it does not include any
reference to the fact that he has been killed. In fact, at one point it
notes should Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks
against Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present
a global threat. That's obviously no longer a problem that they would have
anticipated.

I would say, following along in the key judgments, the key

judgments note that the increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations
of al Qaeda in Iraq might lead to veteran foreign jihadists to focus their
efforts on external operations. Obviously, the President has noted concern
about this, and we take efforts both at home and abroad to defeat the
extremists.

Going further along in the key judgments, there is a note that fighters
with experience in Iraq are a potential source of leadership for jihadists
pursuing the tactics that they use. I would say to you, as we've said
before, this is not any different from any other conflict. People with
fighting experience will take that experience and use it in the future.

The fact is, they were fighting us long before we were in Iraq, we've made
that point, and they were using their experience in prior conflicts. They
will continue to do that, which is why it's very important for us to fight
against them. Shrinking away from them, withdrawing from the conflict will
not alleviate this problem.

The key judgments then go on to note that the radicalization process is
occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet
age. I would note for you that we speak to this in the new National
Security Combating Terrorism strategy, and talk about the importance of
taking aggressive efforts against cyber safe havens. That is also, as you
continue on in the key judgments, it talks about the groups of all stripes
will increasingly use the Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit,
train and obtain logistical and financial support. And, again, as I've
mentioned, we do address that in the National Security Strategy for
Combating Terrorism.

Dana, that's pretty much my summary walking through it, and recent
statements by the President and documents we've released. I'm happy to take
questions.

Q Hi, thank you for doing this. I just have one question. You were going
through a lot of the judgments in the document. The one that you didn't go
over was I guess in paragraph two, where it says that activists identifying
themselves as jihadists are increasing in both number and geographic
dispersion. And that seems to answer the question that Secretary Rumsfeld
posed back in 2003 -- are we capturing, killing or dissuading more
terrorists than are being trained and deployed every day? One, do you agree
with that? And doesn't this say that more jihadists are being created every
day than we're capturing or killing?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, I guess, George, what I would say to you is, one, we
have killed -- I think the -- you know, it's hard to make precise
estimates, but we've captured or killed thousands over the course of the
conflict. It's difficult to count how many have been added. I mean, there's
no -- as you know, they hardly carry membership cards, and they are
dispersed and they do hide in the shadows. It would be very difficult to
count them.

What I would say to you is I think what the judgments are getting at is
this sense that while we see increasing Internet postings and that sort of
thing, while imprecise, we see the rhetoric, the extremists' rhetoric
increasing. And I am not sure that that's a very good way to count, but
it's one way and it's one thing that we look at. And so the judgments are
really just trying to note that while we're in the middle of this war and
this battle, and we are capturing and killing them, there are also others
out there who seem to subscribe to the jihadist ideology. But it's not
clear that those are people willing to commit murder. It's this sort of
extremist version -- perversion, if you will -- of Islam.

Q How many pages in the entire report? And why can't we see the whole
thing?

MS. TOWNSEND: Again, I would refer you to the office of the DNI for the
complete -- for the answer on how the judgments were made about
declassification. I will say this: You've got, by and large, what is
probably roughly 95 percent of the key judgments, themselves. The few that
are not there, I can tell you, having read it, go to national security --
directly to national security concerns. There are pieces in the summary up
front of the report that are sort of textual and methodology boxes, which
explain the analytic process.

And then the details, frankly, of the analytic process and how the analysts
viewed this -- to be fair to them, what you want to encourage over the
long-term, for this President and for future Presidents, are honest
assessments from career analysts in the community. And, frankly, the
combination of sources and methods concerns, and maintaining an environment
that would provide analysts the ability to give you fair and honest advice,
I think those had to be factors in the DNI's decision.

Q Could I get a quick follow on George's question? Are you questioning the
judgment that jihadists are increasing in both number and geographic
dispersion? Because if that's true, how can you say we're safer?

MS. TOWNSEND: I'm sorry, how can you say -- I didn't hear the question.

Q We're safer.

MS. TOWNSEND: I don't think there's any question that we're safer. But as
the President said, do I think that we're safe? No. I mean, we've seen most
recently in the UK bombing plot, they're plotting and planning to kill us;
there's no question about that. We've seen an increase, as we've said
before, of these sort of homegrown, if you will, extremists, these
ideologically inspired groups. I don't think there's any question that
there's an increase in rhetoric.

My only point is, I think it's difficult to count the number of true
jihadists that are willing to commit murder, or kill themselves in the
process, because they don't nominate themselves to be counted.

Q Fran, I wanted to just follow up on George's question before on -- and
particularly focus in on Iraq, in that regard. Every time Iraq comes up in
this, you've responded, the President has responded, it's the central
front, and therefore, it is integral to terrorism. But another way to read
these key judgments is that the order in which we took these things made a
difference and that one might conclude from this, though it does not
explicitly state it in any way here, that had we not done Iraq first, had
we stayed for a while to do Afghanistan or focused on Iran first or
something else, that you might not have created what they refer to here as
the Iraqi jihad movement that has attracted so much motion.

That, the President doesn't go to, not the question of whether Iraq is or
is not, but whether it was -- whether it has, itself, because of it's
timing, turned the tide somewhat against us. Can you address that?

MS. TOWNSEND: Sure. David, first, let me start with the notion of the
central front in the war on terror. What's -- forget what the -- put aside
for the moment what the President has said, because he's been clear about
the administration's view. Let's look at what bin Laden and Zawahiri have
said -- and Zarqawi -- about this being either where they're going to have
ultimate victory or ultimate defeat when the President went through those
-- the quotations from al Qaeda, themselves.

Q But that made that statement only after we had invaded. In other words,
had we chosen to delay invasion dealing with Iraq for X number of years,
would -- is it your conclusion from this that we would have avoided having
to deal with an Iraqi jihad at the moment that we are dealing with all of
the other elements of this problem?

MS. TOWNSEND: Two points. First I would say to you, it presumes that when
you say, the order of things, that we can't do more than one thing at a
time. And as we know, we're fighting in Afghanistan while we're fighting in
Iraq. Second, what I would say to you is, there's always an excuse. I mean,
we weren't in Iraq on September the 11th when we got hit, and they hit us
anyway. There are always going to be some excuse for them to propagate
their hateful ideology -- whether it's the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
it's the conflict in Afghanistan, it's our troop presence in the Gulf --
there's always an excuse. And so I think that that's not -- I just don't
think that holds weight.

Q I wanted to follow up on the earlier question. I know you're referring
questions about why more couldn't be declassified to the DNI's office, but
it does go to the point that the President and Ambassador Negroponte have
been making over the past couple of days, saying that the critics don't
have the full picture, are quoting only selectively -- and we still only
have four pages of, as I understand it, a 30-page report. So is this going
to answer the criticisms that you all have faced over the past couple of
days?

MS. TOWNSEND: Thanks for the question. I would say to you -- and, again, I
don't make the declassification decisions, that's left to the intelligence
professionals in the office of the DNI. What I can tell you is this:
There's a very high bar for declassification, and we have to be careful not
to be whipsawed into, because somebody breaks the law and leaks classified
information, that we do further damage because we're going to engage in a
public debate by declassifying too much.

As I've said to you, you have the entire section, unexpurgated, on Iraq.
There's not anything in there on Iraq that you haven't seen, in terms of
the key judgments. This is a debate, by the way, and a discussion that is
focused around the key judgments. And I really think you've got to give
some ability of the DNI to weigh the national security risks against the
potential gain out of declassification. And on the national security side,
you're always going to weigh it on the side of protecting national security
interests and sources and methods.

Q Thank you.

MS. TOWNSEND: Sure.

Q I wanted to get back, again, to George's initial question, and this
paragraph on the second page. I know we can't do a stacking-up of bodies or
a body count, but it says here, "We assess that the underlying factors
fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities," which
seems to me somebody is saying, in an equation here, factors causing
jihadists are greater than factors detracting.

And then if we look at the individual, itemized four items here underneath,
three of them are Iraq-related: fear of Western domination, the Iraq jihad,
and pervasive anti-U.S. sentiment among Muslims, which surely is
contributed to by Iraq.

So as Americans look at this and say, are we any safer, has this nightmare
that existed before 9/11 gotten worse as a result of our actions, doesn't
that paragraph say the answer to that question is, yes?

MS. TOWNSEND: This will not surprise you. I think there is one of the four
that goes directly to the Iraq jihad. But entrenched grievances, the slow
pace of reform, and pervasive anti-U.S. sentiment predate the Iraq war, and
will continue.

And I think, as well -- I mean, I understand what you're saying about that
sentence, about the underlying factors fueling, outweighing its
vulnerabilities. But, again, I want you to remember, this is -- it's
talking about the current trends. The President has always said that this
is going to be a long, hard slog. This is a long war because it's not only
a battle of arms, but it's a battle of ideas. And the battle of ideas is
going to be a long-term battle.

And so I don't take issue with it. What I would say to you is, it's a
current assessment of what the near term -- what the near-term struggle is
going to be about. And I think we all understand that we have a long-term
battle in terms of the war of ideas.

Q But for the near term, that pendulum hasn't quite kept, because our goal
in life, right, is to get -- so the pendulum, the factor spreading the
movement do not outweigh the vulnerabilities. We want vulnerabilities to be
larger than factors fueling. That would -- that would be a tipping point
we'd look for, wouldn't it be?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, I think what -- I don't think this is so much a numeric
count as an exploiting the vulnerabilities. And we continue to exploit the
vulnerabilities every day. This is a constant judgment we make. But I'm not
sure of your question. If you're asking me, do I think we're winning the
long-term battle? Yes. Do I think that means every day is going to be easy
and we're going to see wins every day? No. But kills like Zarqawi are
absolute near-term gains.

Q Right. I was just talking about the duration -- they talk here the
duration of the time frame of this estimate. So that would be the time
frame they're talking about.

MS. TOWNSEND: Right. But what -- I guess my point is, while the killing of
Zarqawi is a short-term win for us, it's also a long-term win in the battle
of ideas when you look at the context of them saying, his ability to
exploit that -- the conflict in Iraq and use that to attract the recruits.
He can't do that anymore because he's dead. So it has both a short-term
gain for the U.S., and it is certainly a win for us, but it's also a
longer-term gain in the battle of ideas.

Q Right. Okay, thanks.

MS. TOWNSEND: Sure.

Q Hi, it's Olivier, and I have two. Wanted to quick follow on John's
question, which is, what is the time frame of the estimate, in that trend
line? That's the first one. And the second one is, Jane Harmon said today
at The National Press Club that the administration is deliberately stalling
on another intelligence assessment, this one solely about Iraq, because you
don't want things -- you don't want it out before the election. I wanted
your reaction to that.

MS. TOWNSEND: Okay, now you've got me -- I forgot the -- I forgot the first
question. The first question, the time frame.

Q In that trend line, the one that says that more things are contributing
to the jihadist movement than are detracting from it and are likely to do
so for the duration of the time frame of this estimate. What is the time
frame for this estimate?

MS. TOWNSEND: The time frame for the estimate is over the next five years.
Remember, this is back in April, so it's talking about what they
anticipate. It's their assessment now of what they expect over the next
five years. Of course, in fairness to the community, that's a difficult
thing to predict because you don't know what factors will intervene.

Let me talk for a moment about your question on Jane Harmon. Look, I've had
the pleasure of working with her on a number of intelligence reform issues.
But I will say to you, we should be clear that the DNI agreed to begin
preparing an updated NIE on Iraq. If I recall correctly, I believe that was
back in August. Obviously, most NIEs are substantial research and writing
projects that can take as much as a year. He agreed to try and have this
thing done in -- somewhere in -- something, four to six months, or so,
because it requires grasping and coordination throughout the intelligence
community.

My understanding is the planned release date, given the work that must be
done to have it be comprehensive and complete, is January of '07. But I
will tell you, that's still quicker than most NIEs get done. The timing has
got nothing to do with the election.

Q Okay.

Q Yes, the argument that's being made is that we are less safe by critics
because of the invasion of Iraq. If we could

turn that on its head, can you tell us then where do you think we'd be, how
this report would read, if we had not gone into Iraq?

MS. TOWNSEND: To be fair to me, I'm not going to speculate. This was
written by intelligence community professionals, and you're asking me to
presume the last three years of my life haven't existed. It's kind of hard
for me, and I'm just not going to speculate about that.

Q Well, then, let me ask you on a different point. The emerging groups that
are discussed in this report, the anti-U.S., anti-globalization, can you
quantify the threat from that? Is that something that's just looked at
distantly over the horizon, or is that something that's more of an
emergent, immediate threat?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, as we know from the statements of al Qaeda, where they
have created these partnerships with, for example, North African groups, or
South Asian groups, the key judgments do talk about Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar
al-Sunnah, and North African groups. We view them as serious threats. We
have seen their acts of terror around the world. We take them seriously. We
just don't put them -- the key judgments section don't put them on the same
level of a threat to you, as centrist as they do al Qaeda.

MS. PERINO: All right, thank you, everybody. Thank you.

MS. TOWNSEND: Good night.

END 5:52 P.M. EDT
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